

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Action

Control: 5594

Rec'd:

MARCH 9, 1957

2:31 AM

Info

FROM: CAIRC

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2830, MARCH 8, 7 PM.

SENT DEPARTMENT 2830, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON, PARIS, AMMAN, BEIRUT, BAGHDAD, DAMASCUS, JIDDA, TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM, TRIPOLI, BENGHAZI UNNUMBERED, USUM 100.

LONG BEFORE WITHDRAWAL COMPLETE, PRESS ATTENTION HAD BEGUN TO RESIDUAL QUESTIONS OF CANAL, GAZA AND TIRAN. EDITORS GENERALLY VIEW FIRST AND LAST OF THESE IN TERMS ISRAEL TRANSITS AND SECOND IN TERMS RETURN EGYPTIAN ADMINISTRATION. THEME WHICH RUNS THROUGH ALL EDITORIALS IS CONCESSION TO ISRAEL ON THESE POINTS WOULD BE SATISFACTION ISRAEL'S WAR AIMS, WHEREAS PROPER PRINCIPLE MUST BE RETURN TO STATUS QUO ANTE. SUPPORT OF TRANSITS BY SECRETARY AND PRESIDENT RESENTED IN MODERATE NATIONALIST PRESS AND, WITH ALLEGATIONS CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER RECOMMENDS FORCE TO SOLVE CANAL QUESTION, SEEN BY NATIONALIST PRESS AS EVIDENCE IMPERIALISM CONTINUING USE ISRAEL AS TOOL. "SHE WILL BE USED AGAIN AND AGAIN IN CANAL, AQABA AND GAZA PROBLEMS AND IN ANY OTHER PROBLEM WHICH MIGHT LATER CROP UP". (GUMHOURIYA).

PRESS SUMMARIZES EGYPTIAN POSITION THESE THREE PROBLEMS AS FOLLOWS:

(1) TIRAN: ALL AGREE STRAITS ARE EGYPTIAN TERRITORIAL WATERS; AMONG RIGHT INNOCENT PASSAGE EXISTS (ALTHOUGH THIS NOT ADMITTED BY EXTREME NATIONALIST PRESS) ISRAEL, WITH WHICH EGYPT STILL AT WAR, CANNOT CLAIM PASSAGE HER SHIP IS "INNOCENT". STATUS QUO ANTE MUST BE RESTORED. ANY PARTY WHICH FEELS ITSELF INJURED IS FREE APPEAL ICJ.

(2) GAZA: STRIP IS EGYPTIAN-CONTROLLED TERRITORY PER GAA. EGYPT IN AGREEMENT WITH UNEF PROVIDES LATTER TO COVER WITHDRAWAL

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674.84A/3-857



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- 2 - 2830, MARCH 8, 7 PM, FROM CAIRO

COVER WITHDRAWAL AND GIVES UNEF NO AUTHORITY TO UNDERTAKE ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS. HOWEVER, EDITORS HAVE NOT PRESSED TURN-OVER TIMING AND NOT PRESS OBJECTION MADE SO FAR TO UNEF EXERCISING BORDER POLICING FUNCTIONS UNDER CONCEPT OF SEPARATION FORCES (THEORY LONG ADVOCATED BY GOE FOR GAZA BORDER). PRESS HAS CONFINED ITSELF TO REITERATING EGYPT RIGHT UNDER CHARTER WITHDRAW CONSENT TO UNEF PRESENCE (IF LATTER SHOULD OVERSTEP BOUNDS). (ACCORDING UN SOURCES EGYPTIANS HAVE PRIVATELY EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN OVER UNEF POLICY FOR STRIP, FEARING UNEF MAY BE PLANNING DIRECT ADMINISTRATION ALONG LINES "CANADIAN THINKING", BURNS PROCLAMATION TO GAZA INHABITANTS BEING CITED AS CONSISTENT THIS VIEW).

(3) CANAL: LITTLE SPECIFIC DISCUSSION THIS ISSUE APART FROM GENERAL RECOGNITION IT LIKELY BECOME PRINCIPAL PROBLEM BETWEEN EGYPT AND WEST AS REGARDS QUESTIONS TOOLS AND ISRAELI TRANSITS. POSITION PRESS ON LATTER IS ANALOGOUS THAT REGARDING TIRAN-BUT BASED IN THIS CASE ON GOE INTERPRETATION 1888 CONVENTION. REFERENCE FORMER IS FAR LIMITED GENERAL ASSERTION TOOLS MUST BE PAID EGYPT.

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Action

Control: 5526

Rec'd: MARCH 9, 1957  
12:10 AMNEA  
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RMR

FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 2831, MARCH 8, 8 PM.

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AIRSENT DEPARTMENT 2831, REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV 146,  
JERUSALEM 38, LONDON 532, PARIS 443.

DEPARTMENT ALSO PASS USUN AS 101.

UN SOURCES REPORT GAZA TAKE-OVER HAS PROGRESSED WELL. UNEF TROOPS WERE JITTERY IN BEGINNING BUT NO (RPT NO) INCIDENTS HAVE DEVELOPED APART FROM FEW "COLLABORATIONIST" CASES SUCH AS UNEF HAS REGULARLY ENCOUNTERED THROUGH SINAI. IN ADDITION CHEERING NASSER, POPULACE ENTHUSIASTICALLY WELCOMED UNEF (EVEN MORE CHEERING THAN IN PORT SAID). FACT TAKE-OVER ACCOMPLISHED DURING STEADY DOWN-POUR MAY HAVE INHIBITED DEMONSTRATIONS OR RAIDS ON UNRWA STOCKS.

AT PRESENT NORWEGIAN-DANES STATIONED GAZA. SOUTH OF THEM ARE INDIANS, AND COLOMBIANS WITH SWEDES IN RAFAH. YUGOSLAVS ARE STATIONED "IN STRENGTH" AS ON OLD PALESTINE FRONTIER FROM SEATO QUSEIMA AL BALLAH AND ABU SUWEIR PHASING OUT OF UNEF HEADQUARTERS BEING TRANSFERRED GAZA WITHIN 10 DAYS. GAZA AIRFIELD SUITABLE DAKOT AS, BOX-CARS CAN USE AL ARISH. SEA LIFT INITIALLY TO BE VIA PORT SIAD BUT IF ISRAEL PERMISSION GRANTED AND TECHNICAL PROBLEMS WORKED OUT HAIFA MIGHT ALSO BE USED.

BUNCHE NOW (RPT NOW) EXPECTED CAIRO TUESDAY. HE REPORTEDLY SCHEDULED IN FOR BURNS AND THEN PROCEED GAZA SURVEY UNEF FACILITIES AND CAPABILITIES. SO FAR AS IS KNOWN HE PLANS NO (RPT NO) TALKS WITH GOE. UN SOURCE POINTS OUT BUNCHE PRINCIPAL UN COORDINATOR FOR UNEF MATTERS AND ASSUMES HE INTENDS CONFINE TRIP STRICTLY INTRA-UN MATTERS CONNECTION "BLUE-PRINT" FOR UNEF IN COMING PERIOD.

UN SOURCE

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- 2 - 2831, MARCH 8, 8 PM., FROM CAIRO

UN SOURCE DOUBTS HAMMERASKJOLD WILL VISIT CAIRO UNTIL AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE REACHED ON CANAL, INSISTING NEGOTIATIONS THIS SUBJECT BE SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLETED NEW YORK FIRST. SOURCE OPINED THAT TO BOTH EGYPTIANS AND UN CANAL MUCH MORE URGENT AND KNOTTY PROBLEM THAN GAZA (NOT(RPT NOT) TO MENTION TIRAN).

HARE

RVH

NOTE: PASSED USUN 3/9/57 2 AM. W.W.

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MAR 13 1957



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FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2832, MARCH 8, 8 PM

Control: 5505

Rec'd: MARCH 8, 1957  
10:33 PM

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U.N. SEEKING CONFIRMATION STATEMENT BY QUASI-OFFICIAL MIDEAST  
NEWS AGENCY THAT EXPLOSIVES WOULD BE REMOVED FROM BONNET WITHIN  
24 HOURS. SOME DIFFERENCE OPINION EXPRESSED IN U.N. TECHNICAL  
CIRCLES AS TO TIME NEEDED SALVAGE BONNET. (FROM THREE TO SEVEN  
DAYS UP TO TWO OR THREE WEEKS WITH FORMER ESTIMATE CONSIDERED  
MORE PLAUSIBLE).

HARE

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37  
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Action

Control: 5284

Rec'd: MARCH 8, 1957  
3:21 PM

SS

FROM: TEL AVIV

Info

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1056, MARCH 8, 3 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

PRIORITY

PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING.

REFERENCE EMBTEL 1054.

AFTER HANDING ME HIS REPLY TO PRESIDENT'S MARCH 2 LETTER BEN GURION SAID HE WISHED ADD FEW WORDS TO WHAT IN LETTER.

ON STRAITS OF TIRAN HE SAID GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL THOUGHT IT REASONABLE WITHDRAW AFTER STUDYING FEBRUARY 11 AIDE MEMOIRE REPORTS OF EBAN DISCUSSIONS WITH SECRETARY AND DECLARATIONS VARIOUS STATES AT UNITED NATIONS ALTHOUGH HE HAD FOUND LODGE STATEMENT "VERY DISAPPOINTING". GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL NOW SEES FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN STRAITS AND GULF OF AQABA "MORE OR LESS ASSURED." HE INDICATED BELIEF GENERAL ASSEMBLY ADVISORY COUNCIL MUST DECIDE ON QUESTION WITHDRAWAL UNEF FROM THIS AREA AND IMPLIED HE THOUGHT CONDITIONS PERMITTING WITHDRAWAL UNLIKELY PREVAIL.

REGARDING GAZA BEN GURION SAID ISRAEL SHOULD NOT HAVE EVACUATED AREA AND THAT BEST SOLUTION TO PROBLEM WOULD HAVE BEEN JOINT ISRAEL-UNITED NATIONS ADMINISTRATION. HE REVIEWED IN FAMILIAR TERMS EGYPTIAN VIOLATIONS OF GAA (REPEAT GAA) AND EMPHATICALLY RESTATED HIS VIEW GAA NOW DEAD LETTER AND NO LONGER IN FORCE. IN ANY CASE EGYPTIANS MUST NEVER RETURN TO GAZA ... "WE DON'T ACCEPT LODGE VIEW OF THIS". HE ADDED "I DIDN'T PROMISE PRESIDENT TO EVACUATE GAZA IN MY LETTER NOVEMBER 8" SINCE GAZA NOT EGYPTIAN TERRITORY. UNEF OCCUPATION OF GAZA HE SAID MAY BE ONLY "SMOKE SCREEN" UNDER COVER OF WHICH EGYPTIANS WILL RETURN. EVEN IF THIS NOT CASE UNEF ALONE CANNOT PREVENT BORDER TROUBLES

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3-8-57

674.842/3-8-57

SECRET

-2- 1056, MARCH 8, 3 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM TEL AVIV

SINCE EVEN ISRAEL ADMINISTRATION ALONE COULD NOT. NEVERTHE-  
LESS ISRAEL HAD HAD TO EVACUATE GAZA AND HAD ARRIVED AT THIS  
DECISION ON STRENGTH OF PRESIDENT'S LETTER MARCH 2. IN  
DECIDING ON WITHDRAWAL HE HAD TAKEN UPON HIMSELF AND HIS  
COLLEAGUES GREAT HISTORICAL RESPONSIBILITY. HE ADDED FIRMLY  
THAT IF ANYTHING HAPPENS ISRAEL HAS RIGHT DEFEND ITSELF AND  
WILL DO SO ... "IF WE DROVE EGYPTIANS OUT ONCE WE CAN DO IT  
AGAIN".

HE EMPHASIZED AT SOME LENGTH FEELING OF INSECURITY WHICH NOW  
RETURNED TO ISRAEL BORDER SETTLEMENTS AND SAID GOVERNMENT AND  
HE PERSONALLY HAD REASSURED SETTLERS SIMPLY ON BASIS OF BELIEF  
IN WORD OF UNITED STATES. "WHILE THERE IS NO CLEAR UNDER-  
TAKING STILL WE FEEL PRESIDENT GAVE US ASSURANCES".

BEN GURION ASKED ME PARTICULARLY TO CONVEY TO DEPARTMENT HIS  
CONVICTION THERE MUST BE NO RETURN OF EGYPTIANS TO GAZA.  
AGAIN HE NOTED THERE NO CLEAR UNDERTAKING ON THIS POINT BY  
UNITED STATES BUT HE RELIED HEAVILY ON BELIEF THAT UNITED STATES  
WOULD DO WHAT IT COULD TO PREVENT THEIR RETURN.

TURNING AWAY FROM SECURITY PROBLEMS BEN GURION THEN INTRO-  
DUCED SUBJECT OF RETURN TO NORMAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS. HE NOTED  
EXIM BANK NEGOTIATIONS HAD COME TO A HALT WITH SINAI CAMPAIGN  
AND EXPRESSED HOPE THERE WOULD BE EARLY RESUMPTION THESE  
NEGOTIATIONS. HE ALSO SAID "WE REALLY EXPECT AMERICAN SHIPS  
WILL COME TO EILAT AS WAS PROMISED BY LODGE". THE ARRIVAL  
OF SHIPS INCLUDING TANKERS WOULD MEAN THAT TIRAN IN FACT WAS  
FREE PASSAGE AND THAT RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE HAD BEEN  
ESTABLISHED.

SPEAKING IN BROAD TERMS BEN GURION SAID HE WANTED SOON TO  
PROPOSE TO KNESSET DEEP WATER PORT AT EILAT CONSTRUCTION OF  
RAILROAD THROUGH NEGEV AS WELL AS ROXOS AND IF POSSIBLE  
LARGER OIL PIPELINE TO HAIFA OR WADI SUCREIA. "I HOPE UNITED STATES  
WILL TAKE PART IN THESE PROJECTS".

LAWSON

TT

SECRET.





**INCOMING TELEGRAM***Department of State***ACTION COPY****SECRET****H**  
ActionControl: 5240  
Rec'd: MARCH 8, 1957  
2:40 PM**SS**  
Info**FROM:** TEL AVIV**TO:** Secretary of State**NO:** 1056, MARCH 8, 3 P.M. (SECTION 2 OF 2).

1

**PRIORITY**

WITH REGARD GAZA BORDER SECURITY PROBLEM I REMARKED IT HAD ONCE BEEN PROPOSED TO ERECT PATROLLED DOUBLE FENCE ALONG BORDER. IN RESPONSE BEN GURION SAID THIS HAD ONCE BEEN PROPOSED BY ISRAEL BUT REJECTED BY EGYPT. HE HAD JUST MET WITH GENERAL STAFF AND TOLD THEM TO PREPARE PLAN FOR DEFENSE BORDER SETTLEMENTS AND HE EXPECTED TO HAVE PLAN IN ABOUT WEEK OR 2. HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER SUCH FENCE PART THEIR PLANNING.

I TOLD HIM I THOUGHT HE HAD DONE STATESMAN LIKE JOB (IN ACCEPTING OUR ADVICE TO WITHDRAW IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION) IN FACE OF HIS EXISTING DIFFICULT DOMESTIC POSITION. HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO CONVEY EFFECTIVELY TO HIS PEOPLE CONFIDENCE HE ENJOYED. I ADDED THAT I SURE HE WOULD FIND THAT HIS CONFIDENCE WELL JUSTIFIED AND HIS DECISION A PROPER AND REALISTIC ONE. BEN GURION SAID "SPEAKING PERSONALLY" HE HAD MIXED FEELINGS. HE REFERRED AGAIN TO PEOPLE LIVING IN GAZA BORDER SETTLEMENTS AS "BEST WE HAVE" AND SAID HE HAD ACTED AGAINST THEIR FEELINGS WHICH HE SHARED. BUT HE ONLY DID SO "BECAUSE IT HAD TO BE DONE." ONLY HISTORY WOULD TELL WHETHER HIS DECISION HAD BEEN CORRECT BUT HE SURE IT WOULD WORK OUT IF PRESIDENT IS RIGHT AND ISRAEL HAS NO CAUSE FOR REGRET.

IN CONCLUSION BEN GURION REPEATED AS HE HAS FREQUENTLY BEFORE THAT HE HAD MET PRESIDENT "WHEN HE WAS ONLY GENERAL" AND THAT HE TOOK AWAY IMPRESSION THAT PRESIDENT IS "MAN UPON WHOM YOU CAN RELY".

COMMENT: BEN GURION RELAXED BUT SHOWED REAL EMOTION WHEN HE SPOKE OF INSECURITY OF GAZA BORDER SETTLERS A POINT HE UNDERSCORED HEAVILY AS HE EVIDENCED HIS CONCERN FOR THEM AND HIS SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THEIR SECURITY. THEY SO ESSENTIAL

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-2- 1056, MARCH 8, 3 PM (SECTION 2 OF 2) FROM: TEL AVIV

TO HIS FUNDAMENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF NEGEV SETTLEMENT AND BASIC COMBINED SOCIAL-MILITARY PROGRAM WHICH BEAR HIS TRADE-MARK THAT HE PROBABLY MORE UNEASY AS TO WISDOM OF WITHDRAWAL DECISION IN THAT RELATION THAN IN ANY OTHER RESPECT DOMESTICALLY. I NOTED HE AGAIN RETURNED EMPHATICALLY TO HIS INSISTENCE IN CONNECTION WITH GAZA PARTICULARLY THAT GAA (REPEAT GAA) WITH EGYPT IS DEAD...KILLED BY EGYPTIAN VIOLATIONS OVER LONG PERIOD OF TIME...AND ISRAEL WOULD NO LONGER RECOGNIZE ITS EXISTENCE. HE AGAIN UNDERSCORED POINTS CONTAINED IN HIS LETTER I.E. EGYPT MUST NOT RETURN TO GAZA AND THAT ISRAEL RESERVED RIGHT DEFEND ITSELF IF THREATENED FROM GAZA. IN MAKING THESE POINTS CLEAR HE FIRM BUT NOT EMOTIONALLY EMPHATIC. THROUGHOUT ENTIRE CONVERSATION HE REFERRED AGAIN AND AGAIN TO HIS CONFIDENCE IN PRESIDENT AND VERY STRONG INFLUENCE OF ENCOURAGING PHRASES APPEARING IN PRESIDENT'S LETTER. ALTHOUGH HE MAY WELL HAVE BEEN GREATLY INFLUENCED BY THOSE FACTORS IT IS NOT INCONCEIVABLE THAT HE ALSO DOUBLE UNDERSCORING THEM FOR THE RECORD AND FOR POLITICO-TACTICAL REASONS.

LAWSON

JCK

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Tel Aviv  
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advance  
*destroyed*  
6/11/57

1056 (2 sections)

3/8/57

5284

~~#6~~

✓ ~~#7~~

Ben Hurion  
Comments  
Survey  
Categories

✓ ~~#9~~

#7 - M. Sheldon for shells

✓ ~~#11~~

3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11  
*destroyed* 2/3/59  
P. Han

✓ #4

~~Action #5~~

~~NO 7, 11 file~~

12 Sec & book



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53  
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Control: 5202  
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1:16 p.m.

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FROM: Tel Aviv

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

CS

NO: 1060, March 8

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IDF completed evacuation Gaza strip before dark Thursday,  
according to press, plan give over control to UNEK unit  
composed of Swedish company commanded by Major G. Bergstrom.

Newspapers quoted UNEF sources as saying Israel will have  
completed withdrawal its unit at mouth of Aqaba Gulf  
"by Saturday".

LAWSON

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12:45 p.m.

Action  
NEA

FROM: Amman

Info

RMR TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 1053, March 8

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1053, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 216, TEL AVIV 116, DAMASCUS 215, JIDDA 76, JERUSALEM UNNUMBERED.

Arab news agency reports visit Egyptian Charge to Prime Minister yesterday to advise latter Egyptian attitude presence UNEF I Gaza and Gulf. Quoted saying his government reserves right "to demand UNEF evacuation when Egyptian finds evacuation necessary ... Egypt will not allow UNEF remain when Jewish evacuation ends".

After meeting Charge said Prime Minister confirmed Jordans strong support Egyptian attitude and opposition any status for Gaza, Sharm El Sheikh contrary Egyptian wishes. Thus, Prime Minister added, Jordan opposes any proposals aimed at internationalizing entry Gulf.

MALLORY

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JAN 10 1959

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32  
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Control: 4958  
Rec'd: March 8, 1957  
7:04 a.m.

NEA FROM: Ankara

Info  
RMR TO: Secretary of State

SS NO: 2074, March 8, Noon

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In call on acting Director General, Foreign Office Second Department (Dikerdem) March 7, Embassy representative gave him substance Department CIRTEL 720, emphasizing there no (repeat no) unpublicized commitments by USA to Israel re withdrawal and no (repeat no) guarantees.

WARREN

SW:ALR-13

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FOR SECRETARY FROM ACTING SECRETARY

1. At his request, I saw the President today with Rountree, Dillon and Phleger to discuss ~~the~~ Egyptian situation including ~~the~~ Canal, Gaza, Tiran, etc. At his request we outlined what we seek from Egypt, how we have made known what we would like, and steps which might be taken if Egypt does not undertake (repeat not) measures desired. I do not believe that he was seeking any specific conclusions nor did we reach any.

2. You will have seen the SYG report of this afternoon and Lodge's following statement. We felt here and Lodge agreed specifically subject of troops on that since SYG had not mentioned both sides of border preferable have Lodge support SYG's statement and not himself raise question. We are satisfied that SYG position on this point and our own ~~are~~ adequately clear and on the record.

3. In conversation today, Lodge told me ~~that~~ SYG was uncertain whether he would proceed Egypt Monday or week from Monday. He expects momentarily to receive from Fawzi Egyptian position re interim canal arrangements. If this reasonably satisfactory, he would hope delay visit for another week in

order

Drafted by:

S/S:FHowe:jmr 3/8/57

Clearances: NEA:WRountree:jmr

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

S/S - Fisher Howe

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order provide "cooling off" period in Gaza, particularly since he  
confident Egyptians will make no <sup>(repeat no)</sup> immediate move re Gaza. We are  
emphasizing urgency of visit unless entirely satisfactory interim  
agreement can be made here, which would involve more than unilateral  
Egyptian declaration.

4. Eban (repeat Eban) is coming in tomorrow morning at  
his request. Meanwhile, Ben Gurion's reply to the President's message  
of March 2 which was made public has just come in and we are repeating  
to Canberra. I shall probably emphasize to Eban the importance of  
having <sup>some</sup> USEF on the Israeli side of the border and that acceptance of  
this is quite definitely in Israeli interests. In view Ben Gurion's  
repeated statements to Lawson when letter handed to him March 7, that  
Armistice Agreement is "dead letter", I plan also to restate our  
attitude concerning relationship existence Agreement to claim that  
Egypt cannot legitimately exclude Israeli shipping through Straits  
and Canal.

I hope that you had a pleasant and not too exhausting  
trip out and that the conference goes well.

*Hertter* **HERTER**  
ACTING

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8

CANBERRA

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~~#2~~ not sent

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Mr Howe showed to Mr Henderson  
- ~~To show to shown by~~ 3/9/57  
Mr Howe to  
Mr Kellon 3/9  
- To show to etc

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TEDUL 5

3/8/47

04748

enter message to  
Secretary re Suez

Robert C.  
Keep green

✓ 4 Mr Howe showed to  
Mr Bowie  
3/9/57

~~#2~~ not sent

#10 - Tedul file

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

59 Department of State

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Action

Control: 5936

Rec'd: MARCH 9, 1957

2:45 PM

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FROM: CAIRO

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TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 2843, MARCH 9

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SENT DEPARTMENT 2843, REPEATED INFORMATION USUN 102, AMMAN, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, BENGHAZI, DAMASCUS, JIDDA, KHARTOUM, LONDON, PARIS, NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV, TRIPOLI UNNUMBERED.

APPRAISING FORTHCOMING SITUATION FOLLOWING WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI TROOPS, EDITORIAL WRITERS GENERALLY AGREE SUBSTANTIAL BATTLES REMAIN TO BE FOUGHT.

SADAT IN GUMHOURIYA SAYS "THE WITHDRAWAL OF EGYPT DOES NOT MEAN END OF BATTLE BECAUSE FRANCE AND BRITAIN ARE STILL TRYING TO REGAIN LOST INFLUENCE AND CONTROL THROUGH THE SO-CALLED SUEZ CANAL PROBLEM AT SAME TIME ISRAEL IS PLEADING WITH BIG POWERS TO GIVE HER SOME BENEFITS OR PRIZE AT EXPENSE OF EGYPT AND HER ULTIMATE GOAL IS STILL PEACE WITH THE ARABS".

AL-SHAAB FINDS THAT "WITH THEIR DEFEAT IN MILITARY CAMPAIGN AGAINST EGYPT, POWERS OF EVIL ARE NOW PREPARING FOR ANOTHER ROUND IN POLITICAL FRONT BY PRESSING ISRAEL TO SEEK FREE PASSAGE IN EGYPT'S TERRITORIAL WATERS. BRITAIN AND FRANCE ALSO WANT TO HURRY CLEARANCE OPERATIONS AND IMPERTINENTLY DEMAND REORGANIZATION OF EGYPTIAN CANAL ADMINISTRATION". "THE EGYPTIANS", WRITER CONCLUDED, "HAVE WON FIRST ROUND BY THEIR BELIEF IN THEIR LEGITIMATE RIGHTS AND WITH SUPPORT OF ARABS AND PEACE-LOVING NATIONS SO BEFORE AGGRESSORS THINK OF SECURING THEIR INTERESTS THEY SHOULD PAY DAMAGES TO EGYPT AND ARABS AND SHOULD RESTORE RIGHTS OF ARAB REFUGEES".

AKHBAR AL YOM EDITORIALIZES THAT "ISRAEL WITHDRAWAL DID NOT END BATTLE BUT TRANSFORMED BATTLEFIELD TO ANOTHER REGION. ONLY

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-2- 2843, MARCH 9, FROM CAIRO

CHANGE IS THAT AMERICA AND NUMBER OTHER STATES WANT SOLUTION TO COME FROM UN AND HAVE UN RESOLUTIONS RECEIVE FORCE OF AN OBLIGATION. WITHDRAWAL OF BRITAIN, FRANCE AND ISRAEL SEEMS TO BE WAY TO GIVE UN RESOLUTIONS EXECUTORY POWER. AS RESULT, IT IS EXPECTED THAT UN WILL BE ASKED ADOPT DECISIONS AND ASK PARTIES CONCERNED ENFORCE THEM. THESE DECISIONS WILL DEAL WITH NAVIGATION TIRAN STRAIT, ADMINISTRATION GAZA, REFUGEES PROBLEM, NAVIGATION SUEZ CANAL AND PERMANENT SETTLEMENT OF ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE. WRITER CALLS ON ARABS TO UNDERSTAND THIS SHIFT TO UN. "WE HAVE MANY FRIENDS AT UN AND HAVE GAINED GOOD DEAL WITH WISDOM WE HAVE SHOWN AND OUR INSISTENCE ON UN CHARTER AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WE SHOULD CARRY ON THE SAME LAWS BUT AT SAME TIME FULLY EXPLAIN LEGALITY OF OUR POSITION. WE SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT ARABISM DOES NOT MEAN ENMITY TO ANYONE BUT THAT IT STANDS FOR RIGHT OF ARAB PEOPLES TO ENJOY PEACE AND SECURITY LIKE ALL OTHER PEOPLES OF WORLD".

AL KAHIRA "WELCOMES GOING TO INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE... TO PROVE THE NATURE OF OUR TERRITORIAL WATERS WHICH OPPONENTS CLAIM TO BE INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS".

AL AHAM ARGUES THAT TO CHANGE FUNCTIONS OF UNEF WOULD BE LEGAL AND POLITICAL MISTAKE. "NOW THAT ISRAELI FORCES HAVE WITHDRAWN BEHIND ARMISTICE LINES FUNCTION OF UNEF IS OVER AND UNEF SHOULD BY NO MEANS BE TRANSFORMED INTO AN OCCUPATION FORCE BECAUSE THIS WOULD TRESPASS ON EGYPT'S SOVEREIGNTY. A CHANGE IN THE FUNCTION OF UNEF WOULD ALSO BE POLITICAL MISTAKE IN THAT IT CONSTITUTES A CHALLENGE TO EGYPTIAN AND ARAB NATIONALISM. THIS CHALLENGE WILL BRING ABOUT NEW DISTURBANCE WHICH CANNOT BE CHECKED BY PEACEFUL MEANS".

TWO PAPERS REACTED EDITORIALY TO PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ISRAEL HAS COME TO STAY. AL KAHIRA ASKS "IS IT (TO BE) ON BASIS OF UN PARTITION PLAN OR ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WHICH BEN GURION DOES NOT RESPECT OR UN DECISIONS ON REFUGEE PROBLEMS?" AL AHAM STATES "IF THE PRESIDENT HAD SEEN WHAT TOOK PLACE IN GAZA

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-3- 2843, MARCH 9, FROM CAIRO

YESTERDAY, HE WOULD HAVE REALIZED ISRAEL COULD NOT HAVE COME TO STAY BECAUSE OF UNPARALLELED ATROCITIES COMMITTED AGAINST ARABS THERE". WRITER SUGGEST THAT "BEFORE APPEASING BEN GURION AND ISRAELIS HE (EISENHOWER) SHOULD WIPE THE TEARS OF A MILLION REFUGEES THE PARENTS OF ISRAELS VICTIMS AND SHOULD RESTORE THE ARAB LANDS TO RIGHTFUL OWNERS".

MESSAGE UNSIGNED

JS

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

## Department of State

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Classification

1957 MAR 9 PM 3 30

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SENT TO: Amembassy TEL AVIV 860  
Amembassy CAIRO 2979  
Amembassy CANBERRA TOSEC 5  
USUN 688  
Amembassy LONDON (VIA POUCH) 4  
Amembassy PARIS " "  
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674.84A/3-957

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(Following based on memo conversation unclassified by ~~XXX~~ Acting Secretary Eban called his request Acting Secretary March 9. Handed letter from Israel Foreign Minister to Secretary expressing appreciation for Secretary's efforts, discussing Aqaba and Gaza, expressing hope for quieting period, and hope US-Israel cooperation in other fields could now be resumed.

Israel hoped US would quickly exemplify its intention to exercise its rights in Gulf Aqaba and send US flag vessel through Straits Tiran. Phleger suggested that Israel approach US shipowners on commercial basis with cargo for delivery to Eilat. If shipowner then asked USG concerning its attitude, we could reply along lines Secretary's March 5 press conference.

Acting Secretary said we had real concern re desirability stationing UNEF on both sides armistice line. While, contrary to press reports, Lodge had not expressed himself on this issue in March 8 GA, preferring that it not arise as matter of contention, we thought it might be necessary station UNEF on both sides line in order keep UN force in Gaza area.

Eban

NEA:NE:DCBergus:cmt:amb  
3/9

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

William M. Rountree

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Eban remarked UNSYG wished proceed area shortly plan next stage in administration Gaza which would follow present military stage. Israel wanted UNSYG put off discussion of next stage which raised difficult juridical questions. Present stage should be fully crystallized through use UNEF civil affairs officers and UNRWA. Eban had discussed this with others and now thought UNSYG saw wisdom of going slowly in matter. He therefore hoped UNSYG would not soon make trip. Acting Secretary pointed out US interest in arrangement for Suez Canal and that UNSYG would have make decision about proceeding to area to discuss Suez problem as well as Gaza.

Phleger ~~rebutted~~ pointed out section of Armistice Agreement which forbade passage of war vessels within three miles of coastline of other party. We thought would be ~~not~~ unwise if Israel attempted move war vessels through Straits Tiran (as Israel reportedly considering). This prohibition would also apply to warships in waters in area of Suez Canal. Mr. Eban said he would have take up this matter. It presented possibility that Israel warships presently stationed at Eilat would be bottled up in Gulf Aqaba. Israel had no intention bringing any more warships into Aqaba. Acting Secretary said there were reports Israel intended bring its warships out. He hoped Israel wouldnot do so since such an act would have unfortunate psychological or practical repercussions as well as raise legal questions.

Eban stressed necessity of urgently raising through ~~not~~ test case question of passage of Israel ship through Suez Canal. Citing Egyptian press reports that Egyptian officials still intended exclude Israel vessels, said question should be raised the very day Canal opened. Phleger said we interested in creating at least interim arrangement for use of Canal. Bases for our proposals are 1888 Convention and Six Principles. He thought it would be unwise to precipitate issue Israel shipping

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shipping at least until we obtained interim arrangement. Eban said Israel would not precipitate issue before interim arrangement had been reached.

Eban referred to matters held in abeyance between two Governments and sought speedy action on FY 1957 economic aid; PL 480 transactions; return of US technicians to Israel; lifting of passport restrictions on tourists; Israel ExImbank loan application.

Acting Secretary said we would give Israel request serious consideration. One of factors had to be our own judgment regarding possibility of resumption hostilities. Risk of hostilities would be inevitable if there were test cases which might precipitate reaction. Eban said Israel would do nothing without consulting US. Only matter on which he had consulted US on today had been passage of US ship through Aqaba. He had merely mentioned Egyptian attitude on Canal.

Acting Secretary stated we disturbed at Ben Gurion's recent remark to Lawson that Armistice Agreement was "dead letter". It was pointed out that whole premise of US positions on Aqaba and Suez had been November 2 UNGA resolution and SC 1951 interpretation of Armistice Agreements as foreclosing rights of belligerency. Important that Israel not attempt to denounce Armistice Agreement but live up to it and insist Egypt do likewise. Eban said Prime Minister's statement had been political and not legal. Shiloah indicated Israelis were working on statement meet US point. Perhaps Israel could re-examine matter now that it was in fact complying with agreement.

*Herter*  
HERTER W M HERTER

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

## Department of State

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1957 MAR 9 PM 3 17

UNITED NATIONS  
UNITED STATES MISSION

SENT TO: USUN NEW YORK

FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE

DC/T

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Origin

Info:

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(Offices  
Only)

We foresee possibility that Egypt for prestige reasons may seek to reassume administrative responsibility in Gaza Strip, at least to some extent. This would obviously be undesirable and we have been thinking of ways in which such move might be discouraged. View SYG's forthcoming trip to Egypt, we would like you to suggest to him that while in Cairo he, in conversations with Nasser and other GOE officials, remind them GOE's reliance on UN during past three months was major factor enabling UN deal effectively with crises, and state the opinion that should Egypt seek to reassume administrative responsibilities in Gaza this would create profoundly unfavorable reaction among UN members. In view of threat to world peace and security represented by delicate situation in NE, of which Gaza is important element, continuance for some time of present UN role in Gaza would appear best hope for maintenance peace and tranquility in area without prejudice Egypt's rights. SYG could express further personal opinion that above course action would also be in best interest of refugees since there would be inclination among UN members to relinquish to Egypt responsibility for maintenance of refugees in Gaza should GOE now press for resuming its administrative responsibilities there.

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C3/U

Drafted by: NEA/NE:SWRockwell:cmt 3/9/57

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

NEA - W.M. Rountree

Clearances:

UNP - Mr. de Palma

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In substance  
Mr. Hester  
Mr. Phillips

674.84A/3-957  
SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DATE: March 9, 1957

SUBJECT: Reply to Soviet Note on Middle East

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Mohamed Abdel Maged Ahmed, First Secretary,  
Sudanese Embassy  
NE - Stuart W. Rockwell  
NE - Lewis Hoffacker

COPIES TO: NE (2cc) AmEmbassy KHARTOUM (1cc)  
EE (1cc)  
OLI (2cc)

Mr. Ahmed called, at the Department's request, to receive, on a confidential basis, a copy of the substance of the United States reply to the Soviet note on the Middle East (Reference: DEPCIRTEL 746, March 8, 1957). Mr. Rockwell pointed out that on the basis of the Soviet record in that part of the world, it was difficult to take seriously the Soviet proposals. Moreover, the United States regarded the states of the Middle East as quite capable of managing their own affairs and could not go along with the idea of a four-power agreement on Middle East matters.

NEA:NE:LHoffacker:feg

3/20/57

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574.34A/3-557

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APR 3 - 1957

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DATE: March 9, 1957

SUBJECT: Response to Soviet Note on Middle East

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Hassan Hosny, Counselor, Egyptian Embassy  
NE - Stuart W. Rockwell  
NE - Lewis Hoffacker

COPIES TO: NE (2cc) AmEmbassy CAIRO (lcc)  
EE (lcc)  
OLI (2cc)

Mr. Hosny called at the Department's request, on a confidential basis, to receive a copy of the substance of the United States reply to the Soviet note on the Middle East (Reference: DEPCIRTEL 746, March 8, 1957). Mr. Rockwell explained that since the reply, which will probably be delivered early next week, spoke of Middle East countries, the United States wished the Egyptian and other governments to have in advance and on a confidential basis the United States thinking on the subject. In short, it was difficult to take seriously the Soviet proposals in view of the past Soviet record in the area.

Mr. Rockwell took the opportunity to remind Mr. Hosny of the vigorous United States efforts expended in order to bring about the withdrawal of British, French and Israeli troops from Egypt and voiced the hope that Egypt would now play a constructive role in helping to resolve the remaining problems in the area. Mr. Hosny expressed optimism over settlement of outstanding problems if all governments concerned approached them with "reasonable understanding, good will and cooperation."

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3/20/57

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Department of State

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5:24 p.m.This Document Must Be Returned to  
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674.84A/3-1157

NEA  
Info

FROM: Cairo

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 2863, March 11.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 2863, USUN 109, REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV  
PRIORITY 151, JERSUALEM 42.

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NAVY

Following released to press by Hatem this afternoon: "Egyptian Government has appointed General Muhammad Hasan Abdel Latif, administrative Governor Gaza Strip, and has also decided Egyptian Administration shall assume its responsibilities in Strip immediately. Furthermore, Egyptian Government has submitted protest to Secretary General against infringement by UNEF of duties defined for it by United Nations and its faring at the civilian inhabitants of Strip. Egypt agreed to presence UNEF only within limits prescribed by United Nations namely to stop fighting and to follow up withdrawal aggressor forces behind armistice lines. Egypt herself cannot agree to UNEF undertaking any duties apart from that."

HARE

HSO/6

Note: Miss Zarger (IO message center) notified 3/11 5:30 PM EH

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53-51  
ActionControl: 6695  
Rec'd: March 11, 1957  
6:20 p.m.

NEA

FROM: Cairo

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 2865, March 11.

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SENT DEPARTMENT NIACT 2865, REPEATED INFORMATION USUN NIACT  
110, TEL AVIV PRIORITY 152, JERUSALEM 43.

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Released by UN after Bunche had returned Cairo and had read  
GOE statement. (EMBTEL 2863)

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AIR

"In answer questions some correspondents Bunche made the following replies: On visit Gaza today found population entirely friendly and no tension. Shops open and no demonstrations any kind other than waving and greetings as UN cars passed. Reports UNEF fired on population in Gaza yesterday are untrue. UNEF units used tear gas by hand and shots were fired into air to disperse crowds trying break through fence into courtyard UNEF headquarters building.

Function being performed Gaza by UNEF at present is function of taking over from withdrawing forces. It is precisely the same function as was performed at Port Said, El Arish, and other communities in Sinai. UN has never questioned Egypt's legal position with regard Gaza. UNEF is acting on basis of General Assembly resolutions. It is a peace force and is not fighting anyone in Gaza or elsewhere. We do not have a 'UN administration' in Gaza any more than we had in Port Said or El Arish, although UNEF has been called upon in the take over to undertake some administrative responsibilities.

My visit to Egypt is in connection with internal UNEF matters."

HARE

HSO/6

Note: Mr. Gammon (UNP) notified 3/11-6:30 p.m. EH

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57-52

Action

NEA

Control: 6519

Rec'd: March 11, 1957  
1:20 p.m.

Info

RMR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 1063, March 11, 6 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1063, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 187, USUN

Foreign Office communique warning UNED of "explosive" developments if Gaza is not controlled more stringently dominated all front pages and editorial columns today. Communique, prompted by reported road mining, deaths of two Arab infiltrators in western Negev, and series thefts from border Kibbutzim over weekend, said:

"Mining incident near Nir Yitzhak is fore taste and warning of what is likely to happen if UNEF will not take stringent measures to prevent renewal of acts of violence perpetrated from Gaza Strip. Unless UNEF can effectively perform its task of preventing Fedayeen raids across demarcation lines, situation there will inevitably become explosive."

Incidents, as reported by IDF and confirmed by Foreign Ministry, were as follows:

Auto hit mine on road at southeastern border of strip, wounding two persons, one seriously. Mine was newly laid because other vehicles had passed same spot three hours earlier.

Bodies of two Arab infiltrators found by police patrol in western Negev. It was surmised that they had been killed in clashes with Kibbutzim guards.

Driver of mail truck took Arab into custody and turned him over to police in Beersheba.

Other incidents were thefts of equipment, reportedly valued at more than \$8,000, from four Kibbutzim near strip.

Comments:

Foreign Ministry official informed Embassy incidents resulted from UNEF's failure to exercise police control. "We had no

(repeat no)

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-2- 1063, March 11, 6 p.m., from Tel Aviv

(repeat no) such trouble during our occupation," he said, "simply because we arrested ring leaders and dealt firmly with border transgressions. UNEF will have to do same. Mere patrol and observation may have been adequate in empty wastes of Sinai but they won't suffice in heavily populated strip." He said, "longer UNEF delays in asserting authority vigorously, greater would be deterioration of law and order." Embassy asked why GOI is not discussing problem with UN authorities. Official replied it was under consideration with approach to UNEF's liaison officer who has offices in Ministry of Defense here as probable first step.

LAWSON

AAL:DEM/10

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57-71

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Action

Control: 6531

Rec'd: March 11, 1957  
1:34 p.m.

NEA  
Info

FROM: Tel Aviv

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 1067, March 11, 7 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1067; REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 189.

Re EMBTEL 1063.

American CARE representative visited Gaza Town this morning and told Embassy officer situation seemed to him extremely tense. He said CARE stocks in Strip now (repeat now) exhausted and arrangements had been made take train load CARE and UNRWA goods from Ashkelon to Gaza Town this morning. However UNEF decided not (repeat not) accept train on grounds Arabs "ready to attack" before accepting food brought in through Israel and serious disorders expected if train brought in.

LAWSON

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~~3/17/57 8 a.m. CWD:DT~~

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**FROM:** Tel Aviv - CORRECTED COPY

**TO:** Secretary of State

**NO:** 1067, March 11, 7 p.m.

**PRIORITY**

**SENT DEPARTMENT 1067; REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 189.**

**NOFORN**

**Re EMBTEL 1063.**

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**CWD:DT**

374.34N/3-1157

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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1068, March 11, 7 p.m.

PRIORITY

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION.

Re INTEL March 7.

Following brief but specific account of pertinent part of a conversation I held with Foreign Minister Golda Meir on her arrival Lydda airport March 10 may reflect strong line GOI will take on issues discussed reference telegram. While Department may have benefit SYG's report conversation he held with Meir following GA session March 1, her description of certain exchanges may be useful as representative of line (possibly with some effect) she will take with cabinet.

Speaking of that conversation she said Hammarskjold introduced subject his probable visit Cairo whereupon she asked, "What are you going to do in Cairo?" Hammarskjold replied "Many things, the opening of Suez, the payment of tolls, and many associated matters".

She then said, "I must tell you that when the Suez Canal is re-opened, you will find an Israeli ship among other ships ready to pass through". Hammarskjold then went on to say, "I must also talk with Nasser about Gaza".

Foreign Minister then said, "You and I have not agreed on many things but I am sure you will agree at all times I have left no doubt with you as to where I stood on all matters. Now I will tell you this. If Egyptians return to Gaza in any form whatever or under any guise, it means war! You have decision of peace or (#) pands. If there should develop a situation which threatens security of Israel we will defend ourselves-we will shoot".

Hammarskjold then asked, "can you get support for that?"

Mrs. Meir said, "I am confident we can. French have made it clear in specific terms and I believe that USG assumes that we would take action under certain conditions".

With

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-2- 1068, March 11, 7 p.m. from Tel Aviv

With regard to Gulf of Aqaba, Hammarskjold asked her how she interpreted Article 51 of Charter (under which article Israel feels it is entitled to take military action in event its ships are attacked when they transit the Gulf).

Mrs. Meir replied, "I am no international lawyer".

Hammarskjold said, "you don't include warships in category of ships which will be eligible for transit of Gulf, do you?"

Mrs. Meir said, "I replied emphatically, I certainly do include warships".

Mrs. Meir, in referring to above conversation, said that she had not really been surprised at Hammarskjold's attitude on these points-they represented no fundamental change in his past attitude. However, she was completely surprised and disappointed at character of Lodge's speech before the Assembly on Friday March 1. She was confident in circumstances Hammarskjold has no intention of visiting Israel. She said she would not have been surprised had Hammarskjold asked GA for more specific authority to handle situations likely to develop out of present position in Gaza and Aqaba, but she thought it would be impractical and impossible to anticipate what might develop and try to present authority on a contingency basis.

LAWSON

MGG/HSO/6

(#) Omission. Correction to follow.

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FROM: Tel Aviv - Corrected page 1

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1068, March 11, 7 p.m.

PRIORITY

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March 11, 1957  
2:43 p.m.

1957 MAR 13 PM 4 11

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001

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TO 144 RM/R - Central Files

Confidential File  
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FILED

958

Correction made  
by RM/R

CONFIDENTIAL

1068, March 11, 7 p.m. from Tel Aviv

With regard to Gulf of Aqaba, Hammarskjold asked her how she interpreted Article 5 of Charter (under which article Israel feels it is entitled to take military action in event its ships are attacked when they transit the Gulf).

Mrs. Meir replied, "I am no international lawyer".

Hammarskjold said, "you don't include warships in category of ships which will be eligible for transit of Gulf, do you?"

Mrs. Meir said, "I replied emphatically, I certainly do include warships".

Mrs. Meir, in referring to above conversation, said that she had not really been surprised at Hammarskjold's attitude on these points—they represented no fundamental change in his past attitude. However, she was completely surprised and disappointed at character of Lodge's speech before the Assembly on Friday March 1. She was confident in circumstances Hammarskjold has no intention of visiting Israel. She said she would not have been surprised had Hammarskjold asked GA for more specific authority to handle situations likely to develop out of present position in Gaza and Aqaba, but she thought it would be impractical and impossible to anticipate what might develop and try to present authority on a contingency basis.

LAWSON

MGQ/HSO/6

(#) Omission. Correction to follow.

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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674.341/3-1157

674.341/3-1157  
Confidential File

53-51

CONFIDENTIAL

Action

Control: 6612  
Rec'd: MARCH 11, 1957  
2:32 PM

IO

FROM: NEW YORK

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 608, MARCH 11, 2 PM

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NIACT

RE PALESTINE

HAMMARSKJOLD REQUESTED MEETING THIS AM TO INFORM US OF RESULTS HIS TALKS WITH FAWZI PRIOR FAWZI'S DEPARTURE FOR CAIRO THIS AFTERNOON AND LATEST DEVELOPMENTS. HE BEGAN BY SHOWING US TICKER REPORT FROM JERUSALEM CONCERNING ISRAELI ALLEGATIONS OF RESUMPTION FEDAYEEN RAIDS AND REPORT FROM BURNS CONCERNING EGYPTIAN ANNOUNCEMENT ON APPOINTMENT GOVERNOR OF GAZA. HE SAID THESE TWO DEVELOPMENTS TAKEN TOGETHER PRODUCED DISTURBING SITUATION AND MIGHT WELL MEAN RECONVENING OF GA WITHIN THE WEEK. WHILE ISRAELI ANNOUNCEMENT MIGHT BE TO LARGE EXTENT PROPAGANDA, THE FACT THEY HAD ISSUED IT WAS OMINOUS.

DURING DISCUSSION HAMMARSKJOLD DEALT WITH VARIOUS POINTS AS FOLLOWS:

1. GAZA. HAMMARSKJOLD GAVE US TEXT OF EGYPTIAN COMMUNIQUE WHICH HE HAD RECEIVED FROM BURNS DURING EARLIER MEETING WITH FAWZI (EGYPT) AND WHICH ANNOUNCED APPOINTMENT OF HASSAN ABDUL AS "ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNOR" OF GAZA STRIP. COMMUNIQUE FURTHER STATED THAT ABDUL SHOULD TAKE OVER IMMEDIATELY AS UNEF HAD OVERSTEPPED ITS FUNCTIONS BY SHOOTING OVER HEADS ARAB REFUGEES.

LATER IN CONVERSATION, HAMMARSKJOLD POINTED OUT THIS COMMUNIQUE DID NOT OPPOSE PRESENCE UNEF BUT REFERRED TO ITS LIMITED FUNCTIONS. HAMMARSKJOLD POINTED OUT WE HAD ALL SAID IN PAST WE COULD PROBABLY NOT AVOID SOME ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS IN GAZA STRIP AND COMMUNIQUE WAS SO WORDED NOT TO SUGGEST UNEF SHOULD LEAVE. ONCE SHOOTING OCCURRED IN GAZA STRIP UNEF WAS

PERMANENT

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CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 608, MARCH 11, 2 PM, FROM NEW YORK

BOUND TO BECOME POLITICAL ISSUE.

SYG SAID HE PLANNED TO PUT THIS MOVE TO ADVISORY COMMITTEE THIS AFTERNOON AND RECOMMEND ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOLLOW PROBLEM AND ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY AS TO WHETHER THIS REQUIRES FURTHER ACTION, I.E., SHOULD GA BE CONVENED.

HAMMARSKJOLD SAID HE HAD TALKED OVER THIS ANNOUNCEMENT WITH FAWZI THIS MORNING AND HE SAID FAWZI "GOT SOLID FAREWELL GREETINGS". FAWZI'S ONLY ANSWER WAS TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN AN ANNOUNCEMENT AND A POLICY AND TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN UNEF'S DUTY TO PATROL ARMISTICE LINE AND ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS.

2. SUEZ. SYG SAID HE HAD LONG UNFRUITFUL TALK WITH FAWZI ON THIS QUESTION. FAWZI "HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO GET ANYWHERE FROM HERE". FAWZI STILL THOUGHT IT WAS A GOOD IDEA FOR SYG TO COME TO CAIRO.

SYG SAID HE TOLD FAWZI HE THOUGHT EGYPT SHOULD ADVISE US FIRST BEFORE TAKING ANY ACTION. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID "IN BLUNT SIMPLE TERMS IT HASN'T BEEN TIED UP EITHER FOR OR AGAINST FOUR-POWER PROPOSALS", BUT SAID IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION THAT EGYPT WAS "MOVING IN PATTERN OF FOUR-POWER PROPOSALS".

3. STRAITS. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID HE HAD "PRE-WARNING" EGYPTIANS MAY BE MOVING TOWARD USE ICJ ON QUESTION OF TRANSIT OF STRAITS, NOT NECESSARILY BECAUSE THEY THINK ICJ WILL DECIDE IN THEIR FAVOR BUT AS A FACE-SAVING DEVICE. ALSO HE SAID THIS WAS TICKLISH LEGAL QUESTION AS STRAITS ARE BOTH INTERNATIONAL AND YET TERRITORIAL WATERS. ICJ COULD WELL RULE THAT COMMERCIAL SHIPS COULD PASS BUT WARSHIPS COULD NOT.

TOWARDS THE END OF DISCUSSION HAMMARSKJOLD RECEIVED FIRST PART OF MESSAGE FROM BUNCHE, SAYING THAT HE BELIEVED GAZA SITUATION REQUIRED REAPPRAISAL. HE BASED THIS ON HIS OBSERVATIONS THERE DURING LAST 24 HOURS. REST OF MESSAGE HAD NOT YET COME IN AND HAMMARSKJOLD AGREED INFORM US OF ITS CONTENTS WHEN RECEIVED.

LODGE

BAG

CONFIDENTIAL



OUTGOING  
TELEGRAM

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

# Department of State

**SECRET**

Classification

05785

1957 MAR 11 PM 7 55

For DCT use

SENT TO: USUN, NEW YORK

PRIORITY

Re URTTEL 608

Origin

Info:

We are disturbed by reports indicating immediate return of Egyptian to Gaza Strip and appointment Egyptian QUOTE administrative governor UN QTE, ~~and statement Egyptian officials concerning Egyptian exclusive rights there~~ We agree with SYG thinking that now not time for Egyptians seek resume administrative responsibilities in Gaza Strip, though early return small number Egyptian officers for MAC duty perhaps not unreasonable. We would hope that GOE would demonstrate continued forbearance that has marked its public position in recent past and that, while maintaining its rights, would cooperate fully in implementation measures set forth SYG's report of February 22 as best means assure peace and quiet in area. It will be recalled SYG presented report in expectation there would be reasonable period of time during which practicable arrangements for the Gaza Strip could be worked out by UN.

Please ask SYG whether he would consider it helpful if Department were to instruct Ambassador Hare approach Nasser urging him refrain from any precipitate action that would serve to undo what has been achieved in area.

We

Drafted by:

IO:UNP:dlGemon:mss

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

IO-Francis O. Wilcox

Checked by:

NE: Mr. Rockwell

NEA:Mr.Rountree (in substance)

**SECRET**

Classification

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**SECRET**  
FILE

374.84A/3-1157

CS/U

674.84A/3-1157

+R  
320.5780  
(made)

DC/FA  
Ans? ☒  
Rev? ☒  
Out? ☒

~~SECRET~~  
Classification

We would view such US approach as complimentary to any made by SYG and in support his own efforts. In view potentially deteriorating situation Gaza we believe US approach to Nasser should be made soonest with view stressing desirability deferring for time being any ~~extensive~~ moves <sup>implementing</sup> ~~assessing~~ Egyptian control.

<sup>if SYG agrees,</sup>  
/ You should also convey above views to selected members Advisory Committee, urging they also seek persuade GOE continue cooperate fully with SYG as recommended by GA.

Re urtel 610 Dept believes SYG in best position determine, in light Bunche's report and recommendation, desirability immediate trip to Cairo. We inclined agree early trip desirable.

HERTER, Acting

(705)

~~SECRET~~  
Classification

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL  
AFFAIRS  
CONFIDENTIAL

53-51

Action  
IO

FROM: NEW YORK

Conf'd: 6654

Rec'd: MARCH 11, 1957

4:08 P.M.

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 610, MARCH 11, 3 P.M.

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NEA

L

RE GAZA; SUEZ

R

O

FURTHER TO MYTEL 608, CORDIER INFORMED US THAT BALANCE OF BUNCHE'S MESSAGE WAS RECOMMENDATION THAT HAMMARSKJOLD GO TO CAIRO EARLIER THAN PLANNED IN LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN GAZA. CORDIER SAID SYG WAS WEIGHING CAREFULLY BUNCHE'S ADVICE.

I AM INCLINED FEEL BEST ACTION IN CIRCUMSTANCES IS FOR HAMMARSKJOLD TO GO IMMEDIATELY TO CAIRO. HE IS IN POSITION TO TELL NASSER THINGS WHICH OTHERS MAY NOT BE ABLE TO SAY, AND TO LEAVE NO DOUBT IN NASSER'S MIND AS TO WHAT EGYPTIAN POSITION IN WORLD OPINION WILL BE IF HE CONTINUES PURSUE NARROW, NATIONALIST APPROACH.

REQUEST DEPARTMENT'S URGENT ADVICE AS TO WHETHER I SHOULD PURSUE THIS LINE WITH HAMMARSKJOLD.

LODGE

MAA

NOTE: Advance copy to IO 3/11-5 p.m. EH



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CT4. 34A/3-1157

Confidential file

674842/3-1157



ALL POUCH  
PRIORITY

SECRET  
(Security Classification)

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674.84A/3-1157  
611.84A

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : A. E. BAGOT, TEL AVIV

154

DESP. NO.

COPY NO.

SERIES A

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

March 11, 1957

DATE

REF : Embassy telegrams 1054 and 1056.

13 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION S/S*	IN F O
	REC'D 3.20.57	OTHER RM/12

SUBJECT:

Transmittal of Prime Minister Ben Gurion's March 7 letter to President Eisenhower.

Enclosed is the original of the letter addressed by Prime Minister Ben Gurion on March 7, 1957 to President Eisenhower in response to the President's letter of March 2, 1957. Ambassador Lawson called on the Prime Minister at the latter's office at 6:30 p.m. March 7 to receive the reply. The text was transmitted to the Department in Embassy telegram 1054 and a summary of Mr. Ben Gurion's oral comments was reported in Embassy telegram 1056.

For the Ambassador:

*William L. Hamilton, Jr.*  
William L. Hamilton, Jr.  
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure:

Original of Prime Minister Ben Gurion's March 7 letter to President Eisenhower.

674.84A/3-1157  
March 11, 1957  
J. Neupert

Transmitted to  
3/20/57  
J. Neupert  
J. Neupert

J. Neupert:jl  
REPORTER

SECRET

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674.84A/3-1157

SECRET FILE



November 8, 1956

James C. Hagerty, Press Secretary to the President

THE WHITE HOUSE

THE PRESIDENT YESTERDAY,  
NOVEMBER 7, SENT THE FOLLOWING  
MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER  
BEN-GURION OF ISRAEL

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

As you know, the General Assembly of the United Nations has arranged a cease-fire in Egypt to which Egypt, France, the United Kingdom and Israel have agreed. There is being dispatched to Egypt a United Nations force in accordance with pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly. That body has urged that all other foreign forces be withdrawn from Egyptian territory, and specifically, that Israeli forces be withdrawn to the General Armistice line. The resolution covering the cease-fire and withdrawal was introduced by the United States and received the overwhelming vote of the Assembly.

Statements attributed to your Government to the effect that Israel does not intend to withdraw from Egyptian territory, as requested by the United Nations, have been called to my attention. I must say frankly, Mr. Prime Minister, that the United States views these reports, if true, with deep concern. Any such decision by the Government of Israel would seriously undermine the urgent efforts being made by the United Nations to restore peace in the Middle East, and could not but bring about the condemnation of Israel as a violator of the principles as well as the directives of the United Nations.

It is our belief that as a matter of highest priority peace should be restored and foreign troops, except for United Nations forces, withdrawn from Egypt, after which new and energetic steps should be undertaken within the framework of the United Nations to solve the basic problems which have given rise to the present difficulty. The United States has tabled in the General Assembly two resolutions designed to accomplish the latter purposes, and hopes that they will be acted upon favorably as soon as the present emergency has been dealt with.

I need not assure you of the deep interest which the United States has in your country, nor recall the various elements of our policy of support to Israel in so many ways. It is in this context that I urge you to comply with the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly dealing with the current crisis and to make your decision known immediately. It would be a matter of the greatest regret to all my countrymen if Israeli policy on a matter of such grave concern to the world should in any way impair the friendly cooperation between our two countries.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

/s/ Dwight D. Eisenhower

(more)

7.11.56  
67484a  
3-11-7

THE PRESIDENT TONIGHT RECEIVED  
THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM  
PRIME MINISTER BEN-GURION

Dear Mr. President:

I have only this afternoon received your message which was delayed in transmission owing to a breakdown in communications between the Department of State and the United States Embassy in Tel Aviv.

Your statement that a United Nations force is being dispatched to Egypt in accordance with pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly is welcomed by us. We have never planned to annex the Sinai Desert. In view of the United Nations Resolutions regarding the withdrawal of foreign troops from Egypt and the creation of an international force, we will, upon conclusion of satisfactory arrangements with the United Nations in connection with this international force entering the Suez Canal area, willingly withdraw our forces.

Although an important part of our aim has been achieved by the destruction, as a result of the Sinai operation, of Fedayeen gangs and of the bases from which they were planned and directed, we must repeat our urgent request to the United Nations to call upon Egypt, which has consistently maintained that it is in a state of war with Israel, to renounce this position, to abandon its policy of boycott and blockade, to cease the incursions into Israel territory of murder gangs and, in accordance with its obligations under the United Nations Charter, to live at peace with member states, to enter into direct peace negotiations with Israel.

On behalf of my government I wish to express to you our gratification at your reference to the deep interest of the United States in Israel and its policy of support for our country. I know these words of friendship stem from the depths of your heart and I wish to assure you that you will always find Israel ready to make its noble contribution at the side of the United States in its efforts to strengthen justice and peace in the world.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

David Ben-Gurion

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file 674.842/3-1157

James C. Hagerty, Press Secretary to the President

-----

THE WHITE HOUSE

THE PRESIDENT TONIGHT SENT THE FOLLOW-  
ING LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER BEN-GURION  
OF ISRAEL

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I was indeed deeply gratified at the decision of your Govern-  
ment to withdraw promptly and fully behind the Armistice  
lines as set out by your Foreign Minister in her address of  
yesterday to the General Assembly. I venture to express the  
hope that the carrying out of these withdrawals will go forward  
with the utmost speed.

I know that this decision was not an easy one. I believe, how-  
ever, that Israel will have no cause to regret having thus  
conformed to the strong sentiment of the world community as  
expressed in the various United Nations Resolutions relating  
to withdrawal.

It has always been the view of this Government that after the  
withdrawal there should be a united effort by all of the nations  
to bring about conditions in the area more stable, more tranquil,  
and more conducive to the general welfare than those which  
existed heretofore. Already the United Nations General  
Assembly has adopted Resolutions which presage such a better  
future. Hopes and expectations based thereon were voiced by  
your Foreign Minister and others. I believe that it is reason-  
able to entertain such hopes and expectations and I want you to  
know that the United States, as a friend of all of the countries  
of the area and as a loyal member of the United Nations, will  
seek that such hopes prove not to be vain.

I am, my dear Mr. Prime Minister,

Sincerely,

/s/ Dwight D. Eisenhower

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674-842 / 3-1157

## PRIME MINISTER BEN-GURION'S CORRESPONDENCE WITH PRESIDENT EISENHOWER

March 16, 1956	Regarding a letter of February 27, 1956 concerning the possibility of a settlement between Israel and Egypt	1
April 11, 1956	Regarding a message of April 9, 1956 concerning the relations between Israel and Egypt (See Tab 1 of the President's correspondence)	2
October 20, 1956	Regarding the prevention of the entry of Iraqi troops into Jordan which would not increase stability in the Middle East and would threaten Israel's security	3
October 29, 1956	Regarding messages of October 27 and 28, 1956 concerning efforts towards a peaceful settlement between Israel and her Arab neighbors and the obstacles to this fulfillment created by the expansionist policy of Colonel Nasser (See Tabs 3 and 4 of the President's correspondence)	4
November 8, 1956	Regarding a message of November 7, 1956 concerning a United Nations force being despatched to Egypt in accordance with the resolutions of the General Assembly (See Tab 5 of the President's correspondence)	5
December 12, 1956	Regarding a copy of a letter of M. Mollet concerning relations between Israel and Egypt	6
February 8, 1957	Regarding a message of February 3, 1957 concerning the evacuation of troops from the Sinai desert; regrets that the United Nations has applied different standards to Egypt and to Israel (See Tab 8 of the President's correspondence)	7



## PRIME MINISTER BEN-GURION'S CORRESPONDENCE WITH PRESIDENT EISENHOWER

March 7, 1957

*March 2 1957 Concerning*  
Regarding the difficulty of evacuating the  
Gaza strip

(See Tab ~~5 above~~) *in President's Correspondence*  
*but Tab 5 above*

8

March 13, 1957

Regarding the dangerous tension in the  
Gaza strip; and reports that Egypt will  
not permit any ship to exercise the right  
of free passage through the Straits of  
Tiran

9

November 27, 1957

Regarding health and wishes for a quick and  
full recovery

10

**AIR PRIORITY**  
PRIORITY  
**CONFIDENTIAL**  
(Security Classification)  
**FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH**

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674.84a/2.1157  
+L 784a.13

FROM : AMEMBASSY, TEL AVIV  
TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

400  
DESP. NO.

February 11, 1957  
DATE

REF : Embassy Telegram No. 941 and 942; Dept. Telegram No. 760.

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	OTHER
	2 21	RM/R.2

SUBJECT:

Prime Minister Ben Gurion's reply to President Eisenhower's letter of February 3, 1957.

Presidential Handling.

There is enclosed the original of Prime Minister David Ben Gurion's reply to President Eisenhower's letter of February 3, 1957 which was delivered by the Prime Minister to Ambassador Lawson at the former's Tel Aviv residence on February 10.

To the President's request that Israel complete withdrawal of its forces behind the general Armistice line in compliance with the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, Ben Gurion replied to the effect that Israel would withdraw its forces from the Sharm-e-Sheikh area in the southeast Sinai if it could be assured of freedom of passage through the Straits of Tiran, but while prepared to evacuate its military forces from the Gaza Strip, it would be obligated to leave there a civil administration and police in "suitable relations with the United Nations."

The text of Ben Gurion's reply, complete except for non-essential words, was transmitted to the Department in Embassy telegram No. 941 of February 10, 1957.

For the Ambassador:

*William L. Hamilton, Jr.*  
William L. Hamilton, Jr.  
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure:

Original reply from Ben Gurion to President Eisenhower's letter of February 3.

WLHamilton:jl  
REPORTER

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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NND 897403  
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21A  
1/1/85

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 674,84A/3-1157  
LTR  
Date 10/28/56  
From Eisenhower  
To Ben Gurion

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NSC  
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1/5/89  
Date

21A

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE



NND 897403  
BOX 2678

21B  
1/2/5

ACCESS RESTRICTED

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674.84A/3-1157  
List

Date

12/9/57

From

State

To

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Authority

1/5/89  
Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

21B

NND 897403  
BOX 2678

(21C)  
1/2/U

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File Designation 674.84A/3-1157  
LTR  
Date 3/7/57  
From BEN GURION  
To Eisenhower

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Date

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(21C)

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21D  
1/2/U

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File Designation

674,84A/3-1157  
LTR

Date

3/13/57

From

BEN GURION

To

HERTER

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Authority

1/5/89  
Date

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21D



M-189  
3-14-50

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATION  
AND RECORDS

TO:

FROM: DC/R - X

Please mark this paper "File" (and initial) if action has been completed, and return to DC/R. This is required under Departments Regulations, 421.2 (Nov. 15, 1946).

Thank you,

DC/R - X  
SA-7

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

ROUTE SLIP

(To Remain With Correspondence)

S/S Rec. 4:50 pm

3/11/57

1563

TO Mr. Fisher Howe  
Director, Executive Secretariat  
Department of State

PROMPT HANDLING IS ESSENTIAL.  
WHEN DRAFT REPLY IS REQUESTED  
THE BASIC CORRESPONDENCE MUST  
BE RETURNED. IF ANY DELAY IN  
SUBMISSION OF DRAFT REPLY IS  
ENCOUNTERED, PLEASE TELEPHONE  
OFFICE OF THE STAFF SECRETARY.

Date March 11, 1957

FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY

ACTION:

Comment \_\_\_\_\_  
Draft reply \_\_\_\_\_  
For direct reply \_\_\_\_\_  
For your information \_\_\_\_\_  
For necessary action \_\_\_\_\_  
For appropriate handling XX \_\_\_\_\_  
See below \_\_\_\_\_

This must be returned to  
M/R  
Central  
Files  
67-64A/5-1127

Remarks: Mr. E.M. Greenwood, Chairman of the Mideast Settlement Comit has just returned from 3 months in Cairo w/personal message from Nasser and says the message incorporates the complete answer to the 4 problems we all wish to solve in the Middle. He encloses outline....asks to see President to discuss matter with President.

White House has acknowledged.

*Department gave substantive comments on Greenwood plan in an attachment to a letter to him from Mr. Murphy.*

GPO 16-71284-1

By direction of the President:

DC/R
Alm <u>53</u>
Rev. _____
Cat. _____

*A. J. Goodpastor*  
A. J. GOODPASTER  
Staff Secretary

*rum*

6/14/57

## NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL BUILDING

THIRD AT PINE

SEATTLE, WASH.



HOTEL STATLER  
Washington, D. C.  
March 7, 1957


President Dwight D. Eisenhower  
White House  
Washington, D. C.

Honorable President:

I have just returned from three months in Cairo and have a personal message from President Nasser to you. It is a message you will be pleased to receive. It incorporates the complete answer to the four problems we all wish to solve-- Suez Canal, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Refugees, and Winning the Mideast for America.

I am enclosing a brief outline of our proposed modus operandi. As you may well understand there is much more that can be explained verbally. May I have this opportunity?

Respectfully,

  
E. M. Greenwood, Chairman  
Mideast Settlement Committee

References:

Frederick Baker, (George Kinnear), Public Relations, Seattle  
L. D. Brill, President, Northwestern Mutual Insurance Co., Seattle  
Maxwell Carlson, President, National Bank of Commerce, Seattle  
Frank Jerome, President, Seattle First National Bank, Seattle  
Dietrich Schmitz, President, Washington Mutual Bank, Seattle  
Henry Broderick, President, Henry Broderick, Inc., Seattle  
Joseph Gottstein, Capitalist, Seattle  
Charles Frankland, President, Pacific National Bank, Seattle  
Frank Belgrano, President, Trans America Corp., San Francisco  
Louis Lurie, Capitalist, San Francisco  
Welton Beckett, Architect, Los Angeles  
Robert MacFarlane, President, Northern Pacific Railroad, St. Paul



MIDEAST SETTLEMENT COMMITTEE

PLAN AND PROPOSALS

(EGYPT)

1. PRIVATE AMERICAN CAPITAL (WORLD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION) SHALL MAKE A COMMERCIAL LOAN TO EGYPT. THIS LOAN SHALL BE LARGE ENOUGH TO COVER ALL OF EGYPT'S AIMS AND DESIRES, AND IN AN AMOUNT THAT CAN BE SAFELY AND COMFORTABLY AMORTIZED IN 30 YEARS. IT SHALL BE MADE WITHOUT POLITICAL TIES OR RESTRICTIONS AND BE ADEQUATELY GUARANTEED AND SECURED BY ALL REVENUES FROM \*\* THE SUEZ CANAL, COTTON, OIL AND NATIONAL PRODUCTS.

THE LOAN WILL CALL FOR ADVANCES TO BE MADE OVER A PERIOD OF 15 YEARS, AND MUCH OF IT WILL BE GIVEN TO EGYPT IN THE FORM OF MACHINERY, EQUIPMENT, PRODUCTS AND OTHER NECESSITIES. A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF THE LOAN WILL BE RETAINED BY THE UNITED STATES TO STABILIZE A NEW CURRENCY ISSUE FOR EGYPT.

2. CHANGE TO "EGYPTIAN DOLIAR". CALL IN OLD MONEY (\*\*PICK UP SAVINGS). USE PORTION OF LOAN TO EGYPT TO STABILIZE THEIR CURRENCY. THIS WILL ELIMINATE ALL FUTURE DISCOUNTING OF EGYPTIAN MONEY IN WORLD MARKETS AND ESTABLISH STRONG CREDIT FOR EGYPT.
3. U. S. SHALL CORRECT \*\*INCOME TAX ABUSES. THIS WILL SAVE AN ESTIMATED 250 MILLION DOLIARS PRESENTLY BEING DISSIPATED.
4. LET DOWN THE BARS SO THAT ALL ISRAELIS AND ARAB REFUGEES MAY BE ALLOWED TO EMIGRATE FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES. \*\*PRESENT ISRAELI RESTRICTION OF \$1,000 PAYMENT AND \$10 POCKET MONEY MUST BE ELIMINATED.
5. NEGOTIATE SOUTH AMERICAN ARRANGEMENTS. THIS INCLUDES AGREEMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT OF SELECTED AREAS WITH SCHOOLS, HOSPITALS, ROADS, POWER, IRRIGATION, ETC., ON A SCALE THAT WILL GREATLY IMPROVE INTERNAL ECONOMY OF COUNTRIES RECEIVING IMMIGRANTS.
6. PRIVATE AMERICAN CAPITAL (WORLD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION) WILL RECEIVE CONCESSIONS FROM BRAZIL, CHILE, BOLIVIA, ETC., BORROW FUNDS (PEACE BOND ISSUE) FOR COMPLETE OPERATION OF POINT NO. 4. THESE FUNDS SHALL COVER TRANSPORTATION, CONSTRUCTION, GUARANTEES TO IMMIGRANTS, ETC.
7. IMMEDIATE DEMAND FOR ISRAEL TO RETURN TO PREVIOUS BORDERS AND HER AGREEMENT TO BE CONTAINED THEREIN.
8. WITH THE RELOCATION OF A LARGE PERCENTAGE OF THE ISRAELIS AND REFUGEES THOSE REMAINING MAY RETURN TO THEIR OWN HOMES AND PROPERTIES, THUS ELIMINATING PRESENT CHAOTIC CONDITIONS. THERE WILL THEN BE NO FURTHER NEED FOR THE MILLIONS OF DOLLARS PRESENTLY BEING SPENT FOR REFUGEE AID BY THE UNITED NATIONS.
9. THE TREMENDOUS SAVING FOR THE U. S. GOVERNMENT THROUGH THE PROPER IMPLEMENTATION OF POINTS #3, #4 AND #8, AND CONSEQUENT PARING OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES IN THE MIDEAST AREA, WILL EXCEED IMMEASURABLY THE LOAN ADVANCED TO EGYPT.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

MIDEAST SETTLEMENT COMMITTEE

  
E. M. GREENWOOD, CHAIRMAN

\*\*TO BE EXPLAINED VERBALLY.

MIDEAST SETTLEMENT COMMITTEE

PLAN AND PROPOSALS

(GENERAL)

1. ESTABLISH WORLD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (QUASI-GOVERNMENT).

DIRECTORS SHALL COMPRISE LEADERS OF AMERICAN FINANCE AND INDUSTRY. THEY SHALL SERVE WITHOUT COMPENSATION. THESE REPRESENTATIVES OF AMERICAN LEADERSHIP SHALL TEACH OTHER COUNTRIES HOW TO PROSPER IN THE PROVEN AND SUCCESSFUL AMERICAN MANNER, WITH THE HIGHEST DEGREE OF EFFICIENCY THE WORLD HAS EVER KNOWN--"THE AMERICAN WAY". THE DIRECTORS AND THIS CORPORATION SHALL BE THE "SALES FORCE" SELLING THE "AMERICAN WAY" TO THE WORLD.

PURPOSES OF THIS CORPORATION SHALL BE TO ASSIST AND FINANCE PROJECTS FOR OTHER COUNTRIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD; TO GIVE TECHNICAL ADVICE AND "KNOW HOW" TO ALL COUNTRIES NEEDING SUCH HELP.

LOANS WILL BE MADE BY THIS CORPORATION TO NATIONS DESIRING LOANS ON A STRAIGHT BUSINESS BASIS (NO POLITICAL TIES OR RESTRICTIONS), IN AMOUNTS THAT CAN BE COMFORTABLY AMORTIZED OVER PERIODS OF TIME AGREED UPON. ALL LOANS SHALL BE ADEQUATELY GUARANTEED AND SECURED BY THE BORROWING NATION THROUGH THE ASSIGNMENT OF NATIONAL ASSETS AND REVENUES.

THE WORLD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION IN EVERY RESPECT SHALL BE THE MORTGAGOR AND THE BORROWING NATION THE MORTGAGEE. EVERY NATION HAS ASSETS IN THE FORM OF CONCESSIONS AND NATIONAL RESOURCES TO PLEDGE AS SECURITY, AND WILL GLADLY DO SO IN RETURN FOR NEEDED FINANCING OF PROJECTS THAT WILL HELP THEIR INTERNAL ECONOMY AND MAKE THEM SELF-SUPPORTING.

2. THERE SHALL BE ISSUED A "WORLD PEACE BOND" ISSUE LARGE ENOUGH TO COVER NECESSARY LOANS AND FINANCING CONTEMPLATED BY THE CORPORATION.

NO INTEREST WILL BE PAID ON THESE BONDS FOR THE FIRST 5 YEARS; THEREAFTER THEY WILL CARRY A 3% PER ANNUM RATE.

WITH EACH \$1,000 BOND WILL BE GIVEN ONE SHARE OF COMMON PARTICIPATING STOCK. THIS STOCK WILL SHARE IN THE PROFITS OF THE CORPORATION. PROFITS WILL BE DERIVED FROM MINING, OIL, LAND GRANTS, DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND ALL CONCESSIONS GIVEN TO THE CORPORATION BY BORROWING NATION.

THESE BONDS WILL BE ELIGIBLE FOR INVESTMENT BY BANKS, INSURANCE COMPANIES, TRUSTS, STATES, COUNTIES AND MUNICIPALITIES, AND WILL BE GUARANTEED BY THE U. S. GOVERNMENT.

THE BONDS AND THE COMMON STOCK SHALL BE TAX EXEMPT FROM EVERY TAX (U. S., COUNTY, STATE, INHERITANCE, ETC.) FOR 30 YEARS. ENHANCEMENT IN VALUE OF COMMON STOCK SHALL BE FREE FROM CAPITAL GAINS, INCOME TAX, ETC.

3. TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS TAX EXEMPTION THE U. S. WILL ELIMINATE PRESENT SPECIAL PRIVILEGES AND RULINGS FOR SOME CHARITIES AND ORGANIZATIONS THAT ARE NOW IN ABUSE, AND RESCIND INCOME TAX DEDUCTIONS FOR FOREIGN CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS.

4. TO HELP ALL UNDEVELOPED NATIONS AND TERRITORIES WISHING DEVELOPMENT AND ADDITIONAL IMMIGRANTS (BRAZIL, CHILE, COLOMBIA), THE U. N. AND THE U. S. WILL LET THE BARS DOWN IN ALL COUNTRIES. THIS WILL ALLOW ALL PEOPLE WISHING TO LEAVE THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES (IRON CURTAIN, ISRAEL, EGYPT) THE OPPORTUNITY OF DOING SO AND EMIGRATING TO ANY OTHER COUNTRY WISHING AND DESIRING TO TAKE THEM.
5. NEGOTIATE WITH BRAZIL AND OTHER SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES TO RECEIVE IMMIGRANTS. THE CORPORATION, IN RETURN FOR CONCESSIONS AND LAND GRANTS, WILL AGREE TO DEVELOP VAST AREAS WITH NEW HOMES, INDUSTRIES, POWER, IRRIGATION, ROADS, SCHOOLS, HOSPITALS, ETC., ALL TO ACCOMMODATE NEW IMMIGRANTS.

THE CORPORATION WILL AGREE TO SPEND ALL NECESSARY FUNDS FOR SUCH DEVELOPMENT AND IMPROVEMENTS, AND WILL BE GIVEN TAX CONCESSIONS FOR FIRST 30 YEARS FROM RECIPIENT COUNTRY.

6. FROM FIRST BOND ISSUE UNDERWRITE EXPENSE OF RELOCATING 5,000,000 PEOPLE FROM EUROPE, IRON CURTAIN COUNTRIES, MIDEAST (ARAB REFUGEES, ISRAELIS, ETC.).

APPROXIMATE BREAKDOWN:

TRANSPORTATION & MISCELLANEOUS FOR RELOCATING 5,000,000 PEOPLE AT \$500 EACH. 20-YEAR LOANS, BEARING 5% INTEREST.	\$2,500,000,000
---	-----------------

1,000,000 NEW HOMES AT \$5,000 EACH. 30-YEAR MORTGAGES, 5% INTEREST.	\$5,000,000,000
---	-----------------

ROADS, SCHOOLS, HOSPITALS, POWER, IRRIGATION AND OTHER NECESSARY IMPROVEMENTS. MORTGAGES AND REVENUES TO BE OWNED BY CORPORATION.	\$5,000,000,000
---	-----------------

AVAILABLE FOR LOANS TO OTHER COUNTRIES, ALL ADEQUATELY GUARANTEED AND SECURED.	<u>\$12,500,000,000</u>
---	-------------------------

\$25,000,000,000

7. CEASE ALL U. S. "HAND OUT" AID AS ALL FUTURE FINANCING WILL BE CARRIED OUT ON LEGITIMATE BUSINESS LOAN BASIS BY THE CORPORATION. THIS WILL SAVE AMERICAN TAXPAYERS MILLIONS OF DOLLARS PRESENTLY BEING SPENT.

8. FORESEEABLE ADVANTAGES OF ENTIRE GENERAL PLAN:

SAVE FOR U. S. TREASURY APPROXIMATELY 250 MILLION DOLLARS BEING LOST NOW THROUGH INCOME TAX DEDUCTIONS FOR FOREIGN CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS.

SPENDING OF FUNDS FROM FIRST BOND ISSUE (25 BILLION DOLLARS) WILL PROVE A BOON TO AMERICAN BUSINESS AND OTHER NATIONS' ECONOMY. MUCH OF THIS MONEY WILL BE USED TO PURCHASE AMERICAN PRODUCTS, MATERIALS AND MACHINERY, THEREBY PROVIDING MORE PAYROLLS, MORE BUSINESS, MORE PROFITS, MORE TAXES.

BY THE DEVELOPMENT OF PREVIOUSLY DORMANT AREAS NEWER AND GREATER MARKETS FOR OUR OWN PRODUCTS WILL COME INTO BEING, THUS IN-  
CREASING OUR OWN INCOME AND PROSPERITY. THE ECONOMY OF OTHER NATIONS SHALL LIKEWISE BE ENHANCED BY CONTEMPLATED INVESTMENTS IN THEIR UNDEVELOPED AREAS.

CREATE A MASSIVE TAX ACCOUNT AFTER 30 YEARS FOR OUR OWN TREASURY, THUS ASSURING CONTINUED PROSPERITY.



WITH THE THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE INVESTING IN THESE PEACE BONDS IT  
WILL DO MUCH TO ELIMINATE THE THREAT OF INFLATION IN ALL COUNTRIES.

ALL FORMS OF FOREIGN AID CAN BE ELIMINATED, THUS SAVING THE  
U. S. SEVERAL BILLIONS OF DOLLARS EACH YEAR.

MORE EFFECTIVELY SECURE THE COOPERATION AND RESPECT OF OTHER  
NATIONS, THUS PRESERVING PEACE AND MAKING "BETTER FRIENDS AND  
INFLUENCING PEOPLE" CONSTRUCTIVELY.

HELP ELIMINATE THREAT OF WAR AND SAVE U. S. AND OTHER NATIONS  
FURTHER BILLIONS IN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, PARTICULARLY IN THE  
MIDEAST. MONEY NOW SPENT FOR DEFENSE AND WAR PURPOSES BY ALL  
NATIONS CAN BE USED FOR THEIR INTERNAL ECONOMY.


ELIMINATE MILLIONS PRESENTLY BEING SPENT BY U. N. AND U. S. ON  
ARAB REFUGEES.

MAKE 5 MILLION PEOPLE HAPPIER BY GIVING THEM A NEW LIFE OF  
SECURITY AND CONTENTMENT, NEW HOPES AND AMBITIONS.

THE PLAN WILL DO MUCH TO COMBAT COMMUNISM AND MAKE U. S.  
LEADERSHIP DOMINANT THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

MIDEAST SETTLEMENT COMMITTEE



E. M. GREENWOOD, CHAIRMAN



## WORLD PEACE BONDS

(TO BE MARKETING AND PROCEEDS USED TO FINANCE WORLD PROJECTS)

WE HAVE HAD LIBERTY BONDS, WAR BONDS, DEFENSE BONDS AND NOW IT IS APROPOS FOR AMERICA AND THE WORLD TO HAVE "WORLD PEACE BONDS", THE PROCEEDS OF WHICH SHALL FINANCE SPECIFIC PROJECTS OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES, OPEN UP UNDEVELOPED AREAS, AND RELOCATE PEOPLE SEEKING NEW HORIZONS AND OPPORTUNITIES.

FIRST ISSUE \$25,000,000,000 (TWENTY-FIVE BILLION DOLLARS). NO INTEREST FOR FIRST 5 YEARS; THEREAFTER 3% PER ANNUM.

WITH EACH \$1,000 DENOMINATION THERE WILL BE GIVEN ONE SHARE OF COMMON STOCK THAT WILL PARTICIPATE IN PROFITS OF "WORLD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION", WHICH PROFITS WILL BE DERIVED FROM OIL, MINERAL AND LAND GRANT CONCESSIONS GIVEN TO THE CORPORATION BY THE BORROWING NATION.

THESE BONDS SHALL BE GUARANTEED BY U. S. GOVERNMENT AND SOLD TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC AND TO PEOPLES OF ALL NATIONS WISHING TO INVEST IN WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY. (THERE IS MUCH WEALTH AND PRIVATE MONEY AVAILABLE OUTSIDE THE U. S. THAT CAN BE CHANNLED INTO THESE "PEACE BONDS".) THEY SHALL BE AN ELIGIBLE INVESTMENT FOR ALL BANKS, INSTITUTIONS, TRUSTS, ETC.

BONDS AND THE COMMON STOCK SHALL BE TAX EXEMPT FOR FIRST 30 YEARS FROM ALL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND INHERITANCE TAXES AND ALL COUNTY AND STATE TAXES.

ALTHOUGH THE BONDS WILL BE MARKETING WITHIN A YEAR, IT WILL TAKE MUCH TIME BEFORE FUNDS ARE DISBURSED. U. S. GOVERNMENT SHALL HAVE USE OF ALL INTERIM MONEY.

PROCEEDS FROM BONDS WILL HELP UNDEVELOPED COUNTRIES, PUTTING THEM ON SELF-SUPPORTING BASIS, AND IMPROVE INTERNAL ECONOMY OF EACH BORROWING COUNTRY, PROVIDING MORE INDUSTRIES, OPPORTUNITIES, PAYROLLS AND A HIGHER STANDARD OF LIVING. THIS MONEY WILL AFFORD MILLIONS OF "HAVE NOTS" WITH NEW HOPES AND OPPORTUNITIES, AND ASSURE THE U. S. PERMANENT WORLD LEADERSHIP ON A SOUND, CONSTRUCTIVE BASIS.

THE SALE OF THESE BONDS WILL BECOME THE BEST GUARANTEE AGAINST INFLATION, NOT ONLY IN AMERICA BUT IN ALL COUNTRIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

THESE BONDS WILL ELIMINATE THE NECESSITY OF PRESENT U. S. GOVERNMENT FOREIGN AID AND SPENDING.

WITH MILLIONS OF PEOPLE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD INVESTING IN THESE BONDS AND HAVING A PERSONAL FINANCIAL STAKE IN WORLD PEACE MUCH OF THE THREAT OF WAR WILL BE ELIMINATED. WITH PERMANENT PEACE MORE ASSURED, ALL DEFENSE BUDGETS CAN BE GREATLY REDUCED.

THESE BONDS WILL BE A PATRIOTIC INVESTMENT AS WELL AS PROFITABLE. PROCEEDS CAN BE USED TO ELIMINATE STRIFE AND MINORITY GROUP PROBLEMS HERE IN U. S., SUCH AS RELOCATING MUCH OF THE NEGRO POPULATION IN SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES WHERE SEGREGATION IS NON-EXISTENT.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

MIDEAST SETTLEMENT COMMITTEE

  
E. M. GREENWOOD, CHAIRMAN



# The SHOREHAM

Connecticut Avenue at Calvert Street  
Washington 8, D. C.

March 13, 1957

Mr. Sherman Adams  
Assistant to the President  
2400 Tilden Street  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

On March 7th I sent a letter to President Eisenhower, a copy of which is enclosed. It is my opinion that neither you nor the President received this letter and the report attached thereto. I cannot believe it possible you will refuse to act in the emergency that exists at the present time.

I have discussed a plan with President Nasser that, in my opinion, will completely answer all of our Mideast problems. I have submitted this information to the State Department and they are taking it under advisement. By the time they get around to act it may be too late due to the precarious situation over there. What we need now is immediate action, not prolonged studies and meditation. This is my request for such action.

The security of our nation cannot be brushed aside with a form letter such as was purportedly sent out by you in answer to my letter to the President. May I have the opportunity of discussing this matter with you personally?

Very truly yours,

MIDEAST SETTLEMENT COMMITTEE

*E. M. Greenwood*  
E. M. Greenwood, Chairman  
The Shoreham Hotel  
Washington, D. C.

EMG:P  
Enclosures

*Interim reply from  
Mr. Adams sent Mar 11.  
Substantive reply from State  
to which Gov. Adams referred  
Greenwood, sent March 21.*

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Department of State

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FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

RMR

NO: 1075, MARCH 12,

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PRIORITY

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THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY COMMENTS ON INTEL MARCH 7 SEEM  
ESPECIALLY APPROPRIATE TO MAKE AT MOMENT WHEN GAZA SITUATION  
APPEARS TO BE APPROACHING EXPLOSIVE STATE AND WHEN SYG'S  
BASIC THEORIES PERTAINING TO HIS APPROACH TO NASSER UNDER  
RESOLUTION FEBRUARY 2 MAY BE PUT TO ACID TEST.

I SUBSCRIBE FULLY TO SYG'S PROPOSAL TO EXTEND TAKEOVER PERIOD  
IN GAZA AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. TIME SHOULD CONTRIBUTE MATERIALLY  
TO COOLING-OFF OF EMOTIONS BOTH IN GAZA AND ISRAEL, PROVIDED  
IT IS NOT TOO LATE TO KEEP GAZA ISSUE OUT OF CONTINUED LIME-  
LIGHT AND FACING UP TO ISSUE BY ISRAEL, EGYPT AND UN CAN BE  
INDEFINITELY POSTPONED.

WITH REGARD TO PLACING, AT THIS TIME, UNEF BOTH SIDES DEMARC-  
ATION LINE, I BELIEVE BEN-GURION'S LONG ADAMANT RESISTANCE  
TO SUCH PROCEDURE WOULD BE FURTHER REINFORCED BY PUBLIC AND  
POLITICAL FORCES IF PRESSURES ALONG THAT LINE MADE NOW.

I RECOMMEND SPECIFIC APPROACH THIS POINT BE POSTPONED.  
HOWEVER USEFUL APPROACH TO PROBLEM AT APPROPRIATE MOMENT  
MIGHT BE ERECTION BY UN OF DOUBLE FENCE ASTRIDE LINE WITH  
UNEF PATROL OPERATING BETWEEN FENCES. THIS WAS ONCE ACCEPTED  
I BELIEVE BY GOI BUT REJECTED BY EGYPT ON GROUNDS IT TENDED  
TO FIX BOUNDARY. IT WOULD BE MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS OF REDUCING  
HIGHLY EXPLOSIVE FEDAYEEN PROBLEMS AND WOULD PERMIT UN TO  
MEET TECHNICALLY OBLIGATIONS IT MAY FEEL IT HAS UNDER RESOLU-  
TION FEBRUARY TWO.

WITH RESPECT TO "BASIC CONTRADICTION UN AND ISRAEL POSITIONS"

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-2- 1075, MARCH 12, FROM TEL AVIV

I AM FEARFUL OF SYG'S PREPAREDNESS TO ACCEPT GOI POSITION AS PARTLY "ARTIFICIAL" OR BLUFF. WHILE WE SHOULD NOT NECESSARILY ACCEPT ATTITUDES OF BEN-GURION AND MEIR IN THEIR FULL TOUGHNESS WE MUST NOT I FEEL BASE OUR POLICIES ON ASSUMPTION ISRAEL CAN OR WILL REMAIN COMPLACENT NOW IF FOR EXAMPLE EGYPTIAN THREAT TO RETURN TO GAZA SHOULD MATERIALIZE.

FOLLOWING, AMONG OTHER CONSIDERATIONS, LEAD ME TO CONVICTION EXTENT OF ARTIFICIALITY OR BLUFF IN ISRAEL'S STATED POSITION ON ISSUE SHOULD NOT BE MISTAKENLY REGARDED AS SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT CALCULATED RISK IMPLIED BY SYG: CURRENT EMOTIONAL STATE OF PUBLIC OPINION, BITTERNESS IDF OVER WITHDRAWAL POLICY, DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION WITH TENUOUS POSITION OF GOVERNMENT FOLLOWING WITHDRAWAL, GOI CONFIDENCE THAT ANY ACT IT MIGHT REASONABLY DEFEND ON NATIONAL SECURITY BASIS WOULD GET DIRECT SUPPORT OF FRENCH AND AT LEAST BROAD MORAL SUPPORT BY THOSE NATIONS WHICH INDICATED SUCH ATTITUDE RECENTLY AT UN, PUBLICLY ASSERTED GOI CONFIDENCE AND DEPENDENCE ON SECRETARY'S POSITION ON GAZA AND WILLINGNESS TO ENCOURAGE DEFACTO ABSENCE EGYPTIANS FOR PERIOD OF TIME, BELIEF THAT US GOVERNMENT AND WIDE SEGMENT US PUBLIC WOULD NOT CONDEMN ISRAEL FOR DEFENSE ACTION IF EGYPT RETURNED TO GAZA WHEN CLEAR IT A THREAT TO ISRAEL SECURITY.

I DO NOT BELIEVE TIME NOR SITUATION WITHIN ISRAEL WOULD NOW WARRANT CALCULATED RISK INVOLVED IN DECISION BY SYG AND US GOVERNMENT NOT TO RESIST BY EVERY MEANS POSSIBLE RETURN OF EGYPTIANS TO GAZA AND BY NOT TAKING POSITIVE POSITION ON ISSUE TO FULLEST EXTENT POSSIBLE. NOR DO I BELIEVE "FIVE OR SIX WEEKS OF CALM" POSSIBLE IF ISSUE CONTINUES TO BE DRAMATICALLY PUBLICIZED AS IS NOW APPARENTLY THE CASE. NOR CAN I VISUALIZE HOW THE EGYPTIANS COULD COME "QUIETLY INTO GAZA" UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. CONTRARY TO SYG'S CONCLUSION I BELIEVE THERE ARE STRONG REASONS TO "FEAR ADVERSE DOMESTIC REACTION IN ISRAEL".

DESPITE GROWING EMOTION IN ISRAEL FED BY REPORTED EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS IN PRESS WITH REFERENCE TO DETERMINATION TO RETURN TO GAZA, SEVERE LIMITATIONS IT APPLIES TO UNEF,

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-3- 1075, MARCH 12, FROM TEL AVIV

AND RABBLE-ROUSING, INFLAMMATORY APPEALS TO GAZA AND EGYPTIAN PUBLIC ESPECIALLY ON CAIRO RADIO, THERE IS CHANCE, I FEEL, THAT GOI MAY BE PERSUADED (A) TO TAKE MODERATE PROPAGANDA LINE REGARDING EGYPTIAN OCCUPATION GAZA DURING PERIOD OF ATTEMPT BY UN AND US GOVERNMENT TO DEVELOP INTERIM PERIOD OF CALM; (B) NOT TO RUN TEST SHIP THRU CANAL; (C) NOT TO MOVE WAR SHIPS THRU STRAITS OF TIRAN. BUT THIS HOPE IS BASED ON ASSUMPTION GOI FULLY AWARE UN AND US GOVERNMENT MAKING EVERY POSSIBLE EFFORT TO PROPERLY INFLUENCE EGYPT (AND THESE EFFORTS ARE BEING MADE NOW WITH SOME PROSPECT OF SUCCESS), IN MEANTIME NO MOVEMENT OF EGYPTIANS INTO GAZA ACTUALLY TAKES PLACE, AND THAT NO SERIOUS THREATS TO ISRAEL ORIGINATE IN GAZA.

LAWSON

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FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1076, MARCH 12, 11 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

N. ACT

SENT DEPARTMENT 1076. REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 211, PARIS 178, CAIRO 193, AMMAN 188, DAMASCUS 135, BEIRUT 175, USUN 72, JERUSALEM UNNUMBERED.

NOFORN

FOREIGN MINISTER MEIR CALLED ME TO HER JERUSALEM RESIDENCE AT 6:30 THIS EVENING TO MAKE WHAT SHE DESCRIBED AS TWELFTH HOUR APPEAL FOR US INTERVENTION TO AVOID "CALAMITY" OF GOI SENDING IDF BACK INTO GAZA.

SHE SAID NASSER'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF APPOINTMENT GOVERNOR GENERAL FOR GAZA THIS MORNING HAD BEEN FOLLOWED ONLY HOUR BEFORE OUR MEETING BY REPORT SHE CONSIDERED UNQUESTIONABLY AUTHENTIC THAT NASSER'S CANDIDATE WAS ENROUTE TO GAZA AND MIGHT EVEN ARRIVE THERE TONIGHT.

"THERE IS ONLY ONE THING THAT CAN SAVE SITUATION AND THAT IS FOR USG TO CALL IN HAMMARSKJOLD AND TELL HIM YOU DO NOT WANT THIS DEVELOPMENT TO TAKE PLACE AND DO NOT WANT HIM TO BELIEVE GOI TO BE BULLIED INTO ACCEPTING JUST ANYTHING NASSER HAPPENS TO WANT." SHE ADDED HAMMARSKJOLD WOULD NOT "DARE" IGNORE SUCH ADMONITION BY USG AND COULD BE PERSUADED BY IT TO STOP RESTORATION EGYPTIAN CONTROL.

MEIR, WHO LIKE MOST OF HER CABINET ASSOCIATES, NOW ACCUSES SYG OF SERIOUS BIAS AGAINST ISRAEL, INSISTED AGAINST ALL MY ARGUMENTS THAT NASSER'S APPOINTMENT OF GOVERNOR GENERAL HAD BEEN DONE WITH KNOWLEDGE, IF NOT CONSENT, OF HAMMARSKJOLD. I ARGUED THAT THERE WAS POSSIBILITY HAMMARSKJOLD HAD BEEN

IGNORANT OF

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by EUR  
11/21/57

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-2- 1076, MARCH 12, 11 PM FROM TEL AVIV (SECTION 1 OF 2)

IGNORANT OF DEVELOPMENT UNTIL TODAY WHICH MIGHT EXPLAIN ANY FAILURE ON HIS PART TO ACT. BUT SHE WOULD NOT BE DISSUADED FROM HER CONVICTION THAT HE MUST HAVE KNOWN OF MOVE OR ACTUALLY APPROVED IT.

SHE PROFESSED TO BE THUNDERSTRUCK BY REMARK ATTRIBUTED BY LOCAL PRESS TO BUNCHE TO EFFECT IF EGYPTIAN GOVERNOR GENERAL DID APPEAR IN GAZA, GENERAL BURNS WOULD SHAKE HIS HAND. SHE SAID EGYPT COULD ONLY INTERPRET SUCH REMARK AS "YES, PLEASE, BY ALL MEANS SEND HIM ALONG".

MEIR SAID SHE PARTICIPATED IN MULTI-PARTY KNESSET FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY COMMITTEE'S STORMY THREE AND ONE HALF HOUR SESSION THIS AFTERNOON ON THOSE DEVELOPMENTS RE NASSER'S NEW GOVERNOR GENERAL WHICH PRECEDED INTELLIGENCE REPORT HE IS ACTUALLY ON HIS WAY TO GAZA. FULL KNESSET WOULD MEET ON ISSUE TOMORROW BY WHICH TIME GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE CONFRONTED WITH FAIT ACCOMPLI OF GOVERNOR GENERAL'S TRIUMPHANT ENTRY INTO TOWN. "IF THEY ASK ME WHAT WE ARE GOING TO DO ABOUT IT, MY PERSONAL ANSWER IS TO SUGGEST WE MOVE RIGHT BACK IN. OUR PEOPLE HAD CORRECT INSTINCT OF TROUBLE AND ACCEPTED DECISION TO WITHDRAW WITH HEAVY HEARTS, BUT WERE PERSUADED BY THEIR GOVERNMENT THEY SHOULD REPOSE THEIR FAITH IN US IN PARTICULAR AND WORLD COMMUNITY IN GENERAL. IT WOULD BE TREASONABLE TO BETRAY THAT FAITH BY ACQUIESCING".

SHE REPEATED TIME AND AGAIN BELIEF SECRETARY DULLES WOULD BE AS DUMBFOUNDED BY THIS DEVELOPMENT AS GOI. SHE SAID IN HER STATEMENT TO UN THERE WAS NOT SINGLE COMMA WHICH HAD NOT HAD APPROVAL OF "IMPORTANT CORPS OF STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS, EVEN INCLUDING AT TIMES SECRETARY HIMSELF WHO HAS LENT HIS HEART AND MIND TO IT ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY, IT APPEARED TO US, FOR AT LEAST TWO WEEKS. WE HAD EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE HE MEANT IT WHEN HE PERMITTED US TO ASSUME THERE WOULD BE UNEF ADMINISTRATION OF GAZA FOR INDEFINITE PERIOD. I DO NOT SAY MR. DULLES ACCEPTS OUR VIEW THAT EGYPTIANS HAD NO LEGAL RIGHT IN GAZA. BUT EBAN SAID SECRETARY HAD INTIMATED HE WOULD NOT OBJECT TO DE FACTO SITUATION OF NO EGYPTIAN RETURN TO GAZA AND DESIRED PERIOD OF QUIET. IN VIEW OF PERSONAL EFFORT SECRETARY PUT IN THIS MATTER, I AM CONFIDENT HE WILL WANT TO PREVENT SITUATION FALLING APART MUCH SOONER THAN EVEN THE MOST PESSIMISTIC OF US EVER BELIEVED".

LAWSON

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FROM: TEL AV - CORRECTED PAGE 1

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1076, MARCH 12, 11 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

N ACT

SENT DEPARTMENT 1076, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 211, PARIS 178, CAIRO 193, AMMAN 188, DAMASCUS 135, BEIRUT 175, USUN 72, JERUSALEM UNNUMBERED.

NOFORN

TOLD HER THAT I DID NOT THINK HER FAITH IN USG WAS MISPLACED AND WAS SURE IF FACTS WERE AS SHE STATED THEM, WE WERE NOT AT THIS MOMENT SITTING IDLY BY. SHE SAID SHE HOPED WE COULD SEND COPY OF THIS MESSAGE OR DIGEST TO SECRETARY AT CANBERRA.

I QUESTIONED HER IN DETAIL AS TO LENGTH SHE HAD GONE TO CONVINCE HAMMARSKJOLD (EMBTel 1068) AND OTHERS THAT EGYPTIAN RETURN TO GAZA MEANT WAR EVEN IF NOT ACCOMPANIED BY SPECIFIC THREAT TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND WHETHER HAMMARSKJOLD MIGHT HAVE THOUGHT THERE WAS ELEMENT OF BLUFF IN HER STATEMENTS. SHE REPLIED EMPHATICALLY SHE HAD MADE IT CLEAR, NOT ONLY TO HAMMARSKJOLD BUT TO LODGE AS WELL, AND FORMER WOULD BE VERY FOOLISH INDEED IF HE THOUGHT SHE WAS NOT SERIOUS. THERE COULD BE NO COMPROMISE OF THIS POSITION BECAUSE GOVERNOR GENERAL, WITH OR WITHOUT STAFF, WAS ENTERING WEDGE. THEY WERE HAVING TROUBLES ENOUGH ALREADY WITH RENEWAL OF FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY WHICH COULD BE EXPECTED TO INCREASE WITH ENCOURAGEMENT HOSTILE ELEMENTS WOULD DERIVE FROM PRESENCE OF GOVERNOR GENERAL.

SHE SAID VERY DELIBERATELY WITH THE APPEARANCE OF WEIGHING EVERY WORD THAT IF THEY WERE OBLIGED TO TAKE TRAGIC DECISION "SENDING OUR BOYS BACK TO GAZA IT WOULD BE WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE UNEF WOULD STILL BE THERE".

Correction made  
by RM/R

IN EFFORT

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Action

Control: 7631

Rec'd: MARCH 12, 1957  
11:11 PM

NEA  
Info

FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1076, MARCH 12, 11 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

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NI ACT

SENT DEPARTMENT 1076, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 211, PARIS  
178, CAIRO 193, AMMAN 188, DAMASCUS 135, BEIRUT 175, USUN 72,  
JERUSALEM UNNUMBERED.

NOFORN

I TOLD HER THAT I DID NOT THINK HER FAITH IN USG WAS MISPLACED  
AND I WOULD SHOW IF FACTS WERE AS SHE STATED THEM, (#)

SHE HOPED WE COULD SEND COPY OF THIS MESSAGE OR DIGEST TO  
SECRETARY AT CANBERRA.

I QUESTIONED HER IN DETAIL AS TO LENGTH SHE HAD GONE TO CONVINCE  
HAMMARSKJOLD (EMBTel 1068) AND OTHERS THE EGYPTIAN RETURN TO  
GAZA MEANT WAR EVEN IF NOT ACCOMPANIED BY SPECIFIC THREAT TO  
ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND WHETHER HAMMARSKJOLD MIGHT HAVE THOUGHT  
THERE WAS ELEMENT OF BLUFF IN HER STATEMENTS. SHE REPLIED EMPHAT-  
ICALLY SHE HAD MADE IT CLEAR NOT ONLY TO HAMMARSKJOLD BUT TO LODGE  
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SHE WAS NOT SERIOUS. THERE COULD BE NO COMPROMISE OF THIS  
POSITION BECAUSE GOVERNOR GENERAL, WITH OR WITHOUT STAFF,  
WAS ENTERING WEDGE. THEY WERE HAVING TROUBLES ENOUGH ALREADY  
WITH RENEWAL OF FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY WHICH COULD BE EXPECTED TO  
INCREASE WITH ENCOURAGEMENT HOSTILE ELEMENTS WOULD DERIVE FROM  
PRESENCE OF GOVERNOR GENERAL.

SHE SAID VERY DELIBERATELY WITH THE APPEARANCE OF WEIGHING  
EVERY WORD THAT IF THEY WERE OBLIGED TO TAKE TRAGIC DECISION OF  
"SENDING OUR BOYS BACK TO GAZA IT WOULD BE WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE  
UNEF WOULD STILL BE THERE".

IN EFFORT

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-2- 1076, MARCH 12, 11 PM FROM TEL AVIV (SECTION 2 OF 2)

IN EFFORT TO TURN HER THOUGHTS TO POSSIBILITIES OTHER THAN REOCCUPATION GAZA, I ASKED HER IF SHE DID NOT THINK ERECTION OF FENCE ON EACH SIDE OF BORDER STRIP MIGHT NOT PROVE SATISFACTORY SAFEGUARD AGAINST FURTHER INCURSIONS BY EGYPTIAN OR OTHER HOSTILE ELEMENTS, BUT SHE DODGED QUESTION BY INDICATING CONSIDERATION SUCH ALTERNATIVES WERE PREMATURE, THAT PRESENT OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE TO PROLONG UNEF ADMINISTRATION INDEFINITELY.

SHE WAS BITTERLY CRITICAL OF HAMMARSKJOLD HAVING CALLED IN NUMBER DELEGATES DAY AFTER GENERAL ASSEMBLY RECESSED TO ASK THEM WHAT THEY THOUGHT SECOND STEP IN GAZA SHOULD BE.

"WHY THE HURRY? I HAD THOUGHT ALL OF US WERE INTERESTED IN FIRST STEP -- OCCUPATION OF GAZA BY UNEF -- BEING DRAGGED OUT LONGEST POSSIBLE TIME."

SHE SAID IF THEY COULD HAVE ENVISAGED THESE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS, THREAT OF ALL SANCTIONS WORLD COULD THINK OF WOULD NOT HAVE PREVAILED ON THEM TO WITHDRAW. THEIR PRIMARY CONSIDERATION WAS STRAIN CONTINUED RESISTANCE WOULD HAVE PLACED ON THEIR BASIC RELATIONSHIP TO USG RATHER THAN SANCTIONS.

AS I ~~WAS~~ AFTER FOUR HOUR'S CONVERSATION, SHE SAID SHE WAS EXPECTING TELEPHONE CALL TO SHILOAH TO COME THROUGH WITHIN NEXT FEW MINUTES. SHE INTENDED TO ASK HIM TO OBTAIN APPOINTMENT WITH ACTING SECRETARY IMMEDIATELY AND WAS GOING TO DISCUSS POSSIBILITY OF RECALLING EBAN WHO LEFT FOR HOLIDAY ONLY TWO DAYS AGO. SHE ADDED THAT BEN-GURION'S HOLIDAY SCHEDULED TENTATIVELY TO BEGIN TODAY HAS BEEN INDEFINITELY POSTPONED.

COMMENT: I CANNOT EVALUATE MEIR'S REMARKS IN DEFINITE TERMS OF PROBABLY CABINET DECISIONS BUT I AM CONVINCED IF DECISION WERE HERS TO MAKE, IT WOULD BE REOCCUPATION OF GAZA IF GOVERNOR GENERAL IN FACT DOES SHOW HIMSELF THERE.

LAWSON

LR

# 50 characters omitted. Correction to follow,

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Action

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Control: 7871

Rec'd: March 13, 1957  
7:26 a.m.NEA  
Info  
RMR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1077, March 12, 11 p.m.

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PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1077; REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 194, PARIS 179,  
LONDON 212, BEIRUT 176, USUN 73, AMMAN 189, DAMASCUS 136,  
BAGHDAD 62

NOFORN

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AIR

Reliable source, who visited Gaza yesterday, told Embassy Army Attache that situation in Gaza Town "very calm" due principally to Danish contingent's forceful handling of crowds. He said Danish soldiers, after failing cow mobs with tear gas and firing into air, unhesitatingly waded into disorderly crowds with rifle butts swinging and populace realized they mean business. He also attributed present calm to fact Egypt has apparently withdrawn armed Fedayeen and professional agitators who were much in evidence during first days UNEF occupation although Fedayeen may have simply gone under ground. He suggests that Fedayeen (who appeared early in their usual uniforms) and agitators were sent by Egypt in order to (1) incite disturbances and compel UNEF use force against civilian population, and (2) establish conviction in populace that it had better want Egyptian administration or else. Source believes Egypt recalled Fedayeen and agitators after having achieved the exercises.

Source added following items:

1. Egyptian pounds now (repeat now) only acceptable currency to population.
2. Telephone and telegraph lines to Israel still intact but not (repeat not) powered.
3. Negotiations with Israel on water and power supply "temporarily at standstill".

Also re Gaza, IDF Intelligence Chief Harcabi told Embassy Army Attache IDF defense positions on Gaza perimeter are being strengthened but that situation is extremely difficult since border

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1977, March 12, 11 p.m., from Tel Aviv

(1) ... and clearly warned at all points and  
in most UNEF patrols way from south of IDF.  
... and assessed IDF intentions are  
... directed against UNEF and noted  
... there one trigger-happy soldier  
... to inclination to shoot first and ask questions

LAWSON

Sw: A-14

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MAR 12 1957

Action

Control: 7112  
Rec'd: March 12, 1957  
9:10 a.m.

EUR

FROM: Paris

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 4659, March 12

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SENT DEPARTMENT 4659; REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 739.

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During nation-wide radio television address last night Mollet said of Gaza: "The news which came from Gaza a few hours ago was not good. I have the impression our American friends, who last week understood our position better, will be able to realize that we were right when we denounced Nasser's attitude."

OCB

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Control: 7373

Rec'd: MARCH 12, 1957

2:24 P.M.



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FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 615, MARCH 12, 1 P.M.

NIACT

RE PALESTINE; GAZA

LODGE SPOKE TO SYG PURSUANT DEPTTEL 689. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID IT WOULD BE GOOD IDEA FOR HARE TO SPEAK TO NASSER IN SENSE INDICATED, BUT HE FELT HARE SHOULD KNOW OF SYG'S INSTRUCTIONS TO BUNCHE (QUOTED BELOW) AND MIGHT DESIRABLY TAKE SIMILAR LINE.

HAMMARSKJOLD HAS NO OBJECTION OUR URGING SELECTED MEMBERS ADVISORY COMMITTEE MAKE SIMILAR APPROACHES TO EGYPT. HE THOUGHT LITTLE USE IN TALKING TO PAKISTANIS, AND CAUTIONED THAT CANADIANS NOT EXACTLY POPULAR IN EGYPT AT THIS MOMENT AS EGYPT BELIEVES CANADIANS FAVOR INTERNATIONALIZATION OF GAZA. HE SUGGESTED BRAZIL AE RWAY AS PARTICULARLY USEFUL.

WE MET LATER WITH SYG AND DISCUSSED ROLE ADVISORY COMMITTEE AS WELL AS SYGS TRIP TO CAIRO.

HAMMARSKJOLD SAID THIS MORNING'S HAMILTON ARTICLE IN NY TIMES WAS A DELIBERATE ATTACK ON ADVISORY COMMITTEE AND HIMSELF. HE SAID THERE HAD BEEN NO DISSENT IN YESTERDAYS ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING. HE SAID COMMITTEE HAD MERELY HAD "COMMON SENSE" DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDED THERE WAS NOTHING TO BE DONE AT PRESENT TIME.

HAMMARSKJOLD SAID THAT THIS AFTERNOONS MEETING OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE HE PLANNED PUT UP TO COMMITTEE:

1. ACTION BY THEM TO CORRECT FALSE IMPRESSION OF HAMILTON ARTICLE (ENGEN (NORWAY) HAS AGREED SOME ACTION DESIRABLE);

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-2- 615, MARCH 12, 1 PM, FROM NEW YORK

2. COMMITTEE DECISION ON UN POSITION RE GAZA.

IN THIS CONNECTION HE HAS PREPARED A BRIEF OF ALL RELEVANT STATEMENTS DURING GA DEBATE WITH REFERENCE TO GAZA IN HOPE COMMITTEE WILL MAKE USE OF THIS BRIEF TO PREPARE STATEMENT RECORDING THEIR INTERPRETATION OF STATUS OF GAZA, DUTIES UNEF, ETC.

SYG THEN TURNED TO HIS PROPOSED TRIP TO CAIRO SAYING HE DID NOT THINK IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR HIM TO LEAVE IMMEDIATELY. HE SAID HE HAD TICKETS TO LEAVE ON SATURDAY AND WOULD ELIMINATE HIS STOPS IN TUNIS AND ROME, THEREBY BEING IN CAIRO ON MONDAY. SYG SAID FAWZI (EGYPT) ARRIVES IN CAIRO TOMORROW NIGHT AND HE BELIEVED HE SHOULD HAVE CHANCE TO PRESENT HIS VIEWS TO NASSER BEFORE SYG ARRIVES. SYG SAID THAT WHILE HE UNDERSTOOD THAT NO ANSWER FROM EGYPTIANS ON INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS CREATES SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES, IT WOULD EQUALLY REFLECT ON HIS OFFICE IF HE WENT OUT THERE NOW AND GOT NO ANSWER. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID HE ALSO BELIEVED THAT IN HIS CAPACITY AS SYG HE MUST PLAY FOR MAXIMUM RESULTS AND NOT FOR PUBLIC EFFECT AND THAT WHILE HE MIGHT SUCCEED ON QUESTION OF INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS, HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE, IN VIEW OF UNFAVORABLE PUBLICITY THAT HAS DEVELOPED, TO SUCCEED IN PUBLIC EYE ON GAZA.

HAMMARSKJOLD THEN GAVE US EXTRACT FROM HIS INSTRUCTIONS TO BUNCHE:

"WE DO NOT QUESTION EGYPTIANS LEGAL RIGHT. WE CONSIDER THAT NO STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN WHICH PREJUDGE A SETTLEMENT OF PROBLEMS MENTIONED IN THE SECRETARY GENERALS STATEMENT IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 22 FEBRUARY, PRIOR TO SUCH A SETTLEMENT. WE FURTHER CONSIDER THAT IF SUCH STEPS ARE DECIDED UPON THEY SHOULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED UNTIL AFTER THE SETTLEMENT. IN THE PRESENT CASE WE DO NOT DENY THAT A LIAISON GROUP MAY BE USEFUL OR THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN EGYPTIAN 'ADMINISTRATIVE' GOVERNOR IN GAZA, BUT WE CONSIDER IT POLITICALLY INADVISABLE, AND IN RELATION TO US A SERIOUS COMPLICATION, IF SUCH ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WERE TO BE PUT INTO EFFECT BEFORE AN UNDERSTANDING IS REACHED ON THE WHOLE SET OF PROBLEMS

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-3- 615, MARCH 12, 1 PM, FROM NEW YORK

REGARDING FUTURE COOPERATION... I FEEL YOU SHOULD STRIVE FOR ... DELAY IN IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES UNTIL AFTER AGREEMENT WITH ME (AS) ESSENTIAL IF EGYPT IS NOT BLOW ITS COOPERATION WITH UN TO PIECES."

HE SAID THAT HE HAD INSTRUCTED BUNCHE TAKE FIRM LINE WITH EGYPTIANS ON

1. NO RAIDS
2. NO EGYPTIAN TROOPS GOING TO GAZA
3. SLOW DOWN ON ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES.

HIS INSTRUCTIONS IN THESE RESPECTS WERE QUITE DETAILED. HE SAID HE FELT THAT BUNCHE, WHO IS SCHEDULED TO SEE NASSER TODAY SHOULD ALSO BE GIVEN CHANCE TO SEE HOW FAR HE CAN GET.

HAMMARSKJOLD OBVIOUSLY NOT ANXIOUS TO GO TO CAIRO UNTIL HE FEELS THERE IS BETTER CHANCE OF SOME SUCCESS. WHILE HE APPARENTLY HAD HOPES ON QUESTION OF INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS,

HE WAS FAR FROM SAANGUINE AS FAR AS GAZA CONCERNED AND PREFERRED TO WAIT AND SEE EFFECTS OF FAWZIS AND BUNCHE'S TALKS WITH NASSER BEFORE FINALIZING HIS APPROACH TO PROBLEM.

IN CONVERSATION EARLIER IN MORNING LODGE SAID DEPT FELT IT DESIRABLE FOR SYG MAKE EARLY TRIP TO CAIRO. BARCO REPEATED THIS AT SECOND MEETING WITH SYG.

LODGE

CES:MDG

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UNIP (Gannon)

Control: 7584

Rec'd: MARCH 12, 1957

9:16 PM

HTP

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FROM: NEW YORK

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 616, MARCH 12

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RE PALESTINE: GAZA

FOLLOWING IS TEXT STATEMENT ISSUED FOLLOWING TODAY'S MEETING OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE BY SPOKESMAN FOR SYG:

QTE AT A MEETING OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON UNEF HELD 12 MARCH, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE DREW ATTENTION TO A REPORT IN A NEWYORK NEWSPAPER PURPORTING TO BE AN ACCOUNT OF DISCUSSIONS AT THE COMMITTEE'S MEETING ON 11 MARCH.

ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE CONSIDERED THAT THE ACCOUNT WAS INACCURATE AND MISLEADING, AND AUTHORIZED THE SYG TO HAVE THIS PRESS COMMUNIQUE ISSUED, INCLUDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THERE WAS NO DISAGREEMENT IN THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE REGARDING QUESTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN DISCUSSED ON 11 MARCH.

THE SPOKESMAN FOR THE SYG ADDED THAT THE MEETINGS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ARE CLOSED MEETINGS.

IF AT ANY TIME IT WERE THOUGHT TO BE DESIRABLE FOR A STATEMENT TO BE MADE ON THE PROCEEDINGS OF AN ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING IT WOULD, BY AGREEMENT WITH THE COMMITTEE'S MEMBERS, BE MADE BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE SYG UNQTE.

LODGE


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ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS  
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47

Action  
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JHP/Gannon

FROM: NEW YORK

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 617, MARCH 12, 8 PM

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RE PALESTINE: GAZA.

FURTHER OUR TEL 615 IN PURSUANCE DEPTTEL 689 MISSION OFFICERS  
SPOKE TO ENGEN (NORWAY), FREITAS-VALLE (BRAZIL), AND URRUTIA  
(COLOMBIA).

ENGEN INDICATED CONCURRENCE IN PURPOSE OF SUGGESTED DEMARCHE  
AND IS WIRING OSLO WITH FAVORABLE RECOMMENDATION. NAEVDAL  
(NORWAY) TOLD US TODAY THAT FONMIN LANGE WOULD PROBABLY CALL  
IN EGYPTIAN AMB IN OSLO RATHER THAN HAVING APPROACH MADE IN CAIRO.

FREITAS-VALLE LIKEWISE AGREED AND IS WIRING RIO RECOMMENDING  
THEY INSTRUCT BRAZILIAN AMB CAIRO MAKE SIMILAR APPROACH.

URRUTIA SAID HE STRONGLY AGREED WITH THIS COURSE OF ACTION AND,  
DUE TO ABSENCE OF COLOMBIAN REPRESENTATION OF ADEQUATE LEVEL  
IN CAIRO, WILL SEND CABLE DIRECT TO FAWZI URGING MODERATION.

ACCORDING TO ENGEN AND CORDIER MOST OF TIME OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE  
THIS AFTERNOON WAS SPENT IN CONSIDERATION OF HARMFUL EFFECTS  
OF HAMILTON ARTICLE IN TODAY'S NY TIMES. COMMUNIQUE AIMED  
AT THIS ARTICLE WITHOUT MENTIONING ITS AUTHOR WAS AGREED TO  
UNANIMOUSLY BY ADVISORY COMMITTEE INDICATING THAT ITS CONTENTS  
WERE INACCURATE AND MISLEADING.  
(TEXT BEING CABLED SEPARATELY.)

FREITAS-VALLE SAID MUCH THOUGHT HAD BEEN GIVEN TO HAMILTON ARTICLE  
AND CONCLUSION WAS IT HAD TO BE ANSWERED. CORDIER COMMENTED THAT  
COMMUNIQUE WAS "VERY CONSTRUCTIVE" DEVELOPMENT.

ENGEN

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-2- 617, MARCH 12, 8 PM FROM NEW YORK

ENGEN SAID THAT SENTENCE IN ARTICLE ATTRIBUTING TO "SOME MEMBERS" OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE THOUGHT THAT APPOINTMENT BY NASSER OF GAZA GOVERNOR WAS SIGN THAT EGYPT HAD DECIDED DISCREDIT UNEF AND DRIVE IT OUT OF GAZA WAS VERBATIM REPRODUCTION OF STATEMENT MADE TO HIM BY KIDRON (ISRAEL) OVER TELEPHONE LAST NIGHT. ENGEN SAID THIS IDEA HAD NOT EVEN BEEN RAISED BY ANYONE IN ANY WAY IN YESTERDAY'S MEETING. ENGEN WAS QUITE EMPHATIC IN SAYING "NOT A SINGLE WORD" OF HAMILTON'S ARTICLE WAS TRUE.

NORWEGIANS TOLD US THAT KIDRON YESTERDAY HAD INFORMED THEM HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BEGINNING TODAY TO FILE DAILY REPORTS WITH UN REGARDING FEDAYEEN RAIDS MADE AGAINST ISRAEL.

NORWEGIANS ALSO INFORMED US THAT EGYPTIANS HAD TOLD GEN BURNS THEY WERE PLANNING TO SEND SMALL GROUP OF OFFICERS WITH GOVERNOR-DESIGNATE TO GAZA IN NEXT DAY OR SO. BUNCHE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED ACCORDING TO ENGEN, TO DISSUADE EGYPTIANS FROM TAKING THIS STEP NOW. ENGEN SAID THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE FOR UNEF TO REFUSE TO ADMIT PEOPLE SENT TO GAZA BY EGYPT, SINCE LEGALLY EGYPT HAD SUCH RIGHT. THEREFORE, HE FELT VARIOUS APPROACHES TO EGYPT OUGHT TO STRESS, AS HE UNDERSTOOD BUNCHE'S INSTRUCTIONS STRESSED, THAT IT WAS NOT A QUESTION OF EGYPT NOT HAVING RIGHT TO DO CERTAIN THINGS, BUT QUESTION OF DESIRABILITY, EXPEDIENCY, WISDOM, ETC.

LODGE

SGC

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APR 1 1957



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☐ CHARGE TO

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1957 MAR 12 PM 2 15

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PRIORITY 2993

RPTD INFO: USUN NEW YORK

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Origin

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Department deeply concerned reports re Egyptian attitude regarding Gaza. While US has consistently recognized that arrangements following Israeli withdrawal must be within framework legal situation arising from Armistice Agreement, we have placed importance in arrangements, in which Egypt ~~unanimously~~ acquiesced, for UNEF administration at least for some time following withdrawal and, we hoped, until there is agreement on future of Strip or permanent overall settlement. While we recognized Egypt might for prestige reasons insist upon some participation, at least symbolic, it obviously of utmost importance Egypt take no precipitate action which in present circumstances would involve grave danger that UN efforts to achieve peace will fail.

You are requested to seek appointment with Nasser soonest and, in foregoing context, urge him refrain from any precipitate action that would serve to undo what has been achieved. We hope GOE will continue demonstrate forbearance that has marked its special position in recent past and that while ~~maintaining~~ retaining its rights Egypt will cooperate fully in implementation measures set forth SYG Report February 22 as best means assure peace and quiet in area.

SV

Drafted by:

NEA:WMRoutree:hh;av

3/12/57

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

Christian A. Hertel

Clearances:

IO Jans  
L JIP

S/S

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CS/J

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You might discreetly allude fact that recurrence of hostilities or creation new dangerous situation which would call for further urgent consideration by UN might, if Egyptian cooperation in this important matter not forthcoming, place Egypt in position entirely different from that occupied during recent GA discussions. We now have opportunity capitalize upon success of UN in restoring peace and achieving withdrawal occupying forces, <sup>in which U.S. played major</sup> and any Egyptian <sup>role</sup> action which would endanger that opportunity would be viewed with grave concern and disfavor by overwhelming majority UN members.

FYI We are urging Hammarskjold proceed immediately to Egypt to discuss with Nasser Gaza question and interim Canal arrangements. We hope his present plans arrive about March 21 will be altered to provide substantially earlier arrival.

*Herter*  
*C. A. H.* **HERTER**

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☐ CHARGE TO

## Department of State

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1957 MAR 12 PM 2 17

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~~Amembassy~~ LONDON ~~PARIS~~  
Amembassy PARIS <sup>3566</sup>  
Amembassy CAIRO <sup>2994</sup>

Code Room: Pls repeat Deptel USUN New York, 687, 3/9/57 to above FYI.

~~XXXXXXXX~~

*674.840*  
*HR 320.580*  
*Herter*  
Acting

HERTER


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Drafted by:

NEA/P:ERB:mer:efc

Clearance:

NE:SWR:hell

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classification approved

ENJ Kretzmann

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TELEGRAM**

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

**Department of State**

**SECRET**  
Classification

06489

1957 MAR 12 PM 7 58

DC/T

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SENT TO: Amembassy CAIRO 3004 PRIORITY

Origin
Info:
Dist. Desired (Offices Only)

674.84a / 3-12

(Code Room: Please repeat for information NEW YORK's 615,  
March 12, to Department.)

SUBJECT: UN Secretary-General instructions to Bunche re Gaza.

This Document Must Be Returned to  
R/R  
C/DePalma  
plus  
674.84A/3-1257

HERTZ  
Hertz  
SDP

CS/BL

674.84a / 3-1257

**SECRET**

Drafted by: IO:UNP:SDePalma:lmr 3/12/57

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by: UNP - Samuel DePalma

Clearances: NE - Mr. Rockwell  
(SDP)

515 CR  
MAR 12 1957 P.M.

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM

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## Department of State

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08300  
1957 MAR 12 PM 7 20

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SENT TO: USUN NEW YORK <sup>694</sup> (FOR INFORMATION)  
Amembassy PARIS <sup>3580</sup> (FOR INFORMATION)  
Amembassy LONDON <sup>6285</sup> (FOR INFORMATION)  
Amembassy ROME <sup>3671</sup> (FOR INFORMATION)

Origin

Info:

Re Gaza and Suez:

Following substance memo of conversation between Elbrick, Coulson and de Laboulaye (France) (Copy being pouched tonight USUN).

Elbrick said he had asked see Coulson and de Laboulaye in order review re interim arrangements for Suez Canal developments re Gaza and Suez. He recalled four-power proposal made to Egyptians through SYG and that no official response received, though Egyptian information officer had announced this proposal unacceptable to Egypt; Elbrick said Hammarskjold had planned <sup>not arrive Cairo before end next week</sup> ~~go to Cairo end of this week~~ but in view developments in Gaza we believe SYG should leave immediately. We believe Egyptians should be pressed give definite official reply to four-power proposal on interim arrangements. Moreover, highly confusing situation in Gaza would probably be handled better by SYG in Cairo than in NY. Department had requested Lodge this morning inform SYG our belief he go Cairo immediately. We <sup>hope</sup> ~~hope~~ UK and France <sup>would</sup> ~~would~~ take similar line with Hammarskjold soonest.

Coulson said prior present developments UK felt unwise for SYG go Cairo before Egyptians had come up with something concrete regarding Canal. Coulson said UK might now feel <sup>differently</sup> ~~anxiously~~ in view Gaza developments. In response Coulson inquiry re possible US pressures on Egypt, Elbrick responded we developing various alternatives whose suitability would be

Drafted by:

IO:UNP:JJSisco:rs 3/12/57

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

EUR - Mr. Elbrick

Clearances:

UNP - Mr. DePalma  
S/S-CE

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determined in light nature Egyptian response on Canal.

De Laboulaye stressed his belief SYG should be made understand we wanted him get Egyptian agreement to four-power proposal and not something less than that.

De Laboulaye said French would prefer Hammarskjold return empty-handed if he had not been able get agreement on four-power proposal rather than have him come back recommendation for with/alternative proposal on Canal which could embarrass users. ~~De Laboulaye~~

~~emphasized that he would like to see Hammarskjold return empty-handed if he had not been able to get agreement on four-power proposal rather than have him come back with an alternative proposal on Canal which could embarrass users.~~

Coulson promised take up matter of parallel UK approach immediately. De Laboulaye said in view Mollet-MacMillan agreement over weekend QUOTE not to react in any way to Nasser UNQUOTE and QUOTE to let Nasser wonder just what we are going to do UNQUOTE he would have to request instructions from Paris re possible approach SYG which in his view might be somewhat contradictory with general line agreed to by Mollet and MacMillan.

In separate meeting, Department Officer urged Ortona (Italy) make similar approach to SYG.

De Laboulaye  
(283)

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NND 897403  
BOX 2678

26A  
1/2/5

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The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 674.84A/3-1257  
Tel 3011  
Date 3/12/57  
From State  
To Cairo

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

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1/5/89  
Date

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26A

**OUTGOING  
TELEGRAM**INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO**Department of State****SECRET**

Classification

06103

957 MAR 12 PM 4 31

DC/T

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SENT TO: Amembassy CANBERRA TEDUL 14

FOR SECRETARY FROM ACTING SECRETARY

to Cairo info USUN

Am repeating to you DEPTTEL 2993/as TEDUL 15.

This summarizes our current position and action on Gaza problem which I shall be taking up with the President and recommending appropriate statement for him to make at his planned press conference tomorrow.

On canal tolls I am repeating to you Paris' 4648 as TEDUL 16. We have avoided discussing this with the UK and France because we prefer if at all possible to get first a reply from SYG that he can handle. If no answer is soon forthcoming from SYG we will need to start discussing with other user nations as well as UK and France.

ACTING

HERTER

Dist.  
Delivered  
(Office  
Only)

Dated by: S/S:PHowe:jmr 3/12/57

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

S/S - Mr. Howe

Clearance:

E - Mr. Dillon

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XR 674.841a

ING  
TELEGRAM

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

# Department of State

SECRET  
Classification

06104

1957 MAR 12 PM 4 31

DC/T

SENT TO: Amembassy CANBERRA TEDUL 15  
To be read only with the permission  
of the Director of S/S.

Repeated below is Department's message to Cairo 2993

on Gaza:

QUOTE

(Code Room: Please repeat 2993 to Cairo

Control 6013) UNQUOTE

ACTING

HERTER

674.84A/3-1257

A-MES

To be read only with the permission  
of the Director of S/S.

Drafted by:

S/S:FHowe:jmr

3/12/57

Telegraphic transmission and

Classification approved by:

S/S - Fisher Howe

Clearance:

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4. **BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT(S)** *(Origin, subject, reference no. or other pertinent data)*

Tel. #FEDUL 15 to Canberra 3/12/57

## 2. COPY INFORMATION

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2/17/58  
(Date)

Harold L. Skean  
(Top Secret Control Officer)

## 3. DATE AND NAME OF PERSON PREPARING FORM

2/17/58 Virginia Hollis

[illegible]

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674.84A/3-1257

**SECRET FILL-12**

10

S  
Canberra

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X

TEDUL 15

3/12/57

6104

*Message to Canberra  
on 3/12/57  
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

March 12, 1957

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE ACTING SECRETARY  
AND AMBASSADOR LODGE, 9:00 a.m.

Ambassador Lodge said he felt there were three discussions we should consider going on the Israeli situation:

1. Tell the Israeli to keep their shirt on. Subsequently in the conversation Governor Herter said that we had told them as much yesterday.
2. Tell the Egyptians that the UN is in a very strong position to act because of the past successful effort in removing the aggression of Israel, UK and France; this to be by way of warning but not a threat.
3. The Department should be studying what type of solution we might wish to sponsor - this on the assumption that the GA would be called back.

Ambassador Lodge said that the Secretary General now plans to go to the area on Saturday. He is meanwhile relying heavily on Bunche who is extremely capable.

The Acting Secretary said that we were giving consideration to what the President might say at his press conference tomorrow and two possible lines suggested themselves:

- (a) Draw particular attention to the Mansfield Amendment to the Middle East Resolution which mentions the support for UNEF.

(b) put

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(2)

1547

S/S : F. Howe

674.844/3-1257

NR 320.5780

- (b) Put the Israeli on public notice that any further Fedayeen raids we would consider as very serious and possibly serious enough to warrant Israel taking steps in self defense. Ambassador Lodge thought the latter of these would be extremely dangerous, inviting the Israeli to take the initiative which we wish to restrain them from taking. He did, however, believe that there should be a statement which would have a sobering effect, including mentioning the possibility of a calling of the GA if there was further trouble.

Governor Herter drew Ambassador Lodge's attention to the telegram we sent out last night, 689 to USUN.

Fisher Howe

S/S:FHowe:jmr  
3/12/57



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*Sec map C*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: March 12, 1957

SUBJECT: Egyptian-Israeli Situation

PARTICIPANTS: Messrs. Herter, Murphy, Henderson, Dillon, Phleger, Wilcox and Rountree.

COPIES TO:

G - Mr. Murphy  
O - Mr. Henderson  
E - Mr. Dillon  
L - Mr. Phleger  
IO - Mr. Wilcox  
NEA - Mr. Rountree

*Let made in 8/5*  
*674.842/3-1257*

Mr. Phleger opened the meeting by stating that some announcement should be made before the President leaves; that there should be no misunderstanding of the United States attitude on the general Egyptian situation.

Governor Herter said he felt the Mansfield Amendment might be mentioned by the President, who should stress the fact that we had given full moral support in this situation as it has unfolded, and that now if we had to use it against Egypt we should not hesitate to do so. If there were further Fedayeen raids, he felt the President should say something about them.

Mr. Murphy inquired whether or not we had ever told Egypt of our knowledge of their raiding set-up. Mr. Rountree said it had been covered by Hare quite extensively.

Mr. Wilcox raised the question as to whether we should explore the French attitude on this situation, and see if we could find out if they had been encouraging the Israelis. Mr. Murphy suggested that no hasty action be taken and that we should wait 48 hours to see what developed. Mr. Rountree agreed.

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*U: H. F. Stimpson*

Mr. Phleger said, the present Egyptian moves may be aimed at testing our reaction. If we don't react, Nasser will then take more pronounced steps, perhaps even requesting the UN to get out of Gaza. Mr. Rountree said Hare should talk to Nasser and then the President should make a public statement.

Mr. Herter said we should continue to emphasize our efforts which we used to get the Israelis out, and that now we should do the same against the Egyptians if necessary. He felt continuing silence on our part might be bad.

Mr. Dillon reported that the British and French had apparently decided to sit quietly and let us wrestle with the Canal problem. He said we should announce ourselves as still being in favor of the four-power proposal.

Mr. Herter reported that Bunche was going to tell the Egyptians to make no move on the Canal situation until a general agreement had been reached. Mr. Herter was in favor of Hammarskjold taking up the matter with Nasser.

Mr. Phleger said Hammarskjold was obviously worried about getting into the Canal situation, but that it was highly desirable that Hammarskjold deal directly with Nasser as soon as possible.

Mr. Herter agreed to tell Ambassador Lodge to urge Hammarskjold to go to Egypt as soon as possible. Mr. Herter then called Lodge, who agreed to do so.

U:HFStimpson:ges

553

M-612

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**Memorandum of Conversation**

DATE: March 12, 1957

SUBJECT: Developments in the Gaza Strip

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Israel Embassy  
Mr. Yohanan Meroz, First Secretary, Israel Embassy  
Acting Secretary, Mr. Herter  
Mr. Rountree (NEA)  
Mr. Roberts (NE)

COPIES TO: S/S (cc), G(cc), C(cc), NEA(cc), NE (cc), OLI (2), TO (cc),  
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Mr. Shiloah said he had called on urgent instructions from his government to bring to the attention of the Acting Secretary his government's concern over developments in the Gaza Strip. Nasser had appointed a Military Governor and the recent statement of Nasser to Arab students that the liberation of the Gaza Strip would be followed by the liberation of Palestine were indications of the mood and the declared policy of the Egyptian Government. There had also been recurrences of Fedayeen activities from Gaza into Israel, although not on a large scale as yet. The riots in Gaza had been inspired by Egyptian agents. All of these were Egyptian actions to create the right climate for them to take over the Strip. UNEF had made a mistake in releasing persons interned by the Israelis who were known to be leaders of Fedayeen units. The most ominous thing, however,--and Mrs. Meir had informed him of this by telephone--was that the UN had actually acceded to the return of the Egyptian Military Governor with a small staff. In Israel's view, the combination of all of these developments indicated the Egyptian intention to reoccupy the Strip and boded no good for the security of Israel or for the security of the area.

Mr. Shiloah's government regarded with particular gravity the information with respect to the United Nations tacit agreement to the return of a Military Governor, General Hassan Abdel Latif, and his staff of 25 civilians. He said that the United States was the only power which perhaps could avert their actual return. As far as Israel was concerned,

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MAR 21 1957

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the occupation of Gaza by Egypt was not a matter of prestige, but a matter of security. He expressed the opinion that Nasser and his Soviet sponsors would not like the area to calm down, and that Nasser is using this return to Gaza as a diversion in order to get the Canal open in advance of any agreement on the regime for the Canal.

He said that perhaps the Secretary General had too much faith in the statement of intentions received from Fawzi, or overestimated what he learned from the Egyptians, but Israel could only look on these things as dangerous developments. He had brought them to the Acting Secretary's attention and his government was asking the U.S. to use its own influence, and all it could gather through appropriate channels, both with the Secretary General and with Egypt directly, if appropriate, in order to prevent another crisis with all the heartaches and dangers involved.

The Acting Secretary referred to his conversation with Mr. Shiloah on Saturday and said that we were just as anxious that there be no inflammatory actions on the part of Egypt as we had indicated we were on the part of Israel; that so far as Egypt was concerned, we were taking steps to utilize our influence to see that there were no inflammatory steps taken by Egypt. He expressed his concern about the situation and stated that we had been busily engaged in doing what we could to avoid what we feel would be any move to aggravate the situation in the area.

Mr. Shiloah referred to a conversation with Assistant Secretary Rountree in which he had informed him that the Government of Israel had no plan to precipitate any test case in the Straits of Tiran, but that this suspected inflammatory action on the part of Israel did not compare in any way with overt Egyptian actions.

Mr. Shiloah said he would also like again to raise the question he had taken up with Mr. Rountree about the Danish ship going through the Straits of Tiran. He said that Mr. Rountree had told him that the decision was that "you did not find it appropriate to raise the question with the Danish Government, but if that government should consult you, you would tell the Danes if it were an American vessel that made the inquiry, you would tell the master or the company that you did not see any objection to their transiting the Straits of Tiran." He said, from reading the U.S. Aide Memoire, he thought we had gone further than that - that we would join with others to secure the recognition of the Straits as a free waterway, and that they had read into the Aide Memoire more encouragement to those that "will have to plunge first into these icy waters."

Mr. Rountree replied that we had made our statement in the United Nations and that the Danes had also made their position clear in the

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-3-

General Assembly. Our counsel was, as specific cases arose, they should be handled within the framework enunciated by the governments as normal, routine, commercial matters. Mr. Rountree added that he did not think it was proper for the United States to seize the initiative and go to the Danish Government as that government had already articulated its policy. Mr. Shiloah said that this position had been challenged publicly by Nasser, or his spokesmen, and there was a feeling in the maritime community that this was not going to be the easiest thing to establish; he hoped that the United States Government would give a little more encouragement to the Danes.

Mr. Rountree reiterated that if it were an American ship, we would tell the company that we saw no reason why it shouldn't proceed, but that we did not think it proper to take the initiative on this point with the Danish Government. After further discussion, the Acting Secretary said that we had given as strong advice as we could; if an American ship inquired, we would say that there was no objection to it going ahead and if anything happened, of course, it would be entitled to our protection.

Mr. Shiloah said he would like to conclude with the statement that Mrs. Meir had described the internal situation in Israel as very, very grave and becoming graver from hour to hour; the sooner we manage to stabilize the situation and prevent these surprises on the part of Nasser, the sooner we could divert the attention of the people into constructive channels. He thanked the Acting Secretary for receiving him at such a late hour.

NEA:NE:RRoberts:lk  
3-13-57

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M-623

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## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: March 12, 1957

SUBJECT: Gaza and the SuezPARTICIPANTS: Mr. J. E. Coulson, Minister, British Embassy  
Mr. Francois de Laboulaye, Counselor, French EmbassyMr. Elbrick, EUR  
Mr. Sisco, UNP

MAR 21 1957

## COPIES TO:

E - Mr. Dillon  
ID  
USUN  
EUR  
ENA  
WEL - Mr. Phleger  
OTA  
UNP  
OLI (2)  
G - Mr. Murphy

Messrs Coulson and de Laboulaye called at Mr. Elbrick's request to discuss recent developments in Gaza and the present situation regarding the opening of the Suez Canal. After noting that the Suez Canal was expected to be opened shortly, Mr. Elbrick informed them of a report we had this morning that the Egyptian Government had now decided the Canal would not be open to ships of 500 tons but only to ships of 300 tons or less. Mr. Elbrick supposed that the change in the Egyptian position was influenced by the fact that ships under 300 tons did not pay tolls, and therefore the tolls question would not arise.

Mr. Elbrick said the present situation required urgent action of some kind. He recalled that the four-power proposal on interim Canal arrangements had been made to the Egyptians through Mr. Hammarskjold and that we had not received an official response, though an Egyptian Information Officer, Hatem, had announced the four-power proposal was acceptable to Egypt. Mr. Elbrick also pointed out that this rejection by the Egyptian Government, if in fact it was a rejection, had no official status since Fawzi on Saturday and Monday of this week in discussions with Hammarskjold had waved off press reports and indicated that the question of interim arrangements for the Canal was still open.

Mr. Elbrick said that Hammarskjold had planned to go out to Cairo at the end of this week. In view of the developments in Gaza, we now believed Hammarskjold ought to go to Cairo immediately and the Egyptians should be pressed to give a definite official reply to the four-power proposal on interim arrangements. Moreover, we did not believe the highly confused situation in the Gaza Strip could be handled as well by the SYG in New York as in Cairo. The Department, therefore, had requested Ambassador Lodge this morning to present our views to Hammarskjold and to inform him of our belief that it would be desirable for Hammarskjold to go to Cairo immediately. Mr. Elbrick expressed the hope that the UK and French Governments would take a similar line with Hammarskjold as soon as possible.

Mr. Coulson

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Mr. Coulson said that prior to the developments of the past two days the UK position had been that it was unwise for Hammarskjold to go to Cairo before the Egyptians had come up with something concrete regarding the Canal. On the other hand, Coulson said his government might feel differently now as a result of the developments in the Gaza area. Coulson asked whether we had any ideas as to possible pressures by the United States which could be applied on Egypt. Mr. Elbrick responded that we were looking into this question and developing various alternatives, the suitability of which would be determined by the kind of response we received from the Egyptians on the Canal question.

Mr. de Laboulaye said that in any approach made by Ambassador Lodge, ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ the Secretary General should be made to understand that we wanted him to get Egyptian agreement to the four-power proposal and not something less than that. He said further that there ought to be no compromise or weakening of our position on Gaza, that the Egyptians had acted much too quickly in Gaza, and that it was clearly understood that we were still in the "initial period" of the UN takeover in Gaza. De Laboulaye added it was important that Hammarskjold not come back from Cairo with a recommendation that an Egyptian counter-proposal for the Canal be accepted, since this would put all of the users in an embarrassing position. He would prefer Hammarskjold to return empty handed if he had not been able to get agreement on the four-power proposal rather than have him come back with an alternative proposal which could embarrass us. He once again emphasized that Ambassador Lodge should inform Hammarskjold of our views on this matter. Mr. Elbrick said we would pass this information to Ambassador Lodge.

De Laboulaye gave us a slight indication of what had been agreed to on the Suez between Mollet and MacMillan over the weekend. He said <sup>the</sup> UK and French had agreed "not to react in any way to Nasser" and "to let Nasser wonder just what we are going to do." De Laboulaye pointed out that in view of the Mollet-MacMillan agreement not to react to Nasser, he would have to report this conversation to Paris and ask for instructions before joining us in an approach to the Secretary General. In his view an approach by the French to the Secretary General asking him to go to Cairo immediately was somewhat contradictory with the general line agreed to by Mollet and MacMillan.

When Mr. Elbrick inquired regarding a press report from London that the UK no longer believed the Suez Canal to be as important as it had been in the past, Coulson responded that he had not seen such a report but that this line was being taken both by the UK and French in order to deemphasize overtly the importance heretofore attached to the Canal.



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Department of State

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Action

NEA

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FROM: Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2878, March 13, 11 a.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 2878; REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY TEL AVIV 154,  
PRIORITY JERUSALEM 44, LONDON 537, DAMASCUS 212, BEIRUT 314,  
BAGHDAD 189, PARIS 447, AMMAN 211, JIDDA 235, USUN 112

NO FORN

Reviewed Gaza situation with Bunche last night. He said GOE statement (EMBTTEL 2863) appeared result conversation March 10 Abu Suweir between Burns and Egyptian liaison officer Helmi which Bunche had attended. Helmi had presented letter on instructions GOE suggesting military liaison group move Gaza where UNEF headquarters were scheduled be established that day Burns had refused, quoting Secretary General's reports and related GA resolutions to show initial takeover in Gaza to be exclusively by UN. In Bunche's opinion possibly Helmi misinterpreted Burns response to imply UNEF intended exclude Egyptians from Gaza. Bunche noted however, that meet with Helmi followed demonstrations in Gaza earlier same day. Demonstrations appeared have been deliberately staged since UN personnel had observed Egyptian correspondents who had arrived by plane preceeding day engaged in agitation and had spotted two known leftist (VOARABS announcer, Ahmad Said and GUMHOURIYA reporter Sami Daoud) in crowd. Whether or not (repeat not) Helmi's request and demonstrations were actually linked, Bunche took strong exception to fact appointment military governor had been tied in GOE statement to "firing at people of Gaza" which GOE must have known to be untrue. He had already protested to Gohar and intended repeat protest to Nasser.

Gohar had told Bunche March 11 GOE intended send Governor with staff of ten to Gaza Wednesday. Next day Gohar in obvious effort minimize entire episode said staff would comprise only six persons, all civilians, who would not (repeat not) arrived Gaza until Thursday. Gohar asked Bunche twice if UNEF would resist their entry. Bunche replied that UNEF would not (repeat not).

Bunche

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PM 12

1957

Control: 8693

Rec'd:

March 14, 1957

7:12 a.m.



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-2- 2878, March 13, 11 a.m., from Cairo

Bunche thought it obvious that "Arabs, which means Egyptian" government must be restored to Gaza. Population was friendly to UNEF but absolutely unwilling collaborate in any governmental function. This attitude understandable in view extreme vagueness UNEF status and local presumption Egyptians would return.

Bunche attempting arrange meeting with Nasser today re several points. Besides clarifying question of governor, he said he intended find out Nasser's intentions regarding Egyptian military personnel in Gaza; measures to prevent raiding, canal clearance, and Canadians. Re latter GOE was attempting block arrival new Canadian contingent of 150 persons for which consent had been previously given but whose departure had been delayed. Bunche assumed GOE objections based distrust Canadian intentions toward Gaza. (Erroneous press charges which have been repeated to us by high GOE officials allege troops involved in March 10 incident were Canadian.) Bunche intended make clear to Nasser UN could not (repeat not) accept refusal admit contingent, and also to take strong line in other issues.

Bunche had previously felt Hammerskjold could delay his arrival Cairo until about March 21. However events had moved so rapidly as "initial takeover" stage telescoped that he had asked Secretary General visit Cairo prior Tunis. He awaiting reply which he thinks may depend on results his talk with Nasser.

Comment: In effort counteract unfavorable impression created by abrupt appointment governor GOE has sought minimize its significance. (Both Kaikal and Zakariya Muhyi Ad-Din yesterday alleged to us appointment was merely intended calm Gaza population which disturbed by "Canada" shooting at demonstrators.) Our impression following discussion with Bunche is that experience of UNEF during first few days in Gaza has demonstrated that idea strip could be administered in political vacuum even temporarily was unrealistic, and that appointment of some sort of Egyptian authority, even of quasi-symbolic character, was inevitable at early date. However, manner in which GOE handled matter clearly discounteous to UNEF and UN if not (repeat not) in fact done in bad faith. In circumstances, believe line taken by Department spokesman if strongly upholding UNEF generally but refraining from taking position on specific issues well taken and, if firmly and quietly followed, could reduce present head of steam and contribute to more normal development of situation.

HARE

SW:ALR-14

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APR 9 1957

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Department of State

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35-D

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Action

Control:  
Rec'd:

7878  
March 13, 1957  
7:38 a.m.

NEA

FROM: Cairo

Info

TO: Secretary of State

RMR

NO: 2879, March 13, 1 p.m.

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PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 2879, USUN 113

EMBTel 2878 sent prior receipt DEPTel 2993. Will endeavor see Nasser soonest and in meantime seeking see Bunche again so as assure coordinated approach.

HARE

SW:ALR-14

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674.84A/3-1357

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 2884, MARCH 13, 7 P.M.

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NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT 2884, NIACT USUN 114, REPEATED INFORMATION JERUSALEM  
PRIORITY 45, TEL AVIV PRIORITY 155, LONDON 538, PARIS 448,  
AMMAN 212, BEIRUT 316, DAMASCUS 213, JIDDA 236, BAGHDAD 190.

NOFORN.

BUNCHE SAW NASSER NOON TODAY. NASSER SAID DECISION APPOINT  
GOVERNOR BASED ON FEELING UN SEEKING TAKE CHARGE GAZA AND  
KEEP EGYPTIANS OUT. NASSER CITED BURNS-HELMI CONVERSATIONS  
(EMBASSY TELEGRAM 2878) REPORTS UNRWA SEEKING EXPAND ITS  
FUNCTIONS BEYOND REFUGEE MATTERS (PRESS HAS CHARGED AND  
BUNCHE AND OTHER UN SOURCES HAVE CONFIRMED PRECIPITATE  
NATURE SOME RECENT UNRWA MOVES) AND REPORTS UNEF "EXERCISING  
CONTROL" OVER ENTRY EGYPTIANS INTO STRIP (BUNCHE NOT (RPT NOT)  
SURE TO WHAT SPECIFIC MEASURES THIS REFERS). NASSER DID  
NOT (RPT NOT) MENTION (AS HAVE HEIKAL, MUHYI AD-DIN AND  
BAGHDADI) NEED FOR APPOINTMENT GOVERNOR TO CALM GAZA IN-  
HABITANTS. CLIMATE ALSO CLOUDED BY DEATH OF PALESTINIAN WHO  
HAD BEEN WOUNDED BY RICOCHET IN SUNDAY INCIDENT. (BUNCHE  
HAD EXPRESSED HIS REGRET TO NASSER AND UN HAS ISSUED PRESS  
RELEASE ACCORDINGLY).

BUNCHE URGED NASSER TAKE NO (RPT NO) DECISION AND MAKE NO  
(RPT NO) MOVES WHICH MIGHT AFFECT BASIC RELATIONSHIP UN TO  
GAZA PRIOR SECRETARY GENERAL'S ARRIVAL. NASSER AGREED IN  
GENERAL BUT BUNCHE RESERVING JUDGMENT PENDING MEETING HE AND  
BURNS TO HAVE WITH GOHAR THIS AFTERNOON. FOR EXAMPLE, NASSER  
APPEARED STILL INTENT ON SENDING GOVERNOR AND HIS CIVILIAN  
ASSISTANTS GAZA TOMORROW. BUNCHE EXPLAINED TO EMBASSY OFFICE

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-2- 2884, MARCH 13, 7 P.M., FROM CAIRO

UN HAD NO (RPT NO) LEGAL BASIS CHALLENGE GOE'S RIGHT DO SO BUT DID CHALLENGE WISDOM AND ESPECIALLY TIMING SUCH A MOVE.

BUNCHE SAID NASSER HAD INSISTED, AS HAD GOHAR, THAT GOE HAD NO (RPT NO) INTENTION SENDING ARMED FORCES GAZA. APART FROM OTHER REASONS, SUCH A MOVE WOULD BE "IMPOSSIBLE" FROM STAND-POINT MILITARY TACTICS. NASSER ALSO CONFIRMED EGYPT DESIRED END FEDAYEEN RAIDS WHICH NASSER DEFINED AS THOSE ORDERED BY GOE; GOE COULD NOT (RPT NOT), OF COURSE, BE RESPONSIBLE ACTS INDIVIDUALS MOTIVATED BY DESIRE VENGEANCE OR PLUNDER. (BUNCHE THOUGHT THIS REASONABLE).

TO SUMMARIZE LINE HE FOLLOWING HERE, BUNCHE SAID HE HAD CABLED SECRETARY GENERAL IT WAS HIS PURPOSE PLAY DOWN SUGGESTIONS CONFLICT OF LEGAL NATURE BETWEEN EGYPT AND UN OVER GAZA, PERSUADE EGYPT KEEP RE-ENTRY TO MOST MODEST PROPORTIONS POSSIBLE, AVOID FURTHER FANFARE, AND HOLD OFF ANY DEFINITE DECISIONS UNTIL SECRETARY GENERAL ARRIVED. HE WAS THEREFORE MAKING NO (RPT NO) DIRECT PUBLIC COMMENT ON GOE ACTION ALTHOUGH INFORMALLY REGRETTING ITS TIMING AND MANNER IN WHICH IT WAS DONE.

REFERENCE DEPARTMENT TELEGRAM 2993, I AM SEEING NASSER AT 7:00 OCLOCK TONIGHT.

HARE

MAA

APR 9 1957

SECRET



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53-51

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Control: 8395

Rec'd: MARCH 13, 1957

7:35 P.M.

FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2885, MARCH 13, 9 P.M.

NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT 2885, REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV 156,  
JERUSALEM 46, LONDON 539, PARIS 449, DAMASCUS 214, AMMAN 213,  
BAGHDAD 191, JIDDA 237, BEIRUT 317, NIACT USUN 115.

REFERENCE EMBASSY TELEGRAM 2818.

NOFORN.

FOLLOWING CONVERSATION WITH BUNCHE AND BURNS THIS AFTERNOON  
GOHAR COMMENTED TO EMBASSY OFFICE OF RECENT GAZA DEVELOPMENTS  
AS FOLLOWS.

ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNOR APPOINTED BECAUSE OF GOE FEAR THAT  
UNEF HAD INTENTION INTERNATIONALIZE AREA. THIS SUPICION BASED  
FIRST OF ALL ON STRENUOUS EFFORTS OF CANADA THROUGHOUT G.A.  
DISCUSSIONS TO HAVE UNEF TAKE OVER ADMINISTRATIVE AS WELL  
AS MILITARY RESPONSIBILITIES FOR AREA AND ON SUPPORT THIS  
VIEWPOINT RECEIVED FROM NUMEROUS OTHER NATIONS. A MORE  
IMMEDIATE CAUSE, WHICH GOHAR SAID MIGHT HAVE BEEN A  
MISUNDERSTANDING IN PART, WAS BURNS CONVERSATION WITH HELMI  
ON MARCH 10TH WHEN IN RESPONSE LATTER'S REQUEST ESTABLISH  
LIAISON OFFICE GAZA, BURNS WAS REPORTED TO HAVE REPLIED THAT  
HE COULD NOT (REPEAT NOT) PERMIT ANY EGYPTIAN TO RETURN TO GAZA  
WITHOUT AUTHORITY SECRETARY GENERAL. GOHAR SAID THERE WERE  
ALSO "OTHER FACTORS" BUT WOULD NOT (REPEAT NOT) ELUCIDATE AND  
INDICATED TWO FACTORS SPECIFIED WERE MAIN REASONS FOR SUDDEN  
ACTION. (IN CONVERSATION WITH EMBASSY OFFICE EARLIER TODAY  
BAGHDADI SPOKE OF CANADIANS IN TERMS EVIDENCING NO (REPEAT NO)  
CONFIDENCE THEIR ACTIVITES GAZA).

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-2- 2885, MARCH 13, 9 P.M. FROM CAIRO

ASKED WHETHER TO HIS KNOWLEDGE THERE COULD BE REASONABLE BASIS FOR MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN GOE AND SECRETARY GENERAL ON QUESTION RESUMPTION ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY BY EGYPT IN GAZA, GOHAR STATED THAT THERE WAS A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING, SPELLED OUT IN ITEM NUMBER 3 OF SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH EBAN (FEBRUARY 25) THAT EGYPT HAD NOT (REPEAT NOT) RELINQUISHED ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO ADMINISTER THE GAZA AREA AND THAT EGYPT WOULD ONE DAY EXERCISE THIS RIGHT. THERE WAS NO (REPEAT NO) UNDERSTANDING AS TO THE PRECISE DATE ON WHICH EGYPTIAN ADMINISTRATION WOULD RETURN TO THE AREA. THIS SPECIFIC QUESTION HAD NOT (REPEAT NOT) BEEN RAISED WITH EGYPT; PERHAPS SOME HAD ANTICIPATED A LATER DATE. EGYPT'S WILLINGNESS TO DEFER THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT WAS DEPENDENT UPON THE IMPORTANCE AND VALUE OF SUCH POSTPONEMENT TO THE OVERALL PROBLEM AND UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES EGYPT DID NOT (REPEAT NOT) SEE THAT FURTHER DEFERMENT WOULD HAVE COMPENSATING ADVANTAGES.

ASKED WHEN THE ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNOR WOULD PROCEED TO GAZA, GOHAR REPLIED "WITHIN 48 HOURS". (BURNS AFTER MEETING GOHAR TOLD EMBASSY OFFICE GOVERNOR TO GO THURSDAY AS SCHEDULED).

REFERENCE SHARM EL SHEIKH, GOHAR STATED THAT "THERE WAS NO (RPT NO) JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OCCUPATION BY UNEF, THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF ISRAELI FORCES IN THE AREA PRESENCE UNEF COULD NOT (REPEAT NOT) BE JUSTIFIED ON GROUNDS OF SEPARATING THE FORCES". UNEF HAD ONLY ONE FUNCTION NOW, TO POLICE THE DEMARCATION LINE. IN RESPONSE INQUIRY GOHAR SAID HE HAD NO (RPT NO) INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS GOVERNMENT TO PRESS THIS ISSUE.

IN CONCLUDING THE CONVERSATION GOHAR STATED THAT HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH BUNCHE AND BURNS TODAY HAD CLEARED UP THE MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND THAT HE HAD ASSURED THEM THAT EGYPT'S ACTIVITIES WOULD BE DIRECTED TOWARDS STABILIZING THE AREA AND REDUCING TENSION. HE THEN REPEATED THIS ASSURANCE TO EMBASSY OFFICE STATING, "YOU CAN BE CONFIDENT THAT THE SITUATION IN GAZA WILL BE CALM".

HARE

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APR 9 1957

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Note: Mr. Rountree's office notified 3-13-57, 8:40 p.m., EH.

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Department of State

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53-51

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Control:  
Rec'd:8443  
MARCH 13, 1957  
10:06 P.M.NEA  
Info  
RMR

FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2887, MARCH 13, 11 P.M.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 2887, NIACT USUN 117.

SAW NASSER TONIGHT AND GAVE HIM OUR VIEWS ON GAZA SITUATION  
ALONG GENERAL LINES OF DEPTTEL 2993.

ESSENCE HIS REPLY WAS "WHATS ALL THE FUSS ABOUT?" HE HAD  
MERELY TAKEN ACTION FOLLOWING PRECEDENT OF PORT SAID AND  
SAW NO REASON WHY GAZA SHOULD BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY. HE  
KNEW, OF COURSE, THAT MANY IDEAS HAD BEEN ADVANCED FOR SOME  
SORT OF TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR GAZA BUT HE HAD ALWAYS  
OPPOSED AND, WITH THAT IN MIND, HAD PUBLICLY TAKEN EXCEPTION  
TO SECOND PART OF FEBRUARY 22 STATEMENT OF SYG WHICH HE  
CONSIDERED VAGUE AND LIABLE TO LEAD TO MISUNDERSTANDING.  
HE HAD ALSO INSTRUCTED FAWZI TO MAKE CLEAR HIS VIEWS IN THIS  
REGARD.

THAT HAD BEEN HIS BASIC THINKING. IMMEDIATE CAUSE OF HIS  
ANNOUNCEMENT HAD BEEN ABRUPT REFUSAL OF GENERAL BURNS TO  
ALLOW EGYPTIAN LIAISON OFFICERS TO GO TO GAZA AND REPORTS  
THAT CIVILIAN SITUATION THERE WAS GETTING OUT OF HAND,  
ESPECIALLY AS RESULT RUMORS THAT GAZA WOULD BE PLACED UNDER  
INTERNATIONAL REGIME. IN CIRCUMSTANCES HE HAD DECIDED THAT  
PROMPT ACTION WAS REQUIRED TO DISPEL UNCERTAINTY. IN SO DOING  
HE HAD ACTED ENTIRELY WITHIN HIS RIGHTS AND FAILED TO UNDER-  
STAND WHAT ALL THE COMMOTION WAS ABOUT.

HE REPLIED CAUSE PERFECTLY CLEAR. FOR PERIOD OF ABOUT 5  
MONTHS NOW MEN OF GOOD WILL FROM MOST COUNTRIES OF WORLD  
HAD BEEN PREOCCUPIED WITH PROBLEM CREATED BY ATTACK ON EGYPT  
AND GREAT AND HEARTENING PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE BY COOPERATIVE

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-2- 2887, MARCH 13, 11 P.M., FROM CAIRO

EFFORT IN UN. IN FACT, NASSER HIMSELF HAD TOLD ME ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS OF HIS ORIGINAL DOUBTS RE UN BUT OF HIS LATER SATISFACTION THAT HE HAD PUT EGYPT'S FATE IN HANDS OF UN. NOW, HOWEVER, JUST AS SUCCESS OF THIS GREAT EXPERIMENT IS ABOUT TO BE REALIZED, HE HAD TAKEN ACTION BRUSQUELY AND IN SUCH WAY AS TO INDICATE HE WAS TAKING CRACK AT ORGANIZATION THAT HAD SAVED HIM. IF IT WAS TRUE THAT HE HAD REACHED HIS DECISION IN THINKING MERELY OF A LITTLE AGITATION IN GAZA AND A SLIGHT MISUNDERSTANDING WITH GENERAL BURNS, THEN HE HAD INDEED ACTED IN DISREGARD OF THINGS FAR MORE IMPORTANT AND EGYPT'S REPUTATION COULD ONLY SUFFER THEREBY.

NASSER ADMITTED THAT HE HAD PERHAPS NOT CONSIDERED ALL IMPLICATIONS OF THE MATTER BUT ADDED THAT THERE REALLY WAS NOT MUCH POINT IN TAKING WESTERN OPINION TOO SERIOUSLY SINCE ANYTHING HE DID WOULD BE TURNED AGAINST HIM BY THE BRITISH AND FRENCH, AS WELL AS AMERICAN PRESS. THIS WAS GAME WHERE CARDS STACKED AGAINST HIM AND HE JUST COULD NOT WIN.

AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION ALONG LINES FOREGOING IN WHICH I ENDEAVORED PUT MATTER IN MORE RATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, I ASKED NASSER WHAT HE INTENDED IN FACT TO DO. HE SAID THAT GOVERNOR AND 6 OFFICERS WOULD GO IN TOMORROW AND THAT BUNCHE AND BURNS FULLY INFORMED. DID I HAVE ANY SUGGESTIONS? I SAID I DID AND THAT WAS TO HOLD UP ACTION UNTIL TIME COULD BE GIVEN TO THINK THINGS OVER MORE CAREFULLY AND ACT ACCORDINGLY. WHEN NASSER INDICATED THAT MATTERS HAD GONE TOO FAR FOR THIS, AND THAT, IN ANY EVENT, HE FELT IMMEDIATE ACTION NECESSARY TO MEET NECESSITIES OF SITUATION, I SAID THEN HAD SECOND SUGGESTION. THIS WAS TO PLAN PUBLICITY AND ACTION IN SUCH A WAY AS TO INDICATE FULL RECOGNITION AND APPRECIATION OF UN ROLE AND INTENTION TO COOPERATE CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH UNEF AND OTHER UN AGENCIES IN GAZA. THIS WAS SECOND BEST TO WITHHOLDING ACTION BUT IT COULD MAKE REAL DIFFERENCE IF IT WERE DONE IN FORTHRIGHT WAY AND FOLLOWED UP BY SINCERELY COOPERATIVE ACTS. OF COURSE, HE HAD IT IN HIS POWER TO STAGE A TURBULENT RECEPTION FOR GOVERNOR WHICH WOULD LEAVE UN IGNOMINIOUSLY IN BACKGROUND BUT IT WOULD BE GREAT MISTAKE.

SECRET



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-3- 2887, MARCH 13, 11 P.M., FROM CAIRO

MUCH WATER HAD GONE OVER DAM BUT STILL NOT TOO LATE FOR  
HELPFUL ACTION. DECISION LAY WITH HIM. I SINCERELY HOPED  
HE WOULD DECIDE WISELY.

FOR MOMENT AT LEAST THIS APPROACH SEEMED TO SINK IN AND NASSER  
SAID HE WOULD THINK OVER SERIOUSLY. CONVERSATION CLOSED ON  
THAT NOTE.

AM SEEING BUNCHE AND BURNS AS SOON AS THIS TELEGRAM SENT AND  
WILL FULLY INFORM.

HARE

MAA

NOTE: MR. MAESTRONE (SS) NOTIFIED 3/13/57, 10:20 P.M., EH.

SECRET

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Department of State

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31  
Action  
NEAControl: 7781  
Rec'd: March 13, 1957  
5:49 a.m.

Info

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

RMR

NO: 1074, March 13, 9 a.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1074, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 192, DAMASCUS 134,  
AMMAN 187, BAGHDAD 61, BEIRUT 174, USUN 71.

Afternoon newspapers March 12 headline mounting tension in Israel over Gaza issue and noting Cairo announcement administration of Gaza would be taken over by Egypt today report, "feverish consultation" being held today in Foreign Ministry and Prime Minister's office on steps to be taken in view of situation. MAARIV (Independent) prints New York correspondent article alleging Hammarskjold thinks no (repeat no) action against Egyptian moves in Gaza necessary as Nasser acting for domestic consumption only. Article says General Assembly may have to reconvene and describes United States reaction as one of "consternation and deep concern" with some officials believing Egypt will now (repeat now) demand evacuation UNEF and return of Gaza to Egyptian control.

Israel press March 10-12 underscored developments following takeover in Gaza with emphasis on assertions of growing disorders in area under UNEF control. All papers this morning headline Egyptian appointment Gaza strip governor. Editorial comment on stated Egyptian intention re-establishing Gaza administration unanimously hostile. Alleged responsibility on United Nations to prevent return of Egyptians to Gaza stressed heavily and most commentators predict that return of Egyptians means reversion to status quo ante unacceptable to Israel.

Press this morning publishes account of broadcast by Walter Eytan Director General Foreign Ministry over Jerusalem short wave radio yesterday in which he stressed United Nations responsibility for asserting international rule in Gaza and preventing Egypt from returning to resume murderous activities which led to Sinai campaign. According JERUSALEM POST Eytan said regarding renewal Fedayeen attacks Israel "had made it clear she will not (repeat not) tolerate provocations of this kind".

Reported

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-2- 1074, March 13, 9 a.m., from Tel Aviv

Reported Bunche statement in Gaza yesterday that UNEF did not (repeat not) intend internationalize Gaza strip though "for time being" it had sole responsibility there and his further statement UNEF in Gaza with clear agreement Egyptian Government and would not (repeat not) go beyond task defined by UNGA elicited JERUSALEM POST comment Israel Government circles viewed his statement with "grave concern".

LAWSON

SW:RSB/7

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Action

Control: 8530

Rec'd: MARCH 14, 1957  
2:51 AM

NEA

FROM: TEL AVIV

Info

TO: Secretary of State

RMR

NO: 1079, MARCH 13, 4 PM

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PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1079, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 214, PARIS 180,  
CAIRO 195, AMMAN 190, DAMASCUS 137, BEIRUT 177, JERUSALEM UNNUMBERED  
usun 74  
DEPARTMENT PASS USUN.

REFERENCE EMBTEL 1076.

ISRAELI MINISTRY EARLY TODAY SUPPLIED ME WITH TEXT OF BEN GURION'S  
LETTER LAST NIGHT TO PRESIDENT ON GAZA STRIP DEVELOPMENTS.

1. ASSUME DECISION TO HAVE BEN GURION'S LETTER AS SECOND HALF  
ONE-TWO PUNCH OF WHICH MEIR'S REMARKS TO ME WERE FIRST HALF WAS  
TAKEN LATE LAST NIGHT AFTER GOI HAD CONSIDERED IMPORT OF  
GOI'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH MEIR.

COMMENT: LETTER HAS AT LEAST THREE OBJECTIVES IN MY VIEW:

1. TO STRESS IMPORTANCE WITH WHICH GOI REGARDS ALLEGED  
RENAISSANCE EGYPTIAN INFLUENCE IN GAZA.

2. TO KEEP UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AWARE AT HIGHEST POSSIBLE  
LEVEL OF DEPENDENCE ON US GOI FEELS IT WON BY ITS WITHDRAWAL  
WITHOUT GUARANTEES AND TO RECORD AGAIN BEN GURION'S EXPRESSED  
STATEMENT OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE OF PRESIDENT'S INFLUENCE HAD  
ON BEN GURION'S FINAL DECISION TO AN XTVAHQ.#

3. TO LAY FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE BEN GURION WILL HAVE TO MAKE  
IN KNESSET AGAINST OPPOSITION CHARGES HE SOLD OUT SECURITY IDF  
HAD ESTABLISHED IN GAZA FOR MIRAGE OF UNITED STATES SUPPORT

Correction made  
by RM/R  
4-24-57

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-2- 1079, MARCH 13, 4 PM, FROM TEL AVIV.

WHICH OPPOSITION WILL CHARGE ACTUALLY DOES NOT EXIST.

JB

LAWSON

# AS RECEIVED. WILL SERVICE UPON REQUEST.

NOTE: PASSED USUN, 3/14/57, 3 AM, WW.

APR 12 1957

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CORRECTION

3/15/57, 10 p.m.

Control: 8530

Rec'd: March 14, 1957  
1:51 p.m.

NEA  
Info

FROM: Tel Aviv

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 1079, March 13, 4 p.m.

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The first paragraph of this CONFIDENTIAL message should be corrected to read:

SENT DEPARTMENT 1079 REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 214, PARIS 180  
CAIRO 195 AMMAN 190 DAMASCUS 137 BEIRUT 177 USUN 74 JERUSALEM  
UNNUMBERED.

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1957 MAR 16 AM 8 32

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Control: 7767

Rec'd: MARCH 13, 1957  
5:36 AM

FROM: BEIRUT

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2179, MARCH 13

SENT DEPARTMENT 2179; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN, BAGHDAD, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JIDDA, PARIS, LONDON UNNUMBERED.

JOINT STATE - USIA MESSAGE.

VIRTUALLY EVERY BEIRUT NEWSPAPER TODAY GAVE BANNER FRONT-PAGE HEADLINES TO ANNOUNCEMENT BY EGYPTIAN INFORMATION CHIEF COLONEL HATEM APPOINTMENT EGYPTIAN GOVERNOR GAZA GENERAL HASSAN ABDUL LATIF. SAMPLE HEADLINES: ARAB NATIONALIST AS SIYASAH -- "EGYPT HAS RE-ESTABLISHED ARAB SOVEREIGNTY IN GAZA"; PRO-PPS AND PRO-WEST AN NAHAR -- "EGYPT FILLS 'VACUUM' IN GAZA STRIP"; INFLUENTIAL MARONITE L'ORIENT -- "NASSER: WE ARE RETURNING TO GAZA".

IN EARLY EDITORIAL COMMENT INFLUENTIAL USUALLY PRO-IRAQI AL HAYAT'S COLUMNIST BASIL BAKAK SAYS: "THIS IS PROOF EGYPT'S RECENT SILENCE WAS NOT ONE OF WEAKNESS" AND CALLED IT "A STRONG AND DARING STEP". PRO-WESTERN AN NAHAR'S MICHEL ABU JAUDEH PRAISED THE MOVE AS "A SUCCESSFUL ONE BY WHICH 'EGYPT EXERCISED HER RIGHTS AND OURS'".

COMMENT: DEPTH OF APPARENTLY FAVORABLE REACTION EVEN FROM PAPERS WHICH HAVE PUBLICLY CRITICIZED NASSER'S POLICIES CANNOT YET BE ASSESSED. HOWEVER, REACTION NOT SURPRISING IN VIEW USUAL PRESS SENSITIVITY TO ISSUES INVOLVING ISREAL.

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Action  
NEAControl: 8271  
Rec'd: MARCH 13, 1957  
3:17 P.M.THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED  
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FROM: BEIRUT

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 2185, MARCH 13.

SENT DEPARTMENT 2185, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN BAGHDAD  
CAIRO DAMASCUS JEDDA LONDON PARIS TEL AVIV UNNUMBERED.

JOINT STATE-OSNFA MSG

RE LMBTEL 2179

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LATE DEVELOPMENTS TODAY SHARE BEIRUT FRONT PAGE ATTENTION WITH  
RICHARDS MISSION WITH FORMER BEING CHIEF TOPIC EDITORIAL INTEREST  
INDICATING VIRTUALLY UNANIMOUS SUPPORT EGYPTIAN POSITION. GOL HAS  
NOT COMMENTED BUT ANTI-COMMUNIST PAPERS DAILY SADA LUBNAN SAYS  
"OFFICIAL SOURCE" COMMENTED "ADMINISTRATION TO GAZA IS EGYPT'S  
RIGHT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARMISTICE AGREEMENT."

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EDITORIALLY, AL HAYAT'S PRO-IRAQI KAMEL MROWA SAYS "WHEN PRESI-  
DENT NASSER APPOINTS AN EGYPTIAN GOVERNOR FOR GAZA, HE IS MERELY  
APPOINTING AN ARAB GOVERNOR FOR AN ARAB TERRITORY. THE UNITED  
NATIONS AND THE STATES WHICH SUPPORT IT MUST UNDERSTAND THAT ARABS  
ARE NOT READY TO ACCEPT FOREIGN RULE IN GAZA."

DCL  
ICA

OTHER COMMENTS: INFLUENTIAL CHRISTIAN AL JARIDA'S BASM EL  
JISSR--"EGYPT HAS MADE A DARING AND WISE STEP, AND IT IS THE  
DUTY OF BIG POWERS, IF THEY ARE EAGER TO MAINTAIN PEACE AND  
STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, TO APPRECIATE EGYPT'S STAND:  
MODERATE MOSLEM BEIRUT'S MUHIEDDINE NSOUJ--"IS THERE ANYTHING  
IN U.N. RESOLUTIONS WHICH STOP EGYPT FROM TAKING THE GAZA STRIP  
OVER? NO, BECAUSE THE U.N. RESOLUTIONS BACK EGYPT'S RETURN TO THE  
AREA". PRO-COMMUNIST A.S. SHARI--"THE LIBERATION OF GAZA FROM  
INTERNATIONALIZATION AFTER LIBERATING IT FROM THE ZIONIST  
OCCUPATIONS IS A GREATER VICTORY FOR THE ARAB LIBERATIONIST  
POLICY IN GENERAL AND FOR PRES NASSAR IN PARTICULAR."

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Control: 8446

Rec'd: MARCH 13, 1957  
10:06 PM

NEA FROM: THE HAGUE  
Info  
RMR TO: Secretary of State  
SS NO: 1379, MARCH 13

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NAVY  
AIR  
MAJOR DUTCH NATIONAL DAILIES EDITORIALIZING ON EGYPTIAN  
PRONOUNCEMENTS REGARDING GAZA STRIP ADMINISTRATION GENERALLY  
CRITICAL OF NASSER MOVE. CATHOLIC DE MAASBODE CALLS IT "GLARING  
EXAMPLE OF BAD FAITH" BUT ASKS "..... WHETHER SOONER OR LATER  
EGYPT WILL NOT HAVE CAUSE TO REGRET ITS LATEST DECISION". LIBERAL  
NIEUWE ROTTERDAMSE COURANT EXPRESSES VIEW NASSER "PROBING  
HOW FAR HE CAN GO AND SOONER HE MEETS SERIOUS RESISTANCE BETTER IT  
WILL BE FOR WORLD". INDEPENDENT LABOR HET PAROOL WRITES:  
"THROUGHOUT MIDDLE EAST CRISIS OVERRULING FACTOR IN US FOREIGN  
POLICY HAS BEEN UNDERSTANDABLE ANXIETY OF STATE DEPARTMENT TO  
PREVENT ARAB NATIONS BEING DRAWN INTO SOVIET ORBIT. THIS IS GENERAL  
PREDOMINANT OBJECTIVE OF AMERICAN POLICY IN MIDDLE EAST. ISRAEL  
TOO WILL HAVE TO RESIGN ITSELF TO THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS AND ENTIRE  
WESTERN WORLD WILL ULTIMATELY OWE DEBT OF GRATITUDE TO AMERICANS  
FOR THIS POLICY".

MATTHEWS

CC

674.84A/3-1357 HBS

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Department of State

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55-51

Action

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FROM: NEW YORK

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TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 625, MARCH 13, 8 P.M.

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RE GAZA

HEAD OF INTERNATIONAL  
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MARCH 13, 1957  
9:13 P.M.

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THIS MORNING HAMMARSKJOLD INFORMED ME OF LATEST DEVELOPMENTS. HE SAID THAT BUNCHE HAD JUST REPORTED THAT EGYPTIANS PLAN TO HAVE ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNOR AND FIVE CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS GO INTO GAZA TOMORROW. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID THAT, WHILE TIMING WAS BAD, IF THIS WAS EXTENT OF EGYPTIAN PARTICIPATION IN GAZA FOR PRESENT, IT SEEMED TO HIM CONSISTENT WITH POSITION THAT UN HAD TAKEN WITH US CONCURRENCE AND HE COULD HARDLY OBJECT TO IT. HE HOPED THAT EGYPTIANS WOULD BE SATISFIED WITH THIS AND NOT ASK FOR INTRODUCTION OF ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL. IN PARTICULAR, HE WAS HOPEFUL THAT THEY WOULD NOT SEEK TO INTRODUCE ANY MILITARY PERSONNEL. ON THIS POINT HE HAD BEEN VERY EXPLICIT TO BUNCHE TO MAKE CLEAR HIS OPPOSITION TO PRESENCE OF EGYPTIAN MILITARY IN GAZA.

HAMMARSKJOLD SAID THAT THERE WERE TWO DEVELOPMENTS WHICH WERE EXTREMELY DISTURBING. ONE WAS BEN GURION'S STATEMENT TO KNESSET THAT IF ISRAEL DECIDED TO INVOKE HER RIGHTS, ISRAEL WOULD ACT WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE. THE SECOND DEVELOPMENT WAS A REPORTED STATEMENT BY BUNCHE THAT TURNOVER IN GAZA WOULD BE ON SAME BASIS AS IN PORT SAID AND THAT IT WAS UP TO EGYPT TO DECIDE WHEN TURNOVER SHOULD TAKE PLACE. HAMMARSKJOLD DOUBTED THAT BUNCHE HAD BEEN CORRECTLY QUOTED, BUT IF HE HAD BEEN, HE FORESAW SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES AS A RESULT OF THIS STATEMENT.

ON QUESTION OF BEN GURION STATEMENT, HAMMARSKJOLD SAID HE PLANNED TO ASK BRITISH AND FRENCH REPRESENTATIVES TO COME TO

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-2- 625, MARCH 13, 8 P.M., FROM NEW YORK

SEE HIM TODAY AND HOPED TO DRAW THEM OUT ON THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS REPORTED BEN GURION STATEMENT. HE DOUBTED HE WOULD SUCCEED BUT HE HOPED TO FIND OUT WHETHER EITHER OF THEM ENDORSED ISRAELI POSITION.

HAMMARSKJOLD INDICATED CONSIDERABLE WORRY THAT ISRAELIS MAY BE DEPENDING ON FRENCH ASSISTANCE FOR ANOTHER ATTACK. ISRAELI REACTION TO EVENTS IN GAZA SEEMED OUT OF PROPORTION TO WHAT HAD ACTUALLY HAPPENED AND MIGHT INDICATE A POSSIBLE DESIRE TO FIND AN EXCUSE TO MOVE BACK IN. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID KIDRON HAD COME TO SEE HIM LAST NIGHT ON INSTRUCTIONS AND HAD SAID THAT ISRAEL EXPECTED SYG TO LIVE UP TO "UNDERSTANDING" IN UN ON CONDITIONS OF ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL. SYG SAID HE HAD POINTED OUT ONCE MORE THAT NO "UNDERSTANDING" AS INTERPRETED BY ISRAEL EXISTED. KIDRON HAD ALSO WANTED TO KNOW BUNCHE'S INSTRUCTIONS. SYG HAD DECLINED TO PROVIDE THEM AND POINTED OUT THAT IF HE DID SO, THEY WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY APPEAR IN THE JERUSALEM POST TOMORROW.

KIDRON HAD ASKED TO SEE SYG AGAIN THIS AFTERNOON AND HAMMARSKJOLD SAID THAT HE WOULD INFORM US OF THIS TALK AS WELL AS OF HIS TALKS WITH BRITISH AND FRENCH.

LODGE

MAA

7961  
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FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 626, MARCH 13, 8 PM

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RE GAZA

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MARCH 13, 1957

9:21 PM



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674.84A/3-357

FURTHER OURTEL 625. CROSTHWAITE (UK) TOLD US AFTER UK-FRENCH MEETING WITH SYG THAT HAMMARSKJOLD HAD INFORMED THEM OF EGYPT'S PLAN FOR ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNOR AND FIVE CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS ENTER GAZA TOMORROW. HE SAID SYG TOLD THEM FIRST TASK OF THIS GROUP WOULD BE "TO OBSERVE AND REPORT ON NEEDS." CROSTHWAITE HAD IMMEDIATELY INTERPRETED THIS INDICATION IN MOST PESSIMISTIC LIGHT AS INDICATION EGYPTIANS INTENDED FOLLOW UP FIRST GROUP WITH CONSIDERABLY LARGER CONTINGENT AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT. CORDIER SUBSEQUENTLY CONFIRMED TO US THAT LANGUAGE QUOTED ABOVE ORIGINATED WITH EGYPTIANS BUT SAID SECRETARIAT HAD NOT PLACED SUCH NEGATIVE INTERPRETATION THEREON. CORDIER'S REACTION WAS "THIS IS BETTER THAN SAYING THEY WERE GOING TO TAKE OVER AT ONCE."

CROSTHWAITE INDICATED SECRETARY GENERAL HAD GIVEN FRENCH AND UKDELS LIST OF QUESTIONS WHICH CROSTHWAITE INTERPRETED AS BEING DESIGNED TO ELICIT EXTENT OF THEIR INTENTION TO BACK UP ISRAEL IN ITS ASSUMPTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS". CORDIER SUBSEQUENTLY ALSO CONFIRMED LIST OF QUESTIONS HANDED TWO DELEGATIONS AND PROMISED PROVIDE US COPY (BEING WIRED SEPARATELY.)

IN CONNECTION UK-FRENCH FUTURE INTENTIONS, LODGE RECOMMENDED TO ACTING SECRETARY THIS AFTERNOON THAT ACTING SECRETARY IMMEDIATELY INFORM ISRAELIS, FRENCH AND POSSIBLY BRITISH, THEY MUST UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES TAKE LAW INTO OWN HANDS IN CONNECTION SITUATION IN GAZA; THAT INASMUCH AS US HAD INTERVENED SO FORCIBLY IN UN IN CONNECTION INVASION OF EGYPT BY THREE POWERS, IT WAS OBVIOUS WE WOULD INTERVENE WITH

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AT LEAST EQUAL VIGOR WITH REGARD TO ANY INFRACTIONS BY EGYPT, AND IT WOULD, IN FACT, BE MUCH EASIER FOR US TO DO SO IN CASE OF EGYPT. IT WOULD THEREFORE BE VERY STUPID AND HOTHEADED FOR ISRAELIS OR FRENCH TO TAKE LAW INTO OWN HANDS WHEN IT WAS EVIDENT WE WOULD GO TO BAT ON THEIR BEHALF THE MINUTE THE SITUATION JUSTIFIED IT. LODGE TOOK THIS LINE WITH CROSTHWAITE TONIGHT.

ACCORDING TO CORDIER, PURPOSE OF KIDRON'S (ISRAEL) CALL ON SYG WAS TO ASCERTAIN INFORMATION ON BUNCHE-NASSER TALK TODAY. CORDIER SAID THEY HAD RECEIVED NO WORD FROM BUNCHE SINCE HIS TALK WITH NASSER AND HAD WIRED BUNCHE FOR REPORT. CORDIER ASSUMED SPECIAL HANDLING OF HIGHLY CLASSIFIED UN CODE CABLES MIGHT HAVE DELAYED TRANSMISSION. CORDIER PROMISED KEEP US INFORMED.

LODGE

CC

7561

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1/2/5

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SENT TO: Amembassy CAIRO

3027

1257

67484A

3-3205780

Origin

Info

(Code Room: Please repeat DEPTel 694, March 12,  
USUN  
1957 to Amembassy Cairo for information.)

*Gonyo*

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ACTING  
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Drafted by:

NEA:NE:LHoffacker:feg

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Telegraphic transmission and  
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Stuart W. Rockwell

Clearances:

S/S-CR

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FYI French Minister Defense informed UK Charge March 11 that in concert with British he is making preparations to provide air cover for Israelis in case they find it necessary reoccupy Gaza. He stated Soviet pilots flying Egyptian planes could not be permitted bomb Israel. He felt certain that if Nasser sent Governor with Egyptian forces into Gaza, Israel would act.

Acting Secretary tonight discussed foregoing with French Ambassador and British Charge emphasizing US concern. He stated any indication to Israel of such support might lead Israel to take precipitate action in circumstances not repeat not warranting employment force. UK-French representatives disclaimed knowledge any military planning and undertook seek information soonest. From this and other conversations it clear both strongly of opinion that implementation of Nasser's decision to send in military Governor even with token administration group would bring about situation in which Israelis would act, at least in French opinion justifiably. They emphasized that Nasser should be told that implementation decision would entail grave risks.

As you know, US position is that administration Gaza should be within framework legal situation arising from Armistice Agreement and that consequently participation by Egyptians in administration would not necessarily

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bring

Drafted by:

NEA:WMRountree:hh 3/13/57

Telegraphic transmission and

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William M. Rountree

Cleared (In draft)

The President

The Acting Secretary

S/S - Mr. Maestroni

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bring about situation which would justify Israeli reaction. Nevertheless, it has been our strong hope that Egyptians would refrain from exercising rights re Gaza leaving exclusively to UNEF administration pending definitive settlement re strip or some final agreement between parties. End FYI.

We believe present situation extremely grave. We concerned that Nasser for prestige reasons might proceed with implementation plan to send Egyptians back into Gaza on basis miscalculation seriousness this move and world reaction thereto. You should therefore seek urgently to see Nasser notwithstanding approach based DEPTTEL 2993 (report of which we have not yet had time to receive) to emphasize this fact. In so doing you should make it clear purpose of demarche is not to define US attitude on legal situation or rights of Egypt <sup>but</sup> to state President Eisenhower's deep concern lest Nasser has grossly miscalculated dangers involved in such action. Statement February 22 by Secretary General made with acquiescence of Egypt provided firm hope that following Israeli withdrawal quieting period would be provided without the situation being inflamed by Egyptian acts re Gaza which, however justifiable from the legal standpoint, would be considered as provocative. US has diligently sought to restore peace and effect withdrawal forces occupying Egyptian territory and Gaza. In context this role which the President feels has resulted in enormous benefit to Egypt, he earnestly expresses the view that Egypt should act with utmost caution in this explosive matter.

In communicating above to Nasser you may want to indicate that the sooner outstanding difficulties with the UN are satisfactorily adjusted the sooner will we be able to discuss resumption normal economic relations including possible assistance programs.

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(Auth) **HERTER**  
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In communicating above to Nasser you may want to indicate that the sooner outstanding difficulties with the UN are satisfactorily adjusted the sooner will we be able to discuss resumption normal economic relations including possible assistance programs.

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NEW YORK

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March 13, 1957

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#6

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#2 Mr. Howe

13 Cunningham

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674-842

3-1257  
320.5774

Origin

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DC/T: Please repeat for information Embassy Tel Aviv Deptel 299

March 12 to Cairo, and Deptel 3011 also March 12 to Cairo.

674-842/3-1257  
XA 320.5774

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NE - Stuart W. Rockwell

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868

RPTD INFO: / CAIRO, ~~HEBEX~~  
USUN NEW YORK

3023  
697

Origin

Info:

Following message based on memo of conversation uncleared by Acting

Secretary:

On urgent instructions from GOI Shiloah called on Acting Secretary 12th to express concern over Gaza Strip developments. He cited Nasser appointment of Military Governor and recurrence of fedayeen activity from Strip as indicative Egyptian mood and considered/tacit UN approval to permit return of Military Governor with civilian staff of 25 as most ominous and indication Egypt intends reoccupy Strip. All this boded no good for security Israel and area. He expressed opinion Nasser and Soviet sponsors did not desire peace in area and Nasser was using return to Gaza as diversion in order open Canal in advance of agreement on regime of Canal. He asked US use influence both with SYG and Egypt to prevent another crisis.

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Acting Secretary referred to conversation on 9th with Shiloah and said we anxious no inflammatory action on part of either Egypt or Israel; that we were taking steps to utilize our influence to try prevent any inflammatory action by Egypt and expressed concern saying we doing what we could avoid any move which might aggravate situation.

DC/R

Anal

Rev

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:RRobert:ad

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

William M. Rountree

than suspected

NE - D. C. Bergus (In draft)

S/S CR

MAR 13 1957 P.M.

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than suspected Israeli action.

Shiloah then raised question possibility Danish merchant ship transiting Tiran, saying he hoped USG would find it appropriate raise question with Danish Government as GOI thought US Aide Memoire indicated we would give ~~more~~ encouragement and join with others to secure recognition Straits as free waterway. Rountree replied both USG and Danes made their positions clear in UNGA. Specific cases would be handled as normal commercial matters. It was not proper for USG take initiative in this matter. If consulted by Danes, would say if asked by US ship owners, we would state no objection to US ship transiting Straits and that US ship would be entitled to our protection.

Shiloah said FonMin Meir described Israel internal situation as "very, very grave and becoming graver from hour to hour." He emphasized necessity stabilizing situation and preventing surprises by Nasser.

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Form DS-10 6-1-45	Department of State	Date 3-15-57
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<input type="checkbox"/> Hold	<input type="checkbox"/> Signature Required
<input type="checkbox"/> Initials Needed	<input type="checkbox"/> See Me
<input type="checkbox"/> Investigate & Report	<input type="checkbox"/> Take Action
<input type="checkbox"/> Instruct	<input type="checkbox"/> Transfer
<input type="checkbox"/> Justify	<input type="checkbox"/> Type
<input type="checkbox"/> Keep Me Advised	<input type="checkbox"/> Verify
<input type="checkbox"/> Legal Matter	<input type="checkbox"/> Reply for Signature of
<input type="checkbox"/> Memo Required	
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## FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : Amembassy MADRID

996

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

March 13, 1957

DATE

REF : -

50 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION NEA-4 EUR-5 REC'D 3-18	DEPT. RM/R-2-011-8 IO-4 P-1 N F OTHER CIA-12 OSD-4 OCB-1 ARMY-4 NAVY-3 AIR-3 ASIA-10
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SUBJECT: Recent Spanish Press Comment on Egyptian-Israeli Dispute and Suez Situation.

Recent editorial comment in the Madrid press has reflected growing impatience with Egypt's intransigent stand on matters at issue with Israel and on the clearance operations to reopen the Suez Canal. Concern was also expressed that the USSR will continue to exploit this difficult situation. Nevertheless, the press has continued to support Egypt's sovereign rights in the area and to criticize Israel both generally as a disturbing influence in the Middle East and specifically for her delay in withdrawing from the Gaza Strip. United States efforts to mediate in the crisis have been praised.

All morning papers on March 12 gave prominent front-page play to the disturbing news that Egypt now plans to install her own administration in Gaza immediately, thereby threatening all recent progress toward a peaceful settlement. ABC headlined that Nasser's decision "places the United States in a very exposed position," and Washington correspondent Jose Maria MASSIP added that "his political interest seems to matter more to Nasser than the pacification of the Middle East." Editorially, ABC lamented that Russia "understands better than the West the lack of material necessities and the typical oriental idiosyncrasies of the Egyptian nation," and that "Egypt is inclining in a greater degree toward the so-called popular democracies than toward the true democracies of the West." Regrettably, "a great part of his [Nasser's] insuperable successes are due to the vacillation of the United States" in her Middle East policy of recent years.

Francisco LUCIENTES in Arriba on the 12th spoke critically of Nasser's "rigid attitude," but declared "it is certain: in the legal sphere, and considering the latest resolutions of the UN, Gaza is Egyptian territory, and Egypt has a right to re-implant her sovereignty there when she judges it convenient."

Ya's New York correspondent the same day warned that communism will not fail to take advantage of Egypt's latest action further to inflame the rancors of the Middle East. In an editorial probably written the day before, however, Ya expressed hope that a compromise on Suez may be in the making based upon recognition of complete Egyptian sovereignty, payment of canal tolls directly to Egypt, free transit, and "control" by the United Nations.

Madrid on the evening of the 12th advised Egypt to act circumspectly in the Middle East in order not to appear contrary to the will of the majority in the

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MAR 20 1957


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Page 2 of  
Encl. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
Desp. No. 996  
From Madrid

United Nations. Recognizing that Gaza was Egyptian territory before the Israeli occupation, however, Madrid could not understand "the clamor raised by Nasser's appointment of an administrative governor, for which he can only be reproached, at most, for his precipitation."

Cuttings of these and other recent press comments on the subject are enclosed for the Department's information.

For the Ambassador:

  
Richard A. Johnson  
Counselor of Embassy

Encl: glt As stated

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Enclosure to Despatch 996,

Madrid



ABC  
3/1/57

## PARECE QUE NO HAY POLITICA COMUN ENTRE LOS FIRMANTES DEL COMUNICADO DE EL CAIRO

Mantienen puntos de vista diferentes sobre la limpieza del Canal y sobre la "doctrina Eisenhower".

Londres 28. (Crónica telefónica de nuestro corresponsal.) Si el comunicado final de la Conferencia de El Cairo reflejara exactamente y con absoluta sinceridad—sin reservas—la voluntad de los reyes de la Arabia Saudita y de Jordania, del presidente Shukri El Kuatly, de Siria, y del coronel Nasser, no quedaría ninguna esperanza de llegar en corto plazo a una solución de los problemas del Oriente Medio, cualquiera que sea el final del forcejeo de los Estados Unidos con Israel para congelar la crisis como primera providencia. Los cuatro líderes árabes, reunidos desde el lunes en el Palacio Jubeh, declaran, por último, su firme voluntad de exigir la retirada "incondicional" de las tropas israelitas; de apoyar los derechos de los árabes de Palestina a sus tierras y la plena soberanía de las naciones árabes en sus territorios y aguas jurisdiccionales; de reclamar el pago a Egipto, por parte de los países agresores, de las indemnizaciones que correspondan por los daños y pérdidas que ha sufrido durante la agresión; de rechazar cualquier intento de disminuir la soberanía absoluta de Egipto en el Canal de Suez; de condenar la agresión británica en el Yemen y solidarizarse con la defensa de aquel país, y de apoyar los derechos de los árabes de Argelia a la independencia y su heroica lucha contra el imperialismo...

No recuerdo que hayan llegado nunca los pueblos árabes a una nota más abrupta. De entrada, "los cuatro de El Cairo" le levantan a la diplomacia "del imperialismo" seis acantilados de Dover, uno encima del otro. He ahí lo que podría llamarse un documento inexpugnable. Pero Londres no parece sentirse muy seguro de la sinceridad de esta

declaración conjunta y la reduce—quién sabe si con exceso de optimismo—a "términos de bazar". "La arrebatada exaltación de la mercancía" como arranque de una operación comercial, no parece ser ajena al deseo de que la nota árabe gravite en las ne-

gociaciones de los Estados Unidos con Israel.

Cree Londres que la política común de "los cuatro de El Cairo" ni es política, porque la declaración desborda todas las posibilidades, ni es común. Siria se opone a que continúen los trabajos de limpieza del Canal e insiste en que las operaciones de salvamento no debieron empezar antes de la retirada de las tropas israelitas; Egipto acepta sin entusiasmo el punto de vista de Siria "y de los que aconsejan a Siria desde el exterior"; Arabia Saudita apoya la necesidad de que el paso de Suez vuelva a ser navegable en corto plazo, y la pequeño Jordania se mantiene en la equidistancia y, sobre todo, en la moderación. La llamada "doctrina Eisenhower" divide también a "los cuatro". En principio, Arabia Saudita acepta sin remilgos el plan de los Estados Unidos; al Rey Hussein le parece lo mismo, o, más bien, regular. Siria sigue en la "maniobra norteamericana", y Egipto duda. La Junta Militar de El Cairo—y no tanto el coronel Nasser—sospecha que la presión que ejerce el presidente Eisenhower sobre Israel para que retire sus tropas puede ser teatral, mientras estimula por el subterfugio la resistencia de Ben Gurion.

Más que ninguno de sus aliados sufrirá Egipto las consecuencias del comunicado de "los cuatro", tan envuelto en intranquilidades, según Londres. Para algunos miembros de la O. N. U. que lo promuevan con el pretexto de "iniciativa inocente" Egipto temerá y la está perdiendo. Tener razón no es fatalicio, y no tenerla tampoco—. LARENA.

Madrid  
2/28

# Washington no sincronizó bien con la Conferencia de El Cairo

La demora conseguida por Israel en prolongadas negociaciones, sostenido Ben Gurion decisivamente por Francia, ha producido ya algunos frutos favorables para el plan general judío. En las negociaciones de El Cairo, que terminaron ayer, han influido extraordinariamente los lentos e infructuosos diálogos celebrados en Washington entre Foster Dulles y el embajador israelí, mientras la ONU aplazaba un debate peligroso en espera de que se consiguiera un resultado práctico por mediación del departamento de Estado. No se podía ignorar en Washington que el plan que querían los judíos era incompatible con el plan Eisenhower para el Oriente Medio. La buena voluntad del Rey de Arabia Saudí, secundado por el Rey de Jordania, como defensores de los proyectos del Presidente norteamericano, no han encontrado en Washington la sincronización necesaria para que nadie pudiera dudar de la posición de Estados Unidos en este grave asunto de la agresión israelí. Porque dice lo que dice Mollet, Israel es el agresor. Y si Mollet quiere que se olvide es porque, después de todo, al defender a Ben Gurion defiende su propia causa personal. Los dos tienen las mismas responsabilidades. Nadie lo ha olvidado.

—o—

El comunicado de las conversaciones de El Cairo dice que el acuerdo consiste en defender a los países árabes con su propio esfuerzo, sin necesidad de contraer compromisos con el Extranjero. La redacción resulta deliberadamente ambigua, pues si, por una parte, parece poner de lado toda posibilidad de buscar la alianza soviética, por otra se puede interpretar como una negativa al plan del Presidente Eisenhower. Si es esto lo que buscaban Israel y sus amigos, lo han conseguido plenamente, al menos en apariencia.

Porque aún hay que conceder un plazo a la situación. Cuando la situación se vaya normalizando en el Oriente Medio, especialmente en Egipto, podrán surgir factores que allanen las actuales dificultades de entendimiento. Si la necesidad de permanecer unidos ha prevalecido en las conversaciones de El Cairo, esa misma unidad árabe puede reflejarse más tarde en la conveniencia de seguir una orientación más coincidente con la Casa Blanca.

# ISRAEL SE RETIRA

ISRAEL no ha tenido más remedio que decidirse a abandonar los territorios que aún ocupa en Gaza y península del Sinaí (sector sur, a la entrada del golfo de Akaba). Quizá hubiera ganado más accediendo antes a la retirada. La verdad es que Ben Gurion, en un principio, apoyado por el Gobierno de París, se creía con posibilidades de aguantar la permanencia en Gaza y sur del Sinaí. Debió sentirse en mala postura cuando el jefe del Gobierno inglés recientemente reafirmó que Israel debería evacuar todos los territorios ocupados fuera de la antigua línea de armisticio. Esta declaración de Macmillan era opuesta a la de Pineau—ministro francés de Asuntos Exteriores—, que apoyaba la negativa israelí a retirarse.

LA tardanza de Israel en acceder a las órdenes de la O. N. U. ha dificultado grandemente las negociaciones del Rey Saud con sus colegas en la conferencia de El Cairo. Hasta el punto de que ya se puede decir que el retardo de la retirada israelí impidió a Saud lograr un acuerdo positivo en favor de la doctrina Eisenhower. Puede aún ese acuerdo alcanzar una formalización escrita en el pasado. Pero de momento, como ayer decíamos, los cuatro estados árabes han adoptado simplemente el compromiso de que cada uno es libre de aceptar o rechazar la "doctrina Eisenhower". Y, en cambio, la terca actitud de Tel-Aviv ha reactivado la solidaridad de los cuatro estados árabes contra el estado de Israel, al que desconocen y con el que se niegan a tratar. Mucho habrá de modificar Israel su diplomacia para abrir brecha en el mundo árabe y preparar así su paz futura.

EL peligro ahora es que Ben Gurion no consiga frenar el descontento de sus colaboradores más intransigentes. El Gobierno israelí se halla al borde de la crisis. Y

lo peor es que, tal como están situadas las fuerzas políticas, va a ser acaso una imposibilidad constituir nuevo Gobierno, si cae el de Ben Gurion. Y entonces no habría otra salida que unas problemáticas elecciones. Dura prueba para el joven estado. Téngase en cuenta que el pueblo israelí se había hecho la ilusión de colocar sus fronteras con Egipto en el mismo canal de Suez, Port Said, apoderándose de la península de Sinaí, que tan entrañables recuerdos tiene para todo judío. Por ello, el haber tenido que ceder esos territorios conquistados de una manera tan brillante como cuando Josué paraba el sol, es para el pueblo israelí un amarguísimo trago. Justo es reconocerlo.

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PERO el error diplomático de Israel ha sido no haberse percatado a su tiempo de que, sin el apoyo de la O. N. U. no podría por menos de retirarse. Entre hacerlo a regañadientes y hacerlo por impulso propio hay bastante diferencia, con fines a lograr una garantía firme para su independencia futura. Esa garantía solamente se la pueden ofrecer los Estados Unidos y la Gran Bretaña, pero en el marco de la O. N. U. Y ahora toda la diplomacia de Tel-Aviv habrá de volcarse, por una parte, en conseguir de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas por compensación de la retirada un seguro de independencia, y por otra, en buscar el modo de firmando paces con sus vecinos.

B. M.

La llamada que Austria dirige a los países libres en favor de los refugiados húngaros es angustiosa. La caridad no reconoce fronteras. ¡Español! Envía urgentemente tu ayuda por medio de dinero, que depositarás en los bancos más importantes, e por los paquetes familiares, la Cáritas se encargará de enviarlos a su destino.



## Ni Gaza ni Aqaba

Ni Gaza ni Aqaba tienen la importancia que se pretende darles. Aunque los egipcios no volviesen nunca a la vieja tierra de los filisteos, no por ello cesaría la actuación de los guerrilleros "fedayin". En vez de la franja de Gaza, su base sería cualquier punto de la península de Sinaí, de Jordania o de Siria. Más importante para Israel es el golfo de Aqaba, donde radica su único puerto, Elath, que mira hacia tierras y mares de Oriente. Puesto que ni los Estados Unidos ni las Naciones Unidas disponen de voluntad y fuerza para imponer la libertad de navegación para los buques israelíes por el Canal de Suez, Elath adquiere importancia. Sí, pero... la objeción nos orienta hacia el Sur, hacia el Estrecho de Bab-el-Mandeb, entrada y salida del mar Rojo. Yemen es uno de los países menos conocidos; sin embargo, su posición puede alcanzar suma importancia estratégica. Las operaciones de los yemenitas contra el protectorado de Aden y la agitación que provocan sus agentes en las tribus protegidas por la Gran Bretaña no sólo obedecen a imperativos de panarabismo, sino también a otros designios más importantes y prácticos. Pensemos que frente al extremo sudoeste de la península de Arabia existe otro conflicto en embrión: la agitación somalí contra la Etiopía cristiana. Y fácilmente deduciremos el objetivo de la doble acción: la posibilidad de cerrar el Estrecho de Bab-el-Mandeb, y con ella transformar el mar Rojo en mar interior árabe, con lo que los golfos de Aqaba y de Suez, así como el Canal, perderían automáticamente carácter internacional. Egipto, guía del panarabismo, podría imponer su criterio a todas las potencias, por grandes que fueran, porque fracasada la aventura de Port-Saïd, no habrá nadie que piense reanudarla. Hoy todavía se discute acerca de si ha de aplicarse al Canal de Suez el convenio de 1888, pero si Bab-el-Mandeb quedase cerrado, la discusión adquiriría carácter de bizantinismo. Gamal Abdel Nasser ha preparado el terreno con admirable habilidad y perseverancia. Tanto que puede permitirse ya todas las negativas que en otras ocasiones, o proferidas por otros Gobiernos, conducirían a serias complicaciones. Conforme escribe "The Daily Telegraph": "El verdadero desafío a las Naciones Unidas no ha sido todavía arrastrado; éste se halla en Egipto, donde Abdel Nasser, desafiándolas, obstruye la limpieza del Canal."

ABC  
3/3/57



# SE RETIRAN, PERO SIGUE EL PROBLEMA

SEGUN lo habíamos dicho, Israel no ha tenido más opción que ordenar la retirada de sus tropas de Gaza y del extremo sur de la península de Sinaí. Retirada tan dolorosa para Ben Gurion, jefe del Gobierno israelí, que no pudo menos de comunicársela llorando a sus ministros. Eso quiere decir que se ha rendido ante presiones muy fuertes. Israel no podía enfrentarse a la mayoría de la O. N. U. Ben Gurion ha obrado con decisión enérgica; ordena ahora la retirada como en su día ordenó el avance, sin contar con el Parlamento. La comunicación a éste la hará hoy. Si no le fallan los diputados de su partido, logrará la mayoría mínima.

...

PERO Ben Gurion queda herido de alma y difícilmente podrá recuperarse de esta derrota moral ante su pueblo. Y eso que esto parece haberlo comprendido a su jefe de Gobierno en el trance doloroso de tener que volverse atrás. Si Israel ha de negociar con los árabes—y esa negociación le resultará pronto una necesidad perentoria—habrá de acudir a otro hombre más diplomático y flexible que Ben Gurion, el "nuevo Moisés" de la lucha contra Madian y Egipto.

La crisis en Tel-Aviv parece inevitable, salvo que la oposición se ablande de su actual intransigencia. El mismo Ejército de Israel, con su generalísimo Dayan a la cabeza, está con los intransigentes y no con el Gobierno.

...

QUE promesas ha recibido Israel de los Estados Unidos? Formales, ninguna. Concretamente todas. Sólo así Ben Gurion podía obrar como ha obrado. Israel seguirá recibiendo el apoyo económico americano. Su existencia política queda garantizada por la O. N. U., pues Israel es miembro de ella. En cuanto a la navegación por el golfo de Akaba, su internacionalización no tiene duda, pues, excepto los cuatro países árabes de la alianza de El Cairo, todas las demás naciones abogan por ella. Y algo por el estilo cabe decir con relación a Gaza. Por lo pronto, los Estados Unidos han empezado por financiar el costo de la manutención de los 300.000 refugiados árabes de esa discutida zona palestina. (Recordemos que Gaza forma parte de Palestina y no de Egipto.)

...

EL problema, sin embargo, de Gaza dista de estar resuelto con la internacionalización. Allí los odios parece que amenazan con estallar. Una masa de hambrientos es difícil de ser gobernada. Desde El Cairo, la Liga Árabe, aunque está bastante deshecha, se niega a dar por buena la internacionalización de Gaza. Y desde Tel-Aviv son muchos los que no se contentan con menos que con la plena integración de Gaza en el Estado judío. Más aún, lo mismo la extrema derecha que la extrema izquierda política de Israel apoyan la tesis de que la soberanía israelí ha de extenderse a toda Jordania y la península del Sinaí. Se ha hablado de una posible federación árabejudía que abarcara en sus fronteras todo lo que fué reino de Salomón. Si los judíos siguen emigrando a Palestina, ¿dónde van a caer? Por otra parte, los llamados árabes de Jordania, Siria y Líbano llevan en sus venas la sangre de las nueve tribus perdidas, que se separaron de Judá después de Salomón.

B. M.

# La crisis del petróleo, en vías de solución

La van diluyendo las nubes del horizonte internacional, al menos a Levant. Se ha completado la retirada israelí de Gaza y es de esperar que las muchas dificultades aún pendientes de solución se puedan vencer con buena voluntad. Siria, tal como había prometido, autoriza la reparación de los oleoductos volados, buena nueva que habrá repercutido alegremente en París y Londres, de manera especial, porque es promesa cierta de que su sangría de dólares para comprar petróleo en América va a ser contentada en momento oportuno.

Casi al mismo tiempo que la Onu ganaba la nueva bama contra la torquedad de Israel—más razonable a última hora que sus conocidos valedores, porque por éstos no se hubieran movido de donde estaban las tropas judías, instrumento de sus secretas ambiciones—, el Senado norteamericano, por inmensa mayoría, aprobaba la doctrina de Eisenhower para el Oriente Medio. Los senadores acabaron por comprender que una mayor dilación era atentar contra el prestigio del Presidente—que es el de la nación—, y tirios y troyanos dieron sus votos a un proyecto destinado a conseguir el apaciguamiento de una zona donde hay que impedir la infiltración comunista.

El camino es ése, el señalado por Eisenhower antes y después de formular públicamente sus planes: respeto a la soberanía de los pueblos árabes y conquista de su amistad y colaboración por los únicos procedimientos admisibles, los que alían la generosidad en la mano y la lealtad de intenciones en el corazón.

¿Cuándo volverá a funcionar el canal de Suez? A crecer a Dulles, en un plazo de diez días si se trabaja activamente, como fuera de decir. Creemos sinceramente que las reclamaciones que ha formulado Nasser y están aún pendientes de satisfacción, no deben ser obstáculo para que se acelere la recuperación de los barcos hundidos. El Presi-

dente egipcio seguramente corresponderá a la votación de las Naciones Unidas con criterio realista, para aportar su esfuerzo a la restauración del orden internacional, violado por una agresión, reparada en parte.

Pero esta colaboración egipcia no se puede conseguir con amenazas como las formuladas por el primer ministro canadiense, Saint Laurent, que habla de recurrir a la fuerza para abrir el Canal si el Gobierno de El Cairo no da facilidades. Su lenguaje resulta peligroso por muchos motivos, y uno de ellos, no desdeñable, es que las amenazadoras palabras coinciden con el envío a Egipto de más tropas canadienses para aumentar los efectivos de la Policía internacional. Por esencia, por la misión que les fué encomendada, estas tropas tienen que ser efectivamente neutrales, y mal pueden serlo los canadienses después de las manifestaciones del jefe del Gobierno de Ottawa. ¿Es que quieren crear problemas con el Gobierno de Saint Laurent?

La crisis del Canal, que llevó aneja la del petróleo, ha servido para activar muchos proyectos de nuevos oleoductos y construcción de buques tanques de enorme tonelaje. Esos «pipe-lines» tienen por objeto evitar en el futuro otra situación de escasez y privar a Suez de la importancia vital que hoy tiene. Pero otros tienen un propósito menos político, como el que estudia un grupo americano, aliado con el armador griego Niarcho, para construir en suelo egipcio un oleoducto de Suez a Port Said, capaz de transportar 20 millones de toneladas anuales. Los técnicos en la materia aseguran que la producción petrolífera en el Oriente Medio se triplicará en pocos años y que las posibilidades del Canal se agotarán hasta la saturación. El petróleo que no pueda ser conducido embarcado por esta razón, y porque los buques tanques de 100.000 toneladas tienen excesivo calado para seguir el antiguo camino, deberá ser llevado hasta el Mediterráneo por oleoductos. Conviene no olvidar que en caso de conflicto, y después de la trágica situación revelada por el ataque anglofrancés, Rusia no tendría muchos escrúpulos en utilizar con un bombardeo el Canal para provocar la parálisis de Europa.

Otros proyectos de este tipo son: el que patrocina Israel para llevar por su territorio un oleoducto desde Ellat (golfo de Akaba) hasta Haifa, capaz para 20 millones de toneladas al año, y otro que trasladaría 60 millones de toneladas anuales de petróleo desde los yacimientos norteaños del Irán hasta el puerto turco de Alexandrette. Este «pipe-line» está calculado de forma que evita dando un gran rodeo—el territorio sirio, y tendría un ramal, dirigido hacia el sur de Persia, para nutrirse también con la enorme producción de Bassra, Abadan y Kowat.—J. S. R.

Madrid 3/17

A B C en París

## EGIPTO ARROJO PIEDRAS SOBRE SU PROPIO TEJADO

Sin turismo, con escasas ventas de algodón y sin tráfico en el Canal, la libra egipcia ha perdido el cuarenta por ciento de su valor

### FRANCIA VA RESTABLECIENDO LA NORMALIDAD EN EL SUMINISTRO DE GASOLINA

París 5. (Crónica de nuestro corresponsal, recibida por "Telex".) Los efectos del cierre de Suez se notan ahora en Egipto más que en parte alguna. La súbita interrupción del flujo de divisas ha sometido al país del Nilo a una bíblica carestía. El turismo, en cierto modo "fuente" del Nilo, también quedó totalmente interrumpido desde el pasado verano; el algodón, máxima riqueza egipcia, se vende mal. Últimamente lo compraban, por lo visto, los países de allende el telón, para revenderlo a los occidentales. Ahora, esta operación, por distintos motivos económicos, es mucho menos fructuosa. La libra egipcia ha perdido el cuarenta por ciento de su valor.

En todos los órdenes de la vida, la risa va por barrios. Las precedentes noticias de Egipto coinciden con cierto fluir de la gasolina, ante la sola perspectiva del despeje del Canal. Durante estos días de puente laboral, apoyado en el martes lardero, la circulación de automóviles ha aumentado

hasta el punto de dar la impresión de que ya no existen restricciones.

La prueba—triste y paradójica demostración—de que hay muchos coches rodando, la da el número de muertos en las carreteras: 26 en el día de ayer. La normalidad del suministro de gasolina se puede medir

## DON GREGORIO MARAÑÓN, HIJO ADOPTIVO DE TOLEDO

También le será dedicada una calle en las inmediaciones de la Casa del Greco

Toledo 5. El Ayuntamiento ha nombrado hijo adoptivo de Toledo al doctor don Gregorio Marañón, en reconocimiento a la labor literaria de exaltación de los valores históricos y artísticos de la ciudad. También le será dedicada una calle en las inmediaciones de la Casa del Greco.—Cifra.

por la cifra de muertos... La prosperidad y la normalidad, calculadas en función de los cadáveres... He aquí un tema insospechado que hubiera podido hacer la felicidad de un Bernard Shaw. No sería fácil para mí dejarme deslizar por la pendiente del humor macabro. Especialmente porque en los últimos accidentes de circulación surge un nuevo y espantoso agravante: como muchos automóviles transportan bidones o latas de gasolina, los choques provocan, a veces, rapidísimos incendios. Anteayer murieron, no por el choque, sino por el subsiguiente incendio, una madre y sus dos hijas, y ayer, en Lyon, la explosión de otros recipientes provocó la muerte de otras tres personas.

La forzada austeridad salvó durante nuestra guerra a muchos enfermos graves. Se curaron innumerables llagas de estómago. Ahora, en Francia, la rígida escasez de gasolina, en trance de desaparecer, habrá salvado también muchísimas vidas humanas. Y, lo que tampoco es despreciable: ha permitido a mucha gente redescubrir las bienandanzas de los recorridos y paseos a pie. Este invierno se podía circular y estacionar en París el automóvil casi cuándo y cómo se quería, como era igualmente cómodo andar a pie en días no excesivamente fríos. ¿Perderemos ahora esta doble ventaja? La normalidad para el próximo verano parece inevitable...

### ATENTADO CONTRA EL CARNAVAL

Hace pocos días, en la plaza Massena, de Niza, pasé algunos ratos con una brigada de obreros daba los últimos toques a los andamiajes y decorados que debían soportar las iluminaciones alegóricas de la visita de Carnaval al país de Pantagruel. El esfuerzo que todos los años despliega Niza para mantener vivo un carnaval que, con los de Colonia y Río de Janeiro, parecen ser los únicos que van quedando en el mundo, es muy considerable.

Ayer, en la misma Niza, y junto a la plaza Massena, el carnaval recibió un golpe muy duro. "Esto acaba de ocurrir por culpa de este maldito carnaval", dijo, entre sollozos, el joyero Warwick. Su tienda acababa de ser asaltada a mano armada por un grupo de máscaras. Un golpe de rara habilidad, que ha proporcionado a sus autores cerca del equivalente a seis millones de pesetas. "¿Quién podía imaginar que el Simca ocupado por tan divertidas y ruidosas máscaras era en realidad un vehículo de atracadores!", exclaman ahora algunos testigos. Vieron detenerse el automóvil y descender de él a las máscaras, precedidas por una que lucía grotesca cabeza de Popeye. Nadie, empero, vio el atraco propiamente dicho, pues éste fue perpetrado con celeridad fabulosa. Los atracadores corrieron en la tienda en el momento en que se recogían las joyas para cerrar el establecimiento. La caja estaba abierta a tal efecto, y ello les permitió llevarse fácilmente joyas y dinero. Después, desaparecieron entre la barahunda sin dejar el menor rastro.—Car-

los SENTIS.

# Falta de memoria y prisa innecesaria

La falta de memoria en los pueblos y en los individuos es factor muy importante en los acontecimientos políticos. En la existencia de esa amnesia colectiva se explican algunas actitudes que no serían posibles si estuvieran siempre frescos los recuerdos. Nasser, por ejemplo, debería tener siempre muy presente que si la agresión de que fué objeto por parte de Inglaterra, Francia e Israel, en claro contubernio, fué condenada por la inmensa mayoría de los pueblos amantes de la paz y la justicia, la eficacia de la protesta de las Naciones Unidas tuvo siempre como instrumento la enérgica actitud del Presidente Eisenhower. Si el Presidente norteamericano hubiera vacilado un segundo, por no arriesgar la alianza occidental en aras de los principios superiores de la ley internacional, es posible que se hubieran consumado hechos irremediables.

Recordar esta realidad permitiría al Presidente Nasser no hacer nada que pueda dar argumentos a sus enemigos exteriores, muchos de los cuales lo son también, aunque no lo digan, del Presidente norteamericano, a quien quisieran desviar de su papel de ferviente paladín de la Onu. El Gobierno francés no ha modificado en nada sus planes sobre el Oriente Medio, y el viaje de Mollet a Washington y la entrevista del jefe del Gobierno francés con Macmillan, en vísperas de la Conferencia de las Bermudas, son fases de la misma maniobra: quebrantar al Presidente Eisenhower en su voluntad y en sus propósitos bien conocidos, para que todo lo que se decida en el futuro sobre el Oriente Medio no sea obra exclusivamente norteamericana; para que Inglaterra y Francia recuperen posiciones perdidas, aun a costa de debilitar o poner en serio peligro a las Naciones Unidas.

Le conviene a Nasser hacerles el juego a Macmillan y Mollet, precipitando decisiones que se pueden presentar como contrarias a la voluntad de la Onu?

—O—

Gaza era territorio egipcio antes de ser ocupado por los israelíes. No se ha tomado ningún acuerdo que ponga en tela de juicio esta soberanía, y la pretensión de Tel-Aviv de internacionalizar la zona que hoy ocupan los soldados de la Policía de Burns no es admisible. Quitar a Egipto la administración de un trozo de su suelo sería dar un premio a los agresores. No se concuerda, por lo tanto, el clamor que ha levantado el nombramiento de un gobernador administrativo hecho por Nasser al que en este aspecto solo puede reprochársele, en último extremo, su precipitación.

La labor de la Policía internacional, perfectamente definida por los acuerdos de las Naciones Unidas, tiene única y exclusivamente a conseguir el apaciguamiento de lo que fué campo de batalla y escenario de muchas tropelías, que un día tendrán debido esclarecimiento. Es necesario, en bien de todos, que las unidades que hoy bordean la frontera de Gaza, para evitar nuevos choques entre egipcios y judíos, encuentren sincera colaboración por ambas partes, hasta que se inicien las negociaciones tendientes a conseguir un arreglo general para un pleito que pone en peligro la paz del mundo. Es obligación ineludible de la Onu impedir incidentes y acelerar los trámites de conciliación. En el seno de las Naciones Unidas debe formarse urgentemente una Comisión que analice desde un punto de vista jurídico todos los acontecimientos para que se pueda firmar un Tratado de paz entre El Cairo y Tel-Aviv, para dar justa solución al problema de los refugiados árabes, y se examinen todas las reclamaciones pendientes, derivadas del ataque anglofrancés contra Egipto.

Es el único medio para que renazca la tranquilidad y se puedan retirar de Gaza las unidades de Policía internacional, que no están allí, naturalmente, con la misión de disminuir los derechos soberanos de Egipto sobre un territorio que le pertenece.


—O—

Fuente de luz y petróleo por los oleoductos sirios. El Arabia Saudi autoriza las ventas de petróleo destinadas a Inglaterra y Francia. Dentro de pocos días el Canal estará abierto al paso de buques de diez mil toneladas. El Cairo pues estar satisfecho de la firme solidaridad demostrada por los países árabes, que, por las decisiones adoptadas, parecen entender que ha sonado la hora de volver a la normalidad. Los perjuicios económicos han sido muy grandes para todos, sin excepción, y parece llegado el momento de pedir a todas actitudes menos obstinadas, menos apresuradas, para que el tiempo ejerza su labor sedante y cada cual recupere el lugar que le corresponde. Egipto no tendrá que arrepentirse de proceder con calma y hasta con generosidad, si hace falta. La fuerza de la razón no se puede malbaratar con prisas.





**NASSER**  
El Presidente de Egipto ha declarado que los barcos franceses y británicos deberán pagar la totalidad de los derechos de paso cuando el canal de Suez sea abierto a la navegación.



# Arriba

Núm. 7.583.—II época.—Madrid, martes 12 de marzo de 1957

**BOLETIN METEOROLOGICO**  
**TIEMPO PROBABLE.**— Continuarán los chapascos en Canarias, Ginebra, nubes en Galicia, con probables chapascos por la tarde. Sin cambios importantes en el resto. Las temperaturas extremas de España han sido: máxima, de 33 grados, en Santander, y mínima, de tres, en Soria.

FUNDADO POR JOSE ANTONIO PRIMO DE RIVERA.—ORGANO DE PALANQUE ESPAÑOLA TRADICIONALISTA Y DE LAS J. O. N. S.—LARRA, 14.—TEL. 23-26-10.—1 PTA.

## PELIGRO DE CRISIS EN EL ORIENTE MEDIO

Egipto trata de implantar su propia Administración en la zona de Gaza.  
**LA DECISION EGIPCIA HA PRODUCIDO GRAN ALARMA EN LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS**

**NUOVA YORK** (Cables cablegráficos de nuestro corresponsal).—No acercamos rápidamente a otra crisis internacional en Egipto si no surge un milagro diplomático, porque la actitud de Nasser va coincidiendo con una visible exhaustación de la paciencia norteamericana. Se está llegando al fondo del barril, dicen aquí los técnicos políticos. El asunto de Oriente Medio puede volver a ponerse muy peligroso si Egipto lleva adelante el propósito que anunció hoy de implantar rápidamente su propia Administración sobre la franja de Gaza. De allí se fueron días atrás las tropas israelitas, reemplazadas por contingentes policiales internacionales de las Naciones Unidas, que el domingo andaban a tiros, de momento al aire, contra la población, que se mantenía tumultuosamente a favor de Egipto.

**Las tropas yugoslavas e indias, dispuestas a retirarse de Egipto**

Cierto: en lo legal, incluso a la Policía de la O. N. U. se hallan dispuestas a retirarse del territorio egipcio en cuanto El Cairo lo indique. Sin embargo, la calma diplomática, pacificadora de Estados Unidos, según las garantías morales, más o menos tácitas, que se ofrecen, no presuponen igualmente el libre tráfico de la navegación comercial de los israelitas a través del golfo de Akaba y el canal de Suez.

### LAS DECLARACIONES DE NASSER HAN SENTADO MAL EN WASHINGTON

Egipto tampoco aceptó aún serenas presunciones. Psicológicamente, lo peor de todo ya, desde lo malo, han sido unas declaraciones de Nasser a un periódico indio, donde el estadista egipcio elogió a Rusia y criticó a los Estados Unidos, afirmando que los soviets demuestran una comprensión de la política de los norteamericanos. Y Rusia ayuda a Egipto espontáneamente por intercambios comerciales, respetando su neutralidad en la guerra fría, cosa que los Estados Unidos no hicieron aún. Las declaraciones han sentado mal muy mal... Claro que las declaraciones periodísticas siempre tienen la ventaja de que pueden desmentirse. Materialmente, lo que ya no puede desmentirse, aunque puede corregirse, es la afirmación egipcia oficial rechazando el plan ofrecido por Estados Unidos, Inglaterra, Francia y Noruega para recaudar y distribuir los derechos de tránsito del canal de Suez. En Estados Unidos, la inquietud que produjo la noticia de que Egipto quiere implantar inmediatamente su propia Administración sobre la franja de Gaza, increíble, increíble, comentó muy nervioso al aparcero rubio y tranquilo secretario general de la O. N. U., Mr. Hammarstrand.

**SE ESPERA UNA RAPIDA ACCION EN LA O. N. U.**  
Desde luego, se aguarda una rápida continuación en la O. N. U.

# PELIGRO DE CRISIS EN EL ORIENTE MEDIO

(Continuación de la página 7)

pida acción en la O. N. U. sobre esta materia, que puede ir hasta a volver a convocar también inmediatamente a la Asamblea General. Y para entendernos con rapidez, añado que la impresión aquí hoy en torno al asunto egipcio es que la O. N. U. y la diplomacia de Washington, en sus últimas resoluciones y manipulaciones, se limitaron apresuradamente a cortar y mal hilvanar un traje, que a los cinco minutos de puesto ya estalla por todas sus costuras: las árabes y las israelitas.

**Francisco LUCIENTES**

## Egipto designa gobernador administrativo de Gaza

EL CAIRO. — Un portavoz del Gobierno anuncia que éste ha decidido que la Administración egipcia asuma inmediatamente sus funciones en el sector de Gaza, y ha nombrado gobernador administrativo del mismo al general Hassan Abdel Latif. (Efe.)

ABC  
3/12/57

las verdaderas democracias del Oeste. De aquellas espera el reforzamiento de su posición internacional y el modo de imponer a todos—y en primer término a ingleses y franceses—el pago de la totalidad del peaje. Hasta la fecha, ha tenido tanta suerte, se le ha mimado de un modo tan singular, que sería un santo varón si dejara de sacar de las circunstancias el mayor beneficio posible. Desde su punto de vista, Gamal Abdel Nasser tiene razón. Para él no han de existir los usuarios, ni el convenio internacional de 1888, a sus ojos caducado para siempre.

Gran parte de sus insuperables éxitos se debe a la vacilación de los Estados Unidos. Esta se manifestó desde un principio, como lo demuestra el ex secretario general de las Naciones Unidas, el noruego Trygve Lie en su libro recién publicado en español, "La causa de la Paz".

La partición de Palestina fue rechazada desde siempre por los árabes. "Cuando terminó la votación—escribe Lie—, los representantes de Siria, Líbano, Irak, Arabia Saudita, Yemen y Egipto, se levantaron y se marcharon del salón de sesiones de la Asamblea. ¡Otra retirada!... El Reino Unido, la potencia mandataria (en Palestina), se abstuvo de votar ni en pro ni en contra de la resolución... Desde la primera semana de diciembre de 1947 había empezado a aumentar el desorden en Palestina. Los árabes habían manifestado repetidamente que estaban decididos a resistir por la fuerza la partición... Sólo la U. R. S. S. parecía tomar en serio la realización de la partición. Los Estados Unidos, evidentemente, no lo hacían así. Corría el rumor de que éstos estaban buscando el modo de moderar la postura árabe, aun a costa de abandonar la partición. (Como se ve, no hay nada nuevo bajo el sol.) El cambio de chaqueta norteamericano en este asunto no ha sido explicado nunca. Quizá Washington, al votar por la partición, esperaba una oposición más débil por parte de los árabes, y un apoyo más firme por parte de los ingleses... En todo caso, el cambio norteamericano fue un golpe para las Naciones Unidas y demostró una descorazonadora desconsideración hacia su efectividad y solidez." Pero meses después (el 14 de mayo de 1948), cuando las autoridades judías proclamaron la existencia del Estado de Israel, Washington sólo tardó horas en reconocerlo "de facto". Lo hizo la Administración demócrata de Harry Truman, pero la republicana de Eisenhower repite que los árabes tendrán que acostumbrarse a convivir con los israelíes. Se puede discutir sobre los detalles, pero no sobre la existencia del Estado, miembro de las Naciones Unidas.

No es probable que el presidente egipcio acepte la tesis de la Casa Blanca; ni tampoco el carácter internacional del Canal de Suez y del golfo de Aqaba. Ha tenido hasta ahora tanta suerte y confía tanto en el apoyo de los países árabes, los afro-asiáticos y el bloque soviético, que está seguro de poder resistir a cualquier presión de carácter económico. El mismo recuerda en sus declaraciones del domingo que el nivel de vida del pueblo egipcio es tan bajo que éste soporta fácilmente las nuevas privaciones. Por saberlo, el primer ministro canadiense, el liberal moderado Louis St-Laurent, deja entrever la posibilidad de que haya que recurrir a la fuerza, pero después de la aventura anglo-francesa de Port Said, ya no parece probable que alguna potencia recomience el experimento. También en este terreno le acompaña a Nasser su

## ABDEL NASSER SE DEFINE

El presidente egipcio hizo el domingo unas declaraciones que todos podíamos aprobar y suscribir al pie de la letra. Es cierto, en efecto, que Rusia comprende mejor que Occidente la falta de necesidades materiales y la idiosincrasia típicamente oriental de la nación egipcia. Los norteamericanos se figuran que todos los pueblos son, más o menos, iguales, y que, lógicamente, se dejan seducir por la ayuda económica; los rusos, por el contrario, saben que para varias naciones el resentimiento y el anhelo de venganza son un ácate muy superior al progreso técnico. Siendo así, nadie se extrañará de que a pesar de las pérdidas materiales que significa para Egipto la política de Nasser, desde el 26 de julio del año pasado no haya disminuido en absoluto su innegable y asombrosa popularidad. Los pueblos son como son, y no como los ideólogos desearían que fuesen.

Las declaraciones del presidente Nasser indican claramente que a pesar de su posición nominalmente neutral, Egipto se inclina en mayor grado hacia las llamadas democracias populares que hacia

**Limpie sus cristales sin  
agua, sin mojarse las manos  
y en mucho menos tiempo.**

Use CRISTASOL. Se rocía con el mismo frasco sobre el cristal... se frota con un paño... ¡y ya está! En un instante y sin ningún esfuerzo brillan que da gloria verlos, y se conservan más tiempo limpios. CRISTASOL hace accesible la limpieza de sus cristales, fríaslos.



A B C en Washington

## CONTRA LOS DESEOS DE ISRAEL, GAZA NO SERA INTERNACIONALIZADA

Egipto ha nombrado ya un gobernador militar para la zona  
LA INTRANSIGENCIA DE NASSER COLOCA A LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS  
EN POSICION MUY COMPROMETIDA

Washington 11. (Crónica telefónica de nuestro corresponsal) A la vista de la intransigencia del coronel Nasser en la crisis inacabada de Suez, la posición de Estados Unidos empieza a ser muy comprometida.

Si la situación persiste no me extrañaría que el secretario de Estado que participa en la reunión de los países de la S. E. A. T. O., en Canberra, tuviese que regresar a toda prisa a Washington. Tampoco parecen muy buenas las perspectivas de la semana de cura que el presidente Eisenhower—afectado por un persistente resfriado—pensaba tomarse en Florida.

A Nasser parece importarle más su interés político que la pacificación del Oriente Medio. Esta capital confiaba en que después de la última experiencia, la moderación se imponería en los consejos egipcios. Está ocurriendo todo lo contrario.

En febrero, cuando Eisenhower anunció al país que estaba dispuesto a apoyar a la O. N. U. a todo trance si Israel se negaba a que si Israel se retira, Egipto impedirá a o del Golfo de Agata. Si desgraciadamente Egipto viola el acuerdo de armisticio y otras obligaciones internacionales, habrá que tratar de ello con toda energía en las Naciones Unidas.

En marzo, durante el último debate sobre Israel, el delegado norteamericano dijo en la Asamblea General: "Ninguna de las partes tiene base para afirmar o ejercer los derechos de beligerancia."

Con el nombramiento de un gobernador militar egipcio para la zona de Gaza, con la protesta contra la actitud de la Policía internacional "ante los motines alrededor" de su cuartel general; con la anticipada negativa de paso a los barcos israelíes por Suez; con la exigencia de que los derechos íntegros de peaje del canal sean pagados a Egipto, Nasser parece dispuesto a ir a Roma por todo y compromete gravemente una situación de la que sólo podía salirse con buena voluntad y comprensión de los graves riesgos que entraña.

Con su actitud se enfrenta no solo con Inglaterra y Francia—cosa no muy sorprendente—, sino con los Estados Unidos, que tomaron sobre sí la responsabilidad de presuponer una actitud conciliatoria en Nasser, y, lo que es más grave, con las Naciones Unidas como organismo internacional.

En protesta contra la supuesta actitud de las fuerzas de la Policía internacional y el nombramiento de un gobernador militar egipcio para Gaza, no pueden interponerse de otra manera. Ya no se trata de ésta o aquella nación. Se trata de la O. N. U.

El Dr. Ralph Bunche, subsecretario general de la O. N. U., que llegó hoy a Gaza, ha dicho, con razón, de la presencia de la Policía internacional, que se debe a un acuerdo de la O. N. U., con el que Egipto se conformó. El subsecretario ha añadido en seguida que—contra lo que quiere Israel—Gaza no será internacionalizada. En otras palabras: pasada la crítica interinidad de hoy, la faja de Gaza volverá a la jurisdicción egipcia de acuerdo con el Acuerdo de armisticio de 1949.

En Israel se afirma que no tolerará la presencia de los egipcios en Gaza—las palabras del Dr. Bunche han reportado hoy como una explosión. Egipto, contesta a las con el nombramiento de un gobernador.

Todo ello crea hoy el preludio de una

nueva crisis. Dag Hammarskjöld, que ha hecho más que nadie en el mundo para sostener el derecho de Egipto, ha conferenciado con el alto personal de la O. N. U. y varios jefes de delegaciones. Esta noche no se excluye, para muy pronto, la convocatoria de una sesión extraordinaria de la Asamblea General. Hasta ayer Washington pensaba que la pretensión de Nasser era tomar posiciones para una negociación más favorable. El embajador de Israel, fué el sábado y ha vuelto hoy al Departamento de Estado buscando aclaraciones a la posición americana ante la intransigencia egipcia. No se ha sabido que contestarle.

Si Nasser persiste, puede provocar una nueva explosión. Un Washington muy desengañado tiene hoy perfecta consciencia de que la crisis de otoño no ha terminado. —José María MASSIP.

Washington 11. Los funcionarios norteamericanos han recibido con inquietud el anuncio egipcio de asumir un inmediato control administrativo de la zona de Gaza.

Rehusan hacer comentario alguno porque, según dicen, este asunto es materia propia de las Naciones Unidas.—Efe.

**"TENIAMOS DERECHO A DENUNCIAR LA ACTITUD DE NASSER"**

París 11. Guy Mollet ha declarado esta noche en una emisión televisada que los re-

cientes acontecimientos desarrollados en Gaza habían venido a demostrar que los franceses tenían razón cuando denunciaron la actitud del presidente Abdel Nasser.

"Las noticias que llegan de Gaza, desde hace pocas horas—dijo—no son buenas. Tengo la impresión de que nuestros amigos norteamericanos, que hace una semana comprendían nuestra posición, comprobarán ahora que teníamos derecho a denunciar la actitud de Nasser."—Efe.

### TOQUE DE QUEDA

El Cairo 11. A partir de las veintiuna horas se ha impuesto un toque de queda nocturno en Gaza, según informa el jefe de la Oficina de Relaciones Públicas del Cuartel de las fuerzas de las Naciones Unidas.—Efe.

### UN PLAN RUSO SOBRE EL ORIENTE MEDIO, RECHAZADO

Londres 11. Los Estados Unidos, Inglaterra y Francia han rechazado oficialmente un plan ruso para un arreglo de "paz" en el Oriente Medio de los cuatro grandes, presentado por el Kremlin el 11 de febrero. En notas diplomáticas entregadas al ministro soviético de Asuntos Exteriores, Andrei Gromyko, en Moscú, los tres grandes occidentales han informado a los rusos que en ese plan no se tenían en cuenta los derechos de las naciones del Oriente Medio.

En la nota británica se acusa a Rusia de haber "buscado no solamente aumentar y perpetuar las diferencias en el Oriente Medio, sino también minar la lealtad de las poblaciones hacia sus respectivos Gobiernos".

La nota dice que la paz y la prosperidad en esa zona y la preservación de la independencia de sus naciones es "el principal objetivo de la política del Reino Unido".

La nota de los Estados Unidos acusa a la Unión Soviética de intentar interferirse en las cuestiones del Oriente Medio y evitar que los países de esta zona puedan defenderse por ellos mismos contra una posible agresión roja.—Efe.

### NASSER NOMBRA GOBERNADOR

El Cairo 11. Un portavoz del Gobierno anuncia que éste ha decidido que la Administración egipcia asuma inmediatamente sus funciones en el sector de Gaza, y ha nombrado gobernador administrativo del mismo al general Hassan Abdel Latif.

### Ya funciona un oleoducto de la Iraq Petroleum Company

Londres 11. La Iraq Petroleum Company anuncia que el petróleo de los pozos de la empresa ha empezado a fluir por el oleoducto a través de territorio sirio a las dos de la tarde, hora española. El combustible llegará al puerto mediterráneo de Banias (Siria) el martes.

Añade el anuncio que el oleoducto que ha empezado a funcionar es el de 75 centímetros de diámetro, y que los otros dos de diámetro inferior y que igualmente dejaron de funcionar al iniciarse la acción militar anglofrancesa contra Egipto, en noviembre pasado, se hallarán en servicio de aquí a pocos días.—Efe.





*Jornada mundial*

## REGIMEN PARA SUEZ

LA cuestión de Suez vuelve al primer término. Y vuelve enconadilla. Nasser ha planteado como exigencia previa, para que los barcos pasen por el canal, la de que paguen a Egipto la integridad de las tarifas de tránsito. A sugerencia francobritánica—al menos, sugerencia de Guy Mollet—, había propuesto Washington que el pago se mediara: la mitad a Egipto y la mitad al Banco Internacional. Realmente, la posición de Nasser es obvia, después de lo pasado. Y no parece que Washington la rechace de plano. Quizá tampoco Londres se aferre a la idea del pago al 50 por 100.

EN Londres se vuelve a poner de manifiesto que, sin el ataque malhadado de las tropas francobritánicas, Egipto habría transigido entonces con un sistema de control ejercido por la O. N. U. Se ha publicado la carta del Nasser al secretario de las Naciones Unidas en las vísperas del ataque francobritánico. Esa carta era, en el fondo, un compromiso que garantizaba el libre tránsito y la oportuna indemnización a la antigua compañía explotadora. Pero fue desoída entonces por Londres y París. Lo peor de todo es que la acción contra Egipto fué inspiración francesa, lo cual no deja de suscitar recelos en la alta dirección política de Londres. Porque lo cierto es que la iniciativa de la entente francobritánica la está llevando París, desde hace un año.

Y de ahí que Macmillan no parezca tan sumiso como Eden a las sugerencias de Guy Mollet. En la entrevista de París, ha buscado Mollet convencer a Macmillan de que Francia e Inglaterra realicen la misma política frente a Nasser. Pero el realismo comercial británico, que se resiente de los efectos del corte de Suez, prefiere acometer otra política más en consonancia con la "doctrina Eisenhower". El compromiso es cosa que siempre les ha entrado bien a los ingleses cuando les fallaban los resortes de la fuerza. Estos resortes, en el caso de Suez, no parece que puedan volver a dispararse. Por tanto, pese a los tesis de "dureza diplomática" que preconiza París, Londres posiblemente se inclinará por la negociación. Todo, sin embargo, lo puede echar a perder el conflicto actual de Gaza.

EL hecho de que las informaciones de la entrevista de París hayan sido tan convencionales se presta a suponer que, entre Mollet y Macmillan no se llegó a un acuerdo claro. Por tanto, cabe deducir que Inglaterra se resiste a acompañar a Francia en una política de presiones sobre Washington, para que Washington se asocie a una diplomacia triangular, al margen de la O. N. U., con respecto a Suez y, en general, el Oriente Medio.

Por otra parte, Nasser acaba de hacer unas declaraciones en las que, a vueltas de alardear de neutralismo, se le ve interesado en llegar también a un compromiso sobre Suez. Ese compromiso es posible sobre estas bases: soberanía egipcia—política y administrativa—en el canal, pago de tarifas a Egipto por los usuarios (sin discriminaciones), libre tránsito, control de las Naciones Unidas (que sustituirían así al consejo consular previsto por la convención de 1888, que nunca llegó a regir).

# "Rusia parece comprender mejor nuestra posición que Norteamérica", dice Nasser

"Los barcos ingleses y franceses tendrán que pagar totalmente los derechos de tránsito por Suez"

EL CAIRO.—El Presidente Nasser ha manifestado que Rusia ha mostrado más comprensión sobre la "positiva neutralidad árabe" que los Estados Unidos.

El Presidente egipcio concedió una audiencia a un grupo de periodistas indios. Preguntado acerca de los planes norteamericanos y soviéticos sobre el Oriente Medio, Nasser declaró: "Todo lo que se puede decir es que Rusia parece comprender mejor nuestra posición que Norteamérica. Por lo menos los rusos nos apoyan en nuestra política de neutralidad y no unión con bloques militares, mientras que Estados Unidos, hasta ahora, no lo han hecho."

"De todas formas—añadió—, la historia está con nosotros, o por lo menos creemos que lo está. No me cabe ninguna duda de que todo el mundo se dará cuenta de las ventajas de la positiva neutralidad afrasiática."

Nasser hizo constar que los barcos ingleses y franceses tendrán que pagar todos sus derechos de tránsito por el canal de Suez a Egipto cuando la vía marítima sea abierta de nuevo a la navegación. "He informado al secretario general de las Naciones Unidas—dijo—de que estamos dispuestos a permitir a los barcos de Francia e Inglaterra que utilicen normalmente el canal de Suez, siempre que los derechos de paso sean abonados en su totalidad a la autoridad egipcia del Canal." Añadió que no se ha llegado a una decisión sobre los derechos de la navegación israelí en el golfo de Akaba y si Egipto aceptará un régimen internacional para él.

Nasser declaró que Egipto sólo ha recibido 12 de los 40 millones consignados por los Estados Unidos para la nación egipcia en 1955. "El resto—añadió—pesa como una especie de presión económica sobre nosotros. Por otra parte, Rusia nos ha ayudado grandemente en intercambios comerciales ordinarios. Nosotros no pedimos ayuda a la Unión Soviética—hizo constar—. Así que nadie nos puede acusar de seguir la política de hacer el juego al Este contra el Oeste."

El Presidente egipcio manifestó a los periodistas que Inglaterra y Francia no podrán eludir el pago total de los derechos de tránsito por el Canal a Egipto, porque—dijo—si nosotros aceptáramos eso, sería seguir una política discriminatoria contra otros países, tales como la India, que han aceptado pagar a la autoridad egipcia dicho total.

"Afirmamos nuestro deseo—siguió diciendo—de seguir fielmente lo dispuesto en el Tratado de 1888 y estamos dispuestos a cooperar al máximo con los usuarios del Canal dentro de los límites de nuestra soberanía y dignidad nacional. Esperamos con ansiedad que hayan terminado las operaciones de limpieza de la vía marítima, para lo cual cooperamos con todos nuestros medios con las Naciones Unidas, porque queremos que el Canal esté abierto de nuevo a la navegación lo antes posible. Queremos asegurar a los usuarios que la navegación transcurrirá sin dificultades por nuestra parte."

Durante su discurso, el Presidente Nasser tocó los siguientes puntos:

1. Ayuda extranjera.—"Acogeremos la ayuda extranjera, siempre que nos sea ofrecida sin ninguna condición es prioritaria y no tenga por fin ligarnos a las actividades defensivas, políticas o económicas de ninguna nación."

2. Bloqueo económico.—Nasser dijo que el bloqueo económico contra Egipto ha resultado ineficaz a causa del bajo nivel de vida del pueblo egipcio y de la ayuda del bloque oriental. "El reforzar el bloqueo—añadió—fue una bendición para nosotros, ya que ahora tenemos que depender de nuestros productos nacionales. Tomen como ejemplo el cigarrillo que estoy fumando. Antes utilizaba únicamente cigarrillos norteamericanos. Ahora me he acostumbrado a los egipcios, y los prefiero."

3. Israel.—Nasser acusó a Israel de llevar a cabo "una expansión" imperialista, y dijo que "algunas de las grandes potencias" son las que dirigen Israel y no su jefe de Gobierno, Ben Gurion.

Preguntado sobre si se podría llegar a un "modus vivendi" con Israel, tomando como base las resoluciones de las Naciones Unidas de 1947 y 1948, el Presidente egipcio contestó: "Israel ha violado repetidamente esas resoluciones. La única solución que yo veo es la realización de la unidad árabe y la seguridad colectiva árabe."

4. Política exterior.—"El método seguido por Gran Bretaña y Francia en la llamada crisis de Suez, continuando luego por la traicionera invasión, después de haberse asegurado, así como al mundo entero, que no provocarían la guerra, me ha convencido del error de seguir creyendo en el Occidente."

"He comprobado—agregó—que la franqueza, la honradez y la buena fe no se dan en la jungla de la diplomacia, donde gobiernan la traición y la propaganda tendenciosa."

Terminó diciendo que por primera vez se habían distribuido armas entre el pueblo egipcio durante la invasión anglofrancesa y que todavía no se habían producido incidentes.—Efe.

## GRAVE INCIDENTE EN GAZA

EL CAIRO.—Las tropas de las Naciones Unidas se han visto obligadas a lanzar bombas de gases lacrimógenos y a disparar al aire cuando una multitud egipcia intentó asaltar la estación de Policía de Gaza.

El jefe de las fuerzas internacionales, general Burns, anunció personalmente el incidente en el aeropuerto de Abu Sakhir poco después de la llegada del secretario general adjunto de las Naciones Unidas, Ralph Bunche.

Bunche llegó a las dos y cuarto de la tarde de ayer (hora española).—Efe.

HOY SERÁ RETIRADO EL REMOLCADOR "EDGAR BONNET", HUNDIDO EN EL CANAL

EL CAIRO.—En círculos autorizados se ha revelado que hoy terminarán los trabajos de limpieza en el remolcador "Edgar Bonnet", hundido en las proximidades de Suez.—Efe.

FIDE A LA POLICIA INTERNACIONAL QUE DETENGA LAS INCURSIONES DE LOS "FEDAYAS" EGIPCIOS

JERUSALEN.—La ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, Golda Meir, ha advertido a las fuerzas de la Policía Internacional de las Naciones Unidas que, a menos que consigan detener las incursiones de los "fedayas" egipcios a través de la zona de Gaza, la situación se hará cada vez más explosiva.

En su primera declaración oficial desde que regresó de Norteamérica, Golda Meir dice que la reciente incursión egipcia en Rafah era un aviso de lo que puede suceder si la Unif no corta esos actos de violencia.—Efe.

EL GENERAL BURNS SE TRASLADA A GAZA

EL CAIRO.—El general Burns, jefe de las fuerzas de la Onu, se ha trasladado a Gaza para tratar con sus subordinados militares sobre el problema de la administración civil de la franja.

Inmediatamente después de su llegada a Gaza acudió al Cuartel General de la Onu, en la calle Omar El Mohtar.

Pocos minutos después de la llegada de Burns a Gaza, un caza israelí voló a baja altura sobre la localidad para regresar a territorio israelí inmediatamente.

Hanuelto a registrarse en la mañana de hoy manifestaciones y las oficinas del Gobierno y escuelas públicas permanecieron cerradas.

Los manifestantes prorrumpen en gritos: "¡Gaza no es ni oriental ni occidental! ¡Gaza es egipcia!"—Efe.

# EGIPTO DE intervenir en

**NOMBRA UN ADMINISTRADOR  
DEBE ACTUAR INMEDIATAMENTE**

**Londres:** Otra vez peligra la solución pacífica en Oriente Medio.—En Londres se habla de desafío egipcio a la O. N. U.—Israel dirige otra enérgica advertencia a Nasser.—Parece que Inglaterra y Francia renunciarían al canal antes que someterse.—Respuesta negativa de las tres potencias occidentales a Moscú.

**París:** Enormes manifestaciones en Giza.—Tuvieron que disparar al aire las tropas internacionales.—En París creen que la acción de Nasser puede tener graves consecuencias.—Norteamérica acaso tenga un papel decisivo para resolver el nuevo conflicto.—El acuerdo anglofrancés no se extiende a las cuestiones europeas.

**El plan occidental sobre Suez, rechazado**

**Se agrava de nuevo la situación en el Oriente Medio**

**NUEVA YORK, 11. (Crónica recibida por "telex" del corresponsal de YA y "La Vanguardia", Angel Zúñiga.)**

La undécima Asamblea de las Naciones Unidas ha conseguido prender con alfileres el patrón-papico de Giza. Ya se ha visto que a los primeros movimientos de las tropas del Organismo aquellos mismos alfileres se han clavado en los dedos de ese minúsculo ejército. Minúsculo, por cuanto se calcula que bastante menos de 3.000 soldados tienen que mantener la paz en una población de 300.000. Una población, además, sobre cuyo lomo sensitivo resalta el látigo nacionalista.

Una serie de manifestaciones provocadas o espontáneamente dirigidas renueva la animosidad contra los acuerdos de las Naciones Unidas, dando argumentos a Nasser para que rechace el control de Giza. En consecuencia, no despreciables, esta situación, agravando los temores de un general Burt, comandante de las fuerzas de las Naciones Unidas, en esas manifestaciones existen signos evidentes de penetración comunista.

## **OPERACIONES SOBRE EL CANAL**

Al rechazar Egipto abiertamente el plan de operaciones sobre el canal de Suez, que viene respaldado por los Estados Unidos, la situación vuelve a ser delicada. Todo el peso de la autoridad de este país ha servido para lograr el cese de hostilidades, primero; luego, para la retirada de las tropas invasoras, llevada a cabo después de los forcejeos consabidos con Israel. En este instante la actuación de Egipto resultará decisiva. Un deseo de mantener a todo trance su actitud, sin el estira y afloja habitual de la buena política, conduciría a una nueva tensión internacional en que la Administración republicana se viese obligada a actuar en otra forma. Incluso contra sus propios deseos de mantener la paz a toda costa. Una política de apaciguamiento que sólo se cumpliera unilateralmente hallaría a la larga una repulsa por el cuerpo electoral de este país.

## **EISENHOWER, MUY ENVEJECIDO**

Decíamos hace poco que habíamos encontrado a Eisenhower muy envejecido. Su salud en estos días ha vuelto a suscitarnos reparos. Son muchas las energías que necesita el Presidente en momento tan difícil. La próxima semana, la reunión con el primer ministro inglés, señor Macmillan, que tendrá lugar en las Bermudas, ha de servir para apretar el nudo de la amistad de los aliados y su política de unión, sobre todo en este asunto de Suez, que ya ha durado demasiado para no enfrentarse con una solución definitiva.

Los aliados de este país, Francia e Inglaterra, se hallan de acuerdo en la política a seguir en el asunto del canal. Sólo necesitan convencer al Presidente de la necesidad de cobrar al unísono y en forma definitiva, si no se quiere que de la pasada cicatriz brote sangre fresca.

(Continúa en tercera pag.)

# CRONISTAS DE

## Crónica de Nue

*Viene de la 1.ª pag.*

### POSIBLES HOSTILIDADES

El senador demócrata Herman Talmadge ha declarado que la "doctrina Eisenhower" está dirigida a hacer en el Oriente Medio lo mismo por lo que Francia, Inglaterra e Israel fueron condenados en las Naciones Unidas. Lo que significa que, si se tira mucho de la cuerda, la rotura de hostilidades es una posibilidad que nadie descarta. El mismo senador cree conveniente una invitación del Presidente a los dos personajes clave de este asunto, el coronel Nasser y el primer ministro, Ben Gurion, a una conferencia, que trataría de evitar la reanudación de la crisis bélica. Pero considerando en estado de guerra con Israel, no resulta fácil calcular el éxito que semejante proposición tendría por parte de Egipto. De la misma manera que decidida a hacer pagar el peaje íntegro a las naciones que deben usar el canal, se encoge de hombros desafiante a la proposición inglesa de sólo pagar un 50 por 100.

Consienten que la otra mitad sea ingresada en una cuenta especial hasta un definitivo acuerdo sobre el tema, pero de ninguna manera que pase a la de cualquiera de las agencias internacionales indicadas por los occidentales.

El otro motivo de discordia es la negativa a dejar pasar los barcos de Israel por el canal.

### SITUACION DELICADA

Lo que, en este sentido, la fuerza moral de las Naciones Unidas no ha servido para nada y el prestigio de este país se halla también en entredicho si no pueden lograr para Israel un trato igual al de las otras naciones. Israel ha comprobado ya que su situación como nación es bien incómoda.

Aparte de Birmania, no se halla en buena relación con ningún estado asiático. Está rodeado de países que han visto con los peores ojos su creación y sus relaciones con Europa, léase Francia e Inglaterra, y con los Estados Unidos, y reaviva en esos vecinos las suspicacias, las sospechas y el sentimiento de creerse injustamente tratados. Aunque con signo contrario, Rusia juega ese peón en el enorme ajedrez árabe.

### PLAN RUSO RECHAZADO

Cualquier injerencia de los soviets en aquella zona puede tomar desde ahora un matiz mucho más dramático. Los Estados Unidos han rechazado totalmente el plan ruso sobre el Oriente Medio. Una negociación con ellos se consideraría por Occidente como la rendición a otro plan más ambicioso, que es el de la consolidación de su influencia en el mundo árabe. Contra eso precisamente está la "doctrina" del

Presidente. Para explicar cuál es su alcance y su significación exacta y también los objetivos norteamericanos, el que fué miembro demócrata del Congreso por Carolina del Sur James P. Richards emprende un viaje por el Oriente Medio representando al departamento de Estado.



# Nasser tiene la palabra

El general Burns, jefe de las fuerzas de Policía Internacional en Egipto, ha sido testigo de una manifestación popular en Gaza, verdadero plebiscito de la población de la discutida zona, que proclamaba su alegría por la retirada de las tropas israelíes y su adhesión al Presidente Nasser. Para éste se presenta ahora la ocasión oportuna de administrar prudentemente la satisfacción de sus gobernados por el desenlace favorable de la crisis que puso en riesgo la independencia de Egipto y el destino personal de su Presidente, uno de los objetivos fundamentales de la agresión francobritánica. Si Nasser sabe utilizar con cautela los triunfos que posee en la mano; si sabe frenar las impacencias de los extremistas que le siguen, su prestigio alcanzará proporciones inusitadas. Pretender conseguir todo de un golpe puede ser muy arriesgado.

—O—

La posición oficial de Egipto en relación con la apertura del Canal y los derechos de peaje no se conocerá seguramente hasta que termine la anunciada visita a El Cairo de Dag Hammarskjöld, el secretario general de la Onu, al que se debe en gran parte la solución de la crisis, como ejecutor sin desmayos de los acuerdos de las Naciones Unidas. Para juzgar de las dificultades de su tarea basta tener en cuenta los odios que ha concitado en las potencias obligadas a rectificar actitudes y en la campaña de que ha sido objeto en la Prensa de algunos países que le acusaban de ser instrumento de Rusia.

—O—

¿Aceptará el Gobierno egipcio el criterio norteamericano sobre el pago de derechos de tránsito? Consiste, como es sabido, en que se abone la mitad al Estado egipcio y la otra mitad al Banco Mundial, para que éste pueda atender, hasta llegar a un acuerdo definitivo, a los gastos de reconstrucción del Canal y los derivados de su limpieza. ¿Es justa la propuesta? Si se tiene en cuenta que el proyecto se hace para salvar un período de interinidad, es muy posible que en El Cairo se acepte la fórmula, mientras se busca el modo de constituir en el seno de la Onu una Comisión internacional que dé cauce a las recíprocas reclamaciones económicas pendientes, tarea que exigirá tiempo para que cristalice en acuerdos solemnes.

Richards, embajador especial del Presidente Eisenhower para su doctrina sobre el Oriente Medio, iniciará en breve su viaje a las capitales de los países árabes. Pero en la noticia que fija la fecha de partida y las naciones que serán objeto de su atención no figura Egipto. ¿Fallo en el teletipo u omisión deliberada del departamento de Estado? Es posible que la duda perdure algunos días, hasta ver cómo reacciona Nasser a la sugerencia de Washington. En Norteamérica se espera que el Presidente egipcio haya sabido estimar en su enor-

me valor la firme actitud de Eisenhower en los momentos más graves de la crisis y que ha llegado la hora de corresponder con comprensión y buena voluntad.

—O—

Hace un mes, antes de cesar como ministro de Asuntos Exteriores de Rusia, Chapilov expuso un programa de seis puntos para el Oriente Medio, destinado a contrarrestar la doctrina de Eisenhower, y ahora se anuncia que Estados Unidos, Inglaterra y Francia rechazarán públicamente el plan soviético. La mejora de la situación hizo obligado el aplazamiento de una manifestación en la que las potencias occidentales renovarían sus propósitos firmes de impedir la infiltración comunista en esa zona del mundo. Esta posición será estudiada seguramente en las Bermudas por Eisenhower y Macmillan, que será interpretado este último no sólo del punto de vista inglés, sino del francés. Y en esta ocasión quien necesitará cautela será el Presidente Eisenhower, pues asociar íntimamente su política a la anglofrancesa en el Oriente Medio sería exponer innecesariamente a serios inconvenientes sus propios planes.—J. S. R.

*Madrid 3/9*

# DURO ATAQUE DE NASSER al Occidente

**Los buques ingleses y franceses deberán pagar los derechos enteros de paso a la Administración egipcia del Canal**

**El Presidente anunció que no serán puestas a la navegación dificultades, "dentro de nuestra soberanía y dignidad"**

EL CAIRO. 10. — El Presidente Nasser ha manifestado que Rusia ha mostrado más comprensión sobre la "positiva neutralidad árabe" que los Estados Unidos.

El Presidente egipcio concedió una audiencia a un grupo de periodistas indios. Preguntado acerca de los planes norteamericano y soviético para el Oriente Medio, Nasser declaró: "Todo lo que puedo decir es que Rusia parece comprender mejor nuestra posición que Norteamérica. Por lo menos, los rusos nos apoyan en nuestra política de neutralidad y no unión con bloques militares, mientras que Estados Unidos hasta ahora no lo han hecho."

De todas formas—añadió—, la historia está con nosotros o, por lo menos, creemos que lo está. No me cabe ninguna duda de que todo el mundo se dará cuenta pronto de las ventajas de la positiva neutralidad afroasiática."

Nasser hizo constar que los barcos ingleses y franceses tendrán que pagar todos sus derechos de tránsito por el canal de Suez a Egipto, cuando la vía marítima sea abierta de nuevo a la navegación. "He informado al secretario general de las Naciones Unidas—dijo—de que estamos dispuestos a permitir a los barcos de Francia e Inglaterra que utilicen normalmente el canal de Suez, siempre que los derechos de paso sean abonados en su totalidad a la autoridad egipcia del canal." Añadió que no se ha llegado a una decisión sobre los derechos de la navegación israelí en el golfo de Aqaba y si Egipto aceptará un régimen internacional para él.

Nasser declaró que Egipto sólo ha recibido 12 de los 40 millones consignados por los Estados Unidos para la nación egipcia en 1955. "El resto—añadió—pesa como una especie de presión económica sobre nosotros. Por otra parte, Rusia nos ha ayudado grandemente en intercambios comerciales ordinarios. Nosotros no pedimos ayuda a la Unión Soviética—hizo constar—. Así que nadie nos puede acusar de seguir la política de hacer el juego al Este contra el Oeste."

(Continúa en séptima pag.)

# DURO ATAQUE DE NASSER AL OCCIDENTE

(Viene de primera página)

El Presidente egipcio manifestó a los periodistas que Inglaterra y Francia no podrán eludir el pago total de los derechos de tránsito por el canal a Egipto. "porque —dijo— si nosotros aceptáramos eso, sería seguir una política discriminatoria contra otros países, tales como la India, que han aceptado pagar a la autoridad egipcia dicho total".

"Afirmamos nuestro deseo —siguió diciendo— de seguir fielmente lo dispuesto en el tratado de 1888 y estamos dispuestos a cooperar al máximo con los usuarios del canal dentro de los límites de nuestra soberanía y dignidad nacional. Esperamos con ansiedad que hayan terminado las operaciones de limpieza de la vía marítima, para lo cual cooperamos con todos nuestros medios con las Naciones Unidas, porque queremos que el canal esté de nuevo abierto a la navegación lo antes posible. Queremos asegurar a los usuarios que la navegación transcurrirá sin dificultades por nuestra parte."

Durante su discurso, el Presidente Nasser tocó los siguientes puntos:

1. Ayuda extranjera. — "Acogeremos la ayuda extranjera, siempre que nos sea ofrecida sin ninguna condición 'a priori' y no tenga por fin ligarnos a las actitudes defensivas, políticas o económicas de ninguna nación."

2. Bloqueo económico. — Nasser dijo que el bloqueo económico contra Egipto ha resultado ineficaz a causa del bajo nivel de vida del pueblo egipcio y de la ayuda del bloque oriental. "El reforzar el bloqueo —añadió— fué una bendición para nosotros, ya que ahora tenemos que depender de nuestros productos nacionales. Tomen como ejemplo el cigarrillo que estoy fumando. Antes utilizaba únicamente cigarrillos norteamericanos. Ahora me he acostumbrado a los egipcios, y los prefiero."

3. — Israel. Nasser acusó a Israel de llevar a cabo "una expansión" imperialista, y dijo que "algunas de las grandes potencias" son las que dirigen Israel y no su jefe de Gobierno, Ben Gurion.

Preguntado sobre si se podría llegar a un "modus vivendi" con Israel, tomando como base las resoluciones de las Naciones Unidas de 1947 y 1948, el Presidente egipcio contestó: "Israel ha violado repetidamente esas resoluciones. La única solución que yo veo es la realización de la unidad árabe y la seguridad colectiva árabe."

4. Política exterior. — "El método seguido por Gran Bretaña y Francia en la llamada crisis de Suez, continuando luego por la traidora invasión de seres nocentes y pacíficos de Egipto por los Ejércitos imperialista y sionista, después de habernos asegurado, así como al mundo entero, que no provocarían la guerra, me ha convencido del error de seguir creyendo en el Occidente."

"He comprobado —agregó— que la franqueza, la honradez y la

buena fe no se dan en la jungla de la diplomacia, donde gobiernan la traición y la propaganda tendenciosa."

Terminó diciendo que por primera vez se habían distribuido armas entre el pueblo egipcio durante la invasión anglofrancesa y que todavía no se habían producido incidentes. —EFE.

## Grave incidente en Gaza

EL CAIRO, 10. — Las tropas de las Naciones Unidas se han visto

obligadas a lanzar bombas de gases lacrimógenos y a disparar al aire cuando una multitud egipcia intentó asaltar la estación de Policía de Gaza.

El jefe de las fuerzas internacionales, general Burns, anunció personalmente el incidente en el aeropuerto de Abu Sueir poco después de la llegada del secretario general adjunto de las Naciones Unidas, Ralph Bunche.

Bunche llegó a las dos y cuarto de la tarde (hora española). —EFE.

## HACIA LA PAZ EN ORIENTE

**TRES** hechos importantes dieron ayer comienzo al reajuste pacífico de los intereses en el Oriente Medio. Los hechos son los siguientes: retirada incondicional de las tropas judías a sus puntos de partida, aprobación por el Congreso americano del programa de Eisenhower para el Oriente Medio; anuncio egipcio de avenirse a la total limpieza del canal de Suez. De no surgir en El Cairo una repentina oposición a Nasser—latente en algunos grupos representados en el Gobierno—, en menos de quince días podrá volver a ser atravesado el canal. Hay, sin embargo, el peligro de que Nasser se vea forzado por los extremistas. Sería fatal para Egipto, pues entonces perdería este país el apoyo incondicional que la O. N. U. le ha prestado en su pleito con ingleses y franceses.

**QUEDA** una dificultad principal para la normalización inmediata: Egipto—secundado por Siria y quizá también por Sudán y Jordania—exige reparaciones de guerra a sus agresores y, mientras éstos no se las paguen, Egipto dice que no les permitirá el uso del canal de Suez. Uso que Israel ha pedido ya a cambio de la retirada de sus tropas. La diplomacia americana trata de llegar a un acuerdo en este delicado asunto.

Para Eisenhower está claro que los árabes deben hacerse a la idea de que "Israel es un hecho histórico" y de que el estrecho de Tiran, en la entrada del golfo de Akaba, no debe ser interceptado a ningún navío. En este sentido obrará la política de los Estados Unidos. Política que, según tajante afirmación de Eisenhower, debe desinvolverse "por medio de las Naciones Unidas". Parece así quedar advertido Macmillan, a fin de que en su próximo encuentro con el Presidente americano no plantee la vuelta a una política a espaldas de la O. N. U.

**EN** Gaza, abandonada por los judíos, se establecerá el cuartel general de las tropas "onuanas". Es el comienzo para instaurar un régimen de internacionalización en el sector. Hay la tendencia, todavía en germen, de internacionalizar todas las zonas disputadas entre árabes y judíos. En lo económico, no cabe duda de que la internacionalización les será muy beneficiosa a los habitantes de Gaza y demás territorios que hayan de quedar al amparo de la O. N. U.

### De Valera, triunfante

**SE** ha confirmado el triunfo de Eamon de Valera. Será el nuevo jefe de Gobierno en Irlanda. El viejo y honrado patriota se ha salido con la suya de poder gobernar sin la ayuda de otros grupos. Ha logrado 78 escaños; más de la mayoría absoluta. El Parlamento lo forman 147 diputados. A Costello—jefe del Gobierno anterior—sólo le han quedado 40 escaños. Los laboristas se llevan 12; los agrarios, tres; los republicanos de Macbride (derrotado éste), se reducen a uno; los independientes tienen nueve, y los extremistas del Sinn Féin, cuatro. La sorpresa la han dado los últimos sacando adelante sus candidatos (todos en la cárcel) a costa del grupo de Macbride y del propio De Valera, aun siendo vencedor.

B. M.



3/10/57

# FRANCIA E INGLATERRA SE AVIENEN A PAGAR A EGIPTO LA MITAD DE LOS DERECHOS DE PASO POR EL CANAL

Mollet y Macmillán estudiaron ayer la actual situación en Oriente Medio a la luz de los últimos acontecimientos

## DE LA AVENTURA BELICA DEL PASADO OTOÑO SOLO ISRAEL HA SALIDO REFORZADO

París 9. (Crónica de nuestro corresponsal, recibida por "telex".) Como dos elegantes caballeros ingleses, de los que de vez en cuando vienen a pasar un fin de semana en París para paladear sus platos favoritos y presenciar algún espectáculo en boga, el "premier" británico y su ministro de Asuntos Exteriores llegaron esta mañana, y, sin perder un minuto se encerraron con sus colegas franceses, con los cuales almorzaron en Matignan y cenaron en el Quai d'Orsay.

La entrevista de los pares británicos y los noñes franceses—la primera desde el azaroso desembarco en Port Said—se había proyectado días atrás para tratar dos temas que inquietaban a Londres: la no aceptación francesa de la retirada de una gran parte de las fuerzas inglesas en Europa y la oposición europea a una ambigua actitud inglesa respecto a la llamada zona del libre cambio, a través de la cual temen en Londres ver caer sus territorios de ultramar en la cacerola europea.

Pero como el hombre propone y Dios dispone, otro tema se ha colocado por sí mismo en cabeza de las conversaciones anglo-francesas: la nueva situación de Suez o próxima reapertura del Canal.

El caricaturista del "Daily Mirror", de Londres, plasma hoy muy graciosamente esta prelación al dibujar a los dos ingleses paseando por los bulevares, junto a una columna publicitaria donde se anuncia: "Suez folies" y "The Mollet review".

La ya muy próxima reapertura del Canal ofrecería un momento muy propicio para cerrar un balance de siete meses, si, en realidad, con los propósitos egipcios de percibir la totalidad de los derechos de paso por el Canal y prohibir el acceso de buques israelíes, no se dejara el epílogo todavía en el tintero.

De todos modos, desde hoy se puede concluir que si el resultado final dejará bastante bien librados a los israelíes, no sacará, en cambio, ni poco ni mucho, a flote los valores materiales y morales que vieron los anglo-franceses hundirse con la operación "Mosquetero", que así, como se recordará, se bautizó el desembarco por los Estados Mayores que lo prepararon. "Los siete meses después" ofrecen a los israelíes un aumento de su prestigio internacional por una victoria que el conflicto de Gaza ha hecho trascender hasta los confines más remotos, cerrados o aislados del mundo árabe. No hay duda de que hoy, en gran parte, gracias al tapón de las fuerzas de la O. N. U., Israel está más garantizado que antes y la navegación por Akaba, golfo antes tan desconocido como lo que allí ocurría, está abierta internacionalmente.

El balance provisional para Francia e Inglaterra, en cambio, es infinitamente menos brillante. Sustituídos o suplantados ambos en todo el Próximo Oriente, se

disponen hoy, a iniciativa de Inglaterra, la más necesitada de las dos en navegar por Suez, a transigir en un punto que antes de Port Said habían salvado totalmente: pagar parte del peaje a los egipcios. Antes depositaban las sumas en las cuentas bloqueadas por la propia Inglaterra y que la vieja Compañía poseía en Londres. Ahora, por contra, se avienen a pagar a Egipto la mitad del peaje, y aún no está escrita que, a la postre, se resignen a más y paguen a Egipto la totalidad o casi.

En ciertos momentos, al escribir, me parece estar reviviendo la misma situación de septiembre del año pasado. Como entonces, el problema más urgente es la reglamentación del peaje y luego debe venir el arreglo de la gerencia o gestión del Canal, todavía en plena nebulosa. No solamente se ha desandado. Francia e Inglaterra han retrocedido en muchos puntos. Para que esta marcha atrás se limite al mínimo, Macmillán y Mollet rememoran esta noche en torno a una buena mesa la "entente cordiale" que esta vez, si pudiera recaer de verdad, tendría también que orientarse a una defensa contra la absorción progresiva por parte de los EE. UU. un amigo de peso... que a veces da un pisotón.—Carlos SENTIS.

### ISRAEL, ALARMADO, PIDE APOYO

Washington 9. Israel intenta conseguir el apoyo de los Estados Unidos para que los barcos israelíes puedan utilizar el Canal de Suez, cuando, sea abierto de nuevo al tráfico.

El embajador judío en Washington, Abba Eban, hizo una petición en tal sentido al secretario de Estado en funciones, Christian Herter. Después de la reunión con Herter, Eban declaró a los periodistas que Israel se siente alarmado ante los informes procedentes de El Cairo, según los cuales Egipto continuará oponiéndose a que

los buques israelíes utilicen la vía marítima. Anunció que había entregado una carta de la ministra de Asuntos Exteriores de su país, Golda Meir, a Herter.

"La carta—dice—expresa la gratitud de Israel por la comprensión que los Estados Unidos han demostrado hacia los problemas judíos, en las últimas semanas y, al mismo tiempo, establece nuestras posiciones sobre cierto número de asuntos."—Efe.

### "ACUERDO COMPLETO"

París 9. Los dirigentes políticos británicos y franceses han anunciado esta noche "un acuerdo fundamental" en todos los problemas internacionales discutidos durante las cuatro horas que han estado reunidos hoy.

Al salir del banquete, Macmillán dijo, volviéndose hacia los periodistas: "Hemos tenido un completo acuerdo."

Por su parte, Pineau manifestó, después de despedir al primer ministro británico y señora de Macmillán: "Hemos tenido un acuerdo fundamental en todos los puntos discutidos hoy."

El ministro francés explicó a los periodistas que "el acuerdo fundamental" en cuanto a la propuesta retirada de las tropas británicas de Alemania era la máxima defensa con el mínimo coste y con armamento moderno."

Agregó Pineau que habían estado también de acuerdo en buscar la forma de que la propuesta británica de una zona libre de comercio, se enlace con el Mercado Común Europeo, y señaló que los técnicos se encargarían de "elaborar los detalles para el futuro".

"Hemos discutido también—terminó diciendo—y hemos llegado a un acuerdo básico sobre las cuestiones del Oriente Medio, de Suez y de la situación de Israel."—Efe.

### LOS CRIOS

Los niños cogen a veces unas llores rabiosas que... Bueno, que le hacen a uno pensar (Dios nos perdone) en que Herodes era un tío simpático.

Pues una de esas cogió el de nuestro amigo, paseándole por el Retiro.

—¡Brrr! ¡Brrr! ¡Brrr! ¡Brrr!

—¡Calma, Joaquín!... ¡Aguanta, Joaquín!... ¡Contente, Joaquín!—clamaba el padre una y otra vez. Y nada.

—¡Vaya, qué crío!—compadeció una señora.—Se llama Joaquín, ¿verdad?

—No, señora, no. Joaquín, soy yo.

EL PALACIO DE LAS CAMAS  
6, Plaza del Angel, 6.

March 13, 1957

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**MEMORANDUM FOR BRIG. GEN. A. J. GOODPASTER  
THE WHITE HOUSE**

**Subject: Cairo Telegrams**

There are enclosed three telegrams from Cairo  
for your information. You will be particularly interes-  
ted in Cairo 2867 which summarizes Ambassador Hare's  
conversation with Nasser.

**Fisher Howe  
Director  
Executive Secretariat**

**5/5-RO**

11/21/57

A true copy of  
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**Enclosures**

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

1006

DATE: March 13, 1957

SUBJECT: The UN and the Middle East Crisis; Afghan-Soviet Relations

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Najib-Ullah - Ambassador of Afghanistan  
Mr. Wilcox - IO  
Mr. Walmsley - IO  
Mr. Howison - SOA

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Dr. Najib-Ullah paid an initial courtesy call on Messrs. Wilcox and Walmsley at 3 p.m. After an exchange of amenities, Dr. Najib-Ullah remarked that the past few days had been trying ones for the UN, to which he referred as "the best hope of small nations" such as his own. As the focus of his concern, he referred to Nasser's reported announcement of his intention to re-occupy the Gaza Strip. He felt, however, that as a result of Dr. Bunche's contact with Nasser the situation had begun to look more hopeful.


Mr. Wilcox expressed agreement with these remarks and went on to say that he felt it was most important that the Egyptians exercise restraint. Should Nasser re-occupy Gaza militarily, the probable outcome would be a renewal of hostilities. Nasser, who had in general enjoyed world support during recent weeks, would stand in danger of drawing upon his own government the kind of censure which had been the lot of his rivals.

Dr. Najib-Ullah declared that he had cabled his government on March 12 in precisely the sense of Mr. Wilcox's remarks. He had also taken a similar line with two Muslim Ambassadors upon whom he had just paid courtesy calls. Mr. Wilcox congratulated Najib-Ullah on taking these steps, observing that it was most important that all countries having influence with the Egyptians exercise that influence in urging discretion. Dr. Najib-Ullah expressed his personal admiration for the role played by the United States in connection with Middle East affairs recent weeks; he mentioned particularly his admiration for Dr. Bunche.

Asked whether he would serve as head of the Afghan Delegation to future sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, Dr. Najib-Ullah did not reply

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directly but left the impression that he expected to do so.

While discussing Soviet affairs, particularly Afghan-Soviet relations, with Mr. Walmsley, Dr. Najib-Ullah remarked that King Zahir had been invited to visit Moscow by Voroshilov; King Zahir had replied that he would like to make such a visit "sometime." Dr. Najib-Ullah clearly intended to imply that King Zahir's temperizing reflected a desire to avoid a step with such implications of special sympathy for the USSR.

*2015*

IO - Francis O. Wilcox

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: March 13, 1957  
6:15 p.m.

SUBJECT: Gaza and United States-Israeli Relations

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Abba Eban, Israeli Ambassador  
Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Israeli Minister

The Acting Secretary  
Robert Murphy - G  
Herman Phleger - L

COPIES TO: William M. Rountree - NEA

C.A.H.

MAR 20 1957

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Ambassador Eban, who had just returned from a curtailed vacation in Florida, handed to the Acting Secretary a letter from Prime Minister Ben Gurion to the President, and read the substance aloud (a copy of the letter is attached). The Ambassador said he wished to supplement the message by stressing the Prime Minister's reliance upon the assurances received from the President and other officials made in conjunction with the Israeli withdrawal, and expressing on behalf of the Prime Minister the fervent hope that such reliance would suffice to avoid a new and serious crisis. He had been asked to sum up the expectations of Israel as how his government saw the situation. He reviewed, with respect to the Gaza strip, the expectations which had been stated concerning the employment of the UNEF and its exercising exclusive responsibility, the UNEF serving as the agency to perform the civil functions set forth by the Secretary General on February 22, and the tenure of the UNEF which should be reached. These assumptions had been drafted in close consultation with the Department in order to be sure the United States agreed with them. Ambassador Lodge had affirmed that these expectations were reasonable, as did the President on March 2, and as other members of the United Nations had also done in the General Assembly. There had therefore developed a clear picture of a solution which we wanted to operate on a de facto basis. The Secretary had told the Ambassador repeatedly that although the United States had no idea of circumventing any legal rights of Egypt, the assurances of the Secretary General encouraged the belief that this de facto arrangement would ensue.

Continuing, the Ambassador said these expectations were set in a framework of a broad association which the Secretary had envisaged. It was understood that if Israel withdrew the United States and "all humanity" would owe a debt of gratitude to Israel and the Secretary believed that this debt would

be fulfilled

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be fulfilled. The Ambassador had understood that the United States would not merely go back to the pre-occupation position, but in fact looked toward an even more intimate association with Israel.

The Ambassador was sure that the Acting Secretary was as shocked as Israel was to learn of the situation developing in Gaza. Tension of great depth now existed all around the frontier. In Gaza there had been a relatively stable administration under Israeli control which had now left. The fedayeen were roving free and there were incidents each day on the Israeli side of the border near Gaza. So-called refugees were coming from Egypt into Gaza, and these included many fedayeen personnel. The UNEF was not controlling the situation, and had in fact liberated a notorious agent who had been held in prison. It was hard to perceive that such a swift reversal of the situation could ensue. The Government of Egypt was exacerbating the problem and increasing tensions by repeatedly making statements concerning its belligerency toward Israel and its objective of the extinction of Israel, and of reiterating its position regarding the territorial nature of the waters of Tiran from which Israeli ships would be excluded. The issue, the Ambassador said, was whether Nasserism and the moral standard of Nasser would dominate the Middle East. He believed the answer to that question would depend upon the nature and character of United States' action with respect to the United Nations, the area and to Israel. Commenting that it might be impertinent of him, the Ambassador had thought that immediately upon the withdrawal of Israeli forces there would be a renewal of normal relationships between the United States and Israel. This, however, was still being withheld particularly as it affected economic aid, the return of tourists to Israel, technical assistance, etc. The Government of Israel had taken a difficult and historic step in placing its hopes in the United States. That was why the Ambassador had stated on several occasions that the last paragraph of the March 2 letter from the President to Prime Minister Ben Gurion had been decisive.

The Ambassador said the Secretary had stated that while the United States did not control the Gaza situation, it did have considerable influence and what the United States wanted very much to happen would have a good chance of happening. Israel expected the United States and others who had urged the Israeli withdrawal to help bring about these things which we wanted to happen.

Israel believed that this was a period in which exclusive United Nations control of Gaza should be maintained. Nasser was practicing policies which the United States and the United Nations were against. The situation in Israel was grave. The return to Gaza of an Egyptian Governor might not sound so bad, but it was extremely bad if that Governor was dedicated to the destruction of Israel. The Ambassador concluded his remarks by urging that the Acting Secretary tell him something reassuring regarding the American attitude on these crucial questions.

The Acting

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The Acting Secretary responded by informing Ambassador Eban that we were acutely conscious of the situation, which was receiving our urgent consideration. He did not feel that at the moment he could be specific in responding to the message conveyed by the Ambassador, but he could say that we viewed the situation with seriousness and hoped that we could be successful in helping to bring about realization of the aims which we had discussed with Israel. He said that the Prime Minister's letter would be brought immediately to the attention of the President and that an answer would be provided without delay.

Ambassador Eban inquired whether the Acting Secretary could express any views regarding the Egyptian situation and the impending Egyptian decision regarding the dispatch of personnel to Gaza. The Acting Secretary replied that we had understood that Egypt was considering sending a Governor and five assistants, and there were indications that they expected to depart for Gaza tomorrow. We were handicapped by a lack of information, and of course we could not check the accuracy of the reports which we had received. We had made representations to Nasser but had not yet learned of the outcome of discussions between Ambassador Hare and the Egyptian President.

Ambassador Eban said that Israel was convinced that the Secretary General had power to require that Egypt not move into Gaza. Israel considered that the United Nations had exclusive jurisdiction in Gaza, at least for the time being. He thought that that authority derived from the United Nations' resolutions setting forth the functions of the UNEF for the "initial period" following Israeli withdrawal. Legally, he emphasized, the Secretary General could say which people could come into Gaza and which could not come in. He asked whether Mr. Phleger would agree with this interpretation.

Mr. Phleger responded that he did not think that the Secretary General had the legal power stated by the Ambassador, but that his operation in Gaza would be in the context of the Secretary General's report of February 22 to the General Assembly. The Secretary General could, of course, recall what Egypt had agreed to as set forth in that report.

Mr. Shiloah felt that the Secretary General would have greater authority if he went back to the basis of the establishment of the UNEF. The force would need Egyptian consent for its entry and deployment, but the United Nations had authority for deciding what tasks it would perform. Continuing, he said that his Government had received information that 25 Egyptian "contractors" had been permitted to come back into Gaza. Taken with others already in Gaza, these could provide the nucleus of an effective staff to run the organization in Gaza. The Acting Secretary observed that Egypt had been complaining that the UNEF was taking into Gaza former employees who were not acceptable to Egypt.

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In a general discussion of the rights of Egypt in Gaza, Ambassador Eban restated his view that Egypt should have no right to reoccupy Gaza so long as it considered itself in a state of belligerency. He wondered if Mr. Phleger would agree. Mr. Phleger responded that he did not agree. An Egyptian return to Gaza would in itself be no violation of the Armistice Agreement. Mr. Shiloah interjected that Egypt had stated publicly that it was in a state of belligerency and that was a violation of the Armistice Agreement. He thought the Armistice Agreement would cover threats as well as acts. Mr. Phleger responded that while acts of belligerency would be inconsistent with the claim of rights under the Armistice Agreement, there was a considerable difference between statements and acts. He thought there had been no recent reports of significant Egyptian violations of the Armistice Agreement. Mr. Shiloah said operations of the fedayeen were well known, and he would now report formally that there had been Egyptian violations of the Armistice Agreement through fedayeen activities. Mr. Phleger inquired whether these violations had been reported to the United Nations. The proper procedure was, he thought, to report them to the Truce Supervisory Commission and to the Secretary General.

The Ambassador said that the basic question was whether we approved the policies of Nasser. The Israeli opposition to those policies included the fact that Nasser wanted to get back into Gaza so that he could carry out acts of aggression against Israel. He also wanted to exercise control over the transit of the Suez and Tiran Straits in order to exclude Israeli vessels.

Responding to a comment by Mr. Murphy that Nasser's desire to send some Egyptian personnel to Gaza might be motivated by public pressure, Ambassador Eban said all dictators had this problem. In order to achieve his purposes, Nasser pursued policies with respect to Gaza, the Suez and Aqaba which would not contribute to an improvement in the situation. One might inquire where he obtained the sense of strength to pursue such a policy. That strength, the Ambassador thought, must be the Soviets. It appeared that whenever the Soviet Union said something should happen regarding Egyptian policies, that would happen within a few hours.

Mr. Shiloah observed that Nasser's purpose might be to get "all of us" involved in Gaza so that we would forget about the Suez until it was opened and its operation in his hands. Negotiations would then begin at a time when all the cards were with him. Mr. Phleger said that these questions were of course very much in our minds. The Canal had not yet been opened, and would not be opened in the immediate future. We

expected

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expected to receive word shortly concerning arrangements for an interim solution to the Canal problem.

The Ambassador said he would like to emphasize one particular point of importance to his Government. There was a certain anomaly in the situation whereby, on the one hand, Israel had been asked to withdraw as an act of faith in the intentions of the United States and other like-minded nations, and in the interest of world peace; and, on the other hand, United States-Israeli bilateral relations following that withdrawal continued on the same basis as before. The Israeli representatives had discussed with American officials "at low levels" the resumption of programs of interest to Israel, but these approaches had been coolly received. The Acting Secretary responded that these matters were receiving our attention now and we should be in a position to discuss them with the Ambassador in the near future.

It was agreed that in responding to questions by the press the Ambassador and the Department would say something along the lines that the Ambassador had called to convey a message from his Government to the Government of the United States regarding the current situation. The Ambassador said he would comment that Israel viewed the situation with great concern.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: March 13, 1957

SUBJECT: Charles Malik's Views on the Middle East

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Maurice Perlswieg, World Jewish Congress

NE - Edward L. Waggoner

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Dr. Perlswieg said that he had been able to see Lebanese Foreign Minister Dr. Charles Malik four times during Dr. Malik's recent visit to the US, and that he had arranged in addition for a meeting between Malik and Dr. Nahum Goldmann. In discussing the Middle East, Dr. Malik had said that in his view Israel was not the source of the present principal problems in the Middle East. Dr. Malik listed the principal problems as Soviet penetration of the Middle East, Arab disunity and Arab nationalism. In speaking of possible long-range solutions to some of these problems, Dr. Malik had said that some sort of Mediterranean alliance, including most of the states on the Mediterranean littoral, probably offered the greatest hope for regularizing the relations of nations bordering the Mediterranean. According to Dr. Perlswieg, Malik had discussed this concept during his visit at the Vatican prior to coming to the US.

Dr. Perlswieg said that he had been most encouraged to learn from Dr. Malik that the latter had voluntarily raised with Nasser the question of Egyptian treatment of Jews in Egypt. Nasser had told Malik that he was not taking action against Jews as such, but rather against subversives. This, according to Perlswieg, has been the standard Nasser reply. Perlswieg had also learned that Nehru had very secretly written to Nasser urging him not to take oppressive action against Egyptian Jews. Although the effects of these approaches to Nasser had been limited, Perlswieg believed that they had had some beneficial effect.

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Perlsweig said that Dr. Malik and Dr. Goldmann had arranged to keep in touch with each other. The channel of communication was not to be the Lebanese Embassy in Washington, in which Dr. Malik had expressed little confidence, but rather "certain other legations and embassies".

Dr. Perlsweig mentioned, in connection with his assertion that the Lebanese attitude toward Israel was considerably more constructive than that of the other Arab states, that discussions were now taking place with the Lebanese concerning the possibility of moving certain invalid Jews from Egypt to Beirut, from which city they would be transported by ambulance to the Israeli border for entry into Israel.

*Wagner*  
NEA:NE:ELWagoner:cdt 3/14/57

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**Memorandum of Conversation**

DATE: March 13, 1957

SUBJECT: Gaza and Suez

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. J. E. Coulson, Minister, British Embassy

EUR - Mr. C. Burke Elbrick  
UNP - Mr. Joseph J. Sisco

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E - Mr. Dillon  
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Coulson (UK) called on Mr. Elbrick to say that his Government had considered our request of yesterday that the United Kingdom, along with the United States and others, urge the Secretary General to go to Cairo immediately. Coulson said the Foreign Office believed it was premature to urge the Secretary General to make an immediate trip to Cairo for several reasons. First, the UK feared that Hammarskjold would come back from Cairo, after having made concessions to Nasser, with proposals which would require US and UK support. Secondly, the UK believed there was some advantage in having the Secretary General delay his trip, thereby giving UNEF time to consolidate its position in Gaza. Thirdly, the UK believed further that not too much importance should be given to the bellicose statements of Nasser. Coulson said we should try to "keep the temperature down". He added that the UK impression was that the Secretary General also preferred not to build up the present situation. Coulson concluded by saying that while the UK did not feel it was wise to encourage an immediate trip of the Secretary General to Cairo, it would nevertheless not take any steps to discourage such an immediate trip.

Mr. Elbrick thanked Mr. Coulson for his views, indicating there would be occasion for further consultations on developments of the Middle East this afternoon.

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EUR - C. Burke Elbrick

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: March 13, 1957

SUBJECT: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN GAZA

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Abohand, French Embassy  
Mr. Francois de Laboulaye, Counselor, French Embassy  
Mr. J. E. Coulson, Minister, British Embassy  
Mr. R. W. Bailey, Counselor, British Embassy  
Signor Ezidio Ortona, Minister, Embassy of Italy  
Ambassador Heeney, Embassy of Canada  
COPIES TO: Mr. J. E. Maybee, First Secretary, Embassy of Canada  
NEA - Mr. William M. Rountree  
EUR - Mr. C. Burke Elbrick  
IO - Mr. Francis O. Wilcox  
UNP - Mr. Samuel DePalma  
UNP - Mr. Joseph J. Sisco

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IO 2 (cc) G (cc) USUN (cc)

Mr. Wilcox opened the meeting by reviewing briefly the steps taken by the United States both with the Secretary General and in Cairo with a view to influencing the Egyptians to refrain from further action relative to the administration of Gaza. Mr. Wilcox informed the group that Mr. Bunche had been instructed by the Secretary General to do everything he could to convince the Egyptians not to take precipitous action which might result in a serious deterioration of the situation. Mr. Wilcox also referred to the remarks allegedly made by Bunche pledging the full cooperation of the United Nations with an Egyptian administration. Mr. Wilcox pointed out we did not know that such a statement was made by Bunche, and if it had been made, it would not be consistent with the instructions Hammarskjold has sent to Bunche. (A denial was issued by Bunche on March 14.)

Mr. Rountree recalled that in Ambassador Lodge's statement of March 1 reference was made to the fact that arrangements for the Gaza Strip should be worked out within the framework of the Armistice Agreement. Mr. Rountree said our interest had been in a de facto arrangement in Gaza whereby the UN would take over without prejudice to the Egyptian legal position, with which we did not quarrel. Mr. Rountree said the United States was disturbed by the reports of recent developments in Gaza, but he felt there were a number of unknown factors which would influence any possible next steps to be taken in the circumstances. There were several

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possibilities: (a) that this was a situation in which the Egyptians were establishing their rights and demonstrating their interests in Gaza for prestige reasons; (b) that the developments were a forerunner of a full-blown Egyptian civil administration in Gaza; or (c) that we were confronted with a forerunner of both a military and civil take-over in Gaza by the Egyptians. Mr. Rountree expressed the hope that the Egyptian actions were largely of a symbolic character.

Mr. Alphand said he was glad to know of the representations made by the United States. He said the French were distressed and they felt it was important to decide what our policy would be in the event the recent developments meant Egyptian take-over of the administration of the Gaza Strip. While such a move by the Egyptians was not contrary "to the law", it was definitely contrary to the modus vivendi arrived at at the United Nations prior to the withdrawal of the Israeli forces. The French and others envisaged an initial period of UN de facto administration, and we should do everything to avoid further fait accomplis by the Egyptian Government. Alphand said he believed we should be firm with Hammarskjöld, making clear that the withdrawal of the Israelis was based on certain conditions, and that if the Egyptians took precipitous steps contrary to the hopes and expectations and understandings reached at the UN, this would mean war since the Israelis had a right to move back into Gaza with force.

Mr. Heeney expressed the view that Egyptian participation in the Gaza administration should definitely be kept to a minimum and that the actions of the last two days had demonstrated the Egyptians had "jumped the gun." In his view, the ambiguities of the conditions under which the Israelis had withdrawn made our approaches to the Secretary General not as effective as they might otherwise be since so much depended upon the consent of Egypt in the circumstances. He hoped the Secretary General would hold the line and felt that pressure must be brought to bear on the Egyptians. He said he would have thought that the Egyptians would be most reluctant to face the Israeli armies again and that all of us should continue to try to dissuade the Egyptians, with whatever limited means we might have at our disposal, from moving precipitously. He inquired as to what indications we might have as to a possible Israeli reaction. Mr. Heeney assumed that the statement attributed to Bunche had not arisen from any instructions of the Secretary General. He added that there was no reason to believe the Secretary General was not making every effort to achieve the same things we sought in the circumstances.

Mr. Rountree agreed that Hammarskjöld's attitude was the same as ours regarding the rights of Egypt in Gaza. It was the Israelis who did not agree with the Egyptian legal position on Gaza. Mr. Rountree said there was really no way for us or the United Nations to alter the legal framework of the Armistice Agreement unless the parties themselves were willing to make changes. Hammarskjöld of necessity was having to operate within the legal limitations set down by the Armistice Agreement. Mr. Rountree further agreed with Ambassador Heeney that the Egyptians probably feared being confronted again by Israeli forces. Mr. Wilcox made the additional point that the Egyptians were probably also mindful of the need not to take action which would weaken their position in the United Nations and turn public opinion against them. In this connection Mr. Rountree brought

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out that if in the exercise of its rights the Egyptians were confronted by precipitous actions by others, then we would be back essentially to where we were in the beginning with public opinion backing the Egyptians. Mr. Rountree emphasized that it was important not only for the Egyptians to defer precipitous action, but also that others restrain themselves.

In response to Ambassador Heeney's query as to the point at which the Israelis would feel the situation in Gaza had deteriorated sufficiently for them to take action, Mr. Rountree responded that there had been a number of extreme statements by the Israelis at various times and expressions of intention to protect their rights. However, we were not in a position to say hypothetically in what circumstances the Israelis would feel justified in taking action.

Coulson said the UK believed we should not pay too much overt attention to what the Egyptians are saying at the present time. He feared that undue emphasis on Nasser's bellicose statements could provoke an Israeli reaction.

Ambassador Heeney brought to the attention of the group parenthetically and on a confidential basis information regarding the difficulty the Canadian Government had recently experienced regarding a small group of Canadian reinforcements for UNEF. He said there had been "noises made in Cairo", but the Canadian Government did not know the extent to which the Egyptian public statements were official. He said if the Egyptian Government persisted in objecting to Canadian reinforcements which had been asked for by the United Nations, and if the Secretary General were forced to acquiesce in the Egyptian objections, Canada would probably have to pull out its forces. Canada had contributed forces on the understanding that once the Egyptians had consented to the introduction of UNEF forces on Egyptian soil the question of composition and deployment of that Force was a matter for the United Nations. Canada had made these views known recently to the Secretary General.

Mr. Alphand returned once again to the importance of determining our policy in advance in the event the Egyptians took over the administration of Gaza. Mr. Alphand asked whether we envisaged a General Assembly meeting. Mr. Wilcox expressed the hope the Egyptians would not go this far at the present time and, as he had indicated earlier, we were making every feasible effort to dissuade them from such precipitous action. Mr. Wilcox said our reaction would depend on the nature of the Egyptian action in Gaza. Mr. Rountree added that we had made clear in Ambassador Lodge's statement on March 1 that if the situation in Gaza deteriorated, the United States would consult with others to see what they or the United Nations should do in the circumstances. Mr. Wilcox said if the Egyptians refused to cooperate it was likely the matter would be brought to the Advisory Committee which in turn would probably make a recommendation to the General Assembly.

Mr. Coulson cautioned against bringing the Gaza situation to the General Assembly unless there were a clear-cut case against the Egyptians. Mr. Rountree pointed out it probably would not be desirable to call the General Assembly back if the Egyptians were limiting their actions to an exercise of their rights in Gaza. When Ortona (Italy) raised the question once again of possible Israeli reaction to present developments, Ambassador Heeney expressed the fear that precipitous action by the Israelis could "spoil our case against the Egyptians."

Ortona

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Ortona said that Italy would probably take similar steps in Cairo as those taken by the United States.

In response to Mr. Alphand's query, both Messrs. Wilcox and Rountree expressed the view that reports of recent fadeveen activities had probably been exaggerated, and that we could expect the Israelis to inform the Secretary General and the press of each one of the raids over the period of the next few weeks. In response to Mr. Heeney's question as to whether there had been any step-up in the criticism of UNEF, Mr. Wilcox and Mr. Rountree mentioned the criticism made by the Egyptians over the recent actions taken by the Force in order to break up the demonstrations in Gaza. It was pointed out that Pravda had picked up this development and played it up. The meeting closed with Mr. Wilcox mentioning that there had been some rumors in the press regarding the possible withdrawal of forces by some states comprising the UNEF. Mr. Wilcox expressed the hope that such a development would not occur.

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IO - Francis O. Wilcox

IO:UNP:JJSisco:lmr



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: March 13, 1957

SUBJECT: Developments in Gaza; and Statements Reportedly Made by Ambassador Hildreth in Pakistan.

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. H. Dayal, Charge d'Affaires, Embassy of India  
Mr. Lampton Berry, NEA  
Mr. Robert W. Adams, SOA

MAY 22 1957

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Amembassy Karachi  
Amembassy New Delhi

Mr. Dayal, calling at his own request, said that he would appreciate being brought up to date by Mr. Berry on developments in Egypt, and asked what the Department's views were concerning the Suez Canal situation. Mr. Berry replied that, up to a few days before, there had been every cause for optimism concerning a peaceful development of the Gaza situation. However, the United States was now disturbed about the possible repercussions of Egypt's appointment of an administrative governor for Gaza. Mr. Berry added that if Egypt were to send in to Gaza only the Governor and a few staff assistants, this might not be regarded as unreasonable. On the other hand, if Egypt sent in a large number of personnel, attempting, in effect, to resume administrative control over Gaza, serious difficulties could arise for the U.N. and its operations in the area. Mr. Berry referred to Israel's great concern over Gaza, and particularly over the resumption of fedayeen raids. He added that the United States had unimpeachable evidence regarding the extent of fedayeen raiding prior to Israel's move into Gaza, and that such raids could easily be resumed despite the destruction of fortifications and arms supplies by the Israelis. Mr. Berry also emphasized that the United States had made no secret commitments to Israel, there being nothing that had not been made public in recent statements by the President or the Department.

Mr. Berry said that work on the Suez Canal was proceeding satisfactorily, although slowly, and that it was hoped that 10,000-ton vessels could soon transit the Canal. In reply to a question by Mr. Dayal, Mr. Berry said that the matter of canal fees was still pending, and that it was hoped Secretary General Hammarskjold could effect some reasonable settlement. With respect to vessels of United States registry, although not to American-owned vessels under foreign flag, the United States could prohibit them under certain World War II regulations from paying such

fees

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fees to a particular government or agency. This was purely negative in character, since the American vessel could not be forced under these regulations to pay the fees to any alternate agency, such as the SCUA.

Mr. Berry said that the United States hopes Nasser will refrain from any precipitate action, and that it believes Secretary General Hammarskjold may effectively bring about a greater understanding in Egypt of the need for moderation at this time. In view of the recent developments in Gaza, the United States hoped Mr. Hammarskjold would go to Cairo even before March 21 or 22, as earlier planned. Mr. Berry said that Egypt should realize that the United States has taken a number of important steps, some favoring Egypt to the detriment of old friends and allies, to prevent general warfare in the Near East, and that it is now up to Egypt to take the next constructive steps towards resolving the issues in the area.

690891 Mr. Dayal then said he had been instructed to raise with the Department a matter concerning public statements touching on the Kashmir issue reportedly made by Ambassador Hildreth in Lahore and Peshawar. Reading from notes, Mr. Dayal said that the Ambassador's statements had been reported by the Press Trust of India and in "Dawn", a Karachi newspaper. According to those sources, Mr. Dayal said, Ambassador Hildreth had stated in Lahore that, in the event of hostilities between India and Pakistan, the United States would side with the victim of aggression. Mr. Dayal commented that this was a "strange" thing to say since it seemed to imply that armed aggression was planned by one side or the other, presumably over Kashmir. He added that some quarters could, unfortunately, misinterpret the Ambassador's statement and be led to believe that a peaceful approach to the Kashmir issue was no longer contemplated. Mr. Dayal then spoke of Ambassador Hildreth's reported statement at Peshawar to the effect that Pakistan has followed the right path, having carried out all United Nations decisions on the Kashmir dispute. Mr. Dayal gave the impression of being much more concerned about this second quotation, stating that India did not believe Pakistan had carried out all U.N. resolutions on Kashmir, and questioning the phrase "followed the right path". He added that, in the present circumstances, he doubted whether such statements were useful, and he wondered why Ambassador Hildreth had found it necessary to make them at this time.

Mr. Berry replied that he had not yet seen the text of Ambassador Hildreth's statements, but he felt that the newspaper sources cited by Mr. Dayal had probably misinterpreted or re-cast the Ambassador's comments. He said that the quotations could well have been reported out of context, making them appear to take on a meaning other than what was intended. Mr. Berry added that Ambassador Hildreth may have been speaking extemporaneously, but that, in any event, when the text of these statements was received in the Department he might get in touch with Mr. Dayal again in order to clarify or correct these newspaper reports. Mr. Berry asked

Mr. Adams

Mr. Adams to bring to his attention any reports on the statements in question as soon as they were received. Mr. Dayal expressed his appreciation to Mr. Perry for his comments and his interest in this matter.

Mr. Dayal, in taking his leave, said that Ambassador Mehta had fallen ill in India, but that he was now reported to be recovering and was planning to return to Washington in the very near future.

NEA:SONRWA  
adams:jm

3/18/57

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THE COUNCIL  
OF  
THE CITY OF NEW YORK  
CITY HALL

2-101  
**ACTION**  
is assigned to

STV



March 13th, 1957.

Hon. John W. Biles,  
Secretary of State,  
21st Street & Virginia Ave., N.Y.  
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:-

I have been directed to forward  
to you the enclosed copy of Resolution No. 611, passed  
by the New York City Council on March 5th, 1957. It is  
self-explanatory and is for your information and whatever  
action you may deem necessary.

Respectfully yours,

*James T. Gavin*  
James T. Gavin  
Chief Clerk.

PUBLIC SERVICES DIV.  
PCB

1957 MAR 15 AM 10 51

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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MAR 21 1957

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*Enc att 2*



# THE COUNCIL

155

Res. No. 911

## **Resolution Calling Upon the State Department to Resist Any Effort to Invoke Sanctions Against Israel.**

By the President (Mr. Stark), Vice-Chairman (Mr. Sharkey), Messrs. Weiss, Ross, Vogel, Panush, Kranis, Curtis, Schreckinger, Stein, Davis, Bloom, Treulich, Schupler:

Whereas, The people of the United States and the people of Israel are dedicated to the same principles of freedom, democracy and human rights, and

Whereas, The State of Israel is struggling for the right to live in peace, to carry on its commerce and industry and to build a nation of free men, and

Whereas, In time of crisis the United States has few steadfast friends in the Middle East except Israel, and

Whereas, The State of Israel has been menaced by backward and bitter nations which have frequently resorted to border attacks against innocent civilians, thereby causing the Israeli people to occupy the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba in an effort to achieve national security, and

Whereas, The State of Israel has expressed a willingness to withdraw from these areas, provided that guarantees are given to prevent future border incidents and economic retaliation against Israeli shipping, and

Whereas, An effort has been made in the United Nations to invoke sanctions against Israel for noncompliance with the United Nations withdrawal resolution, and

Whereas, The same nations which would now invoke sanctions against Israel for defending herself were unwilling to take similar action against the Soviet Union for violations in Hungary, against India for defiance of the United Nations' rulings in the Kashmir situation, and against Egypt for repeated attacks on Israel's borders and illegal blockades of Israeli shipping, and

Whereas, The people of the United States are opposed to the establishment of a double standard which would punish small nations and ignore the violations of major powers, and

Whereas, In the course of establishing a foreign policy for the Middle East, we must not be guided by motives of profit or appeasement, and

Whereas, Even though a longing for peace is uppermost in our minds, it must not be a peace that will sacrifice the political independence, territorial integrity or civil liberties of Israel's population by making Israel a second "Munich," and

Whereas, The position taken by the American State Department and the United States Delegation at the United Nations will undoubtedly set the moral tone for the rest of the world to follow; now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the City Council of New York call upon the American State Department to resist any effort to invoke sanctions against the State of Israel and to give the fullest support to programs that will guarantee the maintenance of peace in the Holy Land, as well as the territorial integrity and commercial rights of all nations, and be it further

Resolved, That copies of this resolution be forwarded to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and United Nations Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge.

The City of New York, }  
Office of the City Clerk, } ss.:

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of a  
Resolution passed by The Council of The City of New York on  
**MARCH 5, 1957**, on file in this office.

.....  
City Clerk, Clerk of the Council.

April 23 1957

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Dear Mr. Gavin:

I have been asked to reply to your letter of March 13, 1957 to Secretary Dulles enclosing a copy of a resolution passed by the New York City Council concerning the recent situation surrounding the Israel withdrawal.

We are gratified that the Government of Israel decided to complete her withdrawal behind the Armistice line in compliance with the United Nations Resolution of February 2, 1957. This decision demonstrates once again that the free world nations have a decent respect for the opinions of mankind, as reflected in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Now that this withdrawal has been completed, in the President's words, "The United States, for its part, will vigorously seek solutions of the problems of the area in accordance with justice and international law."

Please accept my most sincere apologies for the delay in this response.

Sincerely yours,

John P. Meagher  
Chief  
Public Services Division

Mr. James T. Gavin,  
Chief Clerk, Council of the City of  
New York,  
New York.

P:SEV:CERushing:bt

4/17/57

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APR 21 1957

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Department of State

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58-51

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FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2896, MARCH 14, 4 PM

Control: 9101

Rec'd: MARCH 14, 1957  
3:08 PM

1957 MAR 15 AM 6-37

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SENT DEPARTMENT 2896, USUN 118 REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV 157, JERUSALEM 47, LONDON 540, PARIS 450, DAMASCUS 215, AMMAN 214, BAGHDAD 192, JIDDA 238, BEIRUT 318.

PRIORITY

NOFORN.

LAST NIGHT SUMMARIZED TO BUNCHE AND BURNS MY CONVERSATION WITH NASSER (EMBASSY TELEGRAM 2887). THEY EXPRESSED SURPRISE NASSER'S REFERENCE TO "OFFICERS" WHEN (AS REPORTED EMBASSY TELEGRAM 2884) THEY HAD BEEN UNDER IMPRESSION SIX WERE CIVILIANS. I SAID I HAD QUERIED NASSER SPECIFICALLY ON THIS POINT AND HE HAD EXPLAINED THAT ALL ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS "DESERT AREAS" WERE OFFICERS. BURNS AND BUNCHE SAID THEY HAD PRESSED GOHAR AS TO FUNCTIONS GOE EXPECTED SIX TO PERFORM. HE WOULD ONLY SAY "THEY WOULD OBSERVE AND REPORT". (IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH EMBASSY OFFICE GOHAR CONFIRMED THAT INITIAL ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP RETURNING TO GAZA WOULD CONSIST OF MILITARY PERSONNEL BUT EMPHASIZED THAT THEIR SOLE FUNCTION IN GAZA WOULD BE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF EGYPTIAN ADMINISTRATION OVER AREA. ASKED IF HE WOULD DESCRIBE THEIR FUNCTIONS IN GREATER DETAIL, GOHAR SAID HE COULD ONLY STATE THAT THEY WOULD PERFORM THAT WHICH WAS NECESSARY TO RE-ESTABLISH THE EGYPTIAN ADMINISTRATION OVER THE AREA AND NOTHING MORE.)

BUNCHE AGAIN SAID HE SAW NO LEGAL MEANS HALT EGYPTIAN ADMINISTRATION ALTHOUGH HE HOPED IT WOULD BE DONE WITH MINIMUM FANFARE. HE REITERATED VIEW HE PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED (EMBASSY TELEGRAM 2878) THAT ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTION CIVIL GOVERNMENT BY EGYPTIANS WOULD BE NO GOVERNMENT AT ALL.

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-2- 2896, MARCH 14, 4 PM, FROM CAIRO

BURNS EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN OVER GOHAR'S HAVING QUERIED HIM AS TO WHETHER UNEF WOULD OBJECT TO RETURN OF EGYPTIAN MILITARY FORCES TO "SINAI", WHICH BURNS INTERPRETED TO MEAN AT LEAST AS FAR EAST AS AL ARISH.

BUNCHE SAID HE THOUGHT PROBLEM CANADIAN CONTINGENT (EMBASSY TELEGRAM 2878) NOW RESOLVED. NASSER HAD FREELY ADMITTED HOLD-UP POLITICAL IN RETALIATION FOR CANADIAN EFFORTS INTERNATIONALIZE GAZA. GOE HAD NO CRITICISM OF BEHAVIOR CANADIAN CONTINGENT WHICH "GOOD MEMBERS UNEF". NASSER AGREED GOE WAS COMMITTED ACCEPT CONTINGENT AND STATED THAT WITHIN DAY OR TWO GOE WOULD REAFFIRM ITS ASSENT.

REGARDING NASSER'S STATEMENT TO ME (EMBASSY TELEGRAM 2887) THAT HE HAD INSTRUCTED FAWZI MAKE CLEAR VIEWS GOE REGARDING SYG FEBRUARY 22 REPORT I FIND THAT HATTEM, FEBRUARY 24 (SEE EMBASSY'S REVIEW ARABIC PRESS THAT DATE) STATED OFFICIALLY THAT NO NEW AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED WITH GOE ON EXPANSION FUNCTIONS UNEF.

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*Department of State*

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NEA FROM: TEL AVIV  
Info  
RMR TO: Secretary of State

SS NO: 1084, MARCH 14; 5 PM.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1084, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 197,  
AMMAN 191, LONDON 217, PARIS 183, JERUSALEM 73, USUN 75.

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AIR  
NIC

USAIRA LEARNED FROM IMPECCABLE SOURCE WEDNESDAY THAT QUIET  
PREVAILED IN GAZA STRIP PREVIOUS NIGHT EXCEPT FOR SEVERAL  
FEDAYEEN INTERCEPTED ENROUTE TO ISRAEL LADEN WITH EXPLOSIVES.  
MEN TAKEN INTO CUSTODY BY UNEF AND THEIR EXPLOSIVES CONFISCATED  
ACCORDING TO SOURCE BUT RELEASED FEW HOURS LATER. "UNEF HAVE  
NO (REPEAT NO) AUTHORITY HOLD THEM" SOURCE EXPLAINED.

COMMENT:

INCIDENT LENDS CONSIDERABLE WEIGHT TO THESIS WHICH WORKING  
LEVEL FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS BEEN HAMMERING AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY  
WITH EMBASSY OFFICES LAST 10 DAYS (EMBASSY TELEGRAM 1063).  
THESIS IS UNEF MUST EXERCISE POLICE AUTHORITY OR SEE EVERY  
VESTIGE LAW AND ORDER DISAPPEAR IN STRIP. ALOOF PATROL  
OF STREETS AND DETACHED OBSERVATION OF LOCAL SCENE WILL NOT  
(REPEAT NOT) SUFFICE. IN ABSENCE OF SHOW OF FIRMNESS VIRTUAL  
ANARCHY WILL ENSUE WITH ARAB CRIMINAL AND TERRORIST ELEMENTS  
IN STRIP BECOMING BOLDER IN REVERSE RATIO TO DIMINISHMENT  
OF RISK INVOLVED IN LAWLESSNESS. ACCORDING TO FOREIGN  
MINISTRY ISRAEL CIVIL POLICE (AND MILITARY POLICE BEFORE THEM)  
MAINTAINED VIRTUALLY COMPLETE ORDER BY THEIR OWN CONTROL OF  
POLITICAL ACTIVITIES ARREST OF RING LEADERS AMONG PRO EGYPTIAN  
ELEMENTS AND SWIFT PUNISHMENT FOR BORDER TRANSGRESSORS COMBINED  
WITH CAREFUL SUPERVISION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES WHOM ISRAELI'S  
HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL OTHER TYPES OF CIVIL CONTROL.

SMALL SHOW OF FIRMNESS AT THIS POINT ISRAELI'S INSIST WILL

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-2- 1084, MARCH 14, 5 PM, FROM TEL AVIV

BE EFFECTIVE. FORCE NECESSARY TO OBTAIN SAME RESULTS LATER  
WILL HAVE TO BE MANY TIMES GREATER.

CONDITIONS WILL DEVELOP THEY SAY THAT WILL SHOW UNEF  
HOPELESSLY INADEQUATE FOR ITS JOB COMPELLING UNITED NATIONS  
TO MAKE DECISION AS TO WHAT EXTERNAL FORCE IS TO ASSERT SUCH  
AUTHORITY LONG BEFORE DECISION WOULD BE REQUIRED FROM STANDPOINT  
OF PURELY LOCAL CONDITIONS. DECISION FOREIGN MINISTRY ARGUES  
SHOULD BE MADE TO SERVE LONG TERM INTERESTS OF PEACE IN  
ARE NOT (REPEAT NOT) MERELY TO DEAL WITH FESTERING LOCAL SORE.

LAWSON

CC

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SEP 25 1974

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9198

March 14 1955

4:31 p.m.

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RM/R Central

074.341/3-1487

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1085, March 14, 5 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 1085; REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 218, PARIS 184, CAIRO 198, AMMAN 192, DAMASCUS 138, BEIRUT 179, JERUSALEM 74, USUN 76

GOI Wednesday broadened its diplomatic efforts to block reimposition Egyptian influence Gaza and local press fell into line in concerted effort to demonstrate difficulties which would flow from Egyptian return there.

Ben Gurion in Knesset Wednesday took opportunity presented in question posed by Achdut Avoda spokesman Yigal Alon to state "Israel would reserve freedom of action in event Egyptians returned to strip or threats against Israel. If time came when action appropriate and necessary government would not of course give prior notice of its action".

Separate motions by opposition parties General Zionists and Herut demanding debate on Gaza developments defeated by votes supported only by two sponsors. Achdut Avoda delegation left Parliament building to avoid threat of government discipline against their abstention on issue in which their viewpoint closer to opposition than coalitions.

Press overlooked no possibility demonstrate alleged dangers Egyptian take over and pointed up western responsibilities in preventing it. However press cautious in recommending courses of action for GOI obviously waiting government lead.

Golda Meir who already seen me and France's Ambassador Gilbert on subject called in Canada's Charge Wednesday afternoon. Line she took with him nearer Ben Gurion's position with Knesset (see second paragraph above) than with me (EMBTel 1076). Canadian Charge Kidd told Embassy Office Meir said if Egyptians moved back into strip Israel must reserve its right of self defense and freedom of action. As reported in EMBTEL 1076 she told me if Egyptians returned in any manner or form Israel would feel obliged reoccupy Gaza. Only USG could prevent "this calamity" by intervening

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-2- 1085, March 14, 5 p.m., from Tel Aviv

to prevent Egyptian return. In my view her words to me reflect more her own personality while her talks with Kidd reflect more cautious judgment some her Cabinet colleagues.

LAWSON

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8842  
March 14, 1957  
10:12 a.m.

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FROM: Baghdad

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: Unnumbered, March 14

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1517 REPEATED INFORMATION Cairo 143, Tel Aviv 46, Amman 125, Damascus 130, Beirut 251, Jidda 107, London 292, Ankara, Tehran, Karachi, Rabat, Tunis, Khartoum

Prime Minister Nuri declared in Senate yesterday Iraq supports Egyptian return to Gaza and endorsed statements to this effect made by Jamali in UN general assembly. He said, however, Government of Iraq had not "received any information from the Egyptian Government on this issue".

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Action

TO

FROM: NEW YORK

Control: 9288

Rec'd: MARCH 14, 1957  
6:56 PM

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RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 635, MARCH 14, 6 PM

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NIACT

RE GAZA.

CONFIRMING MY PHONE CONVERSATION WITH ACTING SECRETARY AT NOON, SYG ASKED ME OBTAIN FROM DEPARTMENT AS PRECISE AN INDICATION AS POSSIBLE OF EXTENT TO WHICH HE COULD GO IN FORTHCOMING NEGOTIATIONS WITH NASSER REGARDING EGYPTIAN CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN GAZA WHICH U.S. WOULD SUPPORT AS AGAINST BOTH ISRAEL AND EGYPT, IF NECESSARY, AND POSITIVELY IN GA. HAMMARSKJOLD'S REQUEST BASED ON FACT HE NOW KNEW FROM REPORT FROM BUNCHE RATHER FULL EXTENT EGYPTIAN POSITION RE GAZA. IT WAS, ACCORDING TO BUNCHE, (1) EVENTUAL FULL POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF GAZA STRIP BY EGYPT; (2) NO EGYPTIAN MILITARY IN GAZA; (3) UNEF MUST BE "ASTRIDE" THE ARMISTICE LINE AND SHOULD PROPERLY HAVE HEADQUARTERS IN EL AUJA. (NASSER STILL FAVORED 5-MILE ZONE ON EACH SIDE OF LINE.)

ON OTHER HAND, SYG SAID ISRAEL POSITION HAD BEEN MADE FULLY CLEAR ON MANY OCCASIONS TO HIM IN OPPOSING RETURN OF EGYPT TO GAZA IN ANY FORM.

THEREFORE, SYG SAID, HE MUST GO TO CAIRO AND NEGOTIATE WITH NASSER BETWEEN THESE TWO EXTREMES OF POSITION IN MOST DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES. WHILE LEGALLY HE COULD LET NASSER HAVE EVERYTHING HE INSISTS ON AS FAR AS GAZA CONCERNED, POLITICALLY THIS WOULD BE UNWISE IN THE EXTREME. THEREFORE, HE FELT HE MUST BE PREPARED TO BREAK OFF NEGOTIATIONS WITH NASSER AT POINT WHERE HE KNEW U.S. WOULD CONTINUE GIVE HIM FULL SUPPORT.

GIVEN U.S. POSITION UP TO NOW THAT WHILE RECOGNIZING EGYPT'S LEGAL RIGHTS IN GAZA PRESENT SITUATION DEMANDS THAT EGYPTIAN

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2-635 MARCH 14, 6 PM, FROM NEW YORK

PARTICIPATION BE LIMITED TO "TOKEN" ONE, QUESTION WHICH HAMMARSKJÖLD IN EFFECT ASKED WAS HOW WE THOUGHT HE SHOULD DEFINE "TOKEN" AND WHETHER WE WOULD BACK HIM UP IN HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THIS DEFINITION.

SYG. RECOGNIZED IT NOT NECESSARILY POSSIBLE TO LAYOUT IN SPECIFIC DETAIL WHERE HE SHOULD BREAK OFF AND STILL BE USE OF U.S. FULL SUPPORT. ON OTHER HAND, HE LIKENED POSITION HE WAS ABOUT TO ENTER TO NEGOTIATING TEAM WHICH STATE DEPARTMENT WOULD BE SENDING OUT WITH INSTRUCTIONS. IT WAS SUCH KIND OF "INSTRUCTION" WHICH HE HOPED OBTAIN FROM U.S.

HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING NEGOTIATIONS ON WHICH HE WAS ABOUT EMBARK SO PRECARIOUS THAT ONE FALSE STEP COULD LEAD TO WAR. HE THEREFORE BELIEVED IT IMPERATIVE HE HAVE FULL U.S. BACKING.

COMMENT: WE ARE OBVIOUSLY JUST AS HEAVILY INVOLVED AS UN IS AND IT GREATLY TO OUR ADVANTAGE THAT HE WILLING ASK FOR AND ACCEPT OUR "INSTRUCTIONS."

LODGE

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1957 MAR 15 PM 3 49

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VERBATIM TEXT

SENT TO: USUN NEW YORK  
RPD INFO: Ambassador CAIRO

Re USUN 635 deliver following memorandum US position to SYG:

QUOTE The United States greatly appreciates being consulted by the Secretary General, prior to his departure for Cairo, regarding negotiations that he will undertake there. We are in agreement regarding difficulties and dangers inherent in this situation. As the Secretary General is aware, the United States has in the last few months taken positions counter to those held by some of its close associates among members of the United Nations out of the conviction that it was necessary to do so in order to restore and preserve peace and to uphold the Charter. The United States position on the issues involved has ~~largely~~ been stated in numerous public pronouncements. Our position in response to the Secretary General's inquiry can be summarized as follows:

1. We consider that UNEF is to remain in the area of Sharm el Sheikh and Gaza INNER QUOTE until its task is completed END INNER QUOTE (A/3375). This means that Egypt is not entitled unilaterally to terminate the mission of UNEF. UNEF should be withdrawn only when the United Nations is satisfied that it should be. There ought to be ample opportunity for consideration by the General Assembly prior to any decision on withdrawal.
2. No Egyptian force should return to the Sharm el Sheikh area until it is clear that non-exercise of any claimed belligerent rights has established

Drafted by:

L/UNA:R/Hecker:rs

3/15/57

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

IO - F. O. Wilcox

Classified by:

NEA - Mr. Rountree  
(100)

EUR - Mr. Ellbrick  
(100)

L - Mr. Phleger  
(100)

S - Acting Secretary  
(100)

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practice peaceful conditions that must govern navigation in waters having such an international character.

3. We firmly believe that no Egyptian military or paramilitary forces should return to the Gaza Strip, and the UNEF should remain in Gaza until there is a definitive settlement respecting the Gaza Strip or some final general agreement between the parties.

4. Regarding civil administration in the Gaza Strip, it was our understanding from the Secretary General's statement of February 22 that in the initial period the United Nations takeover would be exclusive and there would be no elements of Egyptian administration present. We very much regret the arrival of the Egyptian administrative governor and his staff. However, the presence of these individuals will be less damaging so long as it is only symbolic. Responsibility for administration in the Gaza Strip must remain in United Nations agencies until there is a definitive settlement respecting Gaza or some final general agreement between the parties. There is otherwise not only the danger of some Israeli reaction but also the prospect of a renewal of fedayeen raids and the outbreak of serious disorders in the Strip. While the United Nations maintains UNEF in Gaza and continues to care for the Arab refugees, such developments must not be allowed to occur.

5. We believe that any recessions from above positions would seriously undermine confidence in the United Nations since these positions were reasonable to expect from the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Secretary General's statements to the General Assembly. UNQUOTE

*Herter (acting)*  
HERTER

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JMP / Gannon

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MARCH 14, 1957

8:30 PM

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FROM: NEW YORK

RMR

TO: Secretary of State MESSAGE CENTER

SS

NO: 636, MARCH 14, 7 PM

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
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PRIORITY

RE GAZA



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RWK

FOLLOWING IS FULL ACCOUNT LODGE MEETING TODAY WITH SYG REPORTED  
ALSO IN BRIEF NIACT OURTEL 635

SYG BEGAN BY NOTING CABLE FROM BUNCHE CONTAINING TEXT STATEMENT  
TO PRESS DENYING COMPLETELY ALL QUOTATIONS IMPUTED TO HIM  
YESTERDAY FOLLOWING MEETING WITH NASSER. SYG THEN NOTED OFFICIAL  
STATEMENT FROM CAIRO IN WHICH HALEM SPOKE OF "FULL COOPERATION  
WITH UNEF", AND OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS OF PEOPLE GAZA WITH IT,  
LOOKING TOWARD ESTABLISHMENT PEACEFUL CONDITIONS.

HAMMARSKJOLD REFERRED TO WIRE FROM BUNCHE AND BURNS INDICATING  
LATIF, EGYPTIAN GOV-DESIGNATE GAZA AND PARTY OF FIVE, WERE  
ARRIVING GAZA 3:30 P.M. TODAY LOCAL TIME (I., E., 8:30 A.M.,  
EST) AND THAT THEY WISHED CALL ON BURNS SOON AFTER ARRIVAL.

LODGE GAVE HAMMARSKJOLD ACCOUNT EBAN'S CONVERSATION YESTERDAY  
WITH DEPT, INDICATING ON POLITICAL SIDE ISRAEL EXPECTED US  
LIVE UP ITS COMMITMENTS NOW ISRAEL WITHDRAWN, PARTICULARLY  
IN VIEW DETERIORATING SITUATION GAZA. SYG REPORTED EBAN TOLD  
HIM, ON BASIS CALL FOR JERUSALEM, IF IT TRUE EGYPTIAN PARTY  
ARRIVING GAZA, ISRAEL WOULD TAKE MOST SERIOUS VIEW. MOREOVER  
GOVT ISRAEL "WILL NOT RECONCILE ITSELF TO THIS FACT." EBAN  
SAID HAD TAKEN THIS QUESTION UP WASH. HAMMARSKJOLD RESPONDED  
THERE OBVIOUSLY CERTAIN AMBIGUITY PRESENT SITUATION IN THOSE  
CIRCUMSTANCES HE REGARDED IT NATURAL FOR EBAN TALK WITH WASH.  
IT ALSO RECOGNIZED HE, ACTING ON BEHALF UN, HAD ONLY LIMITED  
POWERS VIS-A-VIS EGYPT. EBAN SAID HE RECOGNIZED BOTH POINTS  
BUT UN SHOULD STILL HAVE HELD UP EGYPTIAN ENTRY. HAMMARSKJOLD

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-2- 636, MARCH 14, 7 PM, FROM NEW YORK

TOLD EBAN STATEMENT ISRAEL WOULD NOT RECONCILE ITSELF TO FACT OF EGYPTIAN GOVERNOR ARRIVING GAZA GAVE HIM CAUSE FOR GRAVE CONCERN. EBAN SAID FELT SHOULD RELAY EXACT WORDS FROM JERUSALEM. HE GAVE IMPRESSION NOT SURE HOW FIRM GOVT VIEW WAS. IN THIS CONNECTION SYG NOTED BEN GURION'S STATEMENT KNESSET IN WHICH HE TOLD MEMBERS HERUT PARTY ALL THOSE WHO HAD PARTICIPATED CONFIDENCE VOTE REGARDING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WELL AWARE SITUATION INTO WHICH ISRAEL WALKED.

SYG SAID WHILE ABOVE SIGNIFICANT, REAL REASON FOR ASKING SEE LODGE WAS REPORT FROM BUNCHE ON CONVERSATION WITH NASSER.

SYG SAID IN PASSING CANADIAN TROOP MATTER APPARENTLY RESOLVED. NASSER TOLD BUNCHE NO DIFFICULTY ACCEPTING 150 MORE, ALTHOUGH HE ASKED FOR TWO OR THREE DAYS IN ORDER CONSIDER MATTER WITH CABINET.

ON MILITARY SIDE BUNCHE REPORTED EGYPT IN NO HURRY SEND MILITARY FORCES GAZA. NASSER WILLING HAVE NO FORMAL AGREEMENT BUT ONLY GENERAL UNDERSTANDING THIS POINT. SYG CONSIDERED IF, AFTER MEETING WITH NASSER, HE COULD INTERPRET THIS AS "GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT" IT WOULD BE SATISFACTORY.

NASSER INSISTED UNEF MUST BE "ASTRIDE" ARMISTICE LINE AND SHOULD PROPERLY HAVE HEADQUARTERS EL AUJA. BUNCHE REPORTED NASSER STILL FAVORED FIVE-MILE NEUTRAL ZONE EACH SIDE ARMISTICE LINE.

ON CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION SIDE, BUNCHE REPORTED NO WILLINGNESS POSTPONE VISIT EGYPTIAN GOV LATIF TO GAZA. HOWEVER, IN RESPONSE BUNCHE'S APPEAL ON BEHALF SYG, NASSER GENERALLY AGREEABLE TAKE NO FINAL DECISIONS, PARTICULARLY RE FEB 22 STATEMENT SYG, PRIOR SYG'S ARRIVAL CAIRO.

BUNCHE SAID UN MIGHT THROUGH SUBTLE AND SKILLFUL NEGOTIATION BE ABLE ESTABLISH DE FACTO RESPONSIBILITIES NOT PREVIOUSLY HELD BY IT IN GAZA. HE REPORTED, HOWEVER, NASSER SEEMED BENT ON POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF STRIP.

HAMMARSKJOLD EXPRESSED APPRECIATION CONFIDENCE PRES EISENHOWER SHOWED IN HIS EFFORTS WORK OUT SOLUTION OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS

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SECRET

-3- 636, MARCH 14, 7 PM, FROM NEW YORK

BUT IN HIS VIEW SITUATION NOT SO SIMPLE SINCE THERE EXISTED ALMOST COMPLETE DIVERGENCE VIEWS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT. IN FORTHCOMING NEGOTIATIONS SYG HAD NO REAL POWER OTHER THAN PERSUASION. HE MUST ATTEMPT ARRIVE AT WORKABLE ARRANGEMENT ON BASIS HIS FEB 22 STATEMENT SOMEWHERE BETWEEN EXTREME POSITIONS ISRAEL AND EGYPT. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, HAMMARSKJOLD SAID, HE AND US MUST HAVE UNDERSTANDING AS TO WHAT WOULD BE REASONABLE WITHIN RANGE POSSIBILITIES BETWEEN TWO EXTREME POSITIONS. LEGALLY HE COULD THEORETICALLY GIVE IN TO NASSER ON ALL POINTS WHERE EGYPT INSISTED REASSERT FULL RIGHTS IN GAZA, BUT HE WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE FOOLISH DO SO.

ONLY ALTERNATIVE THEREFORE WAS TO STICK AT CERTAIN POINT IN NEGOTIATIONS AND RESIST GIVING IN BEYOND THAT TO NASSER ON GROUNDS DO SO WOULD BE UNREASONABLE AND BEYOND HIS COMPETENCE IN LIGHT UN RESOLUTIONS, HIS REPORTS AND GA DEBATES. FOR HIM STOP AT ANY GIVEN POINT, HOWEVER, WOULD BE FRAUGHT WITH GRAVE DANGERS FOR SITUATION IN AREA AS WELL AS IN GA. POINT AT WHICH HE STOPPED WOULD HAVE BE BASIS FOR RETURNING TO GA FOR APPROVAL. IT WOULD HAVE BE BASED IN COMMON SENSE AND HE SHOULD BE ABLE ANTICIPATE SOLID SUPPORT. HE THEREFORE INSISTED ON KNOWING WHAT US WOULD BE WILLING SEE AS OUTCOME HIS NEGOTIATIONS. HE RECOGNIZED THIS WAS "HARSH BID" BUT HE WAS GENUINELY WORRIED THAT OTHERWISE HE MIGHT MAKE MESS OF SITUATION. HE WANTED BE ABLE TAKE OBVIOUS RISKS INVOLVED WITH OPEN EYES. HE SAID HE WAS NOT TRYING THROW BALL BACK INTO US HANDS BUT REITERATED NEED KNOW HOW MUCH US COULD ACCEPT RE EGYPT'S RETURN GAZA IN EXTENT, CHARACTER, ETC.

LODGE POINTED OUT US POSITION HAD BEEN CLEAR FOR SOME TIME IN RECOGNIZING EGYPT'S THEORETICAL LEGAL RIGHTS GAZA BUT WE EQUALLY CLEAR THEY SHOULD BE EXERCISED ONLY IN TOKEN FASHION. WE POINTED OUT IT MIGHT NOT BE PRACTICALLY POSSIBLE SET OUT IN DETAIL ARRANGEMENTS SYG SHOULD WORK FOR AND STICK ON TO POINT OF BREAKING OFF NEGOTIATIONS. HAMMARSKJOLD AGREED BUT FELT WE SHOULD GIVE HIM KIND OF GUIDE LINES OR "INSTRUCTIONS" DEPT WOULD GIVE ANY GROUP NEGOTIATORS EMBARKING ON VITAL MISSION.

AS EXAMPLE OF SITUATION ON WHICH HE FELT GUIDANCE REQUIRED, HE NOTED POLICE IN GAZA THEMSELVES PALESTINIANS. QUESTION FOR HIM WORK OUT WITH NASSER WOULD BE WHO WAS TO BE IN CHARGE.

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-4- 636, MARCH 14, 7 PM, FROM NEW YORK

WITH REGARD MAJOR OBJECTIVE PREVENTING FUTURE RAIDS, HAMMARSKJOLD SAID IF EGYPT INSISTED ON FULL CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION, AND THIS WAS AGREED TO, IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS ON FEDAYEEN QUESTION. AS HE EXPLAINED IT, WHILE EGYPT COULD THEORETICALLY USE FEDAYEEN FROM GAZA MORE EASILY IF THEY WERE IN FULL CONTROL, THEY WERE LESS LIKELY TO DO SO IF THEIR CONTROL RECOGNIZED. THIS WAS AS CLEAR TO HIM AS ANYTHING COULD BE IN LIGHT REAL HISTORY OF FEDAYEEN QUESTION WHERE NASSER ADMITTED FEDAYEEN ONLY WENT INTO ISRAEL IN ANSWER TO SO-CALLED "RETALIATORY" RAIDS FROM ISRAEL. THIS SYG FELT WAS HISTORICALLY TRUE.

HAMMARSKJOLD CONCLUDED BY SAYING SUPPORT HE NEEDED FROM US MEANT AGAINST EGYPT AND ISRAEL, AS NECESSARY, AS WELL AS IN GA, TO WHICH HE WOULD HAVE TURN IF BREAK-OFF OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH NASSER OCCURRED.

LODGE

CC

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MARCH 14, 1957

8:26 PM

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Info

FROM: NEW YORK

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 637, MARCH 14, 7 PM

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PRIORITY

RE GAZA

ENGEN (NORWAY) RAISED WITH US AGAIN THIS NOON QUESTION WHETHER WE HAD ANY INDICATIONS FRENCH COMMITTED BACK ISRAELI RETURN GAZA. HE NOTED WHAT HE TOLD US TWO WEEKS AGO THAT EBAN (ISRAEL) HAD SHOWN HIM PARAGRAPH PURPORTING BE EXCERPT FRENCH NOTE TO JERUSALEM. ENGEN HAD READ FULL PARAGRAPH AND RECONFIRMED TO US HIS IMPRESSION THAT ONLY REASONABLE CONCLUSION TO BE DRAWN FROM FRENCH NOTE WAS THEY WERE GUARANTEEING ISRAEL FULLEST SUPPORT SHOULD ISRAEL DECIDE SITUATION REQUIRED ISRAEL TO RETURN TO GAZA.

LODGE

CC

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
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S/S

Telegraphic transmission and  
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1957 MAR 14 PM 6 33

DC/T

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SENT TO: Amembassy, TEL AVIV 873

Origin

Info

Department handed Israel Embassy March 14 original of following  
from Acting Secretary to Israel Foramin:

QUOTE Dear Madam Minister:

I know that the Secretary will greatly appreciate the kind thoughts you expressed in your letter of March 6, 1957. The major efforts made by so many nations to achieve a constructive solution to problems resulting from recent developments in the Middle East will, I am sure, prove to be important contributions to area and world peace.

As we have stated publicly, we foresee no obstacles to passage through the Gulf of Aqaba by ships of United States registry proceeding on commercial voyages to ports in the Gulf.

With regard to your comments concerning Gaza, there are as you know points on which we hold differing views. As the Secretary told Ambassador Eban on March 2, we would not feel that mere presence of Egyptian personnel in territory which under the Armistice Agreement Egypt is entitled to occupy would give Israel the right to act. While we feel that arrangements for the administration of Gaza must be within the legal framework brought about the Armistice Agreement, it is, as you know, our desire that the United

Nations

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Only)

S/S

Drafted by:  
NEA:NE:DCBergus:rej - 3/14/57

Clearances:

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Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

NE - Stuart W. Rockwell

S/S-CR  
MAR 14 1957 P.M.

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Nations remain in Gaza pending an agreement on the future of that area or a permanent settlement.

We share your hope that there can be a period of relative tranquility which will enable the United Nations and its member states to turn to constructive tasks. We look forward to the return to the Middle East of an atmosphere which will enable normal United States Government activities in the area to be resumed.

Sincerely yours,

(signed) Christian A. Herter  
Acting Secretary UNQUOTE

HERTER  
ACTING  
(SWR)

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SENT TO: Amembassy, TEL AVIV 874

RPTD INFO: Amembassy, CAIRO 3041  
USUN, NEW YORK 707

Origin

Info:

**Following based on memo conversation unclassified by Acting Secretary.**

Eban called his request on Acting Secretary March 13. Stressed Ben Gurion's reliance upon assurances received from President and other officials made in conjunction with Israel withdrawal and fervent hope such reliance would suffice to avoid new and serious crisis. Reviewed Israel expectations which had been stated re employment UNEF and its exercising exclusive responsibility, UNEF serving as agency perform civil functions set forth by UNSYG Feb 22, and tenure UNEF which should be until overall settlement or agreement on future Gaza Strip. These expectations set in framework of broad association which Secretary had envisaged. Ambassador had understood US would not merely go back to pre-occupation position but in fact looked toward even more intimate association with Israel.

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Eban was sure Acting Secretary as shocked as Israel learn of situation developing in Gaza. So-called refugees coming from Egypt into Gaza including many fedayeen personnel. UNEF not controlling situation. Egypt exacerbating problem by repeatedly making statements concerning its belligerency toward Israel and reiterating position regarding territorial nature waters Tiran from which Israel ships would be excluded. Israel believed this period in which exclusive UN control Gaza should be maintained. Return to Gaza of Egyptian

Governor

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:DCBergus:rej - 3/14/57

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

NEA - William M. Rountree

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Governor might not sound so bad but it was extremely bad if that Governor was dedicated to destruction Israel.

Acting Secretary informed Eban we acutely conscious of situation which receiving our urgent consideration. We understood Egypt considering sending Governor and five assistants and there were indications they expected depart for Gaza tomorrow. We handicapped by lack info and could not check accuracy reports which we had received. We had made representations to Nasser but had not yet learned outcome discussions between Hare and Nasser.

Eban said Israel convinced UNSYG had power require Egypt not move into Gaza. He thought that authority derived from UN resolutions setting forth functions UNEF for "initial period" following Israel withdrawal. Phleger responded he did not think UNSYG had legal power stated by Ambassador but that his operation in Gaza would be in context UNSYG statement February 22 to UNGA. UNSYG could, of course, recall what Egypt had agreed to as set forth in that statement.

Eban restated his view Egypt should have no right reoccupy Gaza so long as it considered itself in state belligerency. Phleger did not agree stating Egyptian return to Gaza would in itself be no violation of Armistice Agreement. Shiloah interjected Egypt had stated publicly it in state belligerency and that was violation of Armistice Agreement. Phleger responded that while acts belligerency would be inconsistent with rights under Armistice Agreement, there was considerable difference between statements and acts. Shiloah said operations fedayeen well known and he would now report formally there had been Egyptian violations of Armistice Agreement through fedayeen activities. Phleger inquired whether these violations

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violations had been reported to UN. Proper procedure was, he thought, to report them to UNISO and UNSYG.

Murphy commented Nasser's desire send some Egyptian personnel to Gaza might be motivated by public pressure. Eban said all dictators had this problem. In order achieve his purposes Nasser pursued policies re Gaza, Suez, and Aqaba which would not contribute to improvement situation. Eban thought Nasser obtained strength pursue such a policy from USSR.

In concluding Eban again urged quick resumption of US programs of interest to Israel. Acting Secretary responded these matters receiving our attention now and we should be in position discuss them with Ambassador in near future.

*Heater*  
ACTING **HERTER**  
*us*

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March 14, 1957

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Re Mr Ben  
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to Pres  
on Suez  
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~~TOP SECRET, Rumsfeld~~  
**DEPARTMENT OF STATE**  
**THE UNDER SECRETARY**

March 14, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Conversation between Mr. Herter  
and Ambassador Lodge  
Copies To: G, L, NEA, IO, USUN, New York

Ambassador Lodge phoned Mr. Herter to say that he had just talked with the Secretary General, who is planning departure on Saturday and wants guidance from us. He wants to be told what we would be telling Hare, if Hare were doing the job. He wants us to realize the room for negotiations is very small and what point he breaks off in terms of the General Assembly that would follow a break off. He says there are several different positions to consider: (1) presence of token Egyptian personnel, which is unsatisfactory to Egypt because they want more and unsatisfactory to Israel because it recognizes Egypt has status; (2) what Nasser himself is now asking, namely a complete civil administration but no military, which means taking over Palestine police and bossing them and which he thinks will make raids and fedayeen activities less likely but, of course, is enough to trigger Israel. He says the big question is how far the US would be willing to go beyond the idea of token Egyptian forces.

Mr. Herter remarked that anything beyond token forces would put the US right in the "hopes and expectations" area and that the President has gone on record on this point. He added that there are terrific pressures on the President now to put the heat on Nasser in the same fashion as was done earlier on Israel. Mr. Herter also called Ambassador Lodge's attention to the last points in last night's wire to Ambassador Hare, i.e., the "carrot" of an early resumption of normal US-Egyptian relations, including the possibility of economic aid, provided Egypt complies with the UN resolution. Ambassador Lodge stated that there has not yet been time for the influence of Fawzi to have been felt in Cairo but that the Secretary General is hopeful this will take place before he arrives. Mr. Herter said he thought the best the US could say would be that we are doing everything possible to bring

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about a lessening of tensions and resumption of normalcy. He personally could not conceive that the Israelis would take the risk of trying to move in through the UNEF in Gaza; that this would be incredibly stupid. He added that Mr. Rountree does not entirely agree with him. Mr. Herter also gave the highlights of last evening's session with Ambassador Eban, which he summarized as the "playing up of tension between Egypt and Israel", and specifically the manning of border watch towers, raids and other border incidents. Mr. Lodge said that Nasser had pledged to Bunche there would be no more commando raids. Mr. Herter observed that if Nasser could deliver on this point it would help a lot. Ambassador Lodge suggested that the crux of our policy should be the development of an issue on which we could go to the General Assembly and get a strong vote against Egypt. He suggested that he would draw up a statement to be given to the Secretary General and that he would give it to Mr. Herter for his approval this afternoon. He concluded that his staff is already making a study on possible bases for a resolution against Egypt.

C. A. H.

Christian A. Herter

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
1957 MAR 20 AM 11:40  
*Chief Clerk*

*mk*  
U:MKrebs:MStilson:mfl

M-598

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE: March 14, 1957

SUBJECT: Entry of Egyptian "Governor" Into Gaza

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Abba Eban, Embassy of Israel  
Minister Counselor Zev Argaman, Embassy of Israel  
William M. Rountree, Assistant Secretary, NEA  
Eric E. Oulashin, Special Assistant, NEA

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MAR 19 1957

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Mr. Eban explained that he had come to discuss the significance of the arrival in Gaza, now confirmed, of the Egyptian "Governor" and his small staff. This news would create heightened tension in Israel. What did it mean? Was this the initial step in the establishment of an Egyptian administration of the Gaza Strip? Did this signify the dashing of the hopes, that he understood were shared by the Israeli and U.S. Governments, for an effective de facto control of the Gaza Strip? Was this Egyptian move simply a gesture or a firm act? Members of the UN Secretary-General's Advisory Commission had told him they considered the Egyptian arrival in Gaza as a fleeting apparition following which the UN administration would become a reality. What was Mr. Rountree's evaluation of this development and what was its effect upon American hopes regarding the evolution of the situation?

Mr. Rountree replied that the hopes Mr. Eban had referred to as being shared by the American and Israeli Governments continued to be very much in our minds and that we were most concerned over latest developments. It had been our hope that any Egyptian move into Gaza would be delayed, at least pending Mr. Hammarskjold's arrival in Egypt. It was our understanding that the functions of the Egyptian group now there were not defined and we hoped they would not be before Mr. Hammarskjold's arrival. We ventured the opinion that this move had been largely motivated by political and psychological considerations of prestige, that the Egyptians had felt it necessary to make a show of some Egyptian presence in Gaza. We still wished to secure a maximum position of authority for the UN administration in Gaza and

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hoped that Mr. Hammarskjold's visit would serve to crystallize the situation. Mr. Eban asked whether it was Mr. Rountree's opinion that the Egyptians had come to Gaza to stay or whether they had come to observe and report back. Mr. Rountree replied that to our knowledge the Egyptian group's status was vague. Their explicit function, we thought, would not be defined until Mr. Hammarskjold arrived and discussed the situation. We had of course made representations in Cairo; Ambassador Hare had done so today but his report had not yet been received. Our impression was that the Egyptian move was due to a desire to demonstrate some degree of Egyptian presence and responsibility in Gaza, on the assumption that failure to do so would imply that Egypt had no right to be there.

Mr. Rountree stated that the Acting Secretary regretted his inability to receive Mr. Eban because of another engagement but that he was keeping in touch with the situation even while attending an official function. The Acting Secretary considered that the present situation might prove either to be serious or relatively insignificant; he urged restrained reaction by all concerned so as to avoid possible deterioration of the situation and grave consequences. Mr. Rountree assured Mr. Eban that we were devoting the utmost concentration to this matter and were fully conscious of the hopes we had expressed to the Israeli Government.

Mr. Eban said that he considered it useful to report Mr. Rountree's statements to his government without delay, since Mr. Rountree's views had special status. He summarized his understanding to be that Mr. Rountree still hoped to see the establishment of effective UN administrative functions in the Gaza Strip during a transitional period and added that he had also in mind the agreed concept that UNEF would take over security functions and the UN administration would continue until the Gaza Strip issue was resolved. He asked whether Mr. Rountree did not consider that the latest Egyptian action meant the dissolution of this concept. Mr. Rountree replied that he did not so regard the Egyptian action. He recalled that on March 2nd or 3rd the Secretary had speculated upon the possibility of Egypt's wishing to send some personnel into Gaza for prestige reasons and had pointed out that such action would not necessarily imply creation of a situation involving any particular danger. He then confirmed that our objective continued to be the establishment of a UN agency for the civil administration of the Gaza Strip and, in response to Mr. Eban's specific query, that our policy continued to be as enunciated in the President's recent correspondence with Mr. Ben-Gurion and in other recent Israeli-American exchanges.

Mr. Eban stated that a public reiteration of the U.S. position would be useful. He recalled that it had not been so long ago that the opinion had been expressed that the Egyptians would not show their face in Gaza--and now we were faced with this sudden Egyptian move which implied the elimination of the UN from Gaza; this was causing great anxiety in Israel. The Egyptian styling as "Governor" of this personage who had arrived in Gaza was dramatic and a severe blow to UN efforts to assume de facto responsibility there; this development, he thought, went beyond the contingency that the Secretary had speculated upon. What effect, Mr. Eban asked, would this have upon the population of Gaza? Would it be possible now for the UN administration to secure recognition by the population?

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Mr. Rountree stated that we derived some encouragement from the fact that the significance of the title of the Egyptian "Governor" was vague and his responsibilities were undefined; we hoped that this condition would persist pending Mr. Hammarskjold's arrival in Egypt.

Mr. Eban suggested, half-jokingly, that it might be useful for the Egyptian "Governor" to retire from the Gaza Strip and constitute himself a government-in-exile in the same fashion as certain European governments had done during World War II. Mr. Rountree observed that the parallel was not exact: the World War II governments-in-exile had had no choice but to flee.

Mr. Eban observed that if the UN was to have administrative responsibility in Gaza it had the right to demand that there be no encumbrances to the exercise of such responsibility; the UN Secretary-General's memorandum had set forth assumptions that apparently were now to be brushed aside by Nasser.

Mr. Rountree replied that he was not sure this was the case. He added that he took note of Mr. Eban's suggestion that we publicly state that we continue to hold the hopes we had expressed within the United Nations with respect to the UN role in the Gaza Strip.

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~~SEV~~

State Department  
 Mr. Tolson  
 Mr. E.A. Tamm  
 Mr. Clegg  
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 Mr. Ladd  
 Mr. Nichols  
 Mr. Rosen  
 Mr. Tracy  
 Mr. Carson  
 Mr. Egan  
 Mr. Gurnea  
 Mr. Harbo  
 Mr. Hendon  
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 Mr. Quinn  
 Mr. Nease  
 Miss Gandy



## NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR RELATIONS

BETWEEN

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND ITALY

EXECUTIVE OFFICE: 143 PARK AVENUE

NEWARK, N. J.

N II56/DR

March 14th 19 57

Honorable CHRISTIAN HERTER  
 Acting Secretary of State  
 WASHINGTON, D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am pleased to send to you herewith enclosed my statement about the Review on the International events with a proposal for a strong Army for the United Nations for your kind considerations. Thanking you, I remain

*F. Pollari*  
 Dr. Ferdinand Pollari

Pres.

574.84A/3-1457

6746SEK/3-1457

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PUBLIC SERVICES DIV  
PCB

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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## REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

BY  
DR. FERDINAND POLLARI  
PRESIDENT NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR RELATIONS  
BETWEEN  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND ITALY

Reviewing the several international events starting from the harassed debate of Formosa and coming to the present foreign policy for help to Middle East Nations, which might be subjected to aggressive external menace, I would like to specify some connected facts which will clearly demonstrate how wrongly the international policy is directed.

The debate of Formosa first, as declared by President Nehru of India and as I stated in one of my previous notes, is not yet solved because it is still assumed by a majority of the United Nations Members that there are 2 Chinas while as a real fact Formosa does not represent the China nation by itself as it is only an insignificant part of the Chinese land.

Sometime ago I presented to the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and to the Secretary General of the U.N., a proposal to make an Independent Republic of Formosa, under the name of REPUBLIC OF FORMOSA. This could be the only way for a satisfactory settlement and would eliminate the obstacle of two Diplomatic Representatives at the United Nations for the real China.

Next is the Korean question which is also not yet solved because there was raised a strong contention of the impossibility for a real plebiscite, assuming that the North Korean population is smaller than the one of South Korea.

For this specific reason, in my proposal for the Unification of Korea presented to both the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. and to the Secretary General of the U.N., I stated that the procedure for the plebiscite should be regulated by establishing for the North Koreans an adequate higher percentage of their votes to balance the South Korean votes which are supported by a greater population.

This proposal which could facilitate the plebiscite, was not adopted. If it had received the consideration that it deserved, we would not be facing today a still unsolved Korean problem and we would have the unification of the Republic of Korea and a real peace instead of an Indefinite Armistice.

The latest link in this chain of events, brings us face to face with the worsening of the International situation with the aggression of Israel against Egypt, giving England and France the best opportunity to vindicate their hate against President Nasser and to seize the Suez Canal under the excuse of assistance to Israel.

The statement issued by the Israel Government about reliable information received that Egypt was being prepared to aggress the Israel territory is out of order as such information could be erroneous and dangerous as shown by its creation of serious and grave consequences.

Referring to Egypt I stated in my proposal for the settlement of the Suez Canal that this waterway belongs to Egypt and that this Nation is entitled to collect the tolls for the passage of the vessels through the Canal with a specific guarantee for the free navigation of all vessels at any time.

The thorny dispute of the Suez Canal has brought about a United Nations armed intervention for a peaceful settlement and for the withdrawal of English and French troops from Egyptian territory.

The delay for the armed intervention of the United Nations was due to the fact that the so called International Police has been gleaned on a very small scale from a very small percentage of Neutral Nations.

The United Nations represent a strong moral power in the World with its main purpose to govern the principles of Justice but such power must be supported by a military force to be used to sustain and defend the rights of people in the World wherever it may be endangered.

Consequently it is necessary that the United Nations have a permanent and sturdy arm, controlled by a Supreme Command composed of High Rank expert Officers. Such an Army could and should be ready at any time to take action wherever aggression might arise.

The establishment of a powerful United Nations Army will dispel any thought of aggression from any Nation and will thus avert armed conflict.

If we want peace in the World, we must concede to the United Nations the rights to have at their disposal a very strong army.

The Soviet and United States theory to intervene with their own forces in suppressing aggression to Nations of the Middle East under the appellation of Alliance, will be considered by the Arabs as a form of protectorate which they will not accept.

Any time a great Nation steps into their land with the intention of defending them, with promises for the protection of their interests and to give financial aid, the Arabs become diffident, doubts as to the motive for these actions is aroused as they have experienced the bonds of colonialism and from colonialism to complete domination of a territory is but a short step away, a step that can be made any moment the invader Nation deems it convenient.

The financial and military assistance promised by the United States to the Nations of the Middle East could be considered by the Arab people a vexing menace to them as those people know through long experience that any foreigner attempting penetration of their land always starts such penetration with promises for help.

The Soviet Union made the same promises to the Arabs as the United States with a warning to the Arabs that they be careful about the American policy as it has the objective of interference in the settlement of internal policies of the Arab Nations.

Such a Soviet move is made purposely to obstruct the American policy in the Middle East and to facilitate the accomplishment of their plans for the controlling of the form of Governments by sending in troops with the disguised purpose of protection.

If the United Nations will take charge and intervene by suppressing aggression, the doubts among the Arab people would be dispelled.

Any aggression would be impeded by a strong United Nations Army and this would stop foolish moves on the part of aggressive Nations.

I am deeply convinced that the Arab people would enthusiastically like to see all the Asiatic Nations as Members of the United Nations in order to completely eliminate disputes, provocations, border incidents among contiguous Nations and any other controversy.

If the United Nations at the proper time had a well organized and strong Army, the Israel aggression would not have taken place and both England and France would not have dared to instigate Israel to armed aggression, an aggression which has compelled the United Nations to intervene with a police force made up of an exiguous number of soldiers gathered from neutral Nations.

This action clearly demonstrates that President Nasser is well supported by the Arab Nations and that he had the right to proclaim the Nationalization of the Suez Canal. President Nasser flatly refused to discuss with France and England any settlement for the waterway while Mr. Eden and Mr. Pinau are at the head of both mentioned Nations. Mr. Eden has already resigned, Mr. Pinau will undoubtedly do the same soon.

These facts will greatly satisfy the Arab people as they see the moral and political position of President Nasser being vindicated.

The Secretary General of the United Nations in his Pour-Parlers with President Nasser Officially declared that Egypt had the right to Nationalize the Suez Canal, to collect the tolls for the passage of the vessels through the waterway and to impede the passage of vessels loaded with war material of a Nation which eventually could be at war with Egypt.

If such an official declaration of the Secretary General would be officially accepted, the thorny controversy of the Suez Canal could be settled, the vessels could have the free passage and the vital movement of oil reactivated on behalf of all the people of the World who are now suffering terribly, due to the drastic shortages created.

The Arab Nations especially would enthusiastically applaud such a logical solution imposed and sustained by the United Nations towards whom they would have a great faith as an International Congress for the protection of Justice to ALL.

DR. FERDINAND POLLARI

In reply refer to  
SEV 674.84A/3-1457

May 15 1957

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674.84A/3-1457

CC/BL

Dear Dr. Pollari:

Your letter of March 14, 1957 to Under Secretary Herter, enclosing your statement the "Review of International Events", has been referred to this Division for acknowledgment. Thank you for making your comments available. We have brought them to the attention of the appropriate offices of the Department.

Sincerely yours,

John P. Neagher  
Chief  
Public Services Division

Dr. Ferdinand Pollari, President,  
National Council for Relations between  
United States of America and Italy,  
143 Park Avenue,  
Newark, New Jersey.

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MAY 1 1957

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4:51 a.m.

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FROM: Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 2901, March 15, 11 a.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 2901, PRIORITY USUN 122.

Re Nasser consideration plan publicity and actions so as demonstrate GOE appreciation UN role Gaza and desire cooperate constructively with it (paragraph 6, Embassy telegram 2887), Department's attention called later statement (Embassy telegram 2900).

HARE

MAM:JB-6

674.84A/3-1557

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3:56 PM

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FROM: CAIRO

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 2905, MARCH 15, 2 PM

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SENT DEPARTMENT 2905, REPEATED PRIORITY TEL AVIV 162,  
PRIORITY USUN 124.FOLLOWING ARE SUPPLEMENTAL NOTES ON CONVERSATION WITH  
NASSER LAST NIGHT AS REPORTED IN EMBASSY TELEGRAM 2899:

1. REGARDING MOVEMENT OF EGYPTIAN TROOPS INTO SINAI, IT WILL BE RECALLED THAT GOHAR HAD MENTIONED IT TENTATIVELY TO BURNS (EMBASSY TELEGRAM 2896). IN TALK LAST NIGHT I ASKED IF HE HAD APPROPRIATELY INFORMED BURNS. HE FEIGNED SURPRISE MY QUESTION AND ASKED WHY. I REPLIED THAT SUCH ADVICE WOULD SEEM OBVIOUS PROCEDURE IN VIEW OF FUNCTION OF UNEF TO MAINTAIN QUIET IN CONNECTION WITHDRAWAL NON-EGYPTIAN TROOPS. FURTHERMORE, IRRESPECTIVE OF ACTUAL REQUIREMENTS, SIMPLE COURTESY TO GENERAL BURNS AS REPRESENTATIVE UN WOULD HAVE DICTATED PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH HIM. NASSER SAID IDEA HAD NOT OCCURRED TO HIM; PERHAPS SOMEONE ELSE IN GOE HAD TOLD BURNS; HE DID NOT KNOW.

WITH FURTHER REFERENCE TO MOVEMENT TROOPS INTO SINAI, I SAID THIS WAS NEW ITEM ON WHICH I HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS BUT, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, SEEMED BE ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF BAD TIMING AND METHOD. NASSER HAD PRESENTED MATTER AS NORMAL DEVELOPMENT BUT TO OUTSIDE EYES MOVE WOULD UNAVOIDABLY BE CONNECTED WITH APPOINTMENT OF GAZA GOVERNOR AND UNFAVORABLE IMPLICATIONS DRAWN.

2. TEXT HATEM STATEMENT MENTIONED PARAGRAPH THREE OF EMBASSY TELEGRAM 2899 TRANSMITTED IN EMBASSY TELEGRAM 2900.

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-2- 2905, MARCH 15, 2 PM, FROM CAIRO

BELIEVE POSSIBLE PUT TO CONSTRUCTIVE USE AND WOULD INDICATE SOME SLIGHT DENT MADE IN NASSER'S ARMOR IN OUR PRECEDING CONVERSATION. HOWEVER, TO BE NOTED THAT, ALTHOUGH FIRST REPORTS INDICATE RECEPTION OF GOVERNOR IN GAZA WAS PEACEFUL, OCCASION WAS APPARENTLY USED FOR LARGE PROPAGANDA DEMONSTRATIONS CONTRARY TO MY RECOMMENDATION. NASSER MAINTAINED THIS HAD NOT BEEN STAGED AND THAT HOUR OF ARRIVAL HAD PURPOSELY NOT BEEN PUBLICIZED SO AS AVOID TURBULENCE.

3. NASSER LAST NIGHT GAVE NUMBER OF OFFICERS ACCOMPANYING NEW GOVERNOR AS FOUR RATHER THAN SIX AS HE HAD STATED NIGHT BEFORE.

4. I DID NOT MAKE USE OF DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY TO MENTION RESUMPTION NORMAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND POSSIBLE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IN CONTEXT GAZA PROBLEM. MY REASON WAS THAT NASSER WAS OBVIOUSLY AND DEEPLY IMPRESSED BY GRAVE EVALUATION OF SITUATION AS SEEN BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER AND INTRODUCTION OF IDEA OF ECONOMIC QUID PRO QUE WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE HAD EFFECT OF DILUTING RATHER THAN STRENGTHENING IMPACT OF PRESENTATION. HOWEVER, THIS WOULD BE USEFUL CARD TO PLAY IN MORE APPROPRIATE SITUATION.

*Good point!*  
5. IN STRESSING DANGER OF MISCALCULATION I REMINDED NASSER OF PREVIOUS WARNING WHICH WE HAD GIVEN HIM ON OCTOBER 28 WHICH HE HAD BEEN INCLINED TO TAKE SOMEWHAT LIGHTLY. I HOPED HE WOULD NOT MAKE SAME MISTAKE AGAIN. HE SAID HE REMEMBERED.

6. IN CONTRAST WITH HIS SOMEWHAT ARGUMENTATIVE ATTITUDE OF NIGHT BEFORE, NASSER LAST NIGHT GAVE IMPRESSION, REAL OR SIMULATED, OF PERSON WHO HAD UNWITTINGLY BECOME INVOLVED IN DIFFICULTY WHICH HE FOUND HARD NOT ONLY TO MEET BUT ACTUALLY TO UNDERSTAND. PART OF THIS MAY HAVE BEEN MERE POSE AFTER MISCHIEF DONE BUT ALSO TRUE THAT NASSER NOT INFREQUENTLY DOES HAVE TENDENCY TO LEAP BEFORE HE LOOKS. IN ANY EVENT, AM CONVINCED PRESENTATION DID HAVE SOBERING AND THEREFORE USEFUL EFFECT.

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67484A/3-1557

We note that for good reason you did not make use, during your conversation with Nasser, of discretionary authority to mention resumption normal economic relations and possible economic assistance in context Gaza problem. Since this approach was not employed in contents specific demarche for which it was provided on discretionary basis, possible use this line in future situations should be subject prior consultation with Department.

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Drafted by:

NEA:NE:SWRockwell:cmt 3/16/57

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

NEA - William M. Rountree

Clearances:

S/S-CR

MAR 18 1957 P.M

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FROM: CAIRO

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 2910, MARCH 15, 4 PM

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SENT DEPARTMENT 2910, REPEATED INFORMATION OTTAWA PRIORITY 2,  
USUN PRIORITY 125.

CANADIAN AMBASSADOR HAS INFORMED ME THAT DURING COURSE CON-  
VERSATION WITH NASSER LAST NIGHT THEY DISCUSSED CURRENT PROBLEMS  
PERTAINING CANADIAN TROOPS AND GENERAL STATUS RELATIONS CANADA  
EGYPT. REGARDING FINAL INCREMENT OF CANADIAN FORCES NASSER  
AUTHORIZED AMBASSADOR NORMAN ADVISE HIS GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT'S  
CONSENT THIS ADDITION TO U.N. FORCES. (TIMING GOE CONSENT  
IMPORTANT AS SUBJECT CANADIAN TROOPS WITH UNEF SCHEDULED FOR  
DISCUSSION CANADIAN PARLIAMENT THIS MORNING). THEY ALSO  
CLEARED UP MISUNDERSTANDING STEMMING FROM INACCURATE REPORTING  
ACTIVITIES CANADIAN FORCES GAZA IN LOCAL PRESS. REGARDING  
RELATIONS IN GENERAL NASSER ADMITTED THAT HE HAD DEFERRED  
GRANTING CONSENT ARRIVAL ADDITIONAL CANADIAN FORCES BECAUSE OF  
IMPRESSION CANADA HAD TURNED ANTI-EGYPTIAN. AMBASSADOR NORMAN  
CHALLENGED THIS REMARK AND AFTER DISCUSSION OF CHARGES AND  
COUNTER-CHARGES AND EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY NORMAN REGARDING  
COMPARATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES CANADIAN AND EGYPTIAN PRESS TO  
MISUNDERSTANDINGS, NASSER AGREED GOE MIGHT HAVE JUDGED CANADA  
TOO HARSHLY AND EXPRESSED DESIRE ENJOY FRIENDLIER RELATIONS.

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58-H

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Control: 9946

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FROM: Cairo

Rec'd: March 15,  
3:01 p.m.

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 2912, March 15

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SENT DEPARTMENT 2912; REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV PRIORITY 163, JERUSALEM PRIORITY 49, LONDON PRIORITY 542, PARIS PRIORITY 452, USUN PRIORITY 126; AMMAN, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, JIDDA, BAGHDAD UNNUMBERED.

Following statement by administrative governor Gaza read over EBS afternoon March 15th:

"People Gaza have expressed their wish in manner leaving no room for doubt or interpretation. Will people Gaza which is will all Arabs has been fulfilled. Now we must turn our efforts to future. I call upon all you people Gaza to observe calm and to devote yourselves entirely to your work. Also I hope you will cooperate with me in providing emergency forces with every assistance and aid to facilitate success mission with which United Nations has charged them so that it will be possible eliminate state tension which prevails on armistice lines. I want draw your attention to fact that those on other side armistice line are trying invent reasons distort facts before world public opinion. In my opinion only way for us refute their arguments and their charges is to devote ourselves exclusively to work so as afford fullest scope to efforts United Nations execute its resolutions. Ardent and fervent emotions have played their role. Now has come turn of work and calm, in maturity and thoughtfulness, of seeking bring about tranquility and peace."

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53-H  
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Control: 10160  
Rec'd: March 15, 1957  
9:01 p.m.

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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1089, March 15, 6 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1089, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 219, PARIS 185, CAIRO 199, DAMASCUS 139, AMMAN 193, BEIRUT 181, JERUSALEM 75, USUN 77.

Foreign Minister called me to her Tel Aviv office at 2:00 this afternoon to inform me she is flying to New York tonight in hopes of seeing Secretary between SEATO and Bermuda to avoid crisis over Gaza.

She said Ben Gurion and she had decided last attempt should be made to establish state of affairs they expected to flow from what they thought were "assurances" and upon which GOI based its decision to withdraw.

In main, Meir spoke in general terms of deteriorating situation but was particularly bitter about Egyptian Governor General's arrival in Gaza with his staff. They might be civilians but police and military could be expected to follow. (This indicates she not yet aware the 6 "civilians" are military officers (Cairo's 2896)). She spoke of "pressures" being directed toward Israel, meaning remarks attributed to Secretary while in Canberra and latest speech by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy, to effect UNEF should be stationed on both sides demarcation lines Al Auja. This idea she rejected emphatically.

She said Israel had complied with US requests for evacuation and had given up positions of strength. Now events appeared to be rapidly heading toward situation which existed when GOI had taken original decision (presumably decision to launch Gaza-Sinai campaign). "Results", she said, "may be of character that none of us wants. We must say we are not particularly pleased to see SYG is going to Cairo. No good has as yet come out of his meetings with Nasser. But ultimate outcome not up to Israel, SYG, or to UN, it is completely in your hands."

In this

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-2- 1089, March 15, 6 p.m., from Tel Aviv

In this vein, she was scornful of SYG and UNGA declared Israel could place no hope of achieving progress through activities or ideas of either. UNGA she described as well-intentioned but ineffectual. I gathered impression she meant GOI would not respond to UN insistence UNEF troops on Israel soil.

I told her I was personally gratified she was going to US before GOI made any important decisions in circumstances; and that Secretary, as busy as he was, would be glad, I was confident, she had consulted him at this critical moment. I assured her USG not unaware of seriousness of situation and should not be considered "completely inactive."

Meir is leaving tonight for European unscheduled EL AL flight about 8:30 p.m. She will fly either Sabena from Brussels or Air France from Paris Saturday night arriving New York Sunday noon. She told me she had already instructed Eban and Shiloah to ask for appointment whenever Secretary can see her before leaving for Bermuda, possibly Sunday afternoon or night. She hoped to return here about March 21.

She made it clear GOI in very embarrassing position and Mapai Cabinet members are having rough time with party, not to mention coalition partners and opposition. She said she had tried to explain to Mapai central committee of about 200 last night how, in light of what has since transpired, events led up to their decision to withdraw. "They find it hard to believe when we tell them they have whole story; they don't think we are liars but are beginning to wonder if we were not fools."

LAWSON

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AIR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1091 March 15, 7 p.m.

Control 10215  
Rec'd March 15, 1957  
10:49 a.m.

*Full  
Rec'd  
3-18-57*

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PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1091, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 220, PARIS 186, CAIRO 200, DAMASCUS 140, BEIRUT 182 AMMAN 194, JERUSALEM 76, USUN 78.

British and USARMA today made joint appraisal military position in view Israel Government and public agitation over Gaza developments. They concluded:

1. There is no unusual mobilization activity.
2. IDF has enough strength in being to re-occupy Gaza without difficulty.
3. Heavy downpours nearly every day this week reduced terrain to state that would be deterrent to, although not prevent, major military undertaking.

USARMA and his British colleague plan careful reconnaissance of all borders over weekend for evidence of mobilization.

However there are no trouble indicators today IDF seem to be granting at least normal number Sabbath leaves.

LAWSON

EOC:YAM/13

674.84A/3-1557

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Department of State

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Action

Control: 10276  
Rec'd: March 16, 1957  
1:37 a.m.

NEA

FROM: Tel Aviv

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 1092, March 15, 7 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1092, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 188

Reference Embassy telegrams 971 and 974.

French Ambassador Gilbert left for Paris by air Thursday reportedly for "consultations" including, we assume, developments surrounding Gaza.

Incorrigible as ever, Gilbert told press on boarding plane "let's hope nothing wrong happens while I am away. I mean any negative initiative by Egypt or UNSYG."

One paper quoted him as saying: "Israel and France will have to stand together in future too in order to ensure guarantees promised to Israel will be realized. Israel and France must cooperate to open alternate route between Red Sea and Mediterranean as an alternative to Suez." He then added cryptically, "oral promises are scattered by wind, but written words are eternal."

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VH:JB-6

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Control: 9647  
Rec'd: March 15, 1957  
8:56 a.m.

SS  
Info

FROM: Paris

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 4744, March 15, 2 p.m.

NIACT

PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING

Re DEPTTEL 3629 FOR YOST

President's message delivered to Prime Minister Mollet personally at noon Paris time today.

Mollet expressed appreciation for President's message and said he would counsel restraint and prudence upon Israelis to best of his ability. However he was very deeply disturbed and shocked by latest developments in Near East. It seemed to him that Nasser is acting in flagrant contradiction to Franco-American understanding reached in Washington and, without effective opposition, is marching from success to success. Like all dictators he proceeds bite by bite, today Governor (whom Mollet described as notorious Communist) and six administrators for Gaza, next week 50, then full Egyptian takeover in Gaza. Meanwhile Nasser issues series of intransigent statements on other matters no free transit Gulf of Aqaba, French and British vessels not to transit canal without payment full tolls to Egypt, etc. (in this connection Mollet mentioned with indignation he had just been informed Panamanian Government has announced vessels of Panamanian registry will pay full tolls directly to Egypt. He felt this action, if as reported, would kill four power proposal on toll payments.)

I assured Mollet US Government also takes very grave view of situation and is exerting its influence to utmost to bring about satisfactory settlement. I mentioned Bunche's view that some degree Egyptian administration required in Gaza and argued that, if UNEF remains there and neither Egyptian nor Israeli troops enter, modus vivendi can be worked out.

Mollet replied Gaza population could be incited to render unenforceable any settlement other than complete Egyptian takeover

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☐ CHARGE TO

**Department of State**

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Classification

09560

1957 MAR 18 PM 7 00

DC/T

Page 1 of 1

SENT TO: AmEmbassy, LONDON  
AmEmbassy, PARIS

6463  
3692

Origin

EUR

Info:

Code Room please repeat 643 March 15, from New York,

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674.840/3-1557 Dulles  
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320.57840

DULLES

674.840/3-1557

Re: Gorge situation

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(Offices  
Only)

EUR  
SS  
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Drafted by:

EUR:LStaples:bh 3-18-57

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

Taylor G. Belcher

Clearances:

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MAR 18 1957 P.M.

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Action

IO

Control: 10201

Rec'd: MARCH 15, 1957

9:59 P.M.

Info

RMR

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 644, MARCH 15, 8 P.M.

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PRIORITY

RE(1) GAZA; (2) INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUEZ

(1) LODGE DELIVERED COPY MEMORANDUM U.S. POSITION (DEPTEL 709) TO SYG THIS AFTERNOON, READING IT ALOUD TO HIM.

HAMMARSKJOLD FIRST NOTED HIS TIMETABLE CHANGED BECAUSE OF ARRIVAL ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER. SINCE SHE GOING WASHINGTON FOR DISCUSSIONS, HE FELT IT VERY UNWISE DEPART PRIOR KNOWING OUTCOME THOSE TALKS. HE INTENDED SEE HER PROBABLY MONDAY MORNING, AND DEPART FOR CAIRO 3 P.M. MONDAY AFTERNOON.

FOR OUR VERY PRIVATE INFORMATION, HE SAID IT VERY UNLIKELY HE WOULD NOW GO JERUSALEM AND THEREFORE IT ESSENTIAL HE HAVE CONTACT WITH ISRAELIS AT SOME POINT AND THIS PROVIDED OBVIOUS OPPORTUNITY.

THEN COMMENTING UPON S.S. MEMORANDUM, HAMMARSKJOLD SAID "IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT IS WHAT IS DESIRED. WHAT REMAINS IS TO GET IT." LODGE POINTED OUT IT OBVIOUSLY DIFFICULT FOR US PRESCRIBE ANY EXACT COURSE ACTION FOR HIM; PARTICULARLY SINCE HE HAD NOT GIVEN US ANY LIST VARIOUS MATTERS ON WHICH DECISIONS WOULD BE REQUIRED. HAMMARSKJOLD REPLIED HE HAD GIVEN GOOD DEAL THOUGHT TO MATTERS INVOLVED, BUT HAD INTENTIONALLY NOT PRESENTED US WITH LIST BECAUSE HE HAD NOT WANTED INFLUENCE KIND REPLY WE WOULD GIVE HIM.

COMMENTING ON TEXT, HAMMARSKJOLD NOTED U.S. BELIEVED POSITIONS SET FORTH THEREIN WERE "REASONABLE." HE AGREED THEY WERE REASONABLE PER SE, BUT POINTED OUT RESOLUTIONS AND HIS STATEMENTS HAD NOT COVERED GAZA IN ANY EXPLICIT FASHION. HE NOTED HIS STATEMENT FEBRUARY 22ND SPOKE OF "FIRST INSTANCE", I.E., INITIAL TAKEOVER PERIOD, AND ALSO REFERRED TO "HELPFUL ARRANGEMENTS".

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BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

674.84A/3-1567

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674.84A/3-1567



-2- 644, MARCH 15, 8 PM FROM NEW YORK /

THESE TWO SENTENCES REQUIRED VERY CAREFUL EXAMINATION SINCE THEY WERE CRUCIAL STEPS BY 22 APRIL 1967. QUESTION THEREFORE WAS WHAT SORT ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE HELPFUL AND WHAT WOULD NOT.

TURNING TO PARAGRAPH 4 OF MEMORANDUM, HAMMARSKJOLD INDICATED IT STATED QUITE WELL CONSIDERATION. HOW TO ACHIEVE THAT WAS ANOTHER MATTER. EGPT IN EXERCISE ITS RIGHTS COULD REDUCE UN CONTROL IN GAZA PRACTICALLY TO NOTHING. CONTRASTED TO THAT ON OTHER EXTREME, HE SAID, WAS ISRAELI PUBLIC POSITION. IN THIS CONNECTION HE SAID IN CONVERSATION TODAY EBAN (ISRAEL) HAD BEEN VERY MODERATE AND APPEARED HAVE SWALLOWED TOKEN ELEMENT OF EGYPTIAN ELEMENT CIVIL ADMINISTRATION ALREADY PRESENT. EBAN HAD ACCENTED TIMING CONSIDERATION RATHER THAN SUBSTANCE. HAMMARSKJOLD NOTED EBAN SAID THEY REGARDED MATTERS AS PRIMARILY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND WASHINGTON IN CONNECTION ASSUMPTIONS UNDER WHICH ISRAEL HAD WITHDRAWN.

HAMMARSKJOLD RETURNED TO QUESTION OF HOW ACHIEVE DESIRED RESULTS. HE SAID HE COULD USE ONLY PERSUASION, WITH OR WITHOUT GOVERNMENTAL SUPPORT. HE SAID IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE GET SOME HELP FROM INDIA. HE MUST SEEK SUBSTANTIAL UN ELEMENT IN GAZA WHICH WOULD MEAN MORE UN THERE THAN IN PAST AND AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. BUT, HE REITERATED, IT WAS ONLY PERSUASION WHICH HE COULD BRING TO BEAR UPON EGYPT.

HAMMARSKJOLD REFERRED TO UK FOREIGN SECRETARY'S STATEMENT ON INTERNATIONALIZATION OF GAZA, SAYING IT WAS "BAD LUCK" TO HAVE BEEN MADE AT THIS TIME. HE ALSO FELT WASHINGTON ANNOUNCEMENT REGARDING RENEWAL ECONOMIC TALKS WITH ISRAEL WOULD BE "COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE" IN CAIRO. HIS WHOLE PROBLEM BOILED DOWN, HE SAID, TO POINT AT WHICH HE SHOULD MAKE "DRAMA" OUT OF MATTER.

LODGE REFERRED TO PARAGRAPH 4 OF MEMORANDUM SAYING "RESPONSIBILITY" FOR ADMINISTRATION GAZA WHICH U.S. BELIEVED MUST REMAIN IN UN AGENCIES REFERRED TO "MAJOR" RESPONSIBILITY. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, LODGE SAID, HAMMARSKJOLD HIMSELF WOULD OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO BE GUIDED BY COMMON SENSE AS TO WHETHER THIS BASIC OBJECTIVE ATTAINED.

HAMMARSKJOLD

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-3- 644, MARCH 15, 8 P.M. FROM NEW YORK

HAMMARSKJOLD SAID IT NATURAL FOR HIM SEEK FILL GAPS IN UN'S ROLE IN GAZA BUT IT EQUALLY NATURAL FOR EGYPT SEEK PUSH UN BACK AS FAR AS POSSIBLE. WITHIN THAT RANGE THERE WAS WIDE MARGIN IN WHICH EGYPT COULD ASSUME CIVIL ADMINISTRATION TASKS WITHOUT ANY REAL RISK RESUMPTION RAIDS AND WITHOUT EGYPT APPEARING TO BE UNREASONABLE. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID HIS ONLY POLITICAL TOOL WAS REFERRAL TO GA. THIS WOULD HAVE TO COME AT POINT WHEN EGYPTIAN POSITION HAD BECOME "NON-SUBSTANTIVE AND FOOLISH".

IN CONSIDERING REFERRAL BACK TO GA, HAMMARSKJOLD SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO BEAR IN MIND NEED FOR GETTING THROUGH GA WITH TWO-THIRDS BACKING FOR WHATEVER HE DECIDED WAS REASONABLE. SO MANY FACTORS GOVERNED THIS IT WOULD BE VERY SUBTLE CALCULATION.

IF HE WENT TOO FAR IN EGYPT'S DIRECTION, HE SAID, THERE WOULD BE EXPLOSION FROM ISRAELI SIDE, BACKED UP BY ISRAEL SUPPORTERS. IF HE TRIED BREAK OFF AT POINT OF HAVING GIVEN IN VERY LITTLE TO EGYPT, THEN HE RAN EQUAL RISK NOT BEING BACKED UP BY GA MAJORITY.

HAMMARSKJOLD CONCLUDED THIS PART OF DISCUSSION BY SAYING HE INCLINED STAGE MATTERS SO HIS TALKS IN CAIRO APPEAR TO BE SOMEWHAT EXPLORATORY, GIVING IMPRESSION HE NOT EXPECTING COME OUT OF THEM WITH FINAL AGREEMENT. THIS WOULD FIT IN WITH HIS DESIRE TO CHECK AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE STATUS OF HIS TALKS WITH U.S.

(2) RE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS, LODGE DELIVERED ORALLY MESSAGE CONTAINED DEPTTEL 708.

HAMMARSKJOLD SAID HE COULD NOT AT THIS MOMENT TURN ON MORE PRESSURE ON EGYPT THAN HE NOW HAD. WITH REGARD PARAGRAPH (4) HE NOT AT ALL SURE SITUATION DESCRIBED THEREIN COVERED BY SIX PRINCIPLES ADOPTED BY SC.

HAMMARSKJOLD SAID HE EXPECTED, AS HE HAD ALL ALONG, OBTAIN COUNTER-PROPOSAL FROM EGYPT. IT WAS HIS OWN FEELING EGYPT SHOULD ACCEPT SOMETHING LIKE OUR FOUR-POWER PROPOSAL. HOWEVER, THERE WAS SERIOUS PROBLEM IN CONNECTION TOTAL BLOCKAGE 50 PERCENT UNTIL FINAL SETTLEMENT REACHED. FROM VARIOUS COMMENTS AND REACTIONS IN CONVERSATIONS WITH FAWZI, HAMMARSKJOLD UNDERSTOOD EGYPT TO FEEL ACCEPTANCE OF THIS STIPULATION WAS TANTAMOUNT TO PUTTING EGYPT'S NECK IN NOOSE. IN OTHER WORDS, EGYPT WOULD IN EFFECT

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4- 644, MARCH 15, 1957, 8 P.M. FROM NEW YORK

BE ACCEPTING IN ADVANCE ANY CONDITIONS WHICH "OTHER SIDE", I.E., USERS, MIGHT PUT FORWARD BECAUSE OTHERWISE 50 PERCENT WOULD BE HELD INDEFINITELY. FAWZI HAD SAID TO HIM "HOW CAN ANY GOVERNMENT PUT ITSELF IN POSITION OF ACCEPTING IN ADVANCE ULTIMATE DEFEAT?" IN ORDER TO MEET THIS ARGUMENT, WHICH HE FELT COULD NOT BE BRUSHED ASIDE, IT WOULD BE, IN HIS OPINION, BETTER TO HAVE TIME LIMIT FOR DURATION OF BLOCKAGE OR, AS BRITISH HAD ONCE PROPOSED, ATTACHING CERTAIN CONDITIONS REGARDING DISPERSAL OF BLOCKED 50 PERCENT, SUCH AS SPECIFIC PURPOSES FOR WHICH BLOCKED PART COULD BE SPENT.

HAMMARSKJOLD SAID HE WOULD OF COURSE TRY TO PLAY HIS NEGOTIATIONS IN WAY DEPARTMENT DESIRED. IF, AS HE EXPECTED, EGYPTIANS CAME UP WITH COUNTER-PROPOSAL, HE WOULD ASK THEM SHOW IT TO US DIRECTLY. IF THEY WOULD NOT, HE WOULD DO SO. HE SAID EGYPT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY NOT BE WILLING TO GIVE IT TO ALL FOUR POWERS BECAUSE THEY COULD NOT RECOGNIZE BRITISH AND FRENCH AS EMPOWERED SPEAK FOR USERS. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID EGYPT HAD PUT HIM IN BETWEEN THEMSELVES AND FOUR POWERS AS KIND OF SCREEN OR BUFFER. IT WAS POSSIBLE, THEREFORE, THEY WOULD AGREE ONLY TO HAVING SYG RELAY COUNTER-PROPOSAL TO U.S.

BARCO

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHANGE TO

## Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL  
Classification

08332

1957 MAR 15 PM 4 39

DC/T

SENT TO: Amembassy TEL AVIV

PRIORITY

878

RPTD INFO: Amembassy CAIRO

USUN 710

3657

Origin

Info

Eban last night discussed with Rountree significance Egyptian Governor's entry Gaza stating it created heightened tension and anxiety in Israel. Rountree expressed opinion Egyptian move might have been motivated solely by prestige considerations. Such possibility had been envisaged by Secretary and did not necessarily involve great dangers particularly if it not accompanied by return large numbers Egyptians. Pointed out Governor's role apparently not defined and expressed hope it would not be at least pending Hammarskjold's arrival Cairo.

Eban sought reaffirmation of hopes "shared by American and Israeli Governments" for effective de facto UN control of Gaza and for reaffirmation of our policy as explained in President's correspondence with Ben-Gurion. Suggested usefulness public reiteration US position. Rountree told Eban we continue wish secure maximum position of authority for UN administration in Gaza Strip and hope Hammarskjold's visit Egypt will crystallize situation. Confirmed our policy remained unchanged and stated we continue work toward fulfillment to greatest extent possible hopes which had been expressed by Lodge and others re situation which should prevail after Israeli withdrawal. Counseled restraint in reaction to Egyptian move in order avoid possible

Dist. Desired  
(Offices Only)

DC/R

Drafted by:

NEA:EEoulashin:blw:av

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Clearence:

Rev

Cat

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

William M. Rountree

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Classification

S/S CR  
MAR 15 1957 PM

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374.84A/3-1557

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674.84A/3-1557



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Classification

deterioration situation and grave consequences. Took note Eban's suggestion we publicly state we continue hold our hopes as expressed within United Nations regarding UN role Gaza.

*Herter*  
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*Herter*

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Classification



## DEPARTMENT OF STATE INSTRUCTION

CONFIDENTIAL  
(Security Classification)

1551

FOR DC USE ONLY

NO.: CA-7466 March 15, 1957

SUBJECT: Bunche's Views on Gaza Demonstrations

TO: CERTAIN AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC OFFICERS

Embassy Cairo reports that Ralph Bunche has noted that the Egyptian request for the return of an Egyptian governor to Gaza followed the demonstrations, which in Bunche's view appeared to have been deliberately staged. UN personnel had observed Egyptian correspondents who had arrived by plane the preceeding day engaged in agitation. Bunche also said that whether or not the Egyptian request for the return of the governor and the demonstrations were actually linked, he took strong exception to the fact that the appointment of a governor had been tied to the Egyptian Government's statement to "firing at the people of Gaza" which Bunche said the Egyptians must have known to be untrue.

HERTER, ACTING

DC/T: Send ~~in~~ by pouch to

- Bangkok
- Canberra
- Djakarta
- Hong Kong
- Kuala Lumpur
- Manila
- Phnom Penh
- Rangoon
- Saigon
- Singapore
- Seoul
- Taipei
- Tokyo
- Vientiane
- Wellington
- ARA Capitals

Ref: Cairo 2878 3/13 (C)

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(Security Classification)

DRAFTED BY:

IO:CCMopr:cj

3/15/57

APPROVED BY:

IO:Roy T. Davis, Jr.

CLEARANCES:

574.34A/3-1557

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March 15, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR HON. GEN. A. J. GOODPASTER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Cables on the Middle East  
Situation

Enclosed are cables which the Acting Secretary  
has asked be brought to the attention of the  
President.

FISHER HOWE  
DIRECTOR  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Fisher Howe  
Director  
Executive Secretariat

Enclosures:

674.84a/3-1557  
Cairo's 2899 (TS cy #12)  
Cairo's 2878 (C Advance copy)  
674.84a/3-1357

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March 15, 1957

**MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL ARTHUR W. RADFORD  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

**Subject: UK-French Air Cover re  
Reoccupation Gaza by  
Israelis**

674.84a

The enclosed exchange of cables be-  
tween the Department of State and Embassy,  
Cairo is sent in response to a request  
from your office this afternoon.

674.84A/3-1557

**Fisher Howe  
Director  
Executive Secretariat**

**Enclosures:**

1. DepTel 3030 to Cairo  
(TS copy #5)
2. Embassy Cairo's 2899  
(TS copy #3)

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By :

A. Lee - NEA

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Control: 10415

Rec'd: March 16, 1957

7:10 a.m.

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NEA

FROM: Cairo

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 2914, March 16, 1 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 2914, USUN 127, REPEATED INFORMATION NIACT  
TEL AVIV 164

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In answer to specific question by Military Attache high  
UNEF official here stated today that best his knowledge  
no Egyptian Army units have entered Sinai except for  
members of Frontier Corps and staff (composition unknown)  
who took over airport at Al Arish. Official said he felt  
that if any large unit had entered he would have known it.  
General Burns coming Cairo tomorrow and will endeavor  
check with him.

HARE

LMS:DT

Note: Advance copy to Mr. Maestroni (SS/DO) 9:15 a.m. 3/16/57  
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MAR 22 1957

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Fr. Cairo 2914, March 16, 1957

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5. FORWARDED

3/16/57

(Date)

LEO DOLOFF

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		<i>Wilkins</i>	"		
<i>Ch Cheney</i>		<i>etc</i>	"		<u>3/19</u>
<i>Miss [Signature]</i>	NEA	<i>[Signature]</i>	<u>3/20</u>		
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55-52

Action  
NEAControl: 10605  
Rec'd: March 16, 1957  
2:40 p.m.Info  
RMR

FROM: Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 2922, March 16

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SENT DEPARTMENT 2922; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN, BADHDAH,  
BEIRUT, BENGHAZI, DAMASCUS, JIDDA, KHARTOUM, LONDON, PARIS,  
NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV, TRIPOLI UNNUMBERED, USUN 128

Press March 16 reported following wide range items re Gaza:

Governor's statement urging calm (EMBTEL 2912) which also  
read several times on radio; meeting Helmi-Burns at which  
according former agreement in principle reached on "position  
UNEF" after Egyptian take over administrative functions; appeal  
by "deputation" to governor in course "peaceful demonstration"  
requesting UNEF evacuate towns and withdraw to armistice lines  
"which will unguarded and transfer its headquarters to Al Auja,  
governor replying by recalling Burns had previously stated UNEF  
to be stationed along armistice lines and telling demonstrators  
maintain calm and order; reports UNEF in process taking up  
position along line and might complete move within 48 hours;  
Murphy statement which interpreted as start US pressure on  
Israel accept UNEF on Israeli side; UN spokesman's confirmation  
armistice agreement determines status Gaza and UNEF would with-  
draw from Gaza and Sharm El Sheikh if Egypt so requested; Heikal  
listing "clouds" (Burns-Helmi talks, guarantees to Israel, Canadian  
official statements, demonstration in Gaza, refusal entry Red  
Cross mission) which he now finds dispersed thanks Secretary General  
and Bunche and Egypt's full cooperation with them.

Saudi position Aqaba played prominently. AKHBAR quotes ICJ judge  
Bedawi to effect Aqaba dispute not one court can decide but could  
subject advisory opinion. He would not disqualify himself if case  
heard; on contrary presence judge from country involved imperative.

Other news items of interest US are pickup of Panamanian magazine  
story saying Panamanian Foreign Minister had ordered payment tolls  
directly to Egypt; Washington report British preparing reduce  
or abandon military installations Libya; London-Moscow reports  
SEATO conference confirmed extent US-UK disagreement FE policies.

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AIR

FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 256, March 16, 7 a.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 256; REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 72, AMMAN 154  
BAGHDAD 15, BEIRUT 60, DAMASCUS 57, JIDDA 1, LONDON 33, PARIS  
22, TEL AVIV 129

Following is substance of report telegraphed evening March 14 by  
Lt. Colonel Brown at Gaza (in charge UNTSO observer group there)  
to acting Chief UNTSO:

Demonstrations were called March 13 welcome Egyptian administrative Governor, failed arrive that date. Crowd which gathered was enthusiastically pro-Egyptian, shouting Nasser slogans and calling for return Egyptians. Speakers included among others Mayor Munir Reis. Burns and Bunche who arrive noon of March 14 confirmed impending entry Governor. Demonstrations revived that afternoon as loud-speaker vans called population to welcome him. People moving toward Gaza this purpose. Observers described crowds coming up road from direction Rafah as very large. Egyptian journalists, bona fide and otherwise, representative voice of Arabs, and local papers continue spread Egyptian propaganda. Brown reports no efforts control entry persons across international frontier. Ease of access resulting influx of students from Cairo, plus many persons said coming to see relatives.

Egyptian CID officers who have appeared in Gaza past few days are conducting interrogations, presumably with view ascertain behavior inhabitants during Israeli occupation. Some locals very fearful. Brown understands that 120 Egyptian civil police at El Arish will be reinforced by 1200 army personnel without delay. On March 13 Egyptians issued ultimatum, later withdrawn, ordering UNEF off Gaza airfield and surrounding area. Revolutionary committee continues operate throughout Gaza strip. Night March 14 at meeting headed by Munir Reis committee demanded UNRWA call strike covering all activities except medical services and distribution foodstuffs. Possible arrival Governor will forestall strike.

CONGEN comment: Ease entry Gaza strip from southern end significant

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Rec'd: March 16, 1957  
4:41 p.m.

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NEA

MAR 18 AM 7 05

File  
NEA  
3-18-57



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-2- 256, March 16, 7 a.m., from Jerusalem

significant inter alia in light possible connection Damascus telegram 1980 February 28 to Department reporting large scale airlift from Damascus to Cairo Egyptian controlled persons believed to be Fedayeen.

COLE

MDG:JJ

MAR 19 1957

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

62  
Department of State

ACTION COPY

43-41

SECRET

Action

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Info

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FROM: Oslo

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1045, March 16, 1 p.m.

PRIORITY

Foreign Office advises Norwegian Ministry Cairo made demarche Egypt March 14 backing up previous US demarche urging moderation on Nasser particularly with respect Gaza. Also advises Norwegian demarche made after consultation Hare and presumably stressed some points he had made. Embassy assumes this is matter referred to second paragraph INTEL March 13, 9 p.m.

Because breakdown Norwegian communications with Cairo Foreign Office has been unable obtain details either demarche. Foreign Office therefore asks if full summary re US demarche could be furnished them thru Embassy here for their background information. Would like have this information Monday if possible. Also inquires if US intends:

- (A) Keep fact that demarche made entirely secret;
- (B) Indicate publicly that demarche made without disclosing substance; or
- (C) Publicize demarche with substance.

Embassy believes would be in US interest provide Norwegian Foreign Office information requested. Please reply urgently.

RAYNOR

MDG:MEH/5

Copy No(3)

Destroyed 10/15/57

Name: FLS

Data: 3-17-57

Mr. Hoffacher &  
Egyptian Seal  
at 10:36 AM - 17 March 57  
by Finch, NEA Duty Officer  
Seen by F. Wilkins at 10:45 AM - 17 March  
John Shaw notified 9:55 AM - 17 March

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MAR 17 1957

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# Department of State

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Classification

09176

1957 MAR 17 PM 2 45

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SENT TO: Amembassy OSLO 1002

674.84a / 3-1657

Origin

Info

EMBTel 1045.

Our Ambassador Cairo requested March 12 meet with Nasser and urge him refrain from any precipitous action which would undo achievements to date. Also to express hope GOE continue demonstrate forbearance as in recent past and that within its rights Egypt would cooperate fully in implementation measures aimed at insuring peace and quiet in area.

Dept also suggested Ambassador might discreetly allude fact that if Egyptian cooperation not forthcoming and if hostilities recurred or new dangerous situation arose calling for further urgent UN consideration, Egyptian position might be much different from that enjoyed recent GA discussions. Any Egyptian action endangering recent success UN restoring peace and achieving withdrawal occupation forces would be ~~his~~ viewed with disfavor majority UN members.

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674.84a / 3-1657

Drafted by:

NEA: JShaw/C.Finch

3/17/57

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

CWO: FEDuvall  
~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ EM

Clearances:

IO -

EUR -

**SECRET**

Classification

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SECRET

Classification

Hare saw Nasser March 13 and expressed foregoing views.

Above information may be passed Foreign Office for background but should not be made public nor should Egyptians be informed information passed to Norwegians.

Questions raised will be answered soonest.

*Herter*  
*[Signature]*

HERTER

SECRET

Classification



NND 897403  
BOX 2678

(36)  
1/2/5

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 674, 84A/3-1657  
Tel 883  
Date 3/16/57  
From State  
To Tel Aviv

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

☒ Security-Classified Information

☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

NSC  
Authority

1/5/89  
Date

(36)

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM

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☐ CHARGE TO

## Department of State

09060

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Classification

1957 MAR 16

DC/R	Central	Files
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SENT TO: Amembassy, TEL AVIV 884

Origin

Info:

View number of misleading press reports, there follows, for such use as you may care to make, exact text Secretary's remarks Canberra March 14 re stationing UNEF:

QUOTE Q. Mr. Dulles, was it the hope of your Government when the UN first moved into the Gaza Strip that they would remain for some considerable time?

A. We believe that it would be desirable to have the UNEF function as a barrier between Israel and the neighboring Arab countries. That has been difficult to work out, partly because Israel has not wanted to have any elements of the United Nations Force on the Israeli side of the boundary and Egypt has not wanted to have them exclusively on the Egyptian or Gaza Strip of the boundary. But I still hope something can be worked out there to give greater stability and tranquility to the area and to put a stop to the raiding back and forth.

Q. Did the Israeli Government agree to withdraw its forces on the assumption of the United Nations barrier?

A. No, I would hardly say that, because Israel itself has been the principal obstacle to creating that barrier. As I pointed out, they have not wanted to have the United Nations Forces actually on the boundary line. UNQUOTE

Dist. Desired  
(Offices Only)

DC/R

Aug 16

Drafted by: *PCB*  
NEA:NE:DCBergus:rej - 3/16/57

Rev

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

G - Robert Murphy

Clearances:

~~NEA:FOCONS:DCBergus:rej~~

Oct

NEA - Mr. Rountree *WCS*

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Classification

If questioned re press reports remarks allegedly made by Murphy March 14 calling for stationing UNEF along both sides of border, you may state that an examination of the exact text of Mr. Murphy's remarks reveals that he made no mention whatsoever of where UNEF might be stationed.

*Herter*

ACTING

*157*

HERTER

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PRIORITY

(With Unclassified Portion)  
(Security Classification)

DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE

674.84A/3-1657

## FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

208

DESP. NO.

March 13, 1957

DATE

FROM : Embassy, Jidda

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

REF : ---

17 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.	Central Files
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SUBJECT: London-1 Paris-1 Tel Aviv-1 Allen-1 Shahr-1 Damascus-1  
Newspaper Comment on Gaza Strip and Gulf of Aqaba. Beirut-4 Baghdad-1  
Cairo-1 APR 3 1957 AM 10 36  
CENTRAL

NOT UNCLASSIFIED

## SUMMARY

Writers of the two local newspaper comments which have appeared thus far on Israeli withdrawal from Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba have taken an uncompromising stand on the issue of internationalization of either area. One bitterly attacked Zionism and colonialism, while the other suggested that "there is no justice in the so-called internationalization."

In addition to the printing of certain foreign news items on Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Aqaba, including an Egyptian item in Al-Milad al-Saudiya of March 11 to the effect that the people of Gaza demand the return of Egyptian administration to Gaza; there have been only two local comments in the press on this subject. Both appeared in Hira's March 8 issue.

The first, by political commentator Sulaiman Jadi, observed that Israel had outlined five conditions with respect to withdrawal from Gaza and Aqaba: 1) Egypt must permit Israel free passage for its merchant ships in the Gulf of Aqaba; 2) the U.N. must approve the stationing of an international naval force in the Gulf, as proposed by the Canadian Foreign Minister; 3) Egypt shall never return to Gaza; 4) Israel should be able to maintain economic relations with Gaza; and 5) U.N. forces should be stationed in the Gaza Strip. He added that "international Zionism wants to open the Gulf of Aqaba to Israel so it can control Arab markets." The comment then degenerated into a bitter attack of the usual sort on Zionism and colonialism, beginning with the statement: "the Israeli octopus which wants to surround the Arab world must be eliminated...The colonialists and the Zionists are in agreement on one idea, i.e., that the Middle East must remain under foreign influence," and ending with the warning: "Be careful. Zionism is wearing a new conspiracy in the Middle East after its recent defeat."

The second comment, by Ahmad Muhammad Jamal, brother of the Chief Editor of Hira, strongly condemned any plan to internationalize Gaza Strip and the

CBSelak, Jr./RSHoughton/eh

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Page \_\_\_\_\_ of  
Encl. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
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From \_\_\_\_\_

Gulf of Aqaba. The writer suggested that "the Big Members of the United Nations, who control and steer the U.N. in whatever direction they want, have a different view for each case involving the small nations," and in cases involving the Arab-Israeli problem, can "find no other means to satisfy Israel except to propose the internationalization of land usurped by Israel from the Arabs." The writer suggested that either Israel "has the right to retain what it has usurped from the Arabs," or "the Arabs are the rightful proprietors and the United Nations should give them their rights... There is no justice in the so-called internationalization, which is cheating and fooling."

END UNCLASSIFIED  
BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL

Comment: From samplings taken by the Embassy, the articulate members of the Saudi public appear to support the position taken in these two editorials of opposition to Israel's being granted freedom of passage through the Straits of Tiran and to the internationalization either of the Straits or of the Gaza Strip.

As was pointed out in Cairo's Telegrams 2744 and 2757 to the Department (repeated to Jidda as 218 and 219), King Saud and Shaikh Yusuf Yasin have indicated their strong opposition to the passage of Israeli ships through the Straits of Tiran. The Saudi Arabian Government is not likely to change its position on this matter, a position which is consistent with the firmness of its policy against the recognition of Israel and its support of the Arab boycott. Further, the Saudi Arabian Government is concerned from the security point of view. It appears to believe that freedom for Israeli shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba would expose Saudi Arabia's west coast vis-a-vis Israel.

END CONFIDENTIAL

For the Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

*Robert B. Houghton*

Robert B. Houghton  
Second Secretary of Embassy

Dep't. please pass London, Paris, Tel Aviv, Aden, Dhahran  
and Arab caps.

CONFIDENTIAL

S/S Received 3/16/57  
2:35 pm

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

## ROUTE SLIP

(To Remain With Correspondence)

TO Mr. Fisher Howe  
Director, Executive Secretariat  
Department of State

PROMPT HANDLING IS ESSENTIAL.  
WHEN DRAFT REPLY IS REQUESTED  
THE BASIC CORRESPONDENCE MUST  
BE RETURNED. IF ANY DELAY IN  
SUBMISSION OF DRAFT REPLY IS  
ENCOUNTERED, PLEASE TELEPHONE  
OFFICE OF THE STAFF SECRETARY.

Date March 16, 1957

### FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY

#### ACTION:

Comment \_\_\_\_\_  
Draft reply \_\_\_\_\_  
For direct reply \_\_\_\_\_  
For your information \_\_\_\_\_  
For necessary action \_\_\_\_\_  
For appropriate handling X \_\_\_\_\_  
See below \_\_\_\_\_

Remarks:

gpo 16-71284-1

By direction of the President:

*A. J. Goodpaster*  
A. J. GOODPASTER  
Staff Secretary

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APR 22 1957

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3/16/57  
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64-18-1557



# The SHOREHAM

Connecticut Avenue at Calvert Street  
Washington 8, D. C.

March 16, 1957

Mr. Robert D. Murphy  
1701 Kalmia Road  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Murphy:

Pride, prejudice and personalities haven't any place at a time like this. Irrespective of the non-cooperation, hostility and discourtesies of your offices in the apparent attempt to discredit and discourage our work we shall carry on. I think it would be more constructive if you would allow us the opportunity of scaling the apparently impregnable wall surrounding your Department. Many businessmen have met with the same discouragements handed me, thereby eliminating, quite probably, a lot of good ideas.

I spent three months in Cairo and came back with the solution for permanent peace in the Middle East. WE STAND READY TO PROVE THIS ASSERTION. You have closed the door and have failed to recognize that the Plans and Proposals submitted to you constitute such a solution. Deals solving the Suez Canal, Arab-Israeli Conflict and the plight of the refugees are not made by writing memos and reports. Important negotiations on serious problems are most successfully consummated across the table.

I AM READY, WILLING AND ABLE TO CONCLUDE AN ARRANGEMENT WITH PRESIDENT NASSER THAT WILL SECURE FOR US ALL OF OUR OBJECTIVES. It would be nice to get together with you so that I may prove this statement, and when President Eisenhower meets British

NEA

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with name as referred to

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674844/21657

APR 22 1957

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
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Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in Bermuda on March 20th he will have something definite to offer.

Respectfully,

MIDEAST SETTLEMENT COMMITTEE



E. M. Greenwood, Chairman  
The Shoreham Hotel  
Washington, D. C.

EMG:P

P. S., I have as my guest one of the most influential men in Egypt. This man can give you much information. I would appreciate you allowing him the opportunity of talking to you. I believe it would be very constructive. He can tell you the extent of Communist infiltration in Egypt. He visited Russia last year--it is encouraging to hear his comments and opinions.





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Department of State

BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL  
ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS

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FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2924, MARCH 17, 2 PM

PRIORITY

33

Control: 10756

Rec'd: MARCH 17, 1957

1:59 PM



SENT DEPARTMENT 2924, REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV 164, JERUSALEM 50, LONDON 543, PARIS 453, AMMAN 216, BEIRUT 321, DAMASCUS 217, JIDDA 241, BAGHDAD 194, USUN 129.

PRESS MARCH 18 FEATURES UP GAZA REPORT UNEF HAS TURNED OVER LOCAL PUBLIC SECURITY FUNCTIONS TO "PALESTINIAN POLICE UNDER SUPERVISION EGYPTIAN ADMINISTRATION". ACCORDING UP CORRESPONDENT TURNOVER ALSO INCLUDES CHECK POST BETWEEN RAFAH AND GAZA (EGYPTIAN FRONTIER FORCE TOOK OVER RAFAH CHECK POST ON OLD PALESTINIAN FRONTIER SEVERAL DAYS AGO). PRESS STATES UNEF CONTINUING GUARD UN INCLUDING UNRWA INSTALLATIONS HAS DISCONTINUED STREET PATROLS AND HAS WITHDRAWN YUOGOSLAV MOTORIZED COMPANY TO AL ARISH WHILE MOVING OTHER UNITS TO VICINITY ARMISTICE LINES. HQ BUILDING TEMPORARILY OCCUPIED BY UNRWA BEING HANDED OVER TO EGYPTIAN GOVERNOR.

UN INFORMATION OFFICER CAIRO SEEKING CONFIRMATION FROM GAZA RE POLICE; UNEF LIAISON OFFICER ELY ALSO WITHOUT HARD INFORMATION. BOTH BELIEVE, HOWEVER, NOTHING MORE INVOLVED THAN RESUMPTION NORMAL POLICE FUNCTIONS BY CIVIL AUTHORITIES.

BEGIN NOFORN

IN DISCUSSING MATTER LOCAL ADMINISTRATION FEW DAYS AGO, BUNCHE HAD MENTIONED AVAILABILITY PALESTINIAN POLICE AND NOTED UNEF HAD NO (RPT NO) LEGAL POWER DELAY WITH ORDINARY MALEFACTORS ALTHOUGH IT WAS TAKING AD HOC MEASURES INSURE ITS OWN SAFETY E.G. BY SEIZING ARMS IN HANDS POPULATION.

END NOFORN

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-2- 2924, MARCH 17, 2 PM FROM CAIRO

PRESS ALSO REPORTS AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN GOVERNOR AND UNRWA FOR TURN OVER SUPPLY, HEALTH AND EDUCATION FUNCTIONS LATTER HAD TEMPORARILY ASSUMED. ACCORDING AHRA CONTACT BETWEEN UNEF AND GOVERNOR BEING MAINTAINED THROUGH LIAISON OFFICER HEMI (THIS AVOIDS DELICATE PROBLEMS FIRST CALL WHICH BUNCHE BELIEVES SHOULD BE MADE BY GOVERNOR WHILE EGYPTIANS ASSERT CONTRARY SINCE GOVERNOR "REPRESENTS EGYPTIAN SOVEREIGNTY").

SHOOTING OF PALESTINIAN BY DANISH SOLDIER TREATED BY ONLY ONE ARABIC PAPER WHICH AT SAME TIME PRINTED UNEF COMMUNIQUE EXPRESSING REGRETS.

HARE

JS



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09952  
1957 MAR 19 PM 12 27

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**UNITED NATIONS  
UNITED STATES MISSION**

SENT TO: USUN NEW YORK 723 NIACT  
RPTD INFO: Amembassy CAIRO 3/18/57 1757

Origin

Info:

RE: UNEF IN GAZA

CAIRO'S TELEGRAM 2924 RPTD USUN 129 MARCH 17.

We are seriously concerned Egyptian return to Gaza assuming character complete rather than token administrative takeover. Cairo 2924 contains press reports indicating: (a) local public security functions have been turned over to QUOTE Palestinian police UNQUOTE under supervision Egyptian administration; (b) turnover of frontier check-post to Egyptians; (c) headquarters building being handed over Egyptian governor; (d) UNRWA agreed turn over to Egyptians supply, health and education functions former temporarily had assumed.

However,

SYG this morning in phone conversation with Secretary said that reports from Burns ~~indicated~~ indicated ~~that Egyptian administration in UNEF~~ very much in evidence in Gaza and Egyptian, very little in evidence.

We believe SYG should inform Bunche and Burns of our concern over press reports and if proved to be correct to instruct them to take all feasible measures limit present Egyptian takeover to symbolic basis only and refrain from entering into new arrangements.

D/R

63

Drafted by:

IO:UNP:JJSisco:rs 3/19/57  
S/S:FHowe:po 3/19/57

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

John Foster Dulles

Clearance:

NEA - Mr. Rountree

NE - Mr. Rockwell

L/UNA - Mr. Meeker

IO - Mr. Walmsley

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with Egyptian officials or finalizing those in process. We assume discussion of these and other problems will of necessity be undertaken by SYG in Cairo on basis arrangements contemplated by GA.

*Dulles*  
DULLES *JD*

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INCOMING TELEGRAM



Department of State

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Control: 10775

Rec'd: March 17, 1957  
6:46 p.m.

57-52

Action

NEA

FROM: Cairo

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 2928, March 17, 6 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 2928, REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV 165, NIACT  
USUN 131.

In discussing Gaza situation with Finance Minister Fawzi this afternoon, he maintained with reference to SYG statement of February 22 that only departure from Armistice Agreement to which GOE had acquiesced was stationing of UNEF on both sides of line. Had never been any question of Egypt's relinquishing right to administer, although question of how and when left open. Confusion had arisen as result extreme views extending from immediate administration on one hand, to complete exclusion of Egypt on other. (I observed GOE action had only missed first extreme by few hours at most). He said had always tried make position clear, especially to US delegate. Fawzi added he had suggested to Hammarskjold that cause of peace could best be served by de-emphasizing administration of Gaza and concentrating on deployment of UNEF in such way as to stop infiltration and incidents.

I observed Israeli Foreign Minister reportedly on way to Washington and asked Fawzi if he had any ideas I might convey indication current Egyptian thinking.

Fawzi mentioned following three points:

1. Only legitimate Israeli concern re Gaza is to be reassured against aggression. In this connection, position GOE is that it seriously desires stop infiltration completely and from both sides.

2. Re Israeli fear of military attack by Egypt, all Egypt can say is that such action would be contrary to UN charter and that UN members, including US should act to stop any such aggression.

3. Re Aqaba, GOE feels its position of not allowing Israeli

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-2- 2928, March 17, 6 p.m., from Cairo

shipping through Straits of Tiranis correct and believes that any doubts on matter should be settled by reference to ICJ. However, GOE has no reason take such action since it believes its position proper.

I also gave Fawzi point by point review my talks with Nasser for his information and also to ascertain if GOE understanding of talks checked with mine. Fawzi said it did and, referring to mention I had made of Nasser's expression of despair, re his relations with West, said this question far transcended specific points now at issue. Things had obviously gone too far and he hoped difficulty not too deeply rooted to be eradicated. Only way remove misunderstanding is by concrete acts. We agreed pursue this angle of conversation at another time.

HARE

MDG-8

NOTE: Mr. Finch (NEA/DO) notified 3/17/8:45 pm JAW.

APR 9 1957

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37  
INCOMING TELEGRAM

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Department of State

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Action

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Info

Control: 10748

Rec'd: MARCH 17, 1957  
12:15 P.M.

FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

1

NO: 1093, MARCH 17, 4 P.M.

NI ACT

PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING.

REFERENCE DEPTTEL 883.

BEN GURION INTERRUPTED CABINET MEETING TO RECEIVE ME AND PRESIDENT'S LETTER AT NOON TODAY. (MESSAGE DELAYED IN TRANSMISSION UNTIL 9A.M. LOCAL TIME TODAY). HIS PERSONAL GRATIFICATION OBVIOUS AND AFTER OUR QUARTER HOUR CONVERSATION HE RETURNED TO CABINET CLUTCHING LETTER UNDER ARM APPARENTLY PLEASED TO HAVE THIS EVIDENCE U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST AT TIME WHEN HIS COALITION MORE FRACTIOUS THAN ANY HE HEADED IN YEARS.

HE SAID HE MOST GRATEFUL AND HOPED PRESIDENT'S WISHES AND EXPECTATIONS WOULD BE FULFILLED. "WE TERRIBLY CONCERNED WITH WHAT IS HAPPENING TO US IN GAZA MUCH SOONER THAN ANYONE EXPECTED. AND THESE EVENTS DID NOT TRANSPIRE WITHOUT PARTICIPATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT (EUPHEMISM FOR SYG). YOU DID NOT PARTICIPATE BUT YOUR INFLUENCE IS GREAT AND CAN BE DECISIVE".

HE STATED FIRMLY "WE WILL TAKE NO PRECIPITATE ACTION. WE GOING TO DO NOTHING TO CONTRIBUTE TO DETERIORATION OF SITUATION. BUT UNITED NATIONS ADMINISTRATION MUST BE ESTABLISHED IN GAZA PENDING PEACE AND MUST DO ITS FULL SHARE TO MAKE ITS ADMINISTRATION EFFECTIVE. I STILL THINK UNITED STATES HAS ENOUGH INFLUENCE TO BRING THAT ABOUT BEFORE IT TOO LATE. AS I TOLD PRESIDENT IN MY LETTER WE HOPE THERE WILL BE NO NEED TO USE FREEDOM OF ACTION WHICH WE HAVE RESERVED".

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Tel Aviv 1093

674.842/3-1757

SECRET

2-1093, MARCH 17, 4 PM FROM TEL AVIV

I TOLD BEN GURION I THOUGHT MEIR'S VISIT WILL BE USEFUL IN OBTAINING CLARIFICATION OUR POSITION IN LIGHT OF WHAT HAS HAPPENED. "IT VERY LAUDABLE DECISION ON PART OF ISRAEL". I SAID "TO MAKE THOROUGH EXPLORATION EVERY POSSIBILITY OF PROGRESS THROUGH DIPLOMATIC ACTION BEFORE COMING TO ITS DECISION".

HE REPEATED THAT IF "UNITED STATES DOES WHAT I KNOW IT CAN DO PROBLEM WILL BE SOLVED".

HE REITERATED CONCERN HE CONSTANTLY EXPRESSES FOR SAFETY AND LIVELIHOOD OF GAZA BORDER SETTLEMENTS STATING HE PLANNED VISIT THEM PERSONALLY IN NEXT FEW DAYS.

WE AGREED WE WOULD MAKE NO MENTION OF PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION. MERELY STATING I HAD CALLED ON MY INITIATIVE TO DISCUSS CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS. THIS CONSISTENT WITH GOI'S DESIRE NOT TO REVEAL BEN GURION HAD SENT MARCH 13 LETTER TO PRESIDENT.

COMMENT: I THINK PRESIDENT'S LETTER EFFECTIVE BOTH IN TIMING AND CONTENT AND WILL ASSIST BEN GURION IN KEEPING HIS COLLEAGUES IN CHECK UNTIL MEIR HAS THOROUGHLY EXPLORED SITUATION WITH DEPARTMENT. HOWEVER BOTH IN ACUTELY EMBARRASSING POSITION WITH THEIR COLLEAGUES AND ISRAEL PUBLIC WHICH INCREASINGLY CONVINCED PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER WERE DUPED. THIS SORT OF REACTION NOT ONE WHICH BEN GURION (MEIR EITHER FOR THAT MATTER) TEMPERAMENTALLY EQUIPPED TO ENDURE QUIETLY.

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Pres file  
7 - Mr Cunningham for  
Sec's briefing book

U/OF  
(P.H.W.)

REF ONLY

# NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL BUILDING



NORTHWESTERN BUILDING COMPANY  
E. M. GREENWOOD, PRESIDENT

ELIOT 7200  
SENECA 2566



## The SHOREHAM

Connecticut Avenue at Calvert Street  
Washington 8, D. C.

March 17, 1957

The Honorable John Foster Dulles  
Secretary of State  
2740 - 32nd Street  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

Commander E. H. Hutchison, former Chairman of the Egyptian-Israeli Truce Commission, has just arrived in Washington from Cairo. He informed me today the situation over there is very serious and unless something is done immediately we are in for more trouble. I feel that his warning cannot be ignored.

I have with me at the Shoreham Hotel one of the most influential men in Egypt. He too can give you a message that will be very helpful.

I returned from Cairo two weeks ago and have been trying very hard, but with no avail, to make your Department understand that we definitely have a solution to the whole situation.

I appeal to you to meet with Commander Hutchison, Mr. Gabriel Talhami and myself as soon as possible (tonight if you wish). I state unequivocally that we do have the solution, if you will hear us out, to: the Suez Canal, Arab-Israeli Conflict, the Gulf of Aqaba, and passage of Israeli ships through the Suez.

It is impossible for me to make it clearer than I have tried, to in this letter. By granting us an interview and a little of your time, you have everything to gain and not one thing to lose.

Respectfully,

MIDEAST SETTLEMENT COMMITTEE

*E. H. Greenwood*  
E. H. Greenwood, Chairman  
The Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D. C.

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HOTEL STATLER  
Washington, D. C.  
March 7, 1957

President Dwight D. Eisenhower  
White House  
Washington, D. C.

Honorable President:

I have just returned from three months in Cairo and have a personal message from President Nasser to you. It is a message you will be pleased to receive. It incorporates the complete answer to the four problems we all wish to solve-- Suez Canal, Arab-Israeli Conflict, Refugees, and Winning the Mideast for America.

I am enclosing a brief outline of our proposed modus operandi. As you may well understand there is much more that can be explained verbally. May I have this opportunity.

Respectfully,

E. M. Greenwood, Chairman  
Mideast Settlement Committee

References:

Frederick Baker, (George Kinnear), Public Relations, Seattle  
L. D. Brill, President, Northwestern Mutual Insurance Co., Seattle  
Maxwell Carlson, President, National Bank of Commerce, Seattle  
Frank Jerome, President, Seattle First National Bank, Seattle  
Dietrich Schmits, President, Washington Mutual Bank, Seattle  
Henry Broderick, President, Henry Broderick, Inc., Seattle  
Joseph Gottstein, Capitalist, Seattle  
Charles Frankland, President, Pacific National Bank, Seattle  
Frank Belgrano, President, Trans America Corp., San Francisco  
Louis Lurie, Capitalist, San Francisco  
Welton Beckett, Architect, Los Angeles  
Robert MacFarlane, President, Northern Pacific Railroad, St. Paul



MIDEAST SETTLEMENT COMMITTEE

PLAN AND PROPOSALS

(GENERAL)

1. ESTABLISH WORLD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (QUASI-GOVERNMENT).

DIRECTORS SHALL COMPRISE LEADERS OF AMERICAN FINANCE AND INDUSTRY. THEY SHALL SERVE WITHOUT COMPENSATION. THESE REPRESENTATIVES OF AMERICAN LEADERSHIP SHALL SHOW OTHER COUNTRIES HOW TO PROSPER IN THE PROVEN AND SUCCESSFUL AMERICAN MANNER, WITH THE HIGHEST DEGREE OF EFFICIENCY THE WORLD HAS EVER KNOWN-- "THE AMERICAN WAY". THE DIRECTORS AND THIS CORPORATION SHALL BE THE "SALES FORCE" SELLING THE "AMERICAN WAY" TO THE WORLD.

PURPOSES OF THIS CORPORATION SHALL BE TO ASSIST AND FINANCE PROJECTS FOR OTHER COUNTRIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD; TO GIVE TECHNICAL ADVICE AND "KNOWHOW" TO ALL COUNTRIES NEEDING SUCH HELP.

LOANS WILL BE MADE BY THIS CORPORATION TO NATIONS DESIRING LOANS ON A STRAIGHT BUSINESS BASIS (NO POLITICAL TIES OR RESTRICTIONS), IN AMOUNTS THAT CAN BE COMFORTABLY AMORTIZED OVER PERIODS OF TIME AGREED UPON. ALL LOANS SHALL BE ADEQUATELY GUARANTEED AND SECURED BY THE BORROWING NATION THROUGH THE ASSIGNMENT OF NATIONAL ASSETS AND REVENUES.

EVERY NATION HAS ASSETS IN THE FORM OF CONCESSIONS AND NATIONAL RESOURCES TO PLEDGE AS SECURITY, AND WILL GLADLY DO SO IN RETURN FOR NEEDED FINANCING OF PROJECTS THAT WILL HELP THEIR INTERNAL ECONOMY AND MAKE THEM SELF-SUPPORTING.

2. THERE SHALL BE MARKETING A "WORLD PEACE BOND" ISSUE LARGE ENOUGH TO COVER NECESSARY LOANS AND FINANCING CONTEMPLATED BY THE CORPORATION.

NO INTEREST WILL BE PAID ON THESE BONDS FOR THE FIRST 5 YEARS; THEREAFTER THEY WILL CARRY A 3% PER ANNUM RATE.

WITH EACH \$1,000\*\* BOND WILL BE GIVEN ONE SHARE OF COMMON PARTICIPATING STOCK. THIS STOCK WILL SHARE IN THE PROFITS OF THE CORPORATION. PROFITS WILL BE DERIVED FROM MINING, OIL, LAND GRANTS, DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND ALL CONCESSIONS GIVEN TO THE CORPORATION BY BORROWING NATION.

THESE BONDS WILL BE ELIGIBLE FOR INVESTMENT BY BANKS, INSURANCE COMPANIES, TRUSTS, STATES, COUNTRIES AND MUNICIPALITIES, AND WILL BE GUARANTEED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

THE BONDS AND THE COMMON STOCK SHALL BE TAX EXEMPT FROM EVERY TAX (U.S., COUNTY, STATE, INHERITANCE, ETC.) FOR 30 YEARS. ENHANCEMENT IN VALUE OF COMMON STOCK SHALL BE FREE FROM CAPITAL GAINS, INCOME TAX, ETC.

3. TO HELP ALL UNDEVELOPED NATIONS AND TERRITORIES WISHING DEVELOPMENT AND ADDITIONAL IMMIGRANTS (SOUTH AMERICA) THE U. N. AND THE U. S. WILL LET THE BARS DOWN IN ALL COUNTRIES. THIS WILL ALLOW ALL PEOPLE WISHING TO LEAVE THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES (IRON CURTAIN, ISRAEL,

EGYPT) THE OPPORTUNITY OF DOING SO AND EMIGRATING TO ANY OTHER COUNTRY WISHING AND DESIRING TO TAKE THEM.

4. NEGOTIATE WITH SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES TO RECEIVE IMMIGRANTS. THE CORPORATION, IN RETURN FOR CONCESSIONS AND LAND GRANTS, WILL AGREE TO DEVELOP VAST AREAS WITH NEW HOMES, INDUSTRIES, POWER, IRRIGATION, ROADS, SCHOOLS, HOSPITALS, ETC., ALL TO ACCOMMODATE NEW IMMIGRANTS.

THE CORPORATION WILL AGREE TO SPEND ALL NECESSARY FUNDS FOR SUCH DEVELOPMENT AND IMPROVEMENTS, AND WILL BE GIVEN TAX CONCESSIONS FOR FIRST 30 YEARS FROM RECIPIENT COUNTRY.

5. FROM FIRST BOND ISSUE UNDERWRITE EXPENSE OF RELOCATING 5,000,000 PEOPLE FROM EUROPE, IRON CURTAIN COUNTRIES, MIDEAST (ARAB REFUGEES, ISRAELIS, ETC.).

APPROXIMATE BREAKDOWN:

TRANSPORTATION & MISCELLANEOUS FOR RELOCATING 5,000,000 PEOPLE AT \$500 EACH. 20-YEAR LOANS, BEARING 5% INTEREST. \$2,500,000,000

1,000,000 NEW HOMES AT \$5,000 EACH. 30-YEAR MORTGAGES, 5% INTEREST. \$5,000,000,000

ROADS, SCHOOLS, HOSPITALS, POWER, IRRIGATION AND OTHER NECESSARY IMPROVEMENTS. MORTGAGES AND REVENUES TO BE OWNED BY CORPORATION. \$5,000,000,000

AVAILABLE FOR LOANS TO OTHER COUNTRIES, ALL ADEQUATELY GUARANTEED AND SECURED. \$12,500,000,000

\$25,000,000,000

6. CEASE ALL U.S. "HANDOUT" AID AS ALL FUTURE FINANCING WILL BE CARRIED OUT ON LEGITIMATE BUSINESS LOAN BASIS BY THE CORPORATION. THIS WILL SAVE AMERICAN TAXPAYERS MILLIONS OF DOLLARS PRESENTLY BEING SPENT.

FORESEEABLE ADVANTAGES OF ENTIRE GENERAL PLAN:

SPENDING OF FUNDS FROM FIRST BOND ISSUE (25 BILLION DOLLARS) WILL PROVE A BOON TO AMERICAN BUSINESS AND OTHER NATIONS' ECONOMY. MUCH OF THIS MONEY WILL BE USED TO PURCHASE AMERICAN PRODUCTS, MATERIALS AND MACHINERY, THEREBY PROVIDING MORE PAY-ROLLS, MORE BUSINESS, MORE PROFITS, MORE TAXES.

BY THE DEVELOPMENT OF PREVIOUSLY DORMANT AREAS NEWER AND GREATER MARKETS FOR OUR OWN PRODUCTS WILL COME INTO BEING, THUS INCREASING OUR OWN INCOME AND PROSPERITY. THE ECONOMY OF OTHER NATIONS SHALL LIKEWISE BE ENHANCED BY CONTEMPLATED INVESTMENTS IN THEIR UNDEVELOPED AREAS.

CREATE A MASSIVE TAX ACCOUNT AFTER 30 YEARS FOR OUR OWN TREASURY, THUS ASSURING CONTINUED PROSPERITY.

WITH THE THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE INVESTING IN THESE PEACE BONDS IT WILL DO MUCH TO ELIMINATE THE THREAT OF INFLATION IN ALL COUNTRIES.

MANY FORMS OF FOREIGN AID CAN BE ELIMINATED, THUS SAVING THE U.S. SEVERAL BILLIONS OF DOLLARS EACH YEAR ALLOWING BUDGET CUT.

BOND CONVERSION WILL REDUCE U.S. NATIONAL DEBT.

MORE EFFECTIVELY SECURE THE COOPERATION AND RESPECT OF OTHER NATIONS, THUS PRESERVING PEACE AND MAKING "BETTER FRIENDS AND INFLUENCING PEOPLE" CONSTRUCTIVELY.

HELP ELIMINATE THREAT OF WAR AND SAVE U.S. AND OTHER NATIONS FURTHER BILLIONS IN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, PARTICULARLY IN THE MIDEAST. MONEY NOW SPENT FOR DEFENSE AND WAR PURPOSES BY ALL NATIONS CAN BE USED FOR THEIR INTERNAL ECONOMY.

ELIMINATE MILLIONS PRESENTLY BEING SPENT BY U.N. AND U.S. ON REFUGEES.

MAKE 5 MILLION PEOPLE HAPPIER BY GIVING THEM A NEW LIFE OF SECURITY AND CONTENTMENT, NEW HOPES AND AMBITIONS.

THE PLAN WILL DO MUCH TO COMBAT COMMUNISM AND MAKE U.S. LEADERSHIP DOMINANT THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

MIDEAST SETTLEMENT COMMITTEE

E. M. GREENWOOD, CHAIRMAN

\*\*CONVERTIBLE INTO AN ADDITIONAL SHARE OF COMMON STOCK ANY TIME WITHIN FIVE YEARS. PROFITS FROM CORPORATION COULD BE ENOUGH TO MAKE THIS FEATURE ATTRACTIVE.

MIDEAST SETTLEMENT COMMITTEE

PROPOSAL FOR  
WORLD PEACE BONDS

(TO BE MARKETING AND PROCEEDS USED TO FINANCE WORLD PROJECTS)

WE HAVE HAD LIBERTY BONDS, WAR BONDS, DEFENSE BONDS AND NOW IT IS APROPOS FOR AMERICA AND THE WORLD TO HAVE "WORLD PEACE BONDS", THE PROCEEDS OF WHICH SHALL FINANCE SPECIFIC PROJECTS OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES, OPEN UP UNDEVELOPED AREAS, AND RELOCATE PEOPLE SEEKING NEW HORIZONS AND OPPORTUNITIES.

FIRST ISSUE \$25,000,000,000 (TWENTY-FIVE BILLION DOLLARS). NO INTEREST FOR FIRST 5 YEARS; THEREAFTER 3% PER ANNUM.

WITH EACH \$1,000\*\* BOND THERE WILL BE GIVEN ONE SHARE OF COMMON STOCK THAT WILL PARTICIPATE IN PROFITS OF "WORLD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION", WHICH PROFITS WILL BE DERIVED FROM OIL, MINERAL AND LAND GRANT CONCESSIONS GIVEN TO THE CORPORATION BY THE BORROWING NATION.

THESE BONDS SHALL BE GUARANTEED BY ~~the~~ U.S. GOVERNMENT AND SOLD TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC AND TO PEOPLES OF ALL NATIONS WISHING TO INVEST IN WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY. (THERE IS MUCH WEALTH AND PRIVATE MONEY AVAILABLE OUTSIDE THE U.S. THAT CAN BE CHANNLED INTO THESE "PEACE BONDS".) THEY SHALL BE AN ELIGIBLE INVESTMENT FOR ALL BANKS, INSTITUTIONS, TRUSTS, ETC.

BONDS AND THE COMMON STOCK SHALL BE TAX EXEMPT FOR FIRST 30 YEARS FROM ALL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND INHERITANCE TAXES AND ALL COUNTY AND STATE TAXES.

ALTHOUGH THE BONDS WILL BE MARKETING WITHIN A YEAR, IT WILL TAKE MUCH TIME BEFORE FUNDS ARE DISBURSED. U.S. GOVERNMENT SHALL HAVE USE OF ALL INTERIM MONEY.

PROCEEDS FROM BONDS WILL HELP UNDEVELOPED COUNTRIES, PUTTING THEM ON SELF-SUPPORTING BASIS, AND IMPROVE INTERNAL ECONOMY OF EACH BORROWING NATION, PROVIDING MORE INDUSTRIES, OPPORTUNITIES, PAYROLLS AND A HIGHER STANDARD OF LIVING. THIS MONEY WILL AFFORD MILLIONS OF "HAVE NOTS" WITH NEW HOPES AND OPPORTUNITIES BY RELOCATING THEM IN NEW AREAS.

THE SALE OF THESE BONDS WILL BECOME THE BEST GUARANTEE AGAINST INFLATION, NOT ONLY IN AMERICA BUT IN ALL COUNTRIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

THESE BONDS WILL ELIMINATE THE NECESSITY OF PRESENT U.S. GOVERNMENT FOREIGN AID AND SPENDING.

WITH MILLIONS OF PEOPLE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD INVESTING IN THESE BONDS AND HAVING A PERSONAL FINANCIAL STAKE IN WORLD PEACE MUCH OF THE THREAT OF WAR WILL BE ELIMINATED. WITH PERMANENT PEACE MORE ASSURED, ALL DEFENSE BUDGETS CAN BE GREATLY REDUCED.

THESE BONDS WILL BE A PATRIOTIC INVESTMENT AS WELL AS PROFITABLE. PROCEEDS CAN ALSO BE USED TO ELIMINATE STRIFE AND MINORITY GROUP PROBLEMS HERE IN U.S.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

MIDEAST SETTLEMENT COMMITTEE

E.M. GREENWOOD, CHAIRMAN

\*\*CONVERTIBLE INTO AN ADDITIONAL SHARE OF COMMON STOCK ANY TIME WITHIN FIVE YEARS. PROFITS FROM CORPORATION COULD BE ENOUGH TO MAKE THIS FEATURE ATTRACTIVE.



MIDEAST SETTLEMENT COMMITTEE

PLAN AND PROPOSALS

(EGYPT)

1. PRIVATE AMERICAN CAPITAL (WORLD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION) SHALL MAKE A COMMERCIAL LOAN TO EGYPT. THIS LOAN SHALL BE LARGE ENOUGH TO COVER ALL OF EGYPT'S AIMS AND DESIRES, AND IN AN AMOUNT THAT CAN BE SAFELY AND COMFORTABLY AMORTIZED IN 30 YEARS. IT SHALL BE MADE WITHOUT POLITICAL TIES OR RESTRICTIONS AND BE ADEQUATELY GUARANTEED AND SECURED BY REVENUES FROM \*\* THE SUEZ CANAL, COTTON, OIL AND NATIONAL PRODUCTS.

THE LOAN WILL CALL FOR ADVANCES TO BE MADE OVER AN EXTENDED PERIOD AND MUCH OF IT WILL BE GIVEN TO EGYPT IN THE FORM OF MACHINERY, EQUIPMENT, PRODUCTS AND OTHER NECESSITIES.

2. USE PORTION OF LOAN TO EGYPT TO STABILIZE THEIR CURRENCY. THIS WILL ELIMINATE ALL FUTURE DISCOUNTING OF EGYPTIAN MONEY IN WORLD MARKETS AND ESTABLISH STRONG CREDIT FOR EGYPT.
3. LET DOWN THE BARS SO THAT ALL ARAB REFUGEES AND ISRAELIS MAY BE ALLOWED TO EMIGRATE FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES. \*\*ELIMINATE PRESENT RESTRICTION OF \$1,000 PAYMENT AND \$10 POCKET MONEY.
4. NEGOTIATE SOUTH AMERICAN ARRANGEMENTS. THIS INCLUDES AGREEMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT OF SELECTED AREAS WITH SCHOOLS, HOSPITALS, ROADS, POWER, IRRIGATION, ETC., ON A SCALE THAT WILL GREATLY IMPROVE INTERNAL ECONOMY OF ALL COUNTRIES RECEIVING IMMIGRANTS.
5. PRIVATE AMERICAN CAPITAL (WORLD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION) WILL RECEIVE CONCESSIONS FROM SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES, BORROW FUNDS (PEACE BOND ISSUE) FOR COMPLETE OPERATION OF POINTS 3 AND 4. THESE FUNDS SHALL COVER TRANSPORTATION, CONSTRUCTION, GUARANTEES TO IMMIGRANTS, ETC.
6. WITH THE RELOCATION OF A LARGE PERCENTAGE OF THE ARAB REFUGEES AND ISRAELIS THERE WILL BE NO FURTHER NEED FOR THE MILLIONS OF DOLLARS PRESENTLY BEING SPENT FOR REFUGEE AID BY THE UNITED NATIONS.
7. THE TREMENDOUS SAVING FOR THE U. S. GOVERNMENT THROUGH THE PROPER IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PLAN AND CONSEQUENT PARING OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES IN THE MIDEAST AREA, WILL EXCEED IMMEASURABLY THE LOAN ADVANCED TO EGYPT.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

MIDEAST SETTLEMENT COMMITTEE

E. M. GREENWOOD, CHAIRMAN

\*\*TO BE EXPLAINED VERBALLY.

March 21, 1957

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Dear Mr. Greenwood:

I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of March 17 addressed to Secretary Dulles as well as that of March 16, and enclosures, addressed to me. It is understood that you have had a number of conversations with and opportunity to express at length your views to officers of the Department, including myself, as well as to officers of the American Embassy in Cairo.

Officers of the Department concerned with Egypt and the Middle East stand ready to discuss any additional views you care to submit. They have met at some length with Commander E. H. Hutchison. They are also prepared to talk with foreign visitors whose views may be of assistance.

Your views have received careful consideration, and I am enclosing a memorandum prepared in the Department commenting on the plans and proposals which you have submitted. I hope these comments will be helpful to you.

I appreciate your interest in these questions and your desire to be of assistance to your government. You have gone to great effort and expense in your attempts to suggest solutions. I wish to assure you that the Department of State shares your hopes that solution of these important problems will be rapidly forthcoming.

Yours sincerely,

Robert Murphy

S/S-CR  
MAR 21 1957 A.M.

Enclosure:  
As stated.

Mr. E. M. Greenwood,  
The Shoreham Hotel,  
Washington, D. C.

G:RMurphy:RBFin:vnd 3/21/57

cc: NEA  
✓ S  
✓ S/S  
✓ AmEmbassy Cairo  
✓ Mr. Walter Williams  
(Commerce)

Clearance: NEA - Mr. Rockwell

March 21 1957

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The plan and proposals put forward by the Middle East Settlement Committee have been read with interest and carefully considered in the Department. It is obvious that considerable time and effort has been devoted to developing this plan.

While the objectives set by the Middle East Settlement Committee are desirable, it is feared that they could not be achieved through the course of action proposed by the Committee.

In the first place, the idea of the assignment of national assets and resources by other nations as security for development loans by a corporation directed by leaders of American finance and industry would likely not be favorably received in many countries, particularly those in which the current of nationalism is at present running strong. The fear of indirect control of national resources by citizens and capital of an outside nation, particularly a major power, is deep-rooted in that part of the world which was formerly under colonial rule. It is not believed that it would be possible to obtain the security necessary for launching the type of large-scale loans which the Middle East Settlement Committee has in mind, for the reason set forth above and also because a number of countries which are most in need of development do not possess large national resources.

The issuance of "World Peace Bonds" to cover the necessary loans and financing contemplated by the suggested corporation would, we fear, arouse suspicions that the purpose of the "World Development Corporation" was primarily one of exploiting for profit foreign assets and concessions. The assumptions regarding tax exemptions for these bonds, investibility in banks and guarantee by the United States Government, are considerations less easily achieved than conceived.

Just as the United States would not now be prepared to receive massive amounts of immigrants without restrictions, so it is believed that other countries would not look with favor upon a proposal involving their "letting down the bars," in the words of the plan under discussion, to receive "all people wishing to leave their respective countries." In particular, we do not have reason to think that the South American countries, in return for development projects by the "World Development Corporation," would agree to such large-scale injections of immigrants. The political and economic problems in the relocation of large alien populations in other countries are considerable. So are the obstacles in the way of emigration from many countries, particularly those behind the Iron Curtain.

Finally,

Finally, there are competent institutions already in existence, in which the United States Government participates and which are able to be of considerable assistance to countries desiring loans for economic development. The International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Export-Import Bank and the International Cooperation Administration, are actively working at promoting international economic stability and growth. While the work of these institutions is carried on on a smaller scale than that envisaged by the corporation proposed by the Middle East Settlement Committee, it does not involve the difficulties and obstacles foreseen in connection with the concept of the "World Development Corporation."

NEA:NE:LDingore/SWrockwell:feg

3/19/57



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY

I acknowledge the receipt of ~~the~~  
your letter of March 17 addressed to  
Secretary Dulles as well as that of  
March 16, and enclosures, addressed  
to me. It is understood that you have  
had a number of conversations <sup>and</sup>  
opportunities to express <sup>at length</sup> your views to  
officers of the Dept., including myself,  
as well as to officers of the Am Emb  
in Cairo.

March 20, 1957

Dear Mr. Greenwood:

I am compelled to take issue with your letter of March 16, 1957, to me and your letter of March 17 to Secretary Dulles.

The allegations made in your letter to me of "non-cooperation, hostility and discourtesies" are totally without foundation. As you well know, I have talked to you on several occasions regarding your views, and a number of other officers in the Department and at our Embassy in Cairo have also talked with you and commented on your proposals. Several times we requested you to talk to interested officers in the Department, but you indicated unwillingness to do so. The fact that you prefer to call at the Department without appointment has been a further complicating factor.

Officers of the Department concerned with Egypt and the Middle East stand ready to discuss any additional views you care to submit. They have met at some length with Commander E. H. Hutchison. They are also prepared to talk with foreign visitors whose views may be of assistance.

Your views have received careful consideration, and I am enclosing a memorandum prepared in the Department commenting on the plans and proposals which you have submitted. I hope these comments will be helpful to you.

I appreciate your interest in these questions and your desire to be of assistance to your government. You have gone to great effort and expense in your attempts to suggest solutions. I wish to assure you that the Department of State shares your hopes that solution of these important problems will be rapidly forthcoming.

Yours sincerely,

Robert Murphy

Enclosure:

As stated.

Mr. E. M. Greenwood,  
The Shoreham Hotel,  
Washington, D. C.

G:RBF:nd 3/20/57

Clearance: NEA - Mr. Rockwell <sup>RS</sup>

cc: NEA

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S/S

AmEmbassy Cairo

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Action  
NEAControl: 11455  
Rec'd: MARCH 18, 1957  
8:53 PM

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FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2945, MARCH 18, 8 PM

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SENT DEPARTMENT 2945, REPEATED INFORMATION ROME 260, USUN 132.

PURSUANT INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE FOREIGN OFFICE, WHICH HE BELIEVES AROSE FROM DISCUSSIONS WASHINGTON, AND FOLLOWING EXCHANGE VIEWS AND INFORMATION WITH ME, ITALIAN AMBASSADOR YESTERDAY CALLED UPON HUSSEIN AZIZ, PERMANENT UNDERSECRETARY FOREIGN OFFICE, TO URGE MODERATION AND SUPPORT FOR UN EFFORTS. AT AMA REQUEST ITALIAN COUNSELOR HAS INFORMED US THAT MAIN POINTS OF CONVERSATION INCLUDE FOLLOWING:

1. AZIZ INDICATED QUESTION OF RIGHTS TRANSIT STRAITS OF TIRAN COULD BE RESOLVED BY INTERNATIONAL COURT JUSTICE AND THAT A POSSIBLE COMPROMISE SOLUTION WOULD BE TO RECOGNIZE THAT EGYPT WOULD HAVE RIGHT OF SEARCHING TRANSITTING VESSELS TO DETERMINE WHETHER VOYAGE COMPATIBLE WITH PRINCIPLES OF "INNOCENT PASSAGE".
2. EGYPT CONTINUED TO ACCEPT SIX POINTS CONTAINED IN UN RESOLUTION AS BASIS RESOLUTION CANAL QUESTION. HOWEVER EGYPT DID NOT APPROVE OF THE INTERIM PROPOSALS ADVANCED BY THE FOUR POWERS. IN THE EVENT A DEFINITIVE SOLUTION IS NOT REACHED BEFORE CANAL READY RESUME SUBSTANTIAL VOLUME TRANSITS EGYPT WOULD FAVOR AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT IN WHICH ALL PAYMENTS WOULD BE MADE TO EGYPT; EGYPT WOULD UNDERTAKE REIMBURSE SHAREHOLDERS AND THE SETTING ASIDE OF FUNDS TO COVER MAINTAINENCE COSTS.
3. THE GOE, AS A CONTRIBUTION TO THE EFFORTS TO STABILIZE THE SITUATION IN THE AREA, DOES NOT INTEND AT THIS TIME TO EXERCISE ITS RIGHT TO SEND TROOPS INTO GAZA; HOWEVER EGYPT EXPECTS UNEF TO BE STATIONED ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ARMISTICE LINE. (COUNSELOR SAID IT NOT CLEAR WHETHER DECISION NOT SEND TROOPS GAZA DEPENDENT UPON ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE UN TROOPS ITS SIDE ARMISTICE LINE).

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-2- 2945, MARCH 18, 8 PM, FROM CAIRO

4. EGYPT WILL ENDEAVOR TO KEEP THE SITUATION IN GAZA QUIET AND WILL COOPERATE WITH HAMMARSKJOLD NOT ONLY TO BRING ABOUT SOLUTION OF IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS BUT TO RESOLVE ALL OTHER ALLIED ISSUES.

5. THE CIVIL GOVERNOR HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE UNEF IN GAZA.

6. THE GOE WILL MAKE A VERY SERIOUS EFFORT TO AVOID THE RESUMPTION OF FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES, HOWEVER A CHANGE OF THIS POLICY COULD BE FORCED UPON EGYPT IF ISRAELI ACTIVITIES WERE PROVOCATIVE TO POINT THEY COULD NOT BE IGNORED.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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3/19/57, 2:20 p.m.Control: 11611  
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4:08 a.m.Info  
RMR

FROM: Tel Aviv - CORRECTED COPY

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1095, March 18, 10 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1095, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 210, USUN 99.

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Local press today was either anti-UN, anti-American or anti-government and occasionally combination of all three in very confused reaction to Egyptian Governor General's arrival Gaza, Foreign Minister Meir's unscheduled return to US and related developments.

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Depending upon whom they were attacking, papers made one or more following points:

OCB  
USIA

1. Meir's Washington trip is last effort reach solution through diplomatic channels;

CIA  
OSDARMY  
NAVY

AIR

2. Hammarskjold is tool of Egypt and anti-Israel;

3. US has been guilty of deception;

4. Israel has lost struggle for Gaza and should now concentrate on (A) making last-ditch fight to retain freedom of transit Aqaba and (B) expend its efforts for effective defense of border settlements rather than futile efforts to persuade US to undo Egyptian encroachment.

Hammarskjold was principal target. In one of milder attacks against him JERUSALEM POST said he "has added new element to dangerous formalism by which he has reduced moral standing of body he represents. By agreeing to share administration Gaza strip with present Egyptian setup there, he has in effect linked up UNEF with Fedayeen murder gangs."

According to HERUT, Meir's trip to US was "coolly received" in Washington and she was given another well-known address to take matter up with- address of "Jewish hater Hammarskjold."

Charges of US breach of faith were aired by papers of adverse political affiliation.

DAVAR

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AN 21 1958

Correction by RM/R  
3/21/57

-2- 1095 March 18, 10 p.m., from Tel Aviv - CORRECTED COPY

DAAR asked "do Washington diplomats not realize they are blowing up most grievous crisis? Are they well aware they are setting up joint AM-Edaayeen in Gaza?" Similarly POST said "it will remain to be seen whether his return to Egypt is purely unilateral or whether it was done with tacit encouragement if not with open approval of State Department as part of deal made between President Eisenhower and King Said and in pursuit of Egypt's adherence to Eisenhower doctrine."

Likewise, AL HAMISHMAR (MAFAM) said, "it is unlikely Hammarskjold is acting without knowledge and inspiration of US."

According to HATZOFF: "deception in international relations and especially by power that stands at head of free world cannot but undermine security of region relations. It fosters aggression and will compel deceived country ensure border integrity while there is still time."

HAMCDIA says "Meir's visit proves crisis between Israel and UN is again reaching climax because there has been breach of confidence unprecedented in international life. It state of affairs involves compelling Israel take new defense action, full shift of responsibility will fall on UN and US."

Three papers advised Ben Gurion to take lesson from his failure with Gaza to redouble his efforts to secure Straits of Iran. These were strange companions--HAARETZ, HABOKER and HERUL.

According to HAARETZ "Washington will not be frightened by threat that strip will be occupied again. If that threat is carried out Israel may be sure General Assembly will meet and Afro-Asian and Soviet blocs will again propose sanctions. Moderate tone used by US diplomacy should not encourage growth of illusions. It is true that public opinion friendly to Israel succeeded in influencing American policy against adoption of sanctions but far more than it opposes sanctions against Israel--US public opinion is against renewal of hostilities anywhere."

Israel's diplomatic effort had now better be directed at ensuring freedom of transit in Gulf of Aqaba. Last four months should have taught Israel it has not got enough power to fight for two objectives at same time. If Ben Gurion weighed two and considered free navigation in gulf more important than another aim, he should show perseverance in course he himself has mapped out.

Comment follows in next cable

LAWSON

HLC:DEM/7

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Department of State

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32  
Action  
NEA

Control: 11611  
Rec'd: March 19, 1957  
4:02 a.m.

Info  
RMR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 1095, March 18, 10 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1095 REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 210, USUN 79.

Local press today was either anti-UN, anti-American or anti-government and occasionally combination of all three in very confused reaction to Egyptian Governor General's arrival Gaza, Foreign Minister Meir's unscheduled return to US and related developments.

Depending upon whom they were attacking, papers made one or more following points:

1. Meir's Washington trip is last effort reach solution through diplomatic channels;
2. Hammarskjold is tool of Egypt and anti-Israel;
3. US has been guilty of deception;
4. Israel has lost struggle for Gaza and should now concentrate on (A) making last-ditch fight to retain freedom of transit Aqaba and (B) expend its efforts for effective defense of border settlements rather than futile efforts to persuade US to undo Egyptian encroachment.

Hammarskjold was principal target. In one of milder attacks against him JERUSALEM POST said he "has added new element to dangerous formalism by which he has reduced moral standing of body he represents. By agreeing to share administration Gaza strip with present Egyptian setup here, he has in effect linked up UNEF with Fedayeen murder gangs".

According to HERUT, Meir's trip to US was "coolly received in Washington and she was given another well-known address to take matter up with -n- sx\* of "Jew-hyte\* Hammarskjold"

Charges of US breach of faith were aired by (#) affiliation.

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-2- 1095, March 18, 10 p.m., from Tel Aviv

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-3- 1095, March 18, 10 p.m., from Tel Aviv

free navigation in gulf more important than another aim, he should show perseverance in course he himself has mapped out."

Comment follows in next cable.

LAWSON

BB:DMJ/16

\*As received. Correction to follow

(#) Omission. Correction to follow

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16  
Department of State

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53  
Action  
NEA

Control: 11797  
Rec'd: March 19, 1957  
8:04 a.m.

File  
NE-3-2157

Info

RMR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 1096, March 18, 10 a.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1096; REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 202, USUN 80

Reference EMBTEL 1095

Patternless reaction of press, both coalition and opposition; probably reflects corresponding indecision of GOI which is not giving clear lead even to its own public media. There is still no apparent tendency of government to encourage criticism of US. At same time nothing is being done to dissuade press from assuming extremely hostile attitude toward Hammarskjold and UN, which no matter how violent, does not exceed government's own antipathy for SYG. Embassy dismisses as well-intentioned but misleading, one friendly correspondent's report that most of press here, including foreign correspondents, feels that Israel and US are for once in same boat--both having been pulled by Hammarskjold. SYG may bear brunt of attack, but Embassy feels considerable display anti-American sentiment probably inevitable.

Foreign Ministry official told Embassy informally government is marking time, that it is avoiding striking attitudes, reaching decision, or exercising judgments until it has advice on Meir's meeting with Secretary, which he thought was scheduled for this morning Washington time.

LAWSON

FW:AIR-14

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☐ CHARGE TO

**Department of State**

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11585  
1957 MAR 21 PM 5 10

DC/T

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SENT TO: Amembassy TEL AVIV

RPTD INFO: USUN NEW YORK

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730

6-7-84

3-1857

Origin

Info:

We are concerned increasingly sharp GOI official and press criticism Hammaraskjold (your 1095 and 1096) in apparent attempt prove GOI and others duped UNQUOTE by him and that he cannot be relied on carry out GA mandate. Request you find suitable occasion stress following GOI officials.

1. US has maintained close contact SYG and, while we share GOI disappointment over trend Gaza developments, we have no reason believe SYG responsible for that trend. ~~On contrary SYG has our confidence,~~ On contrary SYG has our confidence, and we continue rely on him achieve maximum possible implementation arrangements set forth his February 22 statement.

2. Part of Israeli concern may stem from inaccurate press accounts Gaza developments. In this connection suggest you pass appropriate portions USUN's 655, repeated Tel Aviv, to GOI officials.

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Desired  
(Office,  
Only)

3. ~~WHILE SYG HAS OUR CONFIDENCE, WE WILL CONTINUE RELY ON SYG TO MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE.~~  
GOI SYG  
~~Important/extend/him~~ cooperation and support since his ability implement GA recommendations dependent effective working relations with both parties. We would be seriously concerned any tendency regard his present role as unhelpful or unnecessary since ~~we will continue rely on SYG to maximum extent possible.~~

4. Avoidance unnecessary critical GOI comment particularly essential during

Drafted by: UNP:SD:palma:scp 3/20/57

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

IO - F. O. Wilcox

Clearances:

L/UNA  
Mr. Ford

NEA

G 137

70 Wilcox  
S/SCR  
MAR 21 1957 P.M.

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CS/J

674.840/3-18

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during period his talks in area which may involve contacts both parties.  
We hope GOI will make every effort maintain constructive atmosphere for  
such contacts.

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Control:  
Rec'd

March 18, 1957 001

Info

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1097, March 18, 11 p.m.

Re EMBTEL 1089.

In view Meir plan return here as soon as possible after  
conversation with Secretary and visit to Embassy she or  
Ben Gurion will be in touch with us immediately thereafter.  
We appreciate any details conversation that can be supplied  
on prior unclassified basis.

LAWSON

RSB/7

674.84A/3-1857

Date

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Action ~~10/6/57~~  
IO

Control: 11483  
Rec'd: MARCH 18, 1957

9:20 PM

Info  
RMR

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

MESSAGE CENTER

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NO: 652, MARCH 18, 8 PM

PRIORITY

RE: GAZA AND SUEZ



*sup. 2*

1. SUBSEQUENT TO CONVERSATION WITH SECRETARY, LODGE SAW SYG THIS AFTERNOON TO CONVEY IMPRESSIONS AFTER SECY'S MEETING WITH MRS. MEIR. LODGE TOLD HIM SECY FELT SITUATION WAS VERY BAD AND THAT EGYPTIANS WERE NOT LIVING UP TO EXPECTATIONS WE HAD HELD. WHILE THEY HAD NOT YET VIOLATED INTERNATIONAL LAW, IF THEY REFUSED TO LET ISRAELI VESSELS TRANSIT CANAL THEY WOULD HAVE. HOWEVER, WE WERE CAUTIONING ISRAELIS TO BE PATIENT AND HAD NOT TAKEN ANY NEW POSITIONS WITH THEM. WE THOUGHT MAIN WEAPON IN HANDS SYG IN DEALING WITH EGYPTIANS WAS POSSIBILITY REFERRING QUESTION BACK TO GA. PROBLEM WAS AT WHAT POINT TO BREAK NEGOTIATIONS, IF NECESSARY, SO THAT HE WOULD BE ASSURED OF TWO-THIRD GA SUPPORT. WE ALSO THOUGHT EGYPTIANS MIGHT BE ASKING THEMSELVES WHAT THEY WOULD GET OUT OF COOPERATION WITH UN AND US. WE WERE NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR ON WHAT WE MIGHT BEST DO AND WONDERED IF SYG HAD ANY SUGGESTIONS.

2. RE CANAL SYG THOUGHT THAT AFTER SATISFACTORY INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN REACHED TIME WOULD HAVE COME FOR US TO MAKE LIBERAL GESTURE TO EGYPT BY RELEASING BLOCKED ACCOUNTS. HE GAVE IMPRESSION IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR HIM BE ABLE INDICATE US WOULD CONSIDER SUCH ACTION AT THAT TIME. THIS WOULD IN TURN MAKE IT EASIER TO MOVE ON TO FINAL SETTLEMENT. HE STATED HE WOULD LET US KNOW WHEN HE THOUGHT TIME HAD COME FOR US TO MOVE. HE FELT THAT IN LAST COUPLE OF MONTHS EGYPTIANS HAD SHOWN SENSITIVITY ABOUT LACK OF IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH US, AND WERE NOT SURE ANYTHING THEY DID WOULD ACTUALLY HELP.

SYG ALSO HAD COPY FAWZI'S "TENTATIVE DRAFT" COMMUNIQUE ON SUEZ

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-2- 652, MARCH 18, 8 PM, FROM NEW YORK

CANAL. HE AGREED IT WAS COMPLETE REJECTION FOUR-POWER PROPOSALS, THOUGHT SECY'S RESPONSE IT SHOULD NOT BE RELEASED WAS CORRECT, AND SAID HE WOULD TELL EGYPTIANS SAME THING.

SYG SAID EGYPTIAN THINKING HAD BEEN TENDING TOWARD ICJ RECENTLY. IF THERE WERE CLEAR CASE ON EGYPTIAN REFUSAL TO PASS ISRAELI SHIPS THROUGH CANAL, HE WAS CONFIDENT THERE WOULD BE TWO-THIRDS VOTE IN GA FOR ADVISORY OPINION. IF QUESTION WAS CLOUDED BY PROBLEM OF PAYMENT OF TOLLS THIS WOULD BE MUCH MORE DOUBTFUL. HE WAS AFRAID ACTUAL TEST WOULD NOT BE CLEAR-CUT, AND HE THOUGHT OUR POSITION ON TOLLS WAS WEAK POINT. AS HE PUT IT, 1888 CONVENTION DID NOT ASSURE PASSAGE SHIPS THROUGH CANAL FREE OF CHARGE.

3. RE GAZA, SYG RESPONDED TO QUESTION THAT WHILE EGYPT HAD NOT ACTED IN MANNER HE HAD BEEN LED TO EXPECT AND HE AGREED THEY WERE TAKING DIFFICULT LINE, HE COULD NOT SAY THEY HAD BROKEN FAITH. HE THOUGHT WHILE HIS EXPECTATIONS ABOUT EGYPTIAN ACTION HAD NOT BEEN REALIZED, NEITHER HAD FAWZI'S. FAWZI HAD INDICATED HIS HOPE "INITIAL TAKE-OVER" MIGHT LAST FOR SOME TIME. SYG HAD NO SUGGESTIONS RE ACTION WE SHOULD TAKE WITH RESPECT GAZA.

4. RE HIS NEGOTIATIONS WITH EGYPT IN GENERAL, SYG NOTED EGYPT INTENDED RAISE (1) QUESTION OF STATIONING UNEF ON BOTH SIDES OF DEMARCATION LINE AND (2) OBSERVANCE BY BOTH SIDES OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, PARTICULARLY IMPLEMENTATION ARTICLES VII AND VIII. SYG OBSERVED ISRAELIS WERE AT PRESENT ADAMANT ON BOTH ISSUES, ALTHOUGH THEY HAD IN JANUARY 1956 AGREED ON EL AUJA DEMILITARIZATION BUT SINCE THEN HAD GONE BACK ON IT.

SYG FELT HE HAD THREE WEAPONS IN DEALING WITH EGYPTIANS. FIRST WAS POSSIBILITY REFERRAL TO GA. THIS WAS NOT AS VALUABLE AS IT LOOKED BECAUSE OF DIFFICULTY OF MARSHALLING TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY. SECOND WAS UNEF ITSELF AND ATTITUDE SOME UNEF MEMBERS. EGYPTIANS KNEW IF UNEF WERE WITHDRAWN ISRAELIS COULD MOVE BACK INTO GAZA AND OTHER AREAS WITHOUT DIFFICULTY. SYG SAID HE HAD USED THREAT WITHDRAWING UNEF THREE TIMES LAST NOVEMBER WITH EGYPT TO GOOD EFFECT: WHILE HE HAD REALIZED HE DID NOT HAVE POWER TO DO THIS EGYPTIANS SEEMED TO THINK HE HAD. HE THOUGHT HE WOULD HAVE STRONG BARGAINING POINT IN FACT THAT UN COULD NOT KEEP UNEF IN EGYPT IN ANY SITUATION WHICH MIGHT APPEAR TO BE HUMILIATION OF IT. THREAT OF WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE PLAYING WITH

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-3- 652, MARCH 18, 8 PM, FROM NEW YORK

HIGH STAKES, BUT WITH MAN LIKE NASSER MIGHT BE EFFECTIVE.  
THIRD WAS ARGUMENT UN WAS EGYPT'S "BRIDGE TO WORLD" AND STIFF ATTITUDE TOWARD UNEF COULD ALIENATE SYMPATHY AMONG UN MEMBERS TOWARD EGYPT. HE IMPLIED THIS WOULD BE HIS MAIN APPROACH. HE THOUGHT KRISHNA MENON'S CURRENT VISIT TO CAIRO SPELLED DIFFICULTY WITH THIS, AS MENON WOULD PROBABLY ASSURE NASSER OF CONTINUED ASIAN SUPPORT AND DISCOUNT GA REACTIONS. WHILE NASSER DID NOT COMPLETELY ACCEPT MENON, HE WOULD BE INCLINED TO LEAN MORE TOWARD HIS ESTIMATES THAN THOSE OF SYG. HE THOUGHT IT INTERESTING, HOWEVER, THAT NASSER WAS REPORTED PROPOSING RELEASE MAJOR POLICY STATEMENT PRIOR MENON'S ARRIVAL, AND POINTED OUT HE HAD DONE SAME THING BEFORE HE HAD ARRIVED LAST TIME. IN THIS CONNECTION SYG AND CORDIER FELT FAWZI'S INTENTION PUT OUT "COMMUNIQUE" ON INTERIM CANAL ARRANGEMENTS MIGHT BE DESIGNED FORESTALL MENON'S ATTEMPT CONTROL CANAL SETTLEMENT.

5. CORDIER EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT SYG'S PERSONAL SECURITY IF AND WHEN HE GOES JERUSALEM, AND INDICATED HE WOULD WANT TO TALK TO US ABOUT IT FURTHER.

6. SYG IS SEEING MRS. MEIR 8 O'CLOCK TONIGHT AND SAID HE WOULD TALK TO US AGAIN TOMORROW MORNING BEFORE HE LEAVES. HE DID NOT THINK LODGE SHOULD GO TO AIRPORT SEE HIM OFF.

LODGE

CC

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM

**INCOMING TELEGRAM** *Department of State*

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54-52

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## Action

NEA

FROM: OSLO

Info  
RMR

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1047, MARCH 18, 5 PM

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Control:- 11197

Rec'd: MARCH 18, 1957

1:32 PM

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THE

FOREIGN OFFICE GRATEFUL INFORMATION CONTAINED DEPARTMENT  
TELEGRAM 1002. PROMISED ABIDE BY INJUNCTION ON USE CON-  
TAINED THEREIN. IT APPEARS LANGE MEETING ON NEAR EAST WITH  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS STARTING EXECUTIVE SESSION TOMORROW. WITHOUT  
THIS INFORMATION HE WOULD HAVE BEEN IN POSITION OF BEING  
FORCED TO ADMIT HE DID NOT KNOW NATURE OF DEMARCHE WHICH  
NORWEGIAN MINISTER HAD MADE CAIRO. FOREIGN OFFICE STILL  
DESIRES INFORMATION REGARDING PUBLICITY RAISED IN EMBASSY  
TELEGRAM 1045. THEY HAVE RECEIVED INQUIRIES AS TO WHAT IF  
ANYTHING NORWAY HAS DONE IN VIEW OF PUBLICITY THAT YUGOSLAVIA  
AND COLOMBIA HAVE MADE REPRESENTATIONS.

RAYNOR

JS

**Copy No. 1**

Destroyed 3.4.58/R

NEA

Name \_\_\_\_\_

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~~TABLE~~

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☐ CHARGE TO

## Department of State

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Classification

11022

1957 MAR 20 PM 7

DC/T

SENT TO: AmEmbassy OSLO 1026

Origin

Info

Embtel 1047

We have not given publicity to content demarche to GOE although fact US has made approach becoming known. Since suggestion of Norwegian demarche originated with SYG and in view delicate and fast-moving nature Gaza situation, GON might wish consult SYG or his assistants if publicity believed desirable from Norwegian point of view.

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Mr/R  
Central  
Files


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674.84A/3-1857

*Miller*  
(SUN)LES

Dist.  
Desired  
(Offices  
Only)



SECRET FILE

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:LHoffacker/SWRockwell

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

Stuart W. Rockwell

Clearances:

UNP - Mr. Gamon (in substance)  
BNA - Mr. Kerley  
Mayer

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Classification

MAR 20 1957 P.M.

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M-557

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1770

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: March 18, 1957

RECEIVED  
APR 2 1957  
DEPT. OF STATE  
RM 400

SUBJECT: The Situation Since Israel's Withdrawal

PARTICIPANTS: Mrs. Golda Meir, Foreign Minister of Israel  
Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel  
Mr. Gideon Raphael, Counselor, Israel Foreign Ministry  
Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Embassy of Israel  
The Secretary  
The Under Secretary  
COMMISSARY: NEA - William M. Rountree  
L - Herman Phleger  
IO - Francis O. Wilcox  
NE - Donald C. Bergus

APR 5 1957

Copies To: S/S(2cc), U, G, C, NEA(2cc), NE(2cc), OLI(2), IO, USUN, Cairo, Tel Aviv,  
L, S/S

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YK  
320.5780

Mrs. Meir stated that she had only been in Israel a few days before it had been decided that it would be best for her to return to the United States. Mrs. Meir had left the United Nations for Israel under certain assumptions which had made it seem that Israel withdrawal was the best course. The basic things which Israel had expected were non-belligerency and a UN takeover of both Gaza and Sharm el Sheikh. In Gaza, it was expected that the UNEF would exercise both military and civil functions including security.

Before leaving the United Nations for Israel, Mrs. Meir had talked with the Secretary General regarding "the initial period" of the UN takeover. She had been shocked by the fact that the Secretary General was already talking about the next step before the UN was even in Gaza. Mr. Lodge had agreed that discussion of the next step should be deferred.

The Israelis were perturbed because it was a question of hours between the Israel withdrawal and Egypt's practically taking over. Not only had an Egyptian General come in as Governor of Gaza, but he had brought a staff with him. On whose authority had he come into Gaza? Mrs. Meir was sure that she could not enter Gaza without UN authorization.

FILED  
APR 8 1957  
The Egyptian General

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The Egyptian General must have received word permitting him to enter Gaza. There were Egyptian police in Gaza. The Egyptian Army was controlling the road between El Arish and Gaza and might be in Gaza within a matter of hours. Israel's information was that Nasser planned to put the Army into Gaza and then ask the UNEF to withdraw to the border. UNEF would then be on the border to watch over the Egyptian occupation of Gaza. What Nasser did not do for the four months during which Israel occupied Gaza, he was doing now. He had been quiet during that period; now he was making declarations such as his statement of this morning that Israel had no right to exist and that passage through Suez and the Gulf of Aqaba should be denied Israel. King Saud had joined with him with respect to Aqaba.

For the first time in two generations, people in Israel did not understand what the Israel Government had done. There had not yet been time for a complete review of the pre-withdrawal discussions before the Knesset. The cry in Israel was, "What are those assumptions under which you withdrew?" The situation in the agricultural settlements near Gaza was bad again after four months of quiet. Israel leaders were not afraid of taking a stand with their people when they were convinced they were right. Mrs. Meir did not know what to say to the Israel people now because she was not convinced. Israel had not relied on the United Nations, it had relied on the United States and the President. There had been an understanding among the United States, Israel, and the French. The United States might say that it was not the United Nations but it had strong influence there. These developments in Gaza would not have taken place if the United Nations had opposed them. Who was in charge of the UNEF? Who carried the responsibility? Israel had had no doubt that the United States would use all its influence to oppose these developments. Israel was disappointed. In his most recent message to Prime Minister Ben Gurion, the President had expressed the hope that Israel would take no precipitate action. Israel had replied that it would not. This was not child's play. Israel could take Gaza again but did not want to. The question had been before the Israel Cabinet yesterday, but no decision had been taken. She wished she could state that all would be fine and peaceful but it did not depend on Israel. Not only the Israelis, but others wanted to know who was in charge:-- the eighty-one members of the UN or Nasser? Did Israel have to live with a Gaza under the control of a belligerent Egypt?

The Secretary said he did not wish to disguise the fact that developments had not been entirely as we anticipated. In saying that, he should say that our anticipations were not quite as optimistic as Israel's. There had been no lack of frankness on either side in that

respect.

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respect. We took the position that what was done had been done within the framework of the General Armistice Agreement which gave Egypt the right of occupancy. We had assumed that there would be token Egyptian occupation, and had hoped that it would remain token although a certain amount of fanfare was probably unavoidable. We hoped for a de facto UN administration even though Gaza was nominally under Egypt. The Secretary General, and we through him, felt that this was a likely result. We had no direct negotiations during this period with Egypt, but relied on the Secretary General. We thought it would be improper and inexpedient to do otherwise. The expectations outlined by Ambassador Lodge, who had quoted the Secretary General, were, we believed, acquiesced in by Egypt. Egyptian activity regarding Gaza had gone somewhat farther than we had expected and Israel had hoped. The attitude of Nasser with respect to the Canal had not been what we had hoped for. The Secretary did not think the situation was hopeless because the fact was that while we had exerted considerable pressure on Nasser, we had not exerted the full weight of our influence on the situation. One of the difficulties was how this might be done, particularly in the light of the Secretary General's responsibilities and activities. We had not yet found an adequate way to coordinate our activities with his. Nasser was anxious to know such things as the future attitude of the U. S., etc., which he could not get through the Secretary General. We were thinking intensively on how to deal with Nasser. We did not know when the Secretary General was going to Cairo. We imagined that Mrs. Meir would be seeing the Secretary General.

Mrs. Meir said she was prepared to meet him but honestly did not expect much good to come from such a meeting. Israel would not have withdrawn if it had been subject to his expressions. They had read all his reports and he had never said that he had approached the Egyptian Government and the Egyptian Government had stated something. Regarding Egypt, the Secretary General always used such language as "assumes," "has reason to believe," or "can state with confidence." Israel on the other hand had made public statements, sent letters to the Secretary General, etc. Israel would not have withdrawn on the basis of the Secretary General's February 22 statement. Israel left Gaza when the United States Government had advised it to work the matter out with a statement regarding assumptions. Except for a few sentences regarding a call for peace to the Arabs, Mrs. Meir's statement of March 1 had been worked out in the Department. That was why Israel had left Gaza. Israel had failed to withdraw before this, not because it sought a political victory but because the lives of its people were involved. The Israel people now felt either that their Government had misled them or that they had not understood what they were doing.

Mrs. Meir

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Mrs. Meir had called on Prime Minister Mollet when she had passed through Paris. She had asked him if Israel had been right in assuming that developments would take place along the lines of her statement. He agreed. Mrs. Meir admitted that the United States had a difference of opinion on the validity of the Armistice Agreement. Israel held that Egyptian action had been such as to prevent it from claiming rights under that agreement. Nevertheless the United States had spoken of the de facto exclusion of Egypt. All this had been turned topsy-turvy. Nasser was de facto in Gaza.

The Secretary said that it was premature to assume that the things we had hoped for were not going to happen. He did not think that the game, if you could call it such, was played out. The United States did not assume it had reached the end of the road. At present, there was no evidence which demonstrated that Gaza would be used as a fedayeen base and that Israel shipping would not pass. There had been a lot of words which were not in the right spirit. It was too early to assume that these expectations and compliance with international law would not happen. There were actions still in the making, such as the Secretary General's trip to Cairo. If he went there, the U.S. would support him strongly. The Secretary hoped that Israel would not come prematurely to feel that the basis of its action in withdrawing had been unwarranted. Whatever happened, he did not feel that Israel would be worse off for doing what it had done. This applied to the British and French as well. Israel was starting again from a sound juridical and moral basis. The Secretary did not think it was necessary to assume things would be as disastrous as Israel and Nasser had forecast. These things may happen but they should not be assumed. In his long experience in foreign affairs matters, the Secretary realized that problems of this type were not easily resolved. Often when things look gloomy, when you realize that you are on the right track, you know that right will prevail in the long run. It need not be such a long run in this case. The Secretary could understand that the Israel Government was going through a difficult period. He had known that we would be in for a tough time and thought that Israel had known so too. He knew that Israel's withdrawal would bring on the second phase of dealing with the Egyptians. We had not found a way to bring maximum pressure to bear, in the light of the Secretary General's role. The Secretary felt that if we could get more directly to grips with Nasser it might be better. This had to be reconciled with the power and influence of the UN which was considerable. Although Mrs. Meir had said that she did not rely on the UN, the United States did.

What

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What we were trying to do was to bring about the supremacy of the principles which we were backing, not individual nations. We believed that the United States occupied a role requiring it to support principles. We were working for Article 1 of the Charter. The first thing to do was to get the stage set for a peaceful settlement in conformity with the principles of justice and international law. If Egypt was at fault regarding Aqaba and Suez, Egypt should conform. On the question of border raids there was room for a difference of opinion. The Secretary thought that Israel should accept the UNEF on its borders and put an end to Israel raids. If Egypt did not conform on Aqaba and Suez, all the weight of world opinion should be brought to bear on Egypt. The UN might not be the only place to do this but it was a real place. The Secretary realized that nations voted by bloc and could not be relied upon to reflect accurately the moral judgment of mankind. Perhaps you could not get a condemnation of Egypt, but the UN was a place where a considerable degree of moral judgment could be expressed. We did not write off the UN nor did we wish to displace it. The problem of accommodation was difficult. We were giving this our most active attention and were planning to continue our study. We certainly felt that it was not yet time to say that the effort on which we embarked had failed.

Mrs. Meir said that she did not know why the British and French went into Suez, but she knew why Israel did. She did not know what interests dictated their withdrawal. Israel had been in danger of an Egyptian attack. Israelis were as sensitive as others to moral values. You could not discount the moral value of people who wished to live and to work out their own destiny. Egypt was trying to destroy Israel. Not for one moment did Mrs. Meir envisage a Gaza of this kind. Had she done so, she would have said no to requests for Israel withdrawal. When Mrs. Meir had gone to Israel in December, she had exaggerated the possible consequences to Israel if it failed to withdraw. Nevertheless, Israel had decided at that time to stand firm. She was convinced that nobody could prove that Israel had started the border raids. She began history with the signature of the Armistice Agreements. Years had passed with Arab raids into Israel and Israel had done nothing. With regard to the value of the United Nations, when the U.S. is so attached to the UN, that attachment arises from a wonderful position of strength. The Israelis were little people who had a life and death interest in the UN. Representatives of countries in the UN had approached Israel and said Israel should not withdraw, even if their own countries voted against Israel.

Israel

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Israel had envisaged a Gaza from which Egypt was de facto excluded. If Egypt were to be there, let the UN go, and let Egypt face Israel. If Nasser wanted to disregard the United States, Britain, France, and even the United Nations, then Israel had played with the fate of its people. The Secretary had said that Nasser had not yet done anything about Aqaba. The Captain of a Danish ship which Israel had chartered was afraid to go through Aqaba in the light of Nasser's statements. Israel had approached the Danes who had said they would consult the UN. The Danish ship was going to Djibouti and then decide whether to risk the voyage through the Straits. There had been fine declarations but there were no ships. The U.S. had approached Israel, made statements about Israel's behavior, etc., but there had been no public announcement regarding Egypt's actions.

Mention had been made of stationing UN forces on Israel's side of the armistice line. The U.S. had taken a public position that Israel consent for this was something very vital. Why should they be placed there? The only basis for placing them was the Armistice Agreement which Egypt had flouted. What kind of an agreement was there when it was one-sided? Israel did not understand why Egypt had to be handled so delicately. Egypt was returning to Sinai and not alone. The USSR was sending arms again to Egypt. Israel had heard that the Russians would not make the same mistake twice, this time they would have plenty of technicians and pilots to operate the arms. We were coming back in giant steps to the same situation which prevailed before October 29.

Israel had already had casualties from infiltrators from El Arish and Gaza. Israel had spoken to a UNEF representative at El Arish. He had said that he had no authority to arrest people or search for arms. Settlers in Erez, about 200 metres from the armistice line, north of the Gaza Strip, had chased back an Arab who had crossed the line. When they complained to the UNEF man on the border he had said that the settlers would have to shoot at such people. The only ones who could keep peace and quiet were Israel. Israel could not live with a Gaza of this kind. If Nasser said that he wanted to have peace, a new leaf would be turned over. The Secretary General would not even ask Nasser if he would follow a policy of non-belligerency after withdrawal, despite Israel entreaties that he do so. Now Nasser had volunteered the answer. Israel could not live with the United Nations giving de facto protection to the Egyptians against Israel.

Mr. Eban said he would like to make an observation with respect to the discrepancies between Israel and U.S. thinking about Gaza. There had been agreement that we should try to achieve de facto control of both civil and military functions in UN hands. The U.S. had spoken about symbolic Egyptian presence and token representation. The Secretary

said



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said that this was a fair statement. Mr. Eban said that he compared this with a wholehearted Egyptian takeover. There was an Egyptian Governor on the spot and he was pushing the UN into a corner. What had happened was not a difference in emphasis, but a total, substantive, reversal.

The Secretary said he would not dispute the statement that things had moved contrary to our anticipations. Unless the present trend of Nasser's thinking were altered, it might lead to a dangerous situation. We were not satisfied that the present trend was definitive and could not be altered. We had intentions but could not guarantee that they would succeed. He had said at the time that there were risks involved, but he still thought Israel did right. He still thought there was a good chance that Israel's forebodings would not be realized. He could understand popular apprehension in Israel. Israel had jumped to the conclusion that the full scope of its forebodings had been realized. He still hoped there was a chance we could prevent Gaza's becoming a fedayeen base and open Aqaba. A difference between us was the assumption that these would follow automatically Israel withdrawal. We foresaw stress and strain and the possibility that Egypt would go back on its assurances. We knew that Nasser was unreliable. The dependability on what he said was not on the fact that he said it but pressures to make it expedient. The question was whether we could find ways to make it expedient for him to live up to what he said. The possibilities were not exhausted. If this effort failed, there would be a new situation. Israel had said it would exercise its rights of self-defense, we had said that we would consult with other UN members. This contingency might come about but had not yet done so. The Secretary realized that this was a difficult situation to live with but must urge Israel to live with it for a longer period.

Mr. Eban said that world opinion did not know that the United States was trying to reverse trends in Gaza. The Secretary said that we would give thought to that aspect of the matter. He asked if anything had been done in his absence. The Under Secretary replied that there had been a background statement to the press on March 15.

Mr. Shiloah said that newsmen were quoting State Department sources that the Secretary intended to warn Israel today. There had been press conferences which had been construed to blame Israel as well as Egypt since Israel would not permit the stationing of troops along its side of the border. An effort might be made to correct these impressions. The Secretary said that we would try but he doubted whether it would pay.

He had been

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He had been asked about the stationing of UN forces while he was in Canberra and had answered the question, he thought, accurately.

The Secretary said that although this was not a central point, he could not understand Israel's objections to the stationing of the UNEF in Israel and greater mobility for the UNTSO. It was hard to reconcile this attitude with Israel's bitter complaints.

Mrs. Meir said all this had its source in the Armistice Agreement. The Agreement provided that the El Auja (Nitsana) area should be demilitarized and Israel lived with it for a while and permitted UN observers there. The Agreement had also said that there should be no Egyptian forces for a certain distance behind the Egyptian border. This Egypt violated. Israel took up this matter with the Secretary General in April stating that either the Armistice Agreement bound all sides or else it didn't exist. We asked the Secretary General if he could get Nasser to live up to Article 1 of the Agreement. The Secretary General had said that if Nasser agreed to this, his Government would fall. Israel had then said that if Egypt allowed Israel shipping through the Suez Canal, Israel would get out of Nitsana. The Secretary General had said that this was fair, that if Nasser promised to open the Canal to Israel shipping and then did not do so, he would support Israel's remaining in El Auja.

Israel had a small territory but long boundaries. If they had the UNEF on the border with Egypt, then there would be pressure to bring them along the Jordan and Syrian borders. The UNEF's remaining on the Egyptian side of the line in Sinai created no problems, because there were no people there. If they were brought to the Israel side of all the frontiers, Israel would be an occupied country and, with all kinds of soldiers on its soil, would no longer be independent. In any event, this would not be necessary. Israel would live up to the Armistice Agreement. The United States should ask Nasser if he was still in a state of war with Israel.

The Secretary mentioned that we had similar problems with regard to Korea and Communist China. We did not recognize Red China. Despite the fact that there was an armistice agreement with Communist China, we still applied our Trading with the Enemy Act. When he talked about stationing troops along Israel's side of the boundary, he was not thinking that Israel was obligated to do so anymore than Egypt was obligated to forego some of its rights under the Armistice Agreement. This did not answer his question.

Mrs. Meir

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Mrs. Meir said that Israel had tried the UNTSO but it had not worked. The UNEF had no more power. The Secretary thought that exposing the facts of a situation through an impartial source was a preventive. Mrs. Meir said that Israel had lived through this for eight years. Bad things had happened even though there had been UN observers. The Secretary said that the hope had been to make it less grim. The UNTSO had been inadequate in numbers and authority. Mrs. Meir said that they would not have to watch over Israel. Israel would not cross borders. The Secretary pointed out that Israel had crossed borders. Mrs. Meir said that Israel had acted the same as any other people in the world would have acted.

Mrs. Meir asked what she could tell her Government. The Secretary hoped that she would report what he had said. We had not given up hope that the conditions we anticipated could be brought about. We had not mobilized fully our influence on the situation. We were in touch with the Secretary General. This was not an easy situation but we believed that it was not hopeless. We hoped for quiet in which to work. We hoped we could achieve a condition such as described in the Secretary General's February 22 statement. Mrs. Meir said that to be fair to the Secretary General she wished to know how we interpreted the statement. The Secretary said he had always assumed that there would be some Egyptian presence in Gaza. He hoped it could be kept down to nominal with a de facto UN administration.

Mrs. Meir said that there seemed to be a full process of the liquidation of the UN. The Secretary General was already in the area in the persons of Dr. Bunche and General Burns. He had his Advisory Committee on the UNEF. Mr. Pearson of Canada had informed Mrs. Meir that he had opposed what was going on in Gaza in the Committee.

Mr. Shiloah said that the UNEF was acting as a shield for Nasser to reorganize his fedayeen bases. It would be better to remove the UNEF in such circumstances. Mrs. Meir said that there would be nothing more simple than for Israel to go get this Egyptian General in Gaza and parade him through Tel Aviv, but the UN forces there protected him. Mr. Eban said the UN was protecting a situation it could not control.

The Secretary asked if this was not a new viewpoint. Mrs. Meir said that if Nasser would not give Gaza to the UN then he shouldn't expect a UN screen.

Mr. Eban referred to the President's letter to Mr. Ben Gurion where it mentioned close consultation. The Secretary said he would like to have

such consultation.

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such consultation. He would like Israel's own thoughts as to how this matter might be handled. He hoped above all else that Israel would not move abruptly without notice to the United States. He knew this was difficult, and was not asking for a veto, but he did not think that our attitude was arbitrary. He assumed there would be normal consultations between Messrs. Eban and Shiloah and Mr. Rountree. It would be useful if Mrs. Meir talked to the Secretary General this afternoon.

Mrs. Meir said that the world should know what the U.S. thought and what it still thinks should be. This should be made public. Mr. Eban said this was as true with respect to Aqaba as well as Gaza. Mrs. Meir said that Saud wouldn't have made his statement about Aqaba if he were sure of the U.S. position. The Secretary felt that Saud was more sensitive on the question of Aqaba than Egypt was.

It was agreed that a joint press statement would be drafted and issued.

*WSS*  
NEA:NE:DCBergus:rej - 3/18/57

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SECRET  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: March 18, 1957

SUBJECT: Israeli Problem

PARTICIPANTS: Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador  
Mr. John Coulson, British Minister  
The Secretary  
Mr. Elbrick  
Mr. Macomber

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During Ambassador Caccia's call today the Secretary referred to his conference of two hours with the Israeli Foreign Minister, Mrs. Meir, earlier in the day. He said that he did not know whether this conference had been useful or not. He had told Mrs. Meir that the first part of the operation, namely the establishing of peace, had been achieved but that it was now necessary to establish conditions which would conform with justice and international law. The thought was expressed that Hammarskjold had been "taken into camp" by Egyptian acquiescence to the understandings expressed in connection with the Israeli withdrawal and that we must now "put on the screws" as far as the Egyptians are concerned. The Secretary had told Mrs. Meir that the Israeli Government should not be discouraged and that we had never expected that the solution of the problem would be easy. The Secretary felt that the Israelis would not take very quick military action and that as long as the Israeli Government feels that we were working toward a solution of the problem it would exercise restraint.

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EUR:CBElbrick:sj

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: March 18, 1957

SUBJECT: Gaza Strip

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PARTICIPANTS: Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador  
Mr. John Coulson, British Minister  
The Secretary  
Mr. Elbrick  
Mr. Macomber

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Ambassador Caccia referred to recent developments in Egypt and in the Gaza Strip. The Secretary noted that the Middle Eastern question will be the first item on the agenda of the Bermuda Conference and he felt that certain aspects of the Middle East question would have to be dealt with very quickly. It appeared to the Secretary that the time had come to coordinate such pressures as may be available to use in bringing Nasser around to a reasonable view. He said that there was a basic aspect of this whole problem which he had discussed with Menzies and others at Canberra during the SEATO meeting. We must decide whether maximum pressure to get a settlement should be exerted, following which we would have to treat Nasser as an acceptable member of the community. Otherwise we must refrain from exerting pressure. Nasser would certainly not concede anything if he realized he would be ultimately treated as an outcast.

Caccia observed that the UK Government did not feel that a boycott of the Canal would be feasible in any event. He asked whether, in the event that Nasser is again made respectable, he might not again raise the question of the financing of the Aswan Dam. The Secretary replied that we would not entertain any approach from Nasser on the Aswan Dam. We certainly would not wish to appear to treat Nasser better than we treat our real friends, and he mentioned the Baghdad Pact Powers particularly in this connection. He felt that the reasons leading to our withdrawal of the offer of the Aswan Dam are still

valid.

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EUR: C.B. Elbrick

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valid. He felt that financing in the magnitude required for this project for a very long period of time would necessitate a regime of austerity in Egypt which would eventually cause great trouble and would reflect itself in a hostile attitude toward the lending country. In addition, he felt that Congress would not authorize the necessary funds, due chiefly to the feeling on the part of some members of the Congress that the Dam would only result in an increase of cotton production which would compete directly with American cotton in the world markets. There are certain measures that we could take to help Egypt, however, such as resumption of our technical assistance programs and the sale of PL 480 wheat as well as the resumption of the tourist trade and the unfreezing of Egyptian balances. The Secretary said that we would like to exchange views very quickly with the UK on measures that might be taken.

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Rec'd: March 19, 1957  
6:13 p.m.

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FROM: Cairo

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RMR

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 2951, March 19

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SENT DEPARTMENT 2951; REPEATED INFORMATION JIDDA 243, TEL AVIV 16

Press reports Feisal met with Nasser Amer Muhyi Ad Din An Sabri evening March 18 same afternoon he reportedly said in answer reporters question re "projects internationalize" Aqaba Gulf "our attitude is very clear we outlined it in communique this subject published day before yesterday I repeat we will oppose any attempt this sort we will not even discuss this question".

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Rec'd: March 19, 1957  
6:13 p.m.

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FROM: Cairo

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 2957, March 19

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SENT DEPARTMENT 2957, REPEATED INFORMATION USUN 133, AMMAN, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, BENGHZI, DAMASCUS, JIDDA, KHARTOUM, LONDON, PARIS, NEW DELHI, TEL AVIV, TRIPOLI UNNUMBERED.

Press March 18 featured stories from "responsible (Egyptian) source" stating "outcries in Paris, London and Tel Aviv and lies filling columns of American Zionist press, since Egypt had exercised her legal rights in Gaza, showed imperialism had been engineering conspiracies against Arab motherland under guise 'internationalization' (first Suez Canal, the Gulf of Aqaba, now Gaza). According GAA Gaza under Egyptian control as Negev is under Israeli control. Proof of collaboration imperialism with Zionism against Arabs is that Britain and France trying reward their tool Israel American press such as NEW YORK TIMES gives American public opinion false news that serves Israel's interests. They call for adoption 'assumptions' on basis which Israel withdrew. These newspapers will not be able deceive free public opinion which realizes they are playthings in hands international Zionism".

NEW YORK TIMES also criticized by AHRAM same day in editorial which also expresses belief MacMillan at Bermuda will attempt "sell imperialism" and ask "will President Eisenhower give in and destroy principles US and UN Charter?" This theme further developed May 19 by AKHBAR which notes "imperialists" concern over ability Afro-Asians block two-thirds vote in UN and SHAAB which sees British attempt link Baghdad Pact and Eisenhower Plan. "If Bermuda conferees realize Egyptian view on Canal (1888 convention tolls paid Egypt) and Arab viewpoint vacuum (none including Jordan) meeting will be milestone on road peace".

AHRAM finds Secretary's statement re high dam proof refusal political seeking keep Egypt weak since "weakness of country is only door through which West can enter to interfere internal affairs".

UN praised

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MAR 25 1957  
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-2- 2957, March 19 from Cairo

UN praised in editorial by AHRAM ("cooperation between Egypt and UNEF serves peace and justice"). Israeli reaction Gaza developments brushed off by AKHBAR ("any action Israel may take outside UN is doomed failure. Israelis should realize UN is determined implement its decisions not simply submit Mrs. Meir's and Ben Gurion's demands"). SADAT ("let Israelis threaten, Egypt is not afraid") and GUMHOURIYA ("who is creating conditions for resumption of war, Nasser or Ben Gurion, who seeks make gains from his attack in Gaza and Aqaba?").

Saudi statement re Aqaba praised by QAHIRA and SHAAB with latter noting reported US concern Egyptian rejection 50-50 tolls scheme supported by TAHRIR and SHAAB, former suggesting most SECGEN can expect is Egypt's agreement earmark half tolls for development, while latter facetiously suggest scheme would be acceptable if rates were doubled.

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM *16* Department of State

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Control: 14046

Rec'd: MARCH 21, 1957  
8:12 PM

FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1103, MARCH 19

SENT DEPARTMENT 1103; REPEATED INFORMATION USUN 81.

ISRAEL MORNING PRESS TODAY GENERALLY VIEWS JOINT STATEMENT ON MEIR'S TALK WITH SECRETARY SOMEWHAT PESSIMISTICALLY AND SAYS IT REVEALS NO CHANGE IN POSITIONS OF US AND ISRAEL, PARTICULARLY IN REGARD GAZA QUESTION. MOST PAPERS STRESS, HOWEVER, THAT SECRETARY INDICATED CONCERN ABOUT ME DEVELOPMENTS AND PROMISED US WOULD USE FULL INFLUENCE TOWARD PEACE.

JERUSALEM POST ARTICLE SAYS QUICK RETURN OF EGYPTIANS TO GAZA "JOLTED" US ALMOST AS MUCH AS ISRAEL AND ADDS THAT US IS PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS TO SEE TRANQUILITY MAINTAINED IN AREA IN VIEW RICHARD'S MISSION. ACCORDING POST, ISRAEL EXPECTED US WOULD USE INFLUENCE WITH UNSYG TO ASSURE CONTINUED UN CONTROL OF GAZA STRIP AND WITHDREW FROM AREA PRINCIPALLY ON BASIS THIS ASSURANCE "APART FROM MORE VAGUE UTTERANCES OF AMERICAN LEADERS. US INABILITY ACHIEVE THIS, CONTINUES POST, WAS SHARP DISAPPOINTMENT TO BEN GURION AND RAISED FEAR FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN TIRAN STRAITS AND SUEZ CANAL WERE ENDANGERED SHOULD US FAILURE IN GAZA AREA BE REPEATED. POST INDICATES MEIR'S TRIP AIMED AT RECEIVING US REITERATION OF ASSURANCES ON FREE NAVIGATION AND WHOLE PROBLEM OF EGYPTIAN BELLIGERENCY AND SAYS, "IT APPEARS FROM JOINT COMMUNIQUE THAT MRS. MEIR WAS SUCCESSFUL IN THIS RESPECT. POST ADDS THAT SHE WILL PROBABLY TAKE OPPORTUNITY IN WASHINGTON TO DISPEL IMPRESSION THAT SEEMS TO HAVE GAINED CURRENCY IN SOME QUARTERS THAT ISRAEL COULD BE PRESSED INTO MAKING NEW CONCESSIONS IN INTEREST OF GENERAL 'SETTLEMENT'." IF IT COMES TO QUESTION OF HAVING UNEF TROOPS ON BOTH SIDES OF DEMARCATION LINE OR HAVING NO UN AT ALL IN GAZA STRIP, SAYS POST, IT IS QUITE LIKELY THAT ISRAEL WOULD PREFER LATTER. ARTICLE CONCLUDES THAT IT IS "PARTICULARLY FORTUNATE" MRS. MEIR IS PRESENTING VIEWS JUST PRIOR TO BERMUDA CONFERENCE, SINCE "CONFEREES

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-2- 1103, MARCH 19 FROM TEL AVIV

WILL BE IMPRESSED BY TIME THEY HOLD FIRST MEETING THAT MOOD IN ISRAEL TODAY IS TO MAKE NO FURTHER CONCESSIONS."

ACCORDING HABOKER (GENERAL ZIONIST) US CORRESPONDENT, REPUBLICAN CIRCLES DEMAND REMOVAL LODGE SINCE MOST US PUBLIC EXPRESSES SYMPATHY FOR ISRAEL, WHILE LODGE HAS BECOME SYMBOL OF US SURRENDER TO ARAB BLACKMAIL.

AFTERNOON PRESS TODAY SAYS US PRESS REGARDS MEIR MISSION AS FAILURE AND MAARIV (INDEPENDENT) QUOTES SECRETARY SAYING "I HAVE PROMISED NOTHING NEW TO ISRAEL."

LAWSON

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APR 12 1957

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Department of State

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Control: 12113  
Rec'd: MARCH 19, 1957  
2:44 PM

MAR 20

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 4810, MARCH 19, 5 PM

SENT DEPARTMENT 4810, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 762.

DESPITE MAJOR GENERAL POLICY DEBATE NOW IN PROGRESS IN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, WHICH IS SCHEDULED TERMINATE IN VOTE OF CONFIDENCE MAR 22, PRINCIPAL PUBLIC INTEREST CENTERS AROUND EGYPT AND ISRAEL. EVEN POLITICIANS WHO ARE ENGAGED IN DEBATE APPEAR AT LEAST EQUALLY CONCERNED WITH MIDDLE EAST. POLITICAL LEADERS WITH WHOM WE HAVE TALKED HAVE ECHOED DEEP DISTURBANCE OVER SITUATION WHICH PRIMIN AND FONOFF HAVE EXPRESSED TO US. THERE IS PROFOUND DISSATISFACTION OVER WHAT APPEARS TO BE UNBROKEN CHAIN OF VICTORIES FOR NASSER. US FOREIGN POLICY IS AGAIN SUBJECT TO BARBED CRITICISM.

HOWEVER, SITUATION DIFFERS FROM THAT OF LAST FALL IN NUMBER RESPECTS. WHATEVER AGITATION THERE MAY BE FROM CERTAIN CABINET MINISTERS (PRIMARILY BOURGES-MAUNOURY AND POSSIBLY CHABAN-DELMAS) FOR CONTINUING SUPPORT ISRAEL BY FORCEFUL MEANS (AND WE ARE NOT IN POSITION JUDGE ACCURATELY STRENGTH THIS POSITION OR ITS SUPPORT BY MIL ELEMENTS), MAJORITY CABINET LED BY MOLLET, WHILE VIGOROUSLY SUPPORTING ISRAEL BY OTHER MEANS, SEEMS UNPREPARED RESORT TO FORCE AGAIN. FURTHERMORE AMONG POLITICAL LEADERS OUTSIDE GOVT, WHOSE SYMPATHY WITH ISRAEL IS UNDIMINISHED, WE HAVE SEEN VERY LITTLE OF WIDESPREAD AGITATION OF LAST AUTUMN FOR MIL ADVENTURE. THEME SONG IN OCT WAS THAT FRENCH WOULD NOT ACCEPT NASSER'S COUP DE FORCE.

AT PRESENT THERE IS NO LESS CONVICTION THAT NASSER IS WRONG AND HIS POSITION SHOULD BE DESTROYED, BUT EMPHASIS HAS SHIFTED TO PUT RESPONSIBILITY FOR SITUATION ON US. IT IS WIDELY BELIEVED AMONG POLITICAL LEADERS WITH WHOM

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-2- 4810, MARCH 19, 5 PM FROM PARIS

WE HAVE TALKED THAT FRANCE MADE HER FULL EFFORT IN JOINT MILITARY VENTURE WITH BRITISH AND HAS NOTHING MORE TO OFFER.

SINCE THESE MEN HAVE LITTLE REGARD FOR UN AND CONSIDER IT UTTERLY INEFFECTIVE, THEY THEREFORE CONCLUDE THAT FULL AND SOLE RESPONSIBILITY RESTS WITH US. WE BELIEVE PUBLIC OPINION GENERALLY MORRORS ABOVE VIEWS.

SINCE SITUATION IS JUDGED TO BE GOING BADLY, TENDENCY OF COURSE IS TO BLAME US. HOWEVER, WE DETECT LACK SAME EMOTIONAL NATURE OF REACTION AS LAST AUTUMN. IN FACT, FRENCH LEADERS SEEM ALMOST EQUALLY UPSET BUT CONSIDERABLY MORE PHILOSOPHICAL. THEY APPEAR THIS TIME MORE AS INTERESTED AND EVEN CONCERNED OBSERVERS, BUT NEVERTHELESS OBSERVERS AND NOT (RPT NOT) PARTICIPANTS. AS RESULT THEY ARE DISCUSSING US POLICY IN MIDDLE EAST WITHOUT MUCH GREATER APPROVAL THAN FORMERLY BUT WITH GREATER RESIGNATION. FURTHERMORE, INTERVENTING EVENTS SUCH AS UNGA ALGERIAN DEBATE, MOLLET VISIT TO US, ETC., HAVE SHOWN CLEARLY THAT FRENCH-AMERICAN DIFFERENCES IN ONE AREA DO NOT (RPT NOT) MEAN NECESSARILY WIDESPREAD DISAGREEMENT ON OTHER POLICY ISSUES. WE CONCLUDE FRENCH POLITICAL LEADERS MAY BE READY ACCEPT THAT WE WILL CONTINUE FOLLOW SEPARATE LINE IN MIDDLE EAST WITHOUT WEAKENING OUR TIES WITH FRENCH IN NATO AND OVER OTHER ISSUES. NEVERTHELESS, KEYNOTE AT PRESENT IS ONE OF CONVICTION US AGAIN MAKING MISTAKE OF CEDING BEFORE PRESSURE OF ARAB DICTATOR IN EGYPT, A POLICY WHICH CAN ONLY LEAD TO FURTHER BLACKMAIL FROM ARAB LEADERS.

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Action

NEA

Control:

Rec'd:

12201

March 19, 1947

4:52 p.m.

FROM: Bern

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 961, March 19, 8 p.m.

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Minister Gygas (FPD) today expressed great concern of Swiss Government over situation in Middle East: Seemed to believe that Israelis prepared act if some compromise could not be reached on Gaza. Also indicated Swiss have information that Nasser no longer master own house but forced continuously make concessions to extremists as in Gaza situation. Statements made on very informal basis but passed on as of interest to Department.

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NEA

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 655, MARCH 19, 1 P.M.

Control: 12087

Rec'd: MARCH 19, 1957  
2:28 P.M.

PRIORITY

RE GAZA AND SUEZ.

MISSION OFFICER ASKED CORDIER FOR CLARIFICATIONS REGARDING VARIOUS PRESS REPORTS ON SITUATION IN GAZA. FOLLOWING IS CONTENT HIS RESPONSES:

1. RE POLICE AND INTERNAL SECURITY. CORDIER INDICATED IT HARD TO GIVE ANY ACCURATE PICTURE SINCE MATTERS IN STATE TRANSITION AND SITUATION IS "SPOTTY". SHIFT TO PALESTINIAN POLICE HAS BEEN GREATER IN GAZA CITY THAN ELSEWHERE IN STRIP. SITUATION HAS BEEN MATTER OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN GENERAL BURNS AND EGYPTIAN LIAISON OFFICER HELMI. CORDIER SAID UNRWA WILL RESUME ITS RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ENTIRE REFUGEE POPULATION WHICH IS TWO-THIRDS OF TOTAL POPULATION IN STRIP. THIS WOULD INCLUDE FUNCTIONS CONNECTION INTERNAL SECURITY. UNEF AND PALESTINIAN POLICE ARE WORKING OUT PATTERN FOR SHARING RESPONSIBILITIES FOR NON-REFUGEE POPULATION.

CORDIER STATED CHIEF SOURCE OF NEWS STORIES STEMMED FROM MATHEMATICAL DISPOSITION FORCES IN STRIP. ONE-THIRD UNEF HAD BEEN STATIONED ON ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE BETWEEN GAZA STRIP AND ISRAEL. TWO-THIRDS OF UNEF HAD BEEN STATIONED IN STRIP PROPER. THIS DISPROPORTION GENERAL BURNS SOUGHT TO SWITCH

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SO THAT TWO-THIRDS HIS TROOPS WOULD BE ON LINE AND ONLY ONE-THIRD WITHIN STRIP. TO DO THIS BURNS FELT HE NEEDED AUTHORITY WORK OUT ARRANGEMENTS UTILIZE PALESTINIAN POLICE TO GREATER EXTENT WITHIN STRIP. SYG, AFTER CONSULTATION ADVISORY COMMITTEE SATURDAY AND MONDAY, INSTRUCTED BURNS THAT SHIFT COMPLETELY REVERSING MATHEMATICAL RATIO WOULD BE UNSATISFACTORY AND TOLD BURNS NOT GO SO FAR AS HAVING TWO-THIRD UNEF ON ARMISTICE LINE. SYG DID AUTHORIZE HIM BEGIN SOME SHIFT IN THAT DIRECTION, HOWEVER. REASON FOR SYG'S CAUTION WAS WHOLE SUBJECT UNEF'S ROLE IN CONNECTION INTERNAL SECURITY GAZA STRIP TO BE SUBJECT NEGOTIATION BETWEEN HAMMARSKJOLD AND NASSER DURING FORTHCOMING TALKS, AND HE DID NOT WANT BURNS NEGOTIATIONS PREJUDICE THEM.

IN THIS CONNECTION, CORDIER READ MISSION OFFICER CABLE RECEIVED THIS MORNING FROM BUNCHE WHICH HE THOUGHT SHED LIGHT ON INACCURATE PRESS REPORTS COMING FROM AREA. BUNCHE REPORTED GAZA COMPLETELY PEACEFUL, WITH NO DEMONSTRATIONS AND NO EGYPTIAN TROOPS AT ALL IN EVIDENCE. ON CONTRARY, UNEF TO BE SEEN THROUGHOUT ENTIRE STRIP.

2. RE REPORT CHECK POINTS TURNED OVER BY UNEF TO EGYPTIAN AUTHORITIES, CORDIER SAID UNEF AND EGYPTIANS HAD BEEN SEEKING WORK OUT JOINT ARRANGEMENTS AND HE HAD NO REPORT AS TO STATUS THESE TALKS SO HE COULD NEITHER CONFIRM NOR DENY SUCH REPORT. HE INCLINED DOUBT IT HAD GONE AS FAR AS PAPERS INDICATED, HOWEVER.

3. RE REPORT UNRWA INTENDED TURN OVER CONTROL HEALTH, EDUCATION AND SUPPLY FUNCTIONS TO EGYPTIAN CIVIL ADMINISTRATION. CORDIER SAID UNRWA IS RESUMING FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL REFUGEE MATTERS WHICH CONSTITUTES FULL CONTROL AS REGARDS TWO-THIRDS ENTIRE POPULATION ON STRIP. CORDIER COMMENTED THIS

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MEANS ONLY PEOPLE WHO WILL HAVE ANY ASSURANCE OF HEALTH, EDUCATION OR SUPPLY BENEFITS WILL BE THAT PROPORTION OF POPULATION ADMINISTERED BY UNRWA.

4. RE UNEF HEADQUARTERS. CORDIER STATED REPORT THAT UNEF HEADQUARTERS MOVING OUT OF BUILDING IT HAD OCCUPIED IN GAZA CITY CORRECT. HOWEVER, THIS HE CHARACTERIZED AS BEING ONLY OF SYMBOLIC SIGNIFICANCE. UNEF HEADQUARTERS REMAINING IN GAZA CITY. REPORT IN PAPERS TODAY UNEF PLANNING MOVE HEADQUARTERS TO EL AUJA OR ELSEWHERE OUTSIDE GAZA STRIP ENTIRELY WITHOUT FOUNDATION.

5. RE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUEZ CANAL. CORDIER REPORTED LOUTFI (EGYPT) HAD SEEN SYG SECOND TIME YESTERDAY TO REPORT THAT COMMUNIQUE REGARDING ARRANGEMENTS WAS TO BE DELIVERED TO ALL DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS CAIRO AND TO REQUEST ITS DISTRIBUTION AS "A" DOCUMENT. SYG DECLINED CIRCULATE THIS AS ASSEMBLY DOCUMENT, SAYING HE WAS NOT SATISFIED WITH SUBSTANCE OF PAPER AND INTENDED TO WORK ON THIS MATTER WHEN HE GOT TO CAIRO. SYG MADE TWO SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR CHANGES IN TEXT OF DRAFT COMMUNIQUE. INSTEAD OF SAYING "DECLARES", SYG FELT IT WISER USE WORD "ENVISAGES", WHICH WOULD HAVE LESS APPEARANCE DICTATION BY EGYPT. SECOND CHANGE RELATED TO PARAGRAPH 6 OF DRAFT EGYPTIAN COMMUNIQUE. SYG SUGGESTED INSERTION OF PHRASE "AFTER CONSULTATIONS" IN LANGUAGE REGARDING INTENTION MAKE FURTHER ANNOUNCEMENT. VIEW GOE INTENTION CIRCULATE TEXT ALL MISSIONS CAIRO, CORDIER NOT AT ALL CONFIDENT SUGGESTED CHANGES WOULD BE MADE.

4656  
6. CORDIER SAID MRS. MEIR (ISRAEL) HAD SPENT TWO HOURS WITH SYG LAST NIGHT DEVELOPING "AIR-TIGHT CASE IN DEFENSE OF MILITARY ACTION UNLESS SITUATION CHANGED". SHE SAID THAT "ISRAEL WOULD NEVER TOLERATE A BELLIGERENT EGYPT RETURNING TO GAZA". SHE THEN WENT TO GREAT LENGTHS TO RECAPITULATE UNDERSTANDINGS, EXPECTATIONS, ASSUMPTIONS, AND HOPES. SHE WENT SO FAR AS TO STATE SYG SHOULD HAVE GOTTEN UP AND DENIED THESE, IF HE DID NOT

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AGREE WITH THEM. FACT HE DID NOT, SHE SAID, DEMONSTRATED THAT THEIR ASSUMPTIONS, ETC. STOOD UNCHALLENGED. SHE CLAIMED, MOREOVER, MAJORITY GA AGREED WITH ISRAEL AND THAT THIS WAS CLEAR FROM DEBATE. UPON LEAVING MRS. MEIR SAID TO SYG SHE WOULD BE GOING BACK TO ISRAEL NOT KNOWING ANSWERS TO HER QUESTIONS.

LODGE

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TELEGRAM**

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

**Department of State**

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1957 MAR 21 PM 5 52

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Origin

(CODE ROOM: Repeat USUN's 655, March 19 to Tel Aviv.)

Info:

Dist.  
Desired  
(Offices  
Only)

Subject: Situation/Gaza Strip

HERTER

*Herter (acting)  
JDP*

674.84A/3-1957

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674.84A/3-1957

Drafted by:

IO: UNP: SDePalma: scp 3/20/57

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

UNP - Mr. DePalma

Clearances:

*EAX*  
*S/SCR*  
*MAR 21 1957 P.M.*

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Action  
IO

FROM: NEW YORK

Control: 12325  
Rec'd: MARCH 19, 1957  
8:11 P.M.

Info  
RMR

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 656, MARCH 19, 7 P.M.

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PRIORITY

RE: MIDDLE EAST



LODGE SAW SYG THIS AFTERNOON PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE FOR EGYPT AND READ TO HIM SUBSTANCE DEPTTEL 723. SYG ALSO CONVENED HIS LATEST INFORMATION AND SUMMARY CONVERSATIONS WITH MRS. MEIR.

1. RE HIS NEGOTIATIONS WITH EGYPT.

SYG NOTED EGYPTIANS HAD PUBLISHED THEIR COMMUNIQUE ON INTERIM ARRANGEMENT ON CANAL IN SPITE ADVICE GIVEN THEM BY HIMSELF AND US. EGYPTIANS HAD EXPLAINED THIS AS EFFORT AVOID INVOLVING SYG IN THIS PHASE. HE SAID HE COULD UNDERSTAND THIS TO SOME EXTENT. HE INDICATED FAWZI HAD STRESSED "ALL DOORS" REMAINED OPEN. BUNCHE HAD ALSO REPORTED, IN RESPONSE POINTED QUESTIONS RELAYED TO FAWZI FROM SYG, THAT FAWZI FELT THERE WAS STILL PLENTY OF ROOM FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH SYG. BOTH FAWZI AND BUNCHE RECOMMENDED HE SHOULD STILL COME. BUNCHE THOUGHT THAT EVEN IF SYG DID NOT ACCOMPLISH MUCH IT WOULD BE BEST BE ABLE SAY HE HAD TRIED, BUT POSSIBILITY EXISTED FOR SOME PROGRESS. FAWZI HAD INDICATED HE WAS WILLING DISCUSS ALL WAYS AND MEANS OF FACILITATING UNEF FUNCTIONS ON DEMARCATION LINE. FAWZI HAD ALSO SAID UNEF WAS "ALL OVER" GAZA BUT THIS FACT COULD NOT BE "ANNOUNCED"; PUBLIC COMMENTS SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO DISCUSSION ITS JOB ON ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE. FAWZI HAD ALSO INDICATED RESPONSIBILITY FOR GAZA POPULATION SHOULD BE LEFT TO EGYPT WITHOUT SAYING TOO MUCH.

2. RE SITUATION IN GAZA.

SYG REPEATED INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY GIVEN MISSION BY CORDIER

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(REPORTED USUN 655) AND SAID HE FELT NOTHING HAD HAPPENED TO PROVIDE ANY FEASIBLE BASIS FOR ACTION AGAINST EGYPT. SITUATION WAS PEACEFUL; THERE WERE NO DEMONSTRATIONS; EGYPTIAN TROOPS HAD NOT ENTERED GAZA; UNEF WAS IN EVIDENCE THROUGHOUT ENTIRE STRIP. BESIDES "FRONTIER FORCES", WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS NOT IMPORTANT, EGYPT HAD MOVED ONE EUROPEAN-SIZED BATTALION OF INFANTRY, AND ONE ANTI-AIRCRAFT BATTERY WITH PLATOON OF SOLDIERS TO PROTECT IT, INTO EL ARISH. BATTALION WAS ABOUT 500 OR 600 MEN. SYG SAID HE REGARDED THIS AS "LITTLE TOO BIG" BUT DID NOT THINK IT INDICATED ANY SPECIFIC INTENTIONS RE MOVING ARMED FORCES INTO GAZA STRIP. CONCERNING OUR WISHES BUNCHE AND BURNS BE INSTRUCTED LIMIT PRESENT EGYPTIAN TAKEOVER TO SYMBOLIC BASIS AND REFRAIN FROM NEW ARRANGEMENTS WITH EGYPTIAN OFFICIALS OR FINALIZING THOSE IN PROGRESS, SYG REPLIED THAT EMPHATIC INSTRUCTIONS HAD BEEN SENT TO BURNS TO RESIST EGYPTIAN PRESSURES PENDING HIS CONSULTATIONS IN CAIRO. SYG ALSO SAID ONLY PROMISE HE HAD GIVEN ISRAELIS ABOUT UNEF IN SHARM-EL-SHEIKH HAD BEEN NOT TO WITHDRAW WITHOUT NOTIFYING ADVISORY COMMITTEE. BURNS HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO DO NOTHING ABOUT ANY WITHDRAWAL REQUESTS EXCEPT TO REPORT TO HEADQUARTERS.

*Labrousse left  
instructing  
BURNS to  
perform this*  
RE UNRWA RESPONSIBILITIES CORDIER COMMENTED EGYPT WAS TAKING OVER SUPPLY, HEALTH AND EDUCATION FUNCTIONS FOR NON-REFUGEES WHICH UNRWA HAD PLANNED BUT NOT ACTUALLY STARTED; HE STRESSED UNRWA CONTINUED TO RETAIN THESE CUSTOMARY RESPONSIBILITIES FOR REFUGEES, WHICH CONSTITUTED TWO-THIRDS TO THREE-FOURTHS OF POPULATION.

3. RE HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH MRS. MEIR. SYG SAID THERE WAS NOTHING NEW OF POLICY NATURE. MRS. MEIR HAD ASKED HIM IN WRITING TO TRANSMIT FORMALLY TO EGYPTIANS ISRAELI QUESTION WHETHER EGYPT CONSIDERED ITSELF IN STATE OF BELLIGERENCY WITH ISRAEL. SYG SAID HE HAD REFUSED TRANSMIT SUCH QUESTION WHILE ISRAEL REMAINED IN GAZA BUT NOW THAT THEY WERE OUT HE FELT BOUND TO DO SO. HE DID NOT THINK THIS WAS GOOD DIPLOMACY AND HAD TOLD MRS. MEIR HE DID NOT THINK SUCH FORMAL REQUEST WOULD HELP SITUATION. HE HAD INQUIRED WHETHER SHE WAS MORE INTERESTED IN PAPER REPLY OR IN PRACTICAL PROGRESS. MRS. MEIR REPLIED SHE WANTED PIECE OF PAPER. SYG THOUGHT ISRAELIS WERE BUILDING RECORD FOR FUTURE ACTION, BUT HE WOULD HAVE TO PASS QUESTION ON. ISRAELI REQUEST INCLUDED REFERENCES TO BELLIGERENCY IN

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GAZA, STRAITS, AND CANAL, AND SYG EXPECTED COMPLICATED REPLY FROM EGYPTIANS.

ba [ MRS. MEIR HAD SAID ISRAEL COULD NOT ACQUIESCE IN PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS IN GAZA. IT COULD NOT AGREE TO RETURN TO SITUATION WHICH PREVAILED PREVIOUSLY. SYG SAID SHE HAD TWO MAIN POINTS: (1) IF EGYPT CONSIDERED ITSELF IN STATE OF BELLIGERENCY WITH ISRAEL, ARMISTICE AGREEMENT DID NOT APPLY AND EGYPT COULD CLAIM NO RIGHTS IN GAZA ON BASIS OF IT. SYG OBSERVED, HOWEVER, THIS SITUATION WOULD NOT GIVE ISRAEL ANY RIGHTS IN GAZA EITHER, NOR COULD UN HAVE ANY RIGHTS THERE, AND WHOLE SITUATION WOULD BECOME LEGAL VACUUM. (2) MRS. MEIR CLAIMED THOSE WHO HAD SAID IN GA ISRAEL'S EXPECTATIONS WERE REASONABLE HAD AGREED TO ISRAEL'S POSITION. THOSE WHO HAD NOT OBJECTED (AND ESPECIALLY SYG) HAD ALSO APPROVED BY THEIR SILENCE. SYG SAID HE REPLIED THAT HIS POSITION ON LEGAL SITUATION IN GAZA HAD BEEN STATED MANY TIMES AND HE HAD NOT FELT IT NECESSARY TO REPEAT IT. HE HAD ALSO STATED HE WAS NOT SURPRISED THAT BLAME FOR SITUATION WAS BEGINNING TO BE SHIFTED TO HIM. HE THOUGHT ISRAELIS WERE BUILDING CASE FOR HOME CONSUMPTION.

MRS. MEIR HAD ALSO STATED ISRAEL WOULD NEVER ACCEPT UN TROOPS ON ITS SIDE OF DEMARCATION LINES IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES. SYG HAD REPLIED FOR RECORD HE WAS NOT PUTTING QUESTION TO HER AT THAT TIME. SHE HAD ALSO ASKED SYG TO GIVE CLEAR-CUT REPLY ON WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR INTERNAL SECURITY IN GAZA STRIP. SYG SAID HE HAD REPLIED IN CERTAIN SENSE UN HAD RESPONSIBILITY BUT CLEAR ANSWER COULD NOT BE GIVEN BECAUSE THIS WAS QUESTION OPEN FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH EGYPT AT HIGHEST LEVEL, AND INVOLVED NEW TYPE SITUATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW ON WHICH IT NOT POSSIBLE GIVE ALL ANSWERS IN SHORT TIME. CERTAIN AMOUNT OF FEELING WAY ALONG NECESSARY.

4. SYG SAID HE HAD VERY MUCH APPRECIATED CONVERSATION WITH SECRETARY.

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**SENT TO:** Amembassy TEL AVIV  
Amembassy CAIRO  
USUN, NEW YORK891  
3101  
722

Origin

Info:

Following based on memo conversation not yet cleared by Secretary

Israel FOMIN called on Secretary March 18. Stated she had originally let UN to return Israel under certain assumptions which had made it seem Israel withdrawal best course. Basic things Israel had expected were nonbelligerency and UN takeover both Gaza and Aqaba. In Gaza it was expected UN would exercise both military and civil functions including security.

Israelis perturbed because question of hours between Israel withdrawal and Egypt's practically taking over. On whose authority had Egyptian General come into Gaza as Governor? Israel's information was that Nasser planned put Army in Gaza and then ask UNEF to withdraw to border. Nasser had been quiet during four months when Israel occupied Gaza and Aqaba, now making declarations such as statement that morning Israel had no right exist and that passage Suez and Aqaba should be denied Israel. Israel Government under heavy pressure explain to people why it had withdrawn forces. Difficult for Government to take stand because it not convinced it had acted rightly. Israel had relied not on UN but on US and President. US might say it not UN but it had strong influence there. Developments in Gaza would not have taken place if UN had opposed them. Israel was disappointed. In recent US message to Ben Gurion, hope expressed that Israel would take no precipitate action. Israel had replied it would not. Israel could take Gaza

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Drafted by:

NEA:NE:DCBergus:crc

3/18/57

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

NEA - William M. Rountree

Clearances:

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again but did not want to. Question before Israel Cabinet yesterday but no decision taken.

Secretary said he did not wish disguise fact that developments not entirely as we anticipated. In saying that he should say our anticipations not quite as optimistic as Israel's. No lack frankness either side that respect. We took position what had been done was within framework General Armistice Agreement which gave Egypt right occupancy. We had assumed there would be token Egyptian occupation. We had hoped for de facto UN administration even though Gaza nominally under Egypt. UNSYG and we through him felt this was likely result. We had no direct negotiations during this period with Egypt but relied on UNSYG. Expectations outlined by Lodge, who had quoted UNSYG, were, we believed acquiesced in by Egypt. Egyptian activity re Gaza had gone somewhat farther than we had hoped for. Secretary did not think situation hopeless because while we had exerted considerable pressure on Nasser, we had not exerted full weight our influence on situation. One of difficulties was how this might be done, particularly in light UNSYG's responsibilities and activities. We had not yet found adequate way coordinate our activities with his. We thinking intensively on how deal with Nasser. We did not know when UNSYG going Cairo. We imagined Mrs. Meir would be seeing UNSYG.

Mrs. Meir said she prepared meet him but honestly did not expect much good to come from meeting. Israel would not have withdrawn if it had been subject his expressions. Israel left Gaza when USG had advised it work matter out with statement regarding assumptions. Except for few sentences, Meir's statement of March 1 had been worked out in Department. Mrs. Meir had seen Mollet who agreed Israel had been right in assuming developments would take place along lines her statement. Israel admitted US had difference opinion with Israel on validity Armistice Agreement. Nevertheless US had

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spoken of de facto exclusion Egypt. Nasser now de facto in Gaza.

Secretary said premature assume things we had hoped for were not going happen. He did not think game played out. Secretary hoped Israel would not come prematurely feel that basis its action in withdrawing had been unwarranted. Whatever happened he did not think Israel would be worse off for doing what it had done. Israel starting again on sound juridical and moral basis. Secretary did not think it necessary assume things as disastrous as Israel and Nasser had forecast. These things may happen but should not be assumed. Secretary could understand Israel Government going through difficult period. We had not brought maximum pressure to bear. If we could get more directly to grips with Nasser might be better. This had been reconciled with power and influence UN which considerable. Although Mrs. Meir said she could not rely on UN, US did. What we trying do was bring about supremacy principles we backing, not individual nations. We did not write off UN nor did we wish displace it. Problem accommodation difficult, we giving it most active attention and planning continue study. We certainly felt that it not yet time say effort on which we embarked had failed.

Meir pointed out Nasser statements re Aqaba creating difficulties for Israel in persuading shippers go through Straits. USSR sending arms to Egypt again and probably would supply technicians operate them. Israel had already had casualties from infiltrators from El Arish and Gaza. UNEF had said it had no authority cope with them.

Secretary said he would not dispute statement things had moved contrary our anticipations. Unless present trend Nasser's thinking altered, might lead dangerous situation. We not satisfied present trend definitive and could not be altered. We had intentions but could not guarantee they would succeed. He had said at time that there were risks involved, but he still thought Israel did right. He still thought there

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good chance Israel's foreboding would not be realized. We knew Nasser unreliable.

The dependability on what he said was not on fact he said it but on pressures make it expedient. Question was whether we could find ways make it expedient for him live up to what he said. If this effort failed, there would be new situation. Israel had said it would exercise its rights self-defense, we had said we would consult with other UN members. This contingency might come about but had not yet done so. Secretary realized this difficult situation live with but must urge Israel live with it for longer period.

Secretary said although not central point, he could not understand Israel's objections to stationing UNEF in Israel and greater mobility for UNTSO. Hard reconcile this attitude with Israel's bitter complaints. Mrs. Meir said this had source in Armistice Agreements, which Egypt not complying with, despite presence UNTSO. Israel had small territory with long boundaries. If UNEF on border with Egypt then pressure bring them along Jordan-Syrian borders. If on Israel side, Israel would be occupied country and no longer independent with all kinds soldiers on its soil. US should ask Nasser if he still in state war with Israel. Secretary pointed out US had armistice agreement Korea but still applied Trading with Enemy Act against Red China. When he talked about stationing troops along Israel side boundary, he not thinking Israel obligated do so any more than Egypt obligated forego rights under Armistice Agreement, but that these were acts which could contribute to improvement situation.

Meir and other Israelis expressed view that UNEF acting as shield for Nasser reorganize his fedayeen bases. Would be simple for Israel go get Egyptian General Gaza and parade him through Tel Aviv but UN protected him. Secretary asked if this not new viewpoint. Meir said that if Nasser would not give ~~Nasser would not give~~ Gaza to UN he shouldn't expect UN screen.

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Mr. Eban referred previous US expressions mentioning close consultation. Secretary said he would like have such consultation. He would like Israel's own thoughts on how matter might be handled. He hoped above all else Israel would not move abruptly without notice to US. He knew this difficult and not asking for veto but did not think our attitude arbitrary. Would be useful if Mrs. Meir talked to UNSYG that afternoon.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**Memorandum of Conversation**

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DATE: March 19, 1957

SUBJECT: AFME Officials' Views on Middle East

PARTICIPANTS: Commander Elmo Hutchison, American Friends  
of the Middle East  
Mr. Charles Hulac, American Friends of the Middle East  
NE - Stuart W. Rockwell  
NE - Lewis Hoffacker

COPIES TO: NE (2cc) AmEmbassy CAIRO (1cc)  
NEA/P (1cc)  
OLI (2cc)

Commander Hutchison and Mr. Hulac called at their request to give their impressions on current Middle East affairs.

Commander Hutchison, who did most of the talking during the fifty minute call, took the line generally held by the Egyptian Government on the Gaza, Palestine and other issues. He reiterated the plea for unfreezing of Egyptian assets now held in the United States and argued that the continued freezing of these funds provided a handy weapon for the communists, who encouraged Egyptians to regard this as a deliberately unfriendly United States act. Mr. Rockwell reminded Commander Hutchison that the communists had been furnished another weapon through the Egyptian "open door policy" concerning Soviet arms and other commodities.

Commander Hutchison quoted Nasser as saying several weeks ago that he would no longer insist on Israel retreat to the 1947 frontiers, that Arab refugee rights and demands would have to be honored in any satisfactory Arab-Israeli settlement, and that given resolution of "other basic questions" Egypt would "accept" Israel. Acknowledging that recent statements by Nasser had detracted from the relatively good position in which Egypt found itself recently, Commander Hutchison believed that Nasser would respond favorably "if the right people got to him at the right time."

Rev. NEA:NE:LHoffacker:feg  
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MAR 28 1957

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CONFIDENTIAL  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
TELEPHONE  
**Memorandum of Conversation**

DATE: March 19, 1957  
9:55 a.m.

SUBJECT: Israel-Egyptian Developments

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary  
Mr. Hammarskjold

COPIES TO: As directed by the Secretary's Office

See Egypt Cable SOSUN 725  
674.842/3-22-57  
NR 320-222  
974-222  
611.74

The Secretary telephoned Mr. Hammarskjold just prior to the latter's scheduled meeting with his Advisory Council. The following is the substance of what the Secretary said to Mr. Hammarskjold (The Reporting Officer heard only one side of the conversation. Miss Bernau made stenographic notes to supplement this memorandum):

The Secretary inquired whether Mr. Hammarskjold planned to leave for Cairo today and expressed the view that it would be useful if he did proceed. He felt the situation was badly deteriorating, in the sense that the expectations which the Secretary General, the United States and Israel had expressed were being diluted by Egypt. He was afraid a situation was being created in which Israel might feel that it could again resort to force, this time under conditions in which it would be very difficult to obtain a condemnation of Israel.

Responding to comments made by Mr. Hammarskjold to the effect that the American press was giving a distorted picture of the Gaza situation which,

NEA: W.M. Rountree

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according

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according to General Burns, was not bad, the Secretary recognized that the news stories undoubtedly reflected pro-Israel influence. On the other hand, he felt that Egypt was anxious to reestablish the status quo ante. It had always been very basic in the United States position, as the Secretary had expressed to the General Assembly on November 1, that out of this development must come something better than the situation previously existing. Egypt must cooperate in achieving that kind of improved situation; otherwise the great efforts which had been made would have been in vain. The Secretary had always called for a settlement by peaceful means in accordance with the principles of justice and international law. We had all worked hard to achieve the peaceful aspect, in pursuance of which the British, French and Israeli withdrawals were arranged. Now Egypt must cooperate in that aspect dealing with justice and international law. Continuing statements by Egypt regarding the exercise of belligerent rights were inconsistent with that purpose. Egypt, the Secretary said, could not have it both ways, on the one hand saying it had belligerent rights and on the other hand saying that Israel did not have rights of belligerency.

The Secretary thought that one of the important questions in the situation, as Nasser viewed it, was whether if he should behave himself regarding Gaza, the Suez Canal, the Straits of Aqaba, etc. he might expect the re-establishment of a normal position in Egyptian-American relations. The Secretary said our thinking was that he should be able to count on a normal relationship in these circumstances. That did not mean that we would pay an extravagant sum for Nasser's cooperation, but if he pursued policies

consistent

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consistent with the objectives which we sought we might be willing to take such action as resuming tourist travel, providing some form of economic help, agree to sales of surplus commodities, etc. The Secretary expected to discuss this matter with the British at Bermuda. The basic problem which they must face was whether they should continue economic warfare regardless of what Nasser did. If they should decide that that should be their policy, it would be much more difficult to arrive at a solution.

The Secretary did not think that we had yet marshalled the full weight of what we could do to influence Egypt to arrive at an acceptable solution. This was largely a question of timing. The Secretary hoped that Mr. Hammarskjold would proceed to Egypt, notwithstanding Mr. Hammarskjold's fears that he might not be successful. The Secretary felt that the outcome would probably not be what was popularly regarded to be a success. He thought, however, that the discussion should not lead to a "break", particularly since we had not yet used all of the ammunition available to us. The Secretary had told Mrs. Meir that he had not thought that everything would work out automatically when the Israelis withdrew; that many difficult problems would be involved in achieving the objectives which we sought. He had pointed out that it had taken a long time to persuade the Israelis to withdraw, and surely it might be expected that problems would arise in working out arrangements with the Egyptians. It would take time to put things right, and he therefore urged Mrs. Meir not to "precipitate things".

The Secretary inquired whether Mrs. Meir had spoken to Mr. Hammarskjold about the possibility of the dissolution of UNEF, commenting that the Israeli

Foreign




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Foreign Minister had spoken positively to him on that question. The Secretary thought that was a possibility which must be envisaged.

The Secretary concluded the conversation by saying he wanted Mr. Hamarskjold to know that we would support him fully if he went to Egypt. He could speak in confidence that the United States backed him up.

  
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE: March 19, 1957

SUBJECT: Middle East Problems

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Ali Amini, Embassy of Iran

The Under Secretary  
Owen T. Jones, Director, GTI

COPIES TO: GTI (2)  
NEA (cc)  
U (cc)  
S/S (2cc)  
OLI (2)

After wishing the Under Secretary well in his new duties, the Ambassador expressed his Government's appreciation for the efforts of the United States in persuading the Israelis to withdraw from the Gaza strip and the Sharm el Sheikh area in the Sinai Peninsula. He said his Government was keenly interested in that area in the Middle East and inquired about recent developments affecting it. Other than observing generally that these developments presented difficult problems, the Under Secretary did not engage himself in a discussion of this subject.

The Ambassador then turned to the Baghdad Pact. He inquired generally about the Pact itself and more specifically about our possible adherence to the Military Committee. The Under Secretary said that, on the assumption that the Baghdad Pact signatories would invite it, a closer association with the Military Committee was under study.

The brief meeting closed with the Under Secretary again responding to the well wishes of the Ambassador.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

March 20, 1957

U - Mr. Stimpson

Ambassador Amini's Call  
on the Under Secretary

The attached memorandum of conversation is submitted for approval prior to distribution. The Under Secretary's remarks are sidelined in red.

Fisher Howe

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

This document consists of 1 page  
No. 1 of 8 Copies A  
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**Memorandum of Conversation**

DATE: March 19, 1957

SUBJECT: The Middle East Situation

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Heinz L. Krekeler, German Ambassador  
Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State  
Mr. J. J. Reinstein, GER

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During a call on Mr. Murphy, Ambassador Krekeler asked whether Mr. Murphy could comment on the Middle East situation. Mr. Murphy said that he felt the actions which the Egyptians were taking were, to say the least, unwise in the light of the efforts other nations had been making to bring about the withdrawal of Israeli forces. These actions had been unduly precipitate and appeared to be designed to promote difficulties rather than to restore stability in the area. He said that if the Egyptians keep this up, the result would be a resumption of hostilities. He indicated that this view had been communicated to the Egyptian Government.

Mr. Murphy remarked that the Egyptian attitude on the Canal was very adamant and that difficulties were apparently in prospect with regard to the Gulf of Aqaba.

Ambassador Krekeler said that he had been surprised over the Saudi Arabian position with regard to the Gulf of Aqaba. Mr. Murphy said this attitude had appeared in the Saudi talks with the U. S. The Ambassador asked whether it was likely that Israeli shipping would be attacked if it attempted to enter the Gulf of Aqaba. Mr. Murphy said that he did not exclude this possibility, but it obviously would not be known until a test had been made. The Ambassador asked whether Mr. Murphy thought that the Saudis would attack Israeli shipping. Mr. Murphy said that the Saudis had no equipment in the area and he thought that in the light of the joint arrangements between the Saudis and the Egyptians, an attack, if it took place, was more likely from the Egyptian side.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

1871  
DATE: March 19, 1957

SUBJECT: Middle East Situation

PARTICIPANTS: Sir Percy Spender, Australian Ambassador  
Mr. M. R. Booker, Counselor of Embassy  
The Under Secretary  
William J. Sebald, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State  
John Gordon Mein, Deputy Director, Southwest Pacific Affairs

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The call was primarily a courtesy one since Sir Percy had never called on nor met the Under Secretary. Sir Percy stated that he had a few days previously had a very helpful conversation with Assistant Secretary Rountree on the general situation in the Middle East and that although he did not wish to take the Under Secretary's time in covering the same ground again there were a few questions he would like to raise.

1. Suez Canal. Sir Percy stated that he knew that certain of the Scandinavian countries were placing the emphasis on getting the canal in operation rather than on the solution of the overall problem, and that he had heard that the State Department was considering some interim arrangement which might involve the "purchase" of a solution by the release of frozen Egyptian assets in this country.

The Under Secretary replied that we have no such plans. He added that there have been recent developments in Cairo and that we have been informed that the Egyptian Government was sending a communique to all foreign missions in Cairo and that although we did not know the contents of the communique indications were that they were not what we would want. He commented that the Egyptians may have felt that they had to take a stand before the Bermuda Conference but it was not clear whether they would be willing to change it at a later date or not. Sir Percy commented that he was disturbed because in his opinion any interim arrangement which might be purchased would only serve to postpone if not put off altogether a permanent settlement.

2. The Gaza Strip. Sir Percy stated that although it is premature to take a firm view on the situation in the Gaza Strip before Mr. Hammarskjold talks with

Nasser,

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Nasser, he was concerned with developments there. The Under Secretary pointed out that the getting of factual information and the formulation of an accurate picture of what the situation in the strip is has been difficult. From the information available, he said, conditions appear to be peaceful but we don't know what has been worked out between the Egyptian Government and Major General Purns.

Sir Percy stated that it appeared to be in Mr. Hammarskjold's mind that as part of a permanent settlement Israel should be asked to allow UNEF to place forces on its side of the line. Sir Percy felt the difficulty Israel was facing was that acceptance of UNEF within its borders would serve to strengthen Nasser's position and any specific attempt at conciliation would be dangerous. He asked what had been done to get Israel to give in. The Under Secretary stated that the situation in the Gaza Strip has changed and that although our position on the UNEF has not changed we are not pressing the Israelis.

Sir Percy stated that the UNEF had been placed in the Gaza Strip for the purpose of carrying out the United Nations General Assembly Resolution of November 2 but that Egypt and Mr. Hammarskjold have been able to take a very legalistic position. He asked whether we were giving any consideration to raising the matter in the United Nations General Assembly should no progress be made with Mr. Nasser concerning the strip or compliance with the November 2 resolution. The Under Secretary replied that we would consider every angle and various possible courses of action but we preferred not to comment on this until after Mr. Hammarskjold has held discussions in Cairo and events have been clarified.

3. Israel. The Israelis claim that their "assumptions" had been put in the form of words. The Under Secretary commented that he had taken no part in the discussions and was not, therefore, in a position to go into this point, but we had made it clear to Mrs. Meir and Ambassador Eban that we had different views on this point. He added that beyond that he could not go.

4. Gulf of Aqaba. Sir Percy stated that he had gathered it was the idea of the State Department that the question of free passage in the Gulf of Aqaba should be effected as a de facto matter. The Under Secretary replied that the State Department had taken the position publicly that these were international waters and that in the absence of a court decision to the contrary should be open to free navigation by all nations. Sir Percy inquired whether this meant that the United States Government as such does not plan to test its position but merely to take a stand which will serve as a guide line to U.S. shipping companies. The Under Secretary confirmed that that was correct. Sir Percy added that according to the NEW YORK TIMES the United States was planning to send a ship into the Gulf of Aqaba every ten days. The Under Secretary commented that we had no plans for the purpose of testing the intention of the Egyptians and Arabians.

5. Saudi Arabia.

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5. Saudi Arabia. Sir Percy inquired what position is being taken by the Saudi Arabians. The Under Secretary commented that the Saudi Arabians seemed to be primarily interested in the protection of the holy places which were well inland.

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*in draft*  
*J.P.B.*

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation



DATE: March 19, 1957

PARTICIPANTS:

Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel  
Mr. Gideon Raphael, Counselor, Israel Foreign Ministry  
Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Embassy of Israel  
The Under Secretary  
NEA - William M. Rountree (for part of meeting)  
NE - Donald C. Bergus

COPIES TO: S/S(2), G, U, C, NEA(2), NE(2), IO, OLI(2), USUN, Cairo, Tel Aviv

Mr. Eban said he wished to discuss the implications of yesterday's joint statement. He regretted that press comments had been attributed to U. S. officials which seemed to place an unfortunate emphasis on warnings and pressures against Israel. The Under Secretary stated that some of these news stories disturbed us, that we had no idea of who was being quoted, and that we were trying to find out where these stories originated. Mr. Rountree pointed out the great press activity which always followed an important event such as Mrs. Meir's call at the Department yesterday. Newsmen did not appear to be above the use of such techniques as approaching Embassy officials, attributing remarks to the Department, and inviting comment. The reverse was also true. We had briefed Department spokesmen yesterday to state that the purpose of the joint communique had been to set forth what had been said in the discussions between the Israel Foreign Minister and the Secretary. It was difficult to control press speculation.

Mr. Eban then passed to the following matters:

1. Clarification of Egypt's Position on Belligerency. When the Foreign Minister had seen the Secretary General yesterday, she had formally requested him to ascertain if Egypt wished to continue to exercise belligerent rights. Mr. Eban handed the Under Secretary a copy (attached) of Israel's formal communication to the Secretary General on this subject. Mr. Eban understood that the Secretary General had undertaken to elicit that clarification. An Egyptian response

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response that it no longer claimed the right of belligerency would be a dramatic turning point. If, on the other hand, the Egyptians said that they intended to maintain belligerency, there was merit in having elicited this expression from them. There would then be a clear position to be brought to the attention of the Security Council, General Assembly, and others. Israel was not publicizing the fact that the Secretary General had been asked to seek the Egyptian view, so as to avoid placing impediments in the way of the Secretary General's inquiry and Egypt's reply.

80 2. Gaza. Mr. Eban said that the present course of events seemed to point to a steady erosion of United Nations responsibility in Gaza. It was necessary to halt and reverse this trend. The first principle of an approach should be the indivisibility of United Nations responsibility. The United Nations could not be held to a position of responsibility for security only on the armistice line with the Egyptians responsible for it elsewhere in Gaza. Israel believed that it should be established as a policy of United Nations member states that if the United Nations were responsible for security on the armistice line it must be responsible for internal security as well. Israel had spoken to some of the countries on the UNEF Advisory Committee. Some, perhaps a majority, agreed with Israel. Israel would welcome U. S. views and seeks U. S. support. Israel would prefer that the United Nations would have no responsibility rather than diluted responsibility. If Egypt wished responsibility in the Gaza Strip, let it face Israel directly. This did not necessarily mean that Israel would fight Egypt but that Egypt would bear the responsibility for its acts. Israel thought it would be useful if there were forthwith appointed a United Nations Commissioner for civil affairs in Gaza. It might be useful if the U.S. called to Egypt's attention the Israel Foreign Minister's March 1 United Nations General Assembly statement that a deterioration of the situation in Gaza could cause Israel to assert its rights.

3. Aqaba. Mr. Eban said it had been reported that the Israel vessel the Queen of Sheba had passed safely through the Straits of Tiran. The Israelis had called to the attention of the Secretary General reports that Egypt sought to replace the Finnish soldiers of UNEF stationed at Sharm el Sheikh. The Secretary General had dismissed these reports as rumors. Israel had told the Secretary General that the arrival of Egyptian soldiers there would be the kind of shock that Israel could not stand, particularly now. If developments of this kind took place, the matter should be immediately referred to the Advisory Committee and the General Assembly. Mr. Eban referred to

previous

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previous conversations with the Secretary where there had been discussion of the idea that a further U.S.-Israel exchange of Aide-Memoires on the Gulf of Aqaba take place. Israel would shortly be presenting a draft Aide-Memoire, along the lines of the Foreign Minister's March 1 statement, for the consideration, in the first instance, of Mr. Phleger. Israel hoped to exchange such documents with a large number of the maritime powers of the world. Mr. Eban renewed his request that the U.S. encourage the Danes to authorize the Brigitte Toft to sail through the Straits of Tiran. The vessel was now in Djibouti awaiting instructions. Mr. Eban said that favorable U.S. action on this request would not be used as a precedent for further Israel requests for U.S. intervention with other maritime powers. Mr. Eban hoped that the U.S. would give effective encouragement to U.S. shippers who were being approached by the Israelis with cargoes for Eilat. The Under Secretary said we would look into this and imagined that the shippers would be approaching us. Mr. Eban hoped that the U.S. would take an encouraging attitude if approached by U.S. or French interests seeking our views on the proposed 32" pipeline from Eilat to the Mediterranean.

4. Suez Canal. Israel welcomed the U.S. assurance that it continued to adhere to the Six Principles. The process of clearing the Canal was approaching its end and there had been no political agreement with respect to the Canal's operation or the ending of discrimination in its use. There was a danger that the United Nations would open the Canal with no assurance that United Nations law on these matters would apply. Israel thought that the short time remaining until the Canal was opened, presumably April 10, should be a period of intense activity aimed at settling these matters. While the Israelis would take no action without consulting the U.S., it was likely that on a certain date, after ships of other nations had transited the Canal, either an Israel ship or an Israel-bound ship under another flag, carrying cargo which the Egyptians had in the past considered contraband, would seek passage through the Canal. Israel believed that every Government which had advanced funds for the clearance of the Canal favored Israel's use of the Canal. Mr. Eban thought these Governments had every right not to see the Canal open for a single day under a regime of discrimination. They should, if necessary, protract the period of Canal clearance. There was more moral leverage now.

5. U.S. Public Attitude Toward Nasser. Mr. Eban said that in each of the three foregoing matters Nasser was pursuing policies

which

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which were opposed by Israel and, he thought, the United States. It must be made plain to world opinion that the U.S. opposed these policies. The Secretary had spoken of the need of exerting maximum pressure on Nasser. One means would be the public voice of the U.S. This would be helpful to the Israel Government in its current domestic difficulties. Perhaps the Bermuda Conference would be an appropriate place for the U.S. and the U.K. to join in expressing policies of opposition to these elements of Nasser's policy.

Attachment: *att*

Israeli Foreign Minister's  
letter of March 19, 1957 to  
the Secretary General.

*SB*  
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19th March  
1957

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

I refer to our conversation of yesterday and have the honour, on behalf of the Government of Israel, to reiterate the request that you put the following question to the Government of Egypt during your forthcoming visit to Cairo:

Is the Government of Egypt prepared to declare that it renounces all claim to the existence of a state of war between Egypt and Israel, and that it will refrain scrupulously from any acts of belligerency and from any hostile action by land, sea or air, including restrictions against Israel-bound shipping in the Suez Canal and in the Gulf of Aqaba and the organisation of raids into Israel from Egypt and other neighbouring territories?

You are authorized to inform the Government of Egypt that Israel has already expressed in due form its readiness to make a pledge of non-belligerency with Egypt.

Please accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Golda Meir  
Minister for Foreign Affairs

H. E. Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld,  
Secretary-General,  
United Nations,  
New York.

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Mr. Rockwell:

Mr. Dinsmore would like to  
know whether you think a reply  
is necessary to the attached.

No

you

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Washington, D.C., le 19 Mars 1957.

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A I D E - M E M O I R E

Le Gouvernement français estime qu'il serait dangereux de laisser subsister plus longtemps l'équivoque entretenue par l'Egypte dans la question de belligérance.

Aussi, souhaite-t-il que le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis s'emploie, parallèlement au Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies, à obtenir du Gouvernement du Caire une clarification de sa position à ce sujet. Il convient de rappeler, à cette occasion, que la résolution du Conseil de Sécurité, en date du 1er Septembre 1951, comporte le passage suivant : " Considérant que, puisque le régime d'armistice, qui est en vigueur depuis près de deux ans et demi, a un caractère permanent, aucune des deux parties ne peut raisonnablement affirmer qu'elle se trouve en état de belligérance active..."

En outre, l'Assemblée Générale, dans sa résolution du 2 novembre 1956, demande que le régime de l'armistice soit scrupuleusement observé./.

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Département d'Etat,

Washington, D.C.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
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(TRANSLATION)

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French

Washington, D.C., March 19, 1957



AIDE-MEMOIRE

The French Government considers that it would be dangerous to allow the equivocal position maintained by Egypt in the question of belligerency to continue any longer.

Accordingly it hopes that the Government of the United States, along with the Secretary General of the United Nations, will seek to obtain from the Cairo Government a clarification of its position in this regard. It is advisable to recall, on this occasion, that the Security Council's resolution of September 1, 1951, contains the following passage: "Considering that, since the armistice that has been in force for nearly two and one-half years is of a permanent nature, neither of the two parties can reasonably affirm that it is in a state of active belligerency..." Furthermore, the General Assembly, in its resolution of November 2, 1956, requests that the armistice be scrupulously observed.

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9:15 p.m.

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TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1108, March 20, 6 p.m.

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Ben Gurion passed by two opportunities, presumably deliberately, to arouse his own public opinion and make case with world on Egypt's return to Gaza Strip.

1. In what Embassy is sure was planted interview with Israeli representative of UP, Ben Gurion said Israel would "fully defend her right of passage through Gulf Aqaba" but he did not take opportunity for polemics on question dealing with Egyptian return to Gaza Strip, merely stating search for Middle East peace is "almost wilfully being thrown away". His tone was similarly restrained on other current issues. On freedom of transit Suez, he said, "it is to be hoped necessary international pressure will be applied to Egypt should she attempt to renew her illegal blockade". Re Selwyn Lloyd's recent proposals for guarantees to both Israel and Arabs against aggression by either side, he said he had not seen transcript of Lloyd's remarks, would welcome discussions with Arabs but would not contemplate relinquishing any Israeli territory to Arabs and to suggest it is "to foster illusion and make peace more difficult of achievement". As for Franco-Israeli pact, he commented "solid friendship is more effective than piece of paper". On relations with Russia: USSR attitude is not determined by question of Israeli withdrawal from Suez and Gaza. Its character was revealed in 1955 when Soviet Union arranged supply Egypt and Syria with modern weapons. He spoke of new Israeli pipeline between Mediterranean and Aqaba as if it were already in existence or at least under contract. "While pipeline is intended to satisfy both local and European needs; it is not intended to compete with anybody ... world and Western Europe have had painful object lesson in what it means to be subjected to blackmail and sabotage. In that respect additional route from Red Sea to Mediterranean is obviously desirable."

2. Other opportunity

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-2- 1108, March 20, 6 p.m. from Tel Aviv

2. Other opportunity which seemed "a natural" would have been provided by his appearances yesterday at Gaza border settlements. These are frequently named in news because of Fedayeen activity or Israeli-Arab encounters there. The entire border settlement populace is very close to his heart and he has frequently declared his particular responsibility to them due to their very exposed position to Egyptian incursions. Here again Prime Minister spoke in moderate tones, although, of course, praising settlers for heroism demonstrated in their manner of living. For first time, he suggested validity withdrawal from Gaza without implying UN or US responsibility. He asked officers in nearby IDF camp "what would you do if you were Prime Minister, settle 100,000 Jews in Negev or feed 300,000 refugees in Gaza Strip?"

Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan, who accompanied Prime Minister is reported to have told settlers that while they might expect some thefts as in past by Gaza infiltrators, there was "little likelihood that large scale Fedayeen raids would be renewed".

Comment: In Embassy's view, Ben Gurion's decision not to exploit these two tailor-made opportunities may be significant of future Gaza policy somewhat more moderate than has yet been indicated by Golda Meir or Ben Gurion, provided (1) effective administration remains in hands UN as anticipated and presence Egyptians only symbolic, (2) no return of Egyptian military or paramilitary forces, and (3) no renewal Fedayeen raids or genuine threat to Israel's security incident to serious disorders in Strip or other subsequent developments.

Even if not so significant in that respect, it seems to reflect his desire to maintain maximum flexibility of policy and, accordingly, he does not want to commit himself more specifically on major issues until Meir returns and results of her talks in US can be assayed. It is possible that once he has decided even limited Egyptian return to Gaza cannot be reversed, he would then be able to minimize with less difficulty importance this political defeat in eyes his public.

LAWSON

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*Egyptian-Israeli  
situation  
Herter*

ACTING

*(SWR)*

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(Offices  
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RE: Egyptian-Israeli Situation

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Drafted by:

NEA:NE:SWRockwell:erc 3/21/57

Clerical:

S/S- Mr. Blood

Telegraphic transmission and  
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FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 660, MARCH 20, 7 P.M.

PRIORITY

RE GAZA

LODGE CALLED ON ISRAELI FONMIN AT HER REQUEST THIS NOON.

MRS. MEIR BEGAN CONVERSATION BY ASKING WHAT LODGE THOUGHT OF PRESENT SITUATION. LODGE REPLIED THERE WERE MANY DISCONCERTING DEVELOPMENTS BUT SITUATION NOT WITHOUT HOPE. MEIR SAID SHE HAD PUT TO EXPLAIN BACK HOME, EVEN TO FRIENDLY MEMBERS OWN PARTY WITH WHOM SHE HAD WORKED FOR THIRTY YEARS, HOW THINGS HAD COME TO BE IN SUCH STATE. HAD ISRAEL BEEN WRONG TO RELY ON US? HAD US IN EFFECT MISLED ISRAEL? THESE WERE HARD TO ANSWER. WHAT COULD SHE SAY?

GETTING SPECIFIC, MEIR STATED ISRAEL HAD LEARNED OF INTENTION OF EGYPT SEND GENERAL LATIF TO GAZA AND HAD "ALERTED" SYG AND STATE DEPT. YET HE HAD COME IN WITHOUT FINGER RAISED AGAINST HIS COMING. SHE COULDN'T UNDERSTAND WHY UN AND UNEF HAD ALLOWED THIS. WHY HAD NOT GA BEEN CONVENED? SO-CALLED INITIAL TAKE-OVER HAD LASTED ONLY 72 HOURS WHEN ISRAEL LED TO BELIEVE IT WOULD LAST CONSIDERABLE LENGTH TIME.

LODGE REPLIED HE WAS HORRIFIED BY QUICKNESS WITH WHICH LATIF CAME IN AND DID NOT BELIEVE EGYPT SHOULD HAVE DONE THIS. BUT US DIFFERED FROM ISRAEL IN OPINION AS TO EGYPT'S LEGAL RIGHTS IN GAZA. MUCH AS WE DEPLORED THESE ACTIONS, WE DID NOT BELIEVE IT VIOLATED ANYTHING MORE THAN OUR EXPECTATION -- OR HOPE -- WHICH WE HAD BEEN LED TO BELIEVE WERE SHARED BY FAWZI. WE ENTITLED FEEL LET DOWN ON THIS.

EBAN TRIED

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-2- 660, MARCH 20, 7 PM, FROM NEW YORK

EBAN TRIED CHARACTERIZE DEVELOPMENTS IN GAZA AS IRREVOCABLE, AND INDICATING WORST POSSIBLE FEARS ISRAEL MATERIALIZING.

MEIR SAID EVERYTHING WHICH SHE, US AND FRANCE WORKED SO LONG, WITH SUCH ENERGY, TO BUILD HAD CRUMBLED TO DUST.

LODGE SAID HE COULD UNDERSTAND REASONS FOR BEING DEEPLY DISAPPOINTED, BUT ISRAEL SHOULD LOOK WITH LITTLE MORE PERSPECTIVE ON WHAT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED. THREE THINGS WERE LIFE AND BLOOD ISSUES FOR ISRAEL: (1) FREEDOM FROM RAIDS EMANATING FROM GAZA; (2) FREEDOM OF PASSAGE IN GULF AQABA AND THROUGH STRAITS TIRAN; (3) FREEDOM TRANSIT SUEZ CANAL. ON ALL THREE ISRAEL SHOULD NOT OVERLOOK IMPORTANT AND FAR-REACHING SUBSURFACE DEVELOPMENTS IN ISRAEL'S FAVOR. TREND OF OPINION HAD VERY DEFINITELY SHIFTED TOWARDS ISRAEL SINCE IT HAD WITHDRAWN. IF EGYPT NOW DID SOMETHING WHICH VIOLATED ANY OF THESE FREEDOMS, IT WOULD NOT BE IMPOSSIBLE TO GET ASSEMBLY TO PRONOUNCE ITSELF IN ISRAEL'S FAVOR ON SUCH DEVELOPMENT. EGYPT'S CLEAR-CUT CONTRAVENTION ISRAEL'S RIGHT SHOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO MARSHALL 2/3 IN ASSEMBLY ON ISRAEL'S SIDE. LODGE POINTED OUT IF ISSUE CLEAR-CUT AND REAL EFFORTS MADE ACHIEVE 2/3 GA VOTE, AND THIS NEVERTHELESS FAILED, WHICH HE DOUBTED, THEN, AND ONLY THEN, WOULD ISRAEL BE UNDERSTOOD IF SHE DECIDED TO TAKE ACTION OUTSIDE UN. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES IT COULD BE SAID ASSEMBLY HAD FAILED IN ITS RESPONSIBILITY. HE URGED ISRAEL ACT STRICTLY WITHIN UN AND EXHAUST REMEDIES AVAILABLE.

EBAN SEEMED IMPRESSED BUT MEIR POINTED OUT IF EGYPT SHOULD FIRE ON ISRAELI SHIPS AT TIRAN, ISRAEL WOULD SHOOT BACK, NOT COME RUNNING TO GA.

IN THIS CONNECTION MEIR SAID ISRAEL FELT BEST APPROACH WAS TO GET ANSWER TO THEIR QUESTION AS TO WHETHER EGYPT CLAIMED BELLIGERENT RIGHTS AGAINST ISRAEL. THAT, IN HER OPINION, WAS KEY TO ENTIRE SITUATION. SHE GAVE US COPY OF LETTER TO SYG IN WHICH SHE ASKED HIM TRANSMIT THIS QUESTION. (TEXT CONTAINED OURTEL 661).

MEIR READ FROM ANOTHER TEXT PURPORTING TO BE INSTRUCTIONS TO

UNEF, WHICH

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-3- 660, MARCH 20, 7 PM, FROM NEW YORK

UNEF, WHICH STATED NO UNEF SOLDIER COULD FIRE UPON POTENTIAL INFILTRATOR EXCEPT TO RETURN FIRE. SHE WENT ON TO STATE THAT UNEF COULD NOT PRESUME INFILTRATOR WAS SUCH UNTIL HE TRIED CROSS ARMISTICE LINE, AND AFTER HE HAD CROSSED IT, HE WAS BEYOND UNEF'S JURISDICTION.

LODGE REPLIED THAT BEST SITUATION WOULD BE FOR UNEF HAVE RIGHT FOLLOW INFILTRATOR ACROSS BORDER INTO ISRAEL AND APPREHEND HIM THERE.

MEIR FEIGNED NOT BEING ABLE UNDERSTAND THIS.

LODGE RESTATED IDEA THAT IN ISRAEL'S OWN BEST SECURITY INTERESTS IT DESIRABLE HAVE TOKEN ELEMENTS OF UNEF IN ISRAEL TO WATCH OVER BORDER SITUATION. WITHOUT DOING THIS IT COULD NOT BE EXPECTED UNEF'S LIFE COULD BE LONG EXTENDED.

MEIR ARGUED GAZA NOT ONLY SOURCE OF RAIDS. SHE CLAIMED NASSER COULD, AND HAD, STOPPED RAIDS FROM EGYPTIAN SIDE AND TURNED THEM ON FROM JORDANIAN AND SYRIAN TERRITORY. THEREFORE, ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO HAVE UNEF ALL AROUND. LODGE REPLIED IT NOT NECESSARY REGARD ARRANGEMENTS ON EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI LINE AS PRECEDENT FOR OTHER AREAS. WHAT WAS IMPORTANT WAS TO HAVE KIND OF CORDON SANITAIRE MAINTAINED BY UNEF WHICH WOULD BE ISRAEL'S BEST ASSURANCE PROTECTION. MEIR RESPONDED ISRAEL WILLING HAVE PHYSICAL BARRIER SUCH AS SYG HAD SUGGESTED LAST YEAR. EGYPTIANS WERE ONES OPPOSED TO THAT. WHAT SHE WANTED FROM EGYPT WAS CLEAR ANSWER, NOT IN HAMMARSKJOLD ENGLISH BUT STRAIGHTFORWARD EGYPTIAN ANSWER, TO ISRAEL'S QUESTION ON BELLIGERENCY. HAVING THAT, ISRAEL WOULD KNOW WHERE IT STOOD AND COULD PLAN ACCORDINGLY.

CONVERSATION ENDED ON THAT NOTE, WITH MEIR SAYING SHE LEAVING RAFAEL IN US TO WORK WITH KIDRON AND EBAN AND MAINTAIN DAILY CONTACT WITH US.

LODGE

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
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FOR AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

I am sending herein a personal message ~~██████████~~ to Nasser which seems to me might usefully be communicated to Nasser in connection with Hammarskjold's visit. You are requested show text to Hammarskjold upon latter's arrival and discuss with him question whether it should be delivered. If you both agree that it should, you may hand it to Nasser without further instructions.

Effectiveness of letter might be diluted if Nasser, having impression we intended publish it, responded with public reaction primarily in mind. Believe, therefore, you should make it clear to Nasser that I regard this as a private communication and have no plans for its publication (FYI we cannot of course guarantee that text will not ~~be published in the press~~ *eventually become public*)

VERBATIM TEXT

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My dear President Nasser:

I venture to communicate with you directly to portray the spirit in which the United States Government approaches the present acute problems with which the United Nations is now dealing.

President Eisenhower and I have consistently sought to assure that the friendship of the United States would be impartially displayed to all of the

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John Foster Dulles

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nations of the Middle East. I explained that to you and others when I was in Egypt four years ago. We have persistently adhered to that policy. Although the relations between your government and ours have not always been what we would have desired, or perhaps what you would have desired, this has not led us to alter our basic attitude as above described.

When you acted to "nationalize" the Universal Suez Canal Company, we did not approve of this action, but we did exert all our influence to prevent a forcible reaction to it on the part of nations who felt particularly aggrieved and endangered thereby.

When, despite our intensive efforts for peace during the preceding three months, Israel and then France and Britain forcibly intervened in Egypt, we stood by the United Nations principle that international disputes should be settled by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law. We did so even though this insistence on peaceful methods involved a sharp break with the policies of nations with which our people have historic ties of friendship and many close ties of race, religion, and culture. Rarely, if ever, has a government's adherence to principle been so strikingly manifested.

The forces of Britain and France promptly withdrew from Egypt, and the forces of Israel have now wholly withdrawn behind the Armistice lines. In this connection, the United States gave no private assurances or undertakings of any kind. Our position has been fully set forth in public documents.

United Kingdom

The withdrawals by Israel, France and the ~~UK~~ were, however, accomplished with such hopes and expectations as I voiced on November 1 at the United Nations

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General Assembly in supporting the United States' ceasefire and withdrawal resolution.

I then said "All of us, I think, would hope that out of this tragedy there should come something better than merely a restoration of the conditions out of which this tragedy came about \*\*\* there needs to be something better than the uneasy armistices which have existed now for these eight years between Israel and its Arab neighbors; there needs to be a greater sense of confidence and security in the free and equal operation of the Canal than has existed since three months ago when President Nasser seized the Suez Canal Company." Such hopes were encouraged by the recent Reports of the Secretary General, describing a role for the United Nations in the Gaza Strip and expressing the view that claimed belligerent rights should not be exercised in relation to the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. The Secretary General has also concerned himself with <sup>the</sup> Suez Canal problem, as to which the Security Council had acted last October, with concurrent progress in negotiations to apply the principles prescribed by that Council and accepted by Egypt.

I have today spoken to the Secretary General on the telephone as he departs for Cairo for talks with you. I greatly hope that these talks will permit of advance along the lines to which I refer and the establishment of "security and tranquillity". I recall that this phrase was used in the important Four Power Memorandum which was brought to us by King Saud on behalf of himself and the governments of Egypt, Jordan and Syria.

Certain recent utterances from Cairo have given rise to widespread concern that it was the purpose of your Government, now that the withdrawal of Britain,

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
France and Israel has been finally accomplished, to return merely to the uneasy conditions which preceded the attack; that your Government intended to exercise claimed rights of belligerency and to avoid the kind of a settlement of the Suez Canal controversy which had been regarded as reasonable and as was forecast by the negotiations which preceded the events of October-November of last year. This concern is heightened by your government's memorandum on Suez Canal tolls, which I have just received. As a result there is occurring in much of the world, including the United States, a large shift of popular sympathy away from Egypt and United Nations an undermining of confidence in the ~~the~~ principles espoused by President Eisenhower and myself when we opposed policies of violence against Egypt. There is renewed danger of an outbreak of hostilities.

I greatly hope that you will find it possible so to act as to evidence a willingness on your part to contribute to security and tranquillity. Such action need involve no derogation of Egyptian sovereignty, but only the exercise of that sovereignty in conformity with the high principles of the United Nations Charter. I feel confident that by so doing you will have contributed to the welfare and prestige of the Egyptian nation, and the Arab world, as well as the great cause of international peace with justice to which both of our nations are dedicated through our membership in the United Nations.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles

END VERBATIM TEXT



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Following is summary Secretary's telephone conversation with Hammarskjold yesterday morning just prior SYG's scheduled meeting with his Advisory Council:

BEGIN SUMMARY Secretary asked Hammarskjold if he leaving for Cairo today (Tuesday) and expressed view would be useful if he went. Secretary said situation deteriorating in sense that expectations of SYG, US and Israel at time of withdrawal being diluted by Egyptians. Secretary said he fears situation being created where Israel might feel could resort to force without subsequent UN condemnation. SYG responded QUOTE If Nasser is not a fool will play with us; if he is fool can break up whole game. UNQUOTE report to him

Hammarskjold quoted [redacted] to general effect that situation in Gaza satisfactory from UN standpoint -- UNEF in evidence throughout area and Egyptians' presence not generally noticeable. SYG noted this differs from press reports. Secretary responded that news stories undoubtedly reflected pro-Israeli influence.

Secretary said Egyptians anxious reestablish status quo ante. On other hand basis US position is that something better than conditions preceding attack be established. SYG agreed emphatically.

Secretary noted we had called for settlement by peaceful means in accordance with justice and international law. Peaceful aspect achieved but

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now must be cooperation by Egypt on latter points. Continued assertion by Egypt <sup>of</sup> ~~of~~ belligerent rights in occupancy Gaza is inconsistent with Armistice, ~~and as such for further negotiations~~. Egypt cannot have belligerent rights while insisting Israel does not.

Secretary asked if we can do anything. SYG replied negatively but said had promised Lodge he would contact him if any US action would be useful.

Secretary said important aspect in Nasser's mind may be whether, if he behaves himself re Gaza, Canal, Straits, et cetera, he may expect re-normalization relations with US. Our <sup>thinking</sup> ~~purpose~~ is that he should be able to count on such expectations. Does not mean we would pay extravagantly for Nasser's cooperation but we would reestablish normal relations re trade, blockage funds, and tourists. Secretary said expects talk this out at Bermuda. Basic problem British must face is whether they are going continue political and economic warfare against Nasser regardless of Egyptian actions. If that is British purpose, solution will be difficult.

SYG said his talk with Mrs. Meir had yielded nothing new. Secretary said the same. SYG hoped he convinced her we will do what we can within limits; <sup>of possibility</sup> ~~limits~~ Israelis must cooperate also. Secretary agreed.

Regardless Hammarskjold's fears his visit Cairo might not be regarded as successful in popular sense, Secretary hoped discussions would not lead to QUOTE break UNQUOTE. Secretary said we have not yet marshalled full weight of persuasion on Egypt and, as SYG says, is largely question of timing. Secretary noted he had told Mrs. Meir could not be expected everything would work out <sup>automatically</sup> ~~when~~ Israelis withdrew. Would take time and he urged Mrs. Meir not to QUOTE precipitate

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things UNQUOTE. SYG said he took same line.

Secretary asked Hammarskjold whether Mrs. Meir had referred to possible dissolution UNEF. SYG said she had cautiously. Secretary said she had spoken positively about it to him. Two men agreed it must be envisaged as possibility. SYG did not think Canadians would stay if reasonable conditions covering their function in UNEF not created.

Secretary concluded telling Hammarskjold he would have our full support if he went to Egypt. END SUMMARY.

*Dulles*  
*pg*

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Info:

Following based on memo conversation unclassified by Under Secretary.

Eban called Under Secretary March 19 stating he wished discuss implications joint US-Israel statement March 18. Stated Israel had formally requested UNSYG ascertain whether Egypt wished continue exercise belligerent rights. UNSYG had undertaken do so. Israel not publicizing this request to UNSYG.

Re Gaza, Eban said necessary halt and reverse present trend of erosion of UN authority there. Responsibility in Gaza should be indivisible, UN should not be held responsible for security along armistice lines if it did not control security in strip itself. Israel would prefer UN have no responsibility rather than diluted responsibility. If Egypt wished responsibility in Gaza, let it face Israel directly. Israel thought it would be useful appoint forthwith UN commissioner for civil affairs Gaza. Might be useful if US called to Egypt's attention Israel Foramin's March 1 UNGA statement that deterioration Gaza situation could cause Israel assert its rights.

Re Aqaba, Israel had told UNSYG that return Egyptian soldiers to Sharm el Shaikh would be kind of shock Israel couldn't stand, particularly now/

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now. If development this type took place, matter should be referred to UNEF Advisory Committee and UNGA. Israel hoped exchange aide-memoires with US and other maritime powers re international character Gulf and Straits. Israel hoped US would encourage Danes send Brigitte Toft from Djibouti to Eilat, encourage US shippers take cargo to Eilat, and take encouraging attitude if approached by US or French interests seeking our views on proposed thirty-two inch pipeline from Eilat to Mediteranean.

Re Suez Canal, Israel welcomed US assurance it continued adhere to Six Principles. Process clearing Canal approaching its end and there no political agreement re operation Canal or ending discrimination in its use. While Israel would take no action without consulting US, it likely that after ships other nations had transitted Canal, either Israel ship or Israel-bound ship under another flag, carrying cargo Egyptians had in past considered contraband, would seek passage through Canal. Israel believed every Government which had advanced funds to UN for Canal clearance favored Israel's use of Canal. These Governments should if necessary protract period Canal clearance. More moral leverage now.

Eban referred to Secretary's comments on need bring maximum pressure on Nasser and said it should be made plain to world opinion that US opposed Nasser's policies on foregoing matters. This would also be helpful to Israel Government in its current domestic difficulties. Perhaps Bermuda Conference would be appropriate place for US and UK to join in expressing policies of opposition to these elements of Nasser's policy.

*Dulles*  
*J.B.*

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: March 20, 1957

SUBJECT: Middle East Problems

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Victor Khouri, Lebanese Ambassador

NEA - Lampton Berry  
NE - Edward L. Waggoner

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Tel Aviv 1.

The Lebanese Ambassador, Dr. Victor Khouri, at his request called on Mr. Berry on March 20 at 11:30 a.m.

Mrs. Meir's Recent Visit to the US. Dr. Khouri said that his government was interested in ascertaining the position of the US on the various questions raised, according to the press, by Israeli Foreign Minister Meir during her recent visit to Washington. Dr. Khouri added that he was somewhat confused as a result of statements issued by the Israelis and conflicting press speculation.

Mr. Berry said that there had been much speculation but that the position of the US had been made public in our aide memoire of February 11 to the Israelis, in the President's statement of February 20, and in Ambassador Lodge's final statement before the UN. We had given no assurances to the Israelis either before or after Mrs. Meir's visit. We had felt and had had the impression that the UN Secretary General felt that the Egyptians would do nothing precipitous. Recent events in that connection had not been encouraging. The US had never questioned Egypt's legal right to be in Gaza under the General Armistice Agreement. We had hoped that the Egyptians were as interested as we in restoring a measure of peace and tranquillity to the area and in allowing tempers to cool. The recent Egyptian action in Gaza had not been helpful. Mr. Berry said that he hoped that the Egyptian Government had acted for symbolic and prestige reasons and would not carry out a full takeover in Gaza. He emphasized again that the US position was as stated publicly, adding that there was no secret agreement expressed or implied between the US and Israel. It was our hope that the Egyptian Government would act moderately in this situation.

Dr. Khouri

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GPO 912677

674.844/3-2057  
CONFIDENTIAL FILE  
MAR 29 1957  
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MAR 28 1957

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PM/R



Dr. Khouri asked what the attitude of Israel would be following Mrs. Meir's recent discussions. Mr. Berry said that the Secretary had told the Israelis that they would be most ill-advised to embark on a military operation without more provocation than had occurred. Recent Egyptian actions, however ill advised, had been within their legal rights. The US had urged both the Egyptians and the Israelis to act with moderation and restraint.

Agaba. Dr. Khouri asked whether the US still supported the principle of innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran. Mr. Berry replied that that was the US position, and that we considered that position had a sound legal basis. Dr. Khouri observed that there were some, including a number of representatives to the UN, who questioned the soundness of such a doctrine. Mr. Berry replied that there were, indeed, some who questioned this position but that we believed it to be sound legally. Dr. Khouri asked whether it would not be preferable to avoid pressing this question for the timebeing. Mr. Berry said that the US had taken the position on the basis of principle, as it had in connection with the Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt, and not on the basis of political expediency. The US was, of course, prepared to accept any ruling by the International Court of Justice in this connection.

Suez. Dr. Khouri asked for Mr. Berry's reaction to the recent Egyptian statement on the administration of the Suez Canal. Mr. Berry said that we had found it discouraging. However, we had reason to believe that this was not the last Egyptian word on the subject and that the situation was still negotiable. We still hoped that something could be worked out. A satisfactory settlement was, of course, as much in Nasser's interest as in the interest of anyone else. Dr. Khouri commented that the tricky question was that of the right of Israeli ships to transit the Canal. Mr. Berry said that it was difficult for us to see how the provisions of the 1888 Convention could be considered in effect if any one state could use the Canal for political blackmail. Mr. Berry added that Nasser could not properly claim rights under the General Armistice Agreement in Gaza and belligerent rights in Suez. Dr. Khouri agreed and observed that the same situation applied with regard to Israeli observance of the General Armistice Agreement and the stationing of UN forces along the armistice lines. Mr. Berry said that the US believed that UNEF should be on both sides of the armistice lines but that the problem was to persuade the Israelis to go along with such an arrangement.

French and British Influence in the Middle East. Mr. Berry asked Dr. Khouri whether, in his opinion, recent French actions had made the French position in the Middle East irretrievable. Dr. Khouri replied that the French position would certainly be irretrievable in the absence of a drastic change in French policies toward Algeria, and toward its alliance with Israel. Dr. Khouri noted that the British were more adaptable than the French, have the friendship of Iraq, and are still believed by many Arabs to have important capabilities in the Middle East. For these reasons Dr. Khouri believed that the British position was considerably better than that of the French.

CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

North African Confederation. Dr. Khouri said that the press had given considerable play to reports of plans for a North African confederation and asked whether there was any substance to such reports. Mr. Berry replied that the idea of such a confederation was still a nebulous one and had not yet taken definite shape. For this reason, the US had not yet taken a position on this general idea, although it would be consistent with our general policies to favor such a cooperative area effort. Dr. Khouri said that such a grouping would be a factor for moderation throughout the Arab World.

Richards Mission Visit. Dr. Khouri indicated that he had as yet received no detailed account of the visit of the Richards Mission to Beirut. Mr. Berry described in general the decisions arrived at in the course of Ambassador Richards' visit and said that we had been most pleased at the favorable reception accorded to Ambassador Richards by the Lebanese Government.

NEA:NE:ELWaggoner:cdt

3/22/57

CONFIDENTIAL

FRANK M. COFFIN  
SECOND DISTRICT, MAINE

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, D. C.**

March 20, 1957

Honorable John Foster Dulles  
Secretary of State  
United States Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

674.84A/2-2557

On February 25th, I wrote you concerning my feelings with regard to the then existing possibility of imposing sanctions against Israel. My letter was an attempt to communicate my deep concern over the matter. It was not written for the purpose of constituting the basis of any publicity, and no publicity has been given to it.

I did, however, look forward to some response from your office, even though I well realize that public events have moved at such a pace as to place that issue, for the moment, at least, in the category of moot matters.

For your convenience, I am enclosing a copy of the letter I sent and would appreciate any answer which you would care to make at this time.

Sincerely,

*Frank M. Coffin*

Frank M. Coffin, M. C.

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**RBP**  
ROOM 145  
HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
DONALD E. NICOLL  
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT  
DISTRICT SERVICE OFFICE:  
480 MAIN STREET  
LEWISTON, MAINE  
MRS. CATHERINE TIMPANY  
DISTRICT ASSISTANT

**ACTION**  
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**NEA**

**SEV**

674.84A/3-2057

PUBLIC SERVICES DIV.

APR 19 1957

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Rev. <i>1</i>
Cat. <i>Class</i>
<i>821</i>

326394

This letter (and its enclosures, if any) micro-filmed for P/R records

A/6

674.84A/3-2057

FROM AND TYPE OF DOCUMENT		DATE DUE	
Coffin, Frank M.		DATE REC'D	
DATE <del>3/20/57</del> 3/20/57		NO.	
SUBJECT			
Ltr. on Feb. 25, concerning sanction against Israel			
TO: <del>DB</del>	TO: SEU-Mr. Rushing	TO:	TO:
DATE 3/22/57	DATE 3-22-57	DATE	DATE
ANSWERED		NO REPLY NECESSARY	



C O P Y

February 25, 1957

Honorable John Foster Dulles  
Secretary of State  
United States Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As I have read the events of the past few weeks leading up to the President's speech of last Wednesday night I have been disturbed by the indications that the Administration is determined to support sanctions against Israel if it does not withdraw its troops from the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba.

I had hoped that the strong and sound expressions of opposition to this course by both the Majority and Minority Leaders in the Senate, together with expressions of similar opinion from other distinguished members of Congress and eminent private citizens would deter the Administration from what seems to me a most unwise and unjust course. Unfortunately, the President's speech does not give me such assurances.

The President, Ambassador Lodge and you have spoken repeatedly of the necessity for taking a "moral position" in this dispute. This is an admirable expression of intent, but I am not sure that it answers the questions posed to us.

The other night the President was understood by many to say, in effect: Russia does not understand and would not respond to moral pressure, but it is too big and too powerful for any attempt to apply sanctions. Israel shares our ethical concepts and would respond to moral pressure, but it is small and weak. Therefore, we shall apply moral pressure to Russia and sanctions to Israel.

To me this is bad logic and absolute injustice. We are acting like the town bully while dressed in the robes of justice.

Israel is a small nation, surrounded by hostile neighbors. Egypt has consistently refused to honor the armistice agreement of February 24, 1949, by preventing the passage of Israeli-bound shipping through the Suez Canal. Egypt has ignored and defied the action of the United Nations Security Council of September 1, 1951, asking

C O P Y

Honorable John Foster Dulles

February 25, 1957

cessation of the blockade. In view of this record, the reluctance of the Israelis to accept the agreement of the Egyptians to the "six principles" at face value is understandable.

To me, the most sensible and constructive approach to this situation is set forth in the Report of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.J. Res. 117:

Other basic problems, causing tension in the area, are not dealt with in the resolution. The solution of the Arab-Israeli controversy, the resettlement of refugees, the reopening of the Suez Canal with the adequate safeguarding of the interests of its users, and other problems, are of grave importance and should be given continued attention by the Executive.

Positive and comprehensive measures for dealing with the fundamental problems of the Middle East should be prepared and presented by the Executive to the United Nations and to the Congress. Sufficient legislative authority already exists for the settlement of many phases of these problems. Our country should lead in boldly pursuing and implementing policies and programs to bring peace, security, and economic stability to the Middle East.

I supported the Middle East Resolution in the House of Representatives because I believed we had no alternatives, and because I believed it would provide a beginning for a policy. I still hope for that development, but as of this moment we seem still to be reacting to individual situations without apparent forethought.

The time is ripe for thoughtful and positive declarations of policy which will place the present crisis in proper perspective and will give the world a balanced view of our total approach. I believe Congress, our own citizens, and the peoples of the world would applaud such action. To do less is to fail in our leadership responsibilities.

Sincerely,

Frank M. Coffin, M. C.

C O P Y

March 20 1957

1193

Dear Mr. Metz:

After consideration at the White House, your letter of February 12, 1957 concerning sanctions against Israel has been sent to the Department of State for reply. I am sorry for the delay in our response.

The United States does not now have the question of sanctions against Israel under consideration because of the decision of the Government of Israel to complete her withdrawal behind the Armistice line in compliance with the United Nations Resolution of February 2, 1957. This decision demonstrates once again that the free world nations have a decent respect for the opinions of mankind, as reflected in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Now that this withdrawal has been completed, in the President's words, "...there should be a greater effort by the United Nations and its members to secure justice and conformity with international law... The United States, for its part, will vigorously seek solution of the problems of the area in accordance with justice and international law."

Sincerely yours,

John P. Moagher  
Chief  
Public Services Division

Mr. Jerome L. Metz,  
J. L. Metz Furniture Co., Inc.,  
252 Wilwood Road,  
Hammond, Indiana.

P:SEV:CERushing:OBL:bt  
3/15/57

Cleared in substance-NEA/P-Mr. Frye  
IO/P-Mr. White

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MAR 15 1957 P.M.

MAR 2 1957 P.M.

674.84A/3-2057

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52

Department of State

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NEA

FROM: CAIRO

Control:  
Rec'd:

14018

MARCH 21,

8:39 PM

Info

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 29/81, MARCH 21, 6 PM

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DEPARTMENT ALSO PASS USDEL BERMUDA INFORMATION PRIORITY ONE.

HAVE JUST SEEN HAMMARSKJOLD TO DISCUSS DEPTTEL 3120 AND USDEL BERMUDA ONE.

REFERENCE DEPTTEL 3120 TRANSMITTING MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY TO NASSER TO BE DELIVERED IN DISCRETION HAMMARSKJOLD AND MYSELF. SYG SAID GREATLY APPRECIATED OFFER SUCH STALWART SUPPORT BUT HE WOULD SUGGEST HOLDING DELIVERY IN ABEYANCE. ONE REASON WAS THAT HE HAD COVERED ALMOST IDENTICAL GROUND IN PRESENTATION TO FAWZI THIS MORNING AND IN EVEN STRONGER LANGUAGE. IN CIRCUMSTANCES DELIVERY MESSAGE NOW WOULD PROBABLY NOT REINFORCE AND COULD EVEN WEAKEN WHAT HE HAD SAID. SECOND REASON WAS THAT THERE WAS ALWAYS RISK OF CREATING REACTION TO WHAT MIGHT APPEAR TO BE PRESSURE AND COLLUSION. HOWEVER, HE REALIZED TALK WITH FAWZI WAS ONLY FIRST ROUND AND HE MIGHT HAVE REASON REVISE HIS JUDGEMENT AFTER TALKING WITH NASSER. IF SO, WE COULD AGAIN ASSESS MATTER. HE REITERATED THANKS SECRETARY'S WILLINGNESS ASSIST. BUNCHE SECONDED SYG'S OPINION AGREED DEFER DECISION.

SYG READ USDEL ONE ATTENTIVELY AND EXPRESSED APPRECIATION BUT DID NOT DISCUSS SPECIFIC POINTS.

HE THEN GAVE ME QUICK RUN-DOWN OF MORNING'S TALK WITH FAWZI WHICH HE HAD FOUND UNEXPECTEDLY ENCOURAGING.

REGARDING GAZA, FAWZI HAD GIVEN "MORAL COMMITMENT" NOT TO BRING IN TROOPS AND HAD SAID THIS COULD BE MADE KNOWN TO AMERICAN AND

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-2- 2981, MARCH 21, 6 PM FROM CAIRO

AND ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS. INTENTIONS DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO CURB RAIDING HAD ALSO BEEN EXPRESSED IN STRONGEST TERMS, AND FAWZI HAD IN ADDITION INDICATED WILLINGNESS DISCUSS EXTENSION OF FUNCTIONS OF UNEF IN GAZA AREA ON UNDERSTANDING THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT MAKE THINGS TOO DIFFICULT BY EXCESSIVE AGITATION.

REGARDING AQABA, FAWZI SAID EGYPT HAD NO INTENTION OF BRINGING TROOPS TO AREA AND WOULD BE DISPOSED TO LET MATTER DRIFT PROVIDED IT COULD BE REMOVED FROM SPOTLIGHT OF PUBLICITY. GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT COULD NOT HOWEVER CONTROL SAUDIS. (I ASKED IF HE THOUGHT POSSIBLE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT TAKING SOFTER LINE ON AQABA ON UNDERSTANDING SAUDIS WOULD MAINTAIN ADAMANT POSITION. SYG SAID HE DIDN'T THINK SO). REGARDING REFERENCE TO ICJ (REPEAT ICJ), EGYPT WOULD FULLY ACCEPT BUT SITUATION COULD BE MADE DIFFICULT IF DRAGGED OUT TOO LONG.

REGARDING CANAL, FAWZI HAD EMPHASIZED ALL DOORS REMAINED OPEN AND STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF 6TH POINT IN MEMORANDUM. HOWEVER, WHEN SOME OF MORE DIFFICULT ASPECTS OF PROBLEM HAD BEEN BROACHED HE HAD SUGGESTED REFERENCE TO NASSER.

IN CONCLUSION, SYG SAID HE FELT THIS MORNING'S MEETING HAD BEEN THE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE HE HAD EVER HAD WITH FAWZI AND HE ATTACHED ADDITIONAL SIGNIFICANCE TO IT BECAUSE GROUND HAD BEEN PREPARED BY BUNCHE AND CONVERSATION WAS THEREFORE SUBSTANTIVE, NOT EXPLORATORY. IN CIRCUMSTANCES, SYG SAID HE FELT MOST USEFUL ASSISTANCE U.S. GOVERNMENT COULD GIVE WOULD BE TO EXERT CALMING INFLUENCE ON ISRAEL SO THAT HE COULD BE "GIVEN A BREAK" IN HIS DISCUSSIONS HERE. HE DIDN'T FEEL TOO MUCH TO ASK OF ISRAELIS TO EXERT RESTRAINT BECAUSE BOTH HE AND BUNCHE CONVINCED ABSOLUTELY NO THREAT FROM EGYPTIAN SIDE.

WE AGREED KEEP IN TOUCH AS CONVERSATIONS PROGRESS.

INTERESTING TO SEE THAT FAWZI SEEMED FEEL QUALIFIED SPEAK WITH ASSURANCE REGARDING GAZA AND AQABA, WHICH USUALLY ESPECIAL PROVINCE OF NASSER, WHEREAS DEFERRING TO NASSER ON CANAL, WHICH USUAL PROVINCE OF FAWZI.

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AIR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1111, March 21, 9 p.m.

Control: 15164

Rec'd: March 23, 1957  
8:37 a.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 1111, REPEATED INFORMATION OTTAWA 4,  
PARIS 190, CAIRO 205, DAMASCUS 142, AMMAN 196, LONDON  
223, BEIRUT 186, JERUSALEM UNNUMBERED

Substance of letter addressed March 7 by Ben Gurion to  
border settlements in explanation his decision to  
withdraw from Gaza, thereby exposing them to renewed  
threat of infiltration, was frontpaged by Israel press  
under scare headlines today.

Letter which, apparently was not disclosed in full,  
was reported by JERUSALEM POST under headline "Ben  
Gurion sees fear of new war within two years". Article  
follows in part:

"Prime Minister has disclosed another war may be feared  
within year or two, if not earlier. Main task of  
government was, therefore, to assure ready supply modern  
arms--prospect which would have been jeopardized had  
sanctions been imposed, he said. Even old and true  
friends, Canada and France "would be unable to sell  
modern aircraft to this country if powerful nations,  
such as US allowed sanctions to be imposed with their  
blessing.

"This was what was behind government's decision to withdraw  
from Sinai, Ben Gurion wrote in letter to border settlements  
March 7.

"Jet fighters were "essence of line" of country today,  
Ben Gurion said. Until Canada and France intervened,  
he wrote, he was prepared to stand firm and face  
sanctions. Neither Canada nor France had exercised  
any pressure against Israel, but "it was my firm belief  
we had no right to leave defense forces without air support"

"Arabs may be expected to renew efforts to fight us,  
and fighting forces of this country must always be in  
position to

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-2- 1111, March 21, 9 p.m. from Tel Aviv  
position to defeat them.

"Prime Minister also said he did not believe Arabs would  
renew their war effort within next few months, although  
even this is not certain".

Comment in following cable.

LAWSON

BB:DT

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Control: 14311

Rec'd: March 22, 1957  
6:34 a.m.

NEA  
Info  
RMR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1112, March 21, 9 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1112; REPEATED INFORMATION OTTAWA 5, PARIS 191, CAIRO 206, DAMASCUS 143, AMMAN 197, LONDON 224, BEIRUT 187, JERUSALEM UNNUMBERED.

Press treatment of Ben-Gurion's letter was unwarrantedly sensational and misleading, Foreign Ministry informed Embassy in reply to our inquiry.

Inference which might be drawn from JERUSALEM POST's first paragraph (Embassy telegram 1111) that US would have used its end-use powers to prevent Canada and France from supplying modern aircraft to Israel was not Ben-Gurion's intention, according to Foreign Ministry official.

Purpose of letter, he said, was to inform border settlers that while withdrawal might subject them to relatively small security threat of renewed Fedayeen activity, security of state itself would be threatened if Israel, remaining in Gaza, were denied modern arms as one of sanctions imposed by Western Powers for her failure to comply UN resolutions. Israel's security, he explained in his letter, depended on steady stream modern weapons to maintain constant state of preparedness in case Egypt, re-equipped by USSR, launched offensive against her. He had meant to explain that even such good friends as Canada and France might be obliged by force of world opinion to withhold arms had Israel not complied.

LAWSON

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Action  
NEAControl: 13519  
Rec'd: MARCH 21, 1957  
8:01 AM

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FROM: PARIS

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 4857, MARCH 21

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FELLOW-TRAVELING WEEKLY FRANCE-OBSERVATEUR CARRIES EDITORIAL "PREPARING NEW WAR SUEZ?" REPORTING "ACCORDING OUR INFORMATION GOVERNMENT ENVISAGES NEW MILITARY INTERVENTION AGAINST EGYPT. PRETEXT WOULD BE SUPPLIED...BY OFFENSIVE OF ISRAELI ARMY IN CASE BEN GURION DECIDED FORCIBLY OCCUPY GAZA AND CHARM-EL-SHEIK... FRENCH MILITARY SUPPORT WOULD BE EXCLUSIVELY AERIAL...FRENCH MILITARY PILOTS READY LEAVE FOR CYPRUS..." ARTICLE ASKS IF TRUE (1) THAT BOURGES-MAUNOURY TOLD YOST FRENCH GOVERNMENT INTENDED PROVIDE AERIAL COVER TO IDF IF BEN GURION ATTACKS; (2) THAT HERTER FORCEFULLY PROTESTED TO ALPHAND AGAINST FRENCH DESIRE ENGAGE THEMSELVES IN NEW ADVENTURE AND PERSIST IN ENCOURAGING MOST EXTREME ELEMENTS ISRAELI OPINION; (3) THAT PINEAU SENT MEMORANDUM TO WASHINGTON WHEREIN HE SOUGHT TO ALTER US POSITION BY RECALLING WHILE US HAD NOT GIVEN ABSOLUTELY FORMAL GUARANTEES TO ISRAEL, US WAS MORALLY BOUND BY GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT NEGOTIATED AMONG DULLES, MEIR, MOLLET, PINEAU; (4) THAT NEW FRENCH PROMISE OF ASSISTANCE DEVOLVES FROM SECRET TREATY OR VERBAL UNDERSTANDING BEHIND BACK OF FRENCH PARLIAMENT BETWEEN MOLLET, BEN GURION.

TO PRESS QUERIES ON FOREGOING EMBASSY HAS REPLIED "NO COMMENT".  
QUAI SPOKESMAN SAID FOREIGN OFFICE REPLYING IN SAME FASHION.

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summary by  
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From PARIS  
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62  
Department of State

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NEA

FROM: Oslo

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1062, March 21, 4 p.m.

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Reference DEPTTEL 1026.

Foreign Office has been forced to admit Norway made demarche Egypt urging moderation. No (repeat no) reference made US demarche. Foreign Office promised continue avoid reference to fact its demarche was made to back up US demarche.

RAYNOR

AAL:BAG/8

Control: 13882

Rec'd: March 21, 1957  
3:08 p.m.

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Action

Control: 14263  
Rec'd: March 22, 1957  
5:38 a.m.

NEA

FROM: Cairo

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 2984, March 22, 10 a.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 2984, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY TEL AVIV 169; AMMAN, BAGHDAD DAMASCUS, JIDDA, LONDON, PARIS, BEIRUT UNNUMBERED.

According Military Attache, 800 Palestinian soldiers, believed to be remnants Palestinian Army, with personal equipment and some with rifles observed awaiting transportation by rail from Maadi (suburb Cairo) this morning. Report with low evaluation stated destination Gaza. Conceivably immediate destination could be Sinai. Am bringing this report attention Hammarskjold.

HARE

LR/12



*Not received  
1957 MAR 22  
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Department of State

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FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2997, MARCH 22, 7 P.M.

Control: 14934

Rec'd: MARCH 22, 1957  
9:12 P.M.

SENT PRIORITY BERMUDA 3; REPEATED INFORMATION DEPARTMENT 2997.

DEPARTMENT PASS USDEL BERMUDA.

REFERENCE EMBTEL 2981 TO DEPARTMENT, REPEATED INFORMATION USDEL

BY ARRANGEMENT WITH HAMMARSKJOLD SAW BUNCHE BETWEEN MORNING AND AFTERNOON SESSIONS THEY ARE HAVING TODAY WITH FAWZI PREPARATORY TO ANOTHER SESSION WITH NASSER TOMORROW AT BARRAGE REST HOUSE OUTSIDE CAIRO.

DELIVERED CONTENTS USDEL 3 AND DEPTTEL 3143 AS INSTRUCTED AND ALSO INFORMED CONTENTS DEPTTEL 723 TO USUN, USDEL 2, AND TEL AVIV'S 1108 TO DEPARTMENT FOR BACKGROUND AND SUCH USE AS MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE. BUNCHE TOOK NOTES AND SAID WOULD PASS TO SYG BEFORE AFTERNOON SESSION WITH FAWZI.

REGARDING LAST NIGHT'S 6-HOUR GO-AROUND WITH NASSER, BUNCHE SAID ATMOSPHERE HAD BEEN GOOD AND SYG HAD BEEN VERY BLUNT, EVEN MORE SO THAN WITH FAWZI THE DAY BEFORE (SEE REFERENCE TELEGRAM), IN STRESSING NECESSARY UNDERSTANDING OF "INTERNATION FACTS OF LIFE" AND OBSERVANCE OF "INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL MANNERS." IN PARTICULAR, HE HAD GIVEN SEVERE WARNING AGAINST NASSER'S ACTING UNDER ILLUSION HE COULD GO IT ALONE. IN SO DOING, SYG FELT HE HAD MADE IMPRESSION AND THAT REAL PROGRESS HAD RESULTED, ALTHOUGH OFTEN DIFFICULT IN TALKING TO NASSER TO BE SURE EXACTLY HOW MUCH IS GETTING THROUGH TO HIM. BUNCHE SAID SYG HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY INSISTENT AND FORCEFUL IN DRIVING HOME POINTS IN MEIR'S LETTER OF MARCH 19 REGARDING NECESSITY FOR GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT TO DECIDE WHETHER ACTING AS

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HBS

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SECRET

-2- 2997, MARCH 22, 7 P.M., FROM CAIRO

BELIGERENT OR UNDER ARMISTICE AND THAT NO DOUBT NASSER HAD NOT ONLY GOTTEN POINT BUT HAD BEEN VISIBLY SHAKEN.

BUNCHE SAID MAIN TOPIC LAST NIGHT WITH NASSER AND TODAY WITH FAWZI HAD BEEN CANAL AND THAT DISCUSSION HAD CENTERED PARTICULARLY ON MORE DETAILED STATEMENT OF EGYPTIAN POLICY ADUMBRATED IN 6TH POINT OF MEMORANDUM OF MARCH 18, WHICH EGYPTIANS FORESEE WOULD TAKE FORM OF AN INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT TO BE FILED WITH UNITED NATIONS. HOWEVER, SYG TAKING POSITION THAT IMPRACTICABLE TO THINK OF DRAWING UP REALLY FINAL DOCUMENT IN SO SHORT TIME WHICH GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT HAS IN MIND AND HE IS THEREFORE PRESSING FOR INCLUSION OF A PROVISION WHICH WOULD PROVIDE FOR FURTHER FACT FINDING ON SUCH THINGS AS ADEQUACY OF 1888 CONVENTION, COMPLAINTS, CONSULTATION AND ARBITRATION. IF THIS PROPOSAL ADOPTED, DOCUMENT PROPOSED BY GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT WOULD BE ANOTHER BUT NOT FINAL STEP IN REACHING SETTLEMENT. STATUS OF UNEF HAD ALSO BEEN TOUCHED ON IN NASSER CONVERSATION AND HE HAD BEEN TOLD HE MUST MAKE UP HIS MIND WHETHER HE IS PREPARED TO HAVE IT REMAIN WITH PROPER RECOGNITION OF ITS STATUS OR NOT; NO INTENTION OF ALLOWING IT TO REMAIN AS MERE CAT'S PAW OF EGYPTIAN POLITICS. NASSER PROTESTED HE DEFINITELY WANTED UNEF TO REMAIN PROVIDED EGYPTIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND DIGNITY NOT INFRINGED.

IN CONCLUSION, BUNCHE SAID, DESPITE SOME VERY REAL DIFFICULTIES, COURSE OF CONVERSATIONS HAS BEEN ENCOURAGING SO FAR AND, IF THEY CONTINUE TO GO ON AS WELL AS THEY HAVE, PROSPECTS ARE FAIRLY GOOD.

IN CIRCUMSTANCES, HE SAID SYG WAS STILL OF OPINION THAT WOULD BE UNWISE TO DELIVER MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY TRANSMITTED IN DEPTTEL 3120.

HARE

MAA

NOTE: PASSED USDEL BERMUDA 3/22/57, 11 P.M., AL.

SECRET

APR 1 1957

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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42-47

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FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2998, MARCH 22, 7 P.M.

CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 14933

Rec'd: MARCH 22, 1957  
9:13 P.M.

SENT DEPARTMENT 2998, REPEATED INFORMATION USUN 142

REGARDING LAST PARAGRAPH OF DEPTTEL 723 TO USUN, SUGGESTING THAT SYG INSTRUCT BUNCHE AND BURNS TO "REFRAIN FROM ENTERING INTO NEW AGREEMENTS," BUNCHE OBSERVED THAT MISUNDERSTANDING SEEMS TO HAVE DEVELOPED IN THIS REGARD WHICH REQUIRES CLARIFICATION. ONLY ARRANGEMENT MADE, HE SAID HAS BEEN RE CHECK-POST WHICH IS JOINT UNEF-EGYPTIAN OPERATION. AS REGARDS UNRWA HE SAID TERM "TURN-OVER" SOMEWHAT MISLEADING SINCE UNRWA HAD NEVER BEEN ABLE EXERCISE EXPANDED FUNCTIONS BECAUSE POPULATION WOULD NOT COOPERATE.

RE CHECK-POST EMBASSY UNDERSTANDS UNEF FUNCTION IS TO FACILITATE CROSSING ITS PERSONNEL AND SUPPLIES AND "OBSERVE".

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Action

Control: 14781  
Rec'd: March 22, 1957  
4:21 p.m.

NEA

FROM: Tel Aviv

Info

TO: Secretary of State

RMR

NO: 1113, March 22, 4 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1113, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 207.

~~NOFORN~~

We find Cairo USARMA's report March 21 MAE-CX 51-57 of return Egyptian troops to El Arish most disturbing. Proximity to Israel territory of unit this size and equipped as reported can not (repeat not) fail to have been noted by IDF reconnaissance and GOI's reaction is certain to be one of alarm. As indicated EMBTEL 1111, there are fair prospects Israel will not (repeat not) resist Egyptian control of Gaza as long as it is not (repeat not) extended in scope and remains purely civilian in character. But any movement or activity El Arish forces that GOI might interpret as prelude military occupation Gaza would have most explosive potentation.\*

LAWSON

MDG:DEM/12

\*As received.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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47

Action  
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FROM: NEW YORK

Control: 14879

Rec'd: MARCH 22, 1957  
6:49 PM

Info  
RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 671, MARCH 22, 6 PM

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RE: PALESTINE: SYG CAIRO TALKS

CORDIER INFORMED US FROM SKETCHY REPORTS FROM SYG IN CAIRO, NEGOTIATIONS SO FAR APPEAR GENERALLY "FAVORABLE." SERIES SYG TALKS WITH FAWZI AND NASSER BEGUN THURSDAY PRESENTLY SCHEDULED CONTINUE THROUGH SATURDAY. CORDIER THEREFORE DID NOT INTEND HOLD MEETING WITH ADVISORY COMMITTEE UNTIL HE HAD FULL REPORT FROM SYG, WHICH MIGHT MEAN WAITING UNTIL SOME DEFINITE STATE REACHED. ONE PURPOSE HOLDING OFF SUCH MEETING WAS DESIRE AVOID POSSIBILITY LEAKS BEFORE MATTERS CLARIFIED. EVEN THEN, SYG'S REPORTS FOR CORDIER TO USE AT ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETINGS WOULD HAVE BE CAREFULLY WORDED AND MIGHT NOT CONTAIN FULL PICTURE. CORDIER DID NOT EXPECT ANY FULL REPORT MUCH BEFORE MONDAY MORNING.

WATSON

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MAY 27 1959

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CHARLES E. POTTER  
MICHIGAN

RAYMOND C. ANDERSON  
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

**ACTION**  
is assigned to

*WLA*

**United States Senate**  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 22, 1957

*Reply drafted  
DE-KB/HR*

*V. Friedman, Mr. Hill + 3-29-57  
Friedman*

*RM/R*

Hon. Robert C. Hill  
Assistant Secretary  
Department of State  
Washington 25, D. C.

*772.13*

Dear Mr. Hill:

It would be appreciated if at your convenience you would give me a rebuttal to the attached copy of letter which Attorney William Friedman (16th Floor, Dime Building, Detroit 26, Michigan) sent to Senator Humphrey.

Kindly return the aforementioned with your reply.

Sincerely yours,

*Charles E. Potter*  
Charles E. Potter

674.84A/3-2257

APR 17 1957  
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*CPA*

This letter (and its enclosures, if any) micro-filmed for RM/R records

*674.84A/3-2257  
A/38*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

March 26, 1957

PC B

SEV - ~~Mr. Meagher~~

Please prepare an appropriate  
reply to the attached letter to the  
President from Rabbi Solomon J.  
Sharfman regarding the Middle Eastern  
situation.

Please send copies of the reply  
to S/S.

  
J. H. Cunningham  
S/S-RO  
for: Archer Blood

Attachments:

1. Rte slip to Howe dtd 3/25/57
2. Ltr to Pres fm Rabbi Solomon J.  
Sharfman dtd 3/22/57  
(S/S-1917)

Rid 7:10 - 3/25 3717

1917

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

**ROUTE SLIP**

(To Remain With Correspondence)

TO Mr. Fisher Howe  
Director, Executive Secretariat  
Department of State

**PROMPT HANDLING IS ESSENTIAL.  
WHEN DRAFT REPLY IS REQUESTED  
THE BASIC CORRESPONDENCE MUST  
BE RETURNED. IF ANY DELAY IN  
SUBMISSION OF DRAFT REPLY IS  
ENCOUNTERED, PLEASE TELEPHONE  
OFFICE OF THE STAFF SECRETARY.**

Date March 25, 1957

**FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY**

**ACTION:**

Comment \_\_\_\_\_

Draft reply \_\_\_\_\_

For direct reply \_\_\_\_\_

For your information \_\_\_\_\_

For necessary action \_\_\_\_\_

For appropriate handling ☒ \_\_\_\_\_

See below \_\_\_\_\_

Remarks: \_\_\_\_\_

By direction of the President:

*A. J. Goodpastor*  
**A. J. GOODPASTER**  
Staff Secretary

*PCM*

1917  
3-25-57



הסתדרות הרבנים דאמריקא

# Rabbinical Council of America

331 Madison Avenue

New York 17, N. Y.

Murray Hill 2-7013

Adar 19 5717

March 22, 1957

THE WHITE HOUSE

Mar 25 12 14 PM '57

RECEIVED

Cable Address:  
HISRABONIM, N. Y.

כ"ה

**President**

RABBI SOLOMON J. SHARFMAN  
Brooklyn, N. Y.

**Honorary President**

RABBI DAVID B. HOLLANDER  
Bronx, N. Y.

**Vice-Presidents**

RABBI ABRAHAM N. AVRUTICK  
Hartford, Conn.

RABBI GILBERT KLAPPERMAN  
Lawrence, L. I., N. Y.

RABBI MANUEL M. POLIAKOFF  
Baltimore, Md.

RABBI CHARLES WEINBERG  
Malden, Mass.

**Recording Secretary**

RABBI SIDNEY APPLBAUM  
Brooklyn, N. Y.

**Financial Secretary**

RABBI PAUL Z. LEVOVITZ  
Lakewood, N. J.

**Treasurer**

RABBI EPHRAIM S. KOLATCH  
Long Beach, N. Y.

**Executive Secretary**

RABBI ISRAEL KLVAN  
Mount Vernon, N. Y.

The Hon. Dwight David Eisenhower  
President of the United States  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

We should like to bring to your attention our thinking on the present situation in the Middle East and our deep concern with events there.

As representatives of an organization of more than 700 orthodox rabbis in all parts of the country, we have tried to keep in touch with the situation. Needless to say, it has caused us grave concern.

The fact is that Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza and Aqaba area was an act of faith in the community of nations. Particularly, it was an act of faith in our own American Government and an expression of its deep belief that we are motivated by a deep sense of justice and moral righteousness.

Israel made certain assumptions with reference to Gaza, Aqaba and Suez, as well as the cessation of a state of war and the establishment of peace. These assumptions were supported by most of the great and democratic nations of our world. Certainly, the hopes which Israel expressed were entirely proper and even laudatory. You yourself in a wonderful communication to the Israeli Government indicated that it will have no cause to regret this action.

Events since that withdrawal have, however, not borne out Israel's faith. Egypt has returned to Gaza, hostilities by the Fedayeen have been resumed. Col. Nasser has again proclaimed with vigor that he will not open the Suez Canal to Israel. He further insists that Egypt continues to maintain a state of war with Israel. Saudi Arabia has proclaimed that it is closing the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping.

31

Be Returned to 574.34.1/3-07

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MAR 27 AM 10:33

RECORDS DIV.

674.34.1/3-07  
4/8/57

Return to SEV/ot

The Hon. Dwight David Eisenhower  
President of the United States  
Washington, D. C.

Page 2.  
March 22, 1957

We were pleased to learn from a communique issued jointly by representatives of the American and Israeli Governments that our Government stands by its promise to support the freedom of the seas and of the Suez Canal for Israeli shipping. We are, however, greatly fearful that the rapidity with which Dictator Nasser is reasserting himself, may preclude a peaceful solution to these problems.

Immediate action is essential and such action can best be taken by you, Mr. President. This is no longer an Israeli problem - it is the problem of the entire world. Failure to live up to the commitments made to Israel and to assure its security would indeed be catastrophic, and would put in jeopardy the moral leadership of the American Government.

It is a fact that the entire world, particularly the democratic world looks to the moral leadership of our great United States which has always demonstrated that type of leadership.

As religious leaders we are deeply proud of the role which our Government has played over the years - a role which was thoroughly in keeping with the high moral and spiritual principles to which we pay homage.

You, Mr. President, have constantly made us proud of the manner in which you have stressed the moral values upon which the world must continue to build its civilization.

We are confident that in the present crisis you will continue to assert that moral leadership to the end that actual and lasting peace in the Middle East, as well as the security of the democracy of Israel will be assured.

May the Almighty bless your efforts.

Respectfully yours,



RABBI SOLOMON J. SHARFMAN  
President

April 23 1957

Dear Rabbi Sharfman:

The White House has asked us to reply to your letter of March 22, 1957 on behalf of the Rabbinical Council of America. Your interest in making the views of your Council available is appreciated. They have been brought to the attention of appropriate offices of the Department.

I can assure you that both the President and Secretary Dulles are continuing their efforts to seek a just and equitable solution of the situation in the Middle East. Now that the withdrawal of the Government of Israel behind the Armistice line has been completed in compliance with the United Nations Resolution of February 2, 1957, as the President has said, "The United States, for its part will vigorously seek solutions of the problems of the area in accordance with justice and international law."

On August 26, 1955 Secretary Dulles outlined the contributions which this Government is prepared to make in assisting the parties directly concerned in efforts to reach a basic settlement in the Middle East. This offer remains valid today. A copy of the Secretary's speech is enclosed for your ready reference.

In the belief that they may be of interest to you, I am also enclosing a selection of recent statements of United States policy in the Middle East.

Sincerely yours,

John P. Meagher  
Chief  
Public Services Division

Enclosures:

✓ Selected material.

Rabbi Solomon J. Sharfman, President,  
Rabbinical Council of America,  
331 Madison Avenue,  
New York 17, New York.

P:SEV:LMCampbell:bt

SEV/OL

NEA/P

4/9/57

S/S-CR  
APR 17 1957 P.M.  
Missing enclosed signature

FW 764 646/5-1057

Enclosure missing 4/17  
Rec'd in S/S-CR  
4/23

Enclosures complete 4/23

הסתדרות הרבנים דאמריקא

# Rabbinical Council of America

331 Madison Avenue

New York 17, N. Y.

Murray Hill 2-7013

Adar 19 5717

March 22, 1957

ACTION  
is assigned to

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HISRABONIM, N. Y.

**President**

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Brooklyn, N. Y.

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The Hon. John Foster Dulles  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

We should like to bring to your attention our thinking on the present situation in the Middle East and our deep concern with events there.

As representatives of an organization of more than 700 orthodox rabbis in all parts of the country, we have tried to keep in touch with the situation. Needless to say, it has caused us grave concern.

The fact is that Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza and Aqaba area was an act of faith in the community of nations. Particularly, it was an act of faith in our own American Government and an expression of its deep belief that we are motivated by a deep sense of justice and moral righteousness.

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674.84A/3-2257

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The Hon. John Foster Dulles  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

Page 2.  
March 22, 1957

We were pleased to learn from a communique issued jointly by representatives of the American and Israeli Governments that our Government stands by its promise to support the freedom of the seas and of the Suez Canal for Israeli shipping. We are, however, greatly fearful that the rapidity with which Dictator Nasser is reasserting himself, may preclude a peaceful solution to these problems.

Immediate action is essential and such action can best be taken by our Government. This is no longer an Israeli problem - it is the problem of the entire world. Failure to live up to the commitments made to Israel and to assure its security would indeed be catastrophic, and would put in jeopardy the moral leadership of the American Government.

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We are confident that in the present crisis our Government will continue to assert that moral leadership to the end that actual and lasting peace in the Middle East, as well as the security of the democracy of Israel will be assured.

May the Almighty bless your efforts.

Respectfully yours,



RABBI SOLOMON J. SHARFMAN  
President

April 5 1957

In reply refer to  
NEA:NE

Dear Rabbi Sharfman:

I have for reply your letter of March 22 to the Secretary in which you express the Rabbinical Council's concern over the present situation in the Middle East.

Since the outbreak of hostilities last fall, the United States position has been that the first requirement for peace in the Middle East was the withdrawal of invading forces from Egyptian territory, and from the Gaza Strip in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly. We had no illusions that such withdrawal would automatically bring peace to the area, but we believed that it would result in an amelioration of the political atmosphere and that in this improved climate it might be possible to make progress toward settlement of outstanding issues. We still hold to this view and are convinced that Israel was right in withdrawing, both from the point of view of strengthening security and stability in the area and from that of Israel's long-term interests. Although since the withdrawal matters have not gone as smoothly as we had hoped, nonetheless there has been progress toward greater tranquillity and, in our view, with patience and persistence, we can at least avoid a return to the status quo ante and may well be able to do more.

We appreciate your having shared your views with us.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

William M. Rountree  
Assistant Secretary

63  
JAN 1957  
Rabbi Solomon J. Sharfman,  
President, Rabbinical Council of America,  
331 Madison Avenue,  
New York 17, New York.

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March 23, 1957  
3:12 p.m.

NEA

FROM: Cairo

Info

TO: Secretary of State

RMR

NO: 3006, March 23, 5 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 3006, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY USUN 145.

Commenting March 23 on Nasser-Nazarskiold talks AKHBAR AL YOM (Amin brothers, Belkel) called today's meetings at Barrage "most important." Summing up talks to date AKHBAR said first meeting (March 21-Bawzi) reviewed "developments"; second (March 21-Nasser/Bawzi) reviewed "subjects for discussion"; third (March 22 morning and afternoon-Bawzi) "went into details." Result these meetings SYG and Foreign Minister able draw up detailed plan talks and framework for discussion each problem at full-dress meeting with Nasser today. Duration SYG stay Cairo would be fixed after Nasser meeting. Talks proceeding in atmosphere trust and frankness. Specifically AKHBAR said: (1) Any agreement on use of UNEF to implement GAA's stipulated UN resolutions would be presented General Assembly; (2) Egyptian side was discussing canal question with SYG as representative of United Nations and not of specific group countries.

In editorials AKHBAR asserted Egypt in talks has put her cards on table as mature state which wants peace, knows its constructive role and seeks settle problems not complicate them. ("We have no conditions, but we have legitimate aspirations which we want implement within limits justice and law.")

In second editorial AKHBAR said SYG believes peace depends on respect armistice agreement; as result plan retaining UNEF also line has emerged and Israel will have to accept UNEF on Israel soil. As for Aqaba, appears certain it will be referred ICJ. Israel knows Egypt's stand supported in law and therefore does not agree having case submitted ICJ.

HARE

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Rec'd:

MARCH 24, 1957  
12:01 PM

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FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 3012, MARCH 24, NOON

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SENT DEPARTMENT 3012 REPEATED TEL AVIV PRIORITY 171.

REFERENCE TEL AVIVS 1113.

ARMA MESSAGE CITED REFERENCE TELEGRAM CONSIDERED ACCURATE REPORT STATUS AS OF MARCH 19. TO BE NOTED MUCH OF MOVEMENT REPORTED THEREIN TOOK PLACE PRIOR MARCH 15 (EMBASSY TELEGRAMS 2899 AND 2905, REPEATED TEL AVIV 159 AND 162). EMBASSY UNDERSTANDS UNEF FORCES IN ADDITION THERE FUNCTIONS IN STRIP REMAIN AT AL ARISH AND ARE PATROLLING OLD PALESTINIAN FRONTIER AS FAR SOUTH AS SABHA. UNITED NATIONS HAS NO INDICATION ANY EGYPTIAN TROOP MOVEMENTS INTO GAZA STRIP OR THAT ANY SUCH MOVEMENTS CONTEMPLATED.

COMMENT: (CEI) PRESENCE EGYPTIAN MILITARY IN AL ARISH UNDERSTANDABLY DISTURBING TO ISRAELIS BUT NO INDICATION DICATED BY OTHER THAN NORMAL DEFENSIVE CONSIDERATION AS WELL AS NECESSITY CONTROL LARGE NUMBER GAZA REFUGEES TEMPORARILY IN AREA.

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Action

Control: 15458

Rec'd: March 24, 1957  
2:46 p.m.

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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1115, March 24, 4 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1115, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 228, PARIS 104, CAIRO 209, BEIRUT 189, DAMASCUS 145, AMMAN 199, USUN 84.

Foreign Minister Meir made following brief comment to me on arrival Lydda Airport Friday afternoon: She had long conversations with Secretary, Lodge and Hammarskjold but in circumstances and limited time available commented only on conversation with latter. She said, in response my question, in her opinion Hammarskjold not (repeat not) likely come to Israel "as he will have nothing worth while to bring". She said she told him, "as Drew Pearson would say, "I predict" you will go to Cairo and come away with some sort of vague formula in which it "would be assumed" that Nasser will do something if Israel will do certain things he wants done. What we want to know is the simple answer to the simple question of whether Nasser insists on belligerency".

Hammarskjold replied, "what you want is that Nasser abandon belligerency is not (repeat not) it?"

She said, "I am sorry, but that is not (repeat not) the question. What we want is a yes or no answer. If it is no (repeat no), we want to know it".

Re El Auja, she said she told him that it would do no good for him "to come up with some sort of proposal requiring Israel to get out. We will not do it." (Apparently, the foregoing remarks attributed to Nasser and Hammarskjold the possibility of the latter confronting Israel with a Nasser agreement on non-belligerency under such terms and sought to forestall it, delay it or establish a tactical position for the future.

Re Gaza: I suggested that Hammarskjold may have been as surprised as anyone at Nasser's quick return of Egyptian civil administration. (The main purpose of my comment was to allay some of the bitter feeling against Hammarskjold, dispell feelings against him based on unfounded or erroneous press and other reports, and encourage greater support for his present efforts. I got exactly

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-2- 1115, March 24, 4 p.m., from Tel Aviv.

exactly nowhere. She remained unconvinced and adamant in her belief that he was fully aware of the impending action in plenty of time to oppose it, yet did nothing to stop it.) She replied quickly and firmly that there was no (repeat no) question in her mind but that Hammarskjold and the USG as well knew that Nasser was sending a governor to Gaza week before he was actually on his way yet did nothing to stop it. "We told Hammarskjold and the Department of the plan. Furthermore, no one will believe that Israel's intelligence is better than that of the US", she said.

One thing that disturbed her, she said was that if Egypt could spring such a surprise with respect to Gaza what assurance was there that she would not soon have troops in Sharm el-Sheikh.

She remains very much on the defensive regarding her statement to the GA on withdrawal made on Friday March 1 and her subsequently unrealized assumptions as to Lodge in speech. After the press departed, she opened her handbag, remarking, "I want to show you something." She produced what she described as the draft of her proposed statement which had been shown to the Department before delivery. It bore many handwritten changes which, she said, had been suggested by the Department. I made no (repeat no) pretext of examining the paper closely but she pointed out a few changes, remarking, "this may not (repeat not) be recognized in a court of law as an "agreement" but it seems to me that there has been such a specific understanding and agreement on the text by our two governments that it is in fact an "agreement". And I did not vary so much as one comma from the text nor did I add anything to it--and the USUN delegation knows I delivered it that way".

Comment: To some extent, it is understandable that she feels very strongly about the dispatch with which Nasser acted in sending his civil government group into Gaza and her concern over the possibility of Egyptian troops following. Also, her continuing defensive attitude on her GA statement is not unexpected. In both matters she, being so closely associated with GOI's withdrawal policy, is very much "on the spot" with the Cabinet, her party and the public. Therefore, it seems not unreasonable to me to see her taking a somewhat more emphatic position than may be taken publicly or privately by Ben Gurion under present circumstances.

LAWSON

AAL:RBW/6

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APR 17 1967

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Amembassy, PARIS (POUCH)  
USUN, NEW YORK (POUCH)

*6*  
*Resuchid*  
*gum*

Tel Aviv's 1115. At suitable opportunity you should inform FONMIN for record that USG did not repeat not have advance knowledge that GOE planned send Governor to Gaza. FYI Your 1076 gives impression FONMIN's first knowledge of Egyptian plan came from Egyptian announcement. Also we note her statement there that Secretary would be as "dumbfounded" as GOI End FYI.

*Dulles*  
*(over)*  
*DULLES*

674.84A/3-2457

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674.84A/3-2457

Origin

Info:

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Drafted by:

NEA:NE:DCBergus:rej - 3/25/57

Clearance:

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Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

NE - Stuart W. Rockwell

S/S-CR  
MAR 25 1957 R.H.

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*Department of State*

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MARCH 25, 1957

4:40 PM

FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 3014, MARCH 25, 2 PM

SENT DEPARTMENT 3014, REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV 170

UNDER HEADLINE "SUCCESS HAMMARSKJOLD MISSION" GUMHOURIYA AND OTHER PAPERS REPORTED "CONCURRENCE OF VIEWS AND UNDERSTANDING ON POSSIBILITY OF REACHING SOLUTION" AT SYG-NASSER BARRAGE TALKS "DURING WHICH NASSER EXPLAINED EGYPT'S DECISION CONCERNING CONDITIONS CANAL TRANSIT". PRESS PRE-DICTS EGYPT WILL ISSUE "ITS DETAILED NOTE ON PASSAGE SHIPS AND PAYMENT DUES WITHIN FIVE DAYS OR IN ANY CASE BEFORE END OF MONTH". (DEPARTMENT WILL RECALL GOE HAS STATED IT WOULD GIVE TWO WEEKS ADVANCE NOTICE OF REOPENING CANAL AND WHEELER HAS STATED CLEARANCE AND REPAIR OPERATION WOULD BE COMPLETED BY APRIL 12.)

PRESS ALSO REPORTS SYG MET WITH FAWZ! AFTERNOON MARCH 24 AND EXPECTS "FINAL MEETING" SYG AND NASSER (" TO EXAMINE ARMISTICE, FRONTIER, AND AQABA QUESTIONS") TO BE HELD TODAY AT 6:00 P.M.

ASKED BY CORRESPONDENTS TO COMMENT ON "AGREEMENT" UN PRESS OFFICER REFUSED. HOWEVER HE OBSERVED SYG NOT EMPOWERED REACH "AGREEMENT" BUT CHARGED WITH RECONCILIATION POINTS OF VIEW.

HARE

CC

APR 1 1957

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File Designation 674,84 A/3-2557  
Tel 302a  
Date 3/25/57  
From Cairo  
To SecState

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

- ☒ Security-Classified Information
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FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 677, MARCH 25, 6 PM.

PRIORITY

RE: PALESTINE

NAEVDAL (NORWAY) INFORMED US LATE TODAY ON CONFIDENTIAL BASIS  
FOLLOWING RESULTS SYG'S TALKS IN CAIRO:

(1) EGYPT APPARENTLY AGREEABLE NOT TO RE-MILITARIZE SHARM  
EL-SHEIKH AND WILLING HAVE ITS STATUS SETTLED BY ICJ.

(2) RE CANAL. MENON (INDIA) HAD APPARENTLY CONSIDERABLY  
COMPLICATED SYG'S JOB BY HARDENING NASSER'S POSITION AGAINST  
4-POWER PROPOSAL OF "IMPERIALISTS". SYG TAKEN ABACK BY HAVOC  
CAUSED BY MENON'S VISIT AND HAD SPEND MAJORITY OF TIME IN  
8-HOUR MEETING WITH NASSER SOFTENING HIM UP TO POINT WHERE  
APPARENTLY NASSER NOW READY START TALKING ABOUT SYG'S OCT  
24 LETTER TO FAWZI.

(3) RE GAZA. EVERYTHING SEEMED HINGE ON QUESTION OF PLACING  
TROOPS ON BOTH SIDES ARMISTICE LINE. UNDERSTAND GENERAL BURNS  
DEVELOPING MEMORANDUM RE INTERNAL SECURITY GAZA WHICH WAS  
TO BE DISCUSSED MONDAY EVENING BETWEEN SYG AND NASSER.

(4) SYG HAD RESERVATIONS GO JERUSALEM WHICH HE CANCELLED  
AFTER RECEIPT WORD FROM ISRAEL HE COULD NOT HAVE APPOINTMENT  
WITH BEN GURION AND BECAUSE OF ISRAELI REPORT ON ADVERSE SECURITY  
SITUATION.


(5) SYG TENTATIVELY PLANNED DEPART CAIRO WEDNESDAY MORNING  
FOR NY AND RECONVENE ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING FRIDAY TO  
CONSIDER SITUATION.

NAEVDAL

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-2- 677, MARCH 25, 6 PM FROM NEW YORK

NAEVDAL SAID CORDIER HAD ASKED ENGEN'S ADVICE ON WHETHER TO CONVENE COMMITTEE ON BASIS ABOVE INFORMATION. ENGEN HAD COUNSELLED AGAINST MEETING UNTIL RECEIPT REPORT FROM SYG ON MONDAY NIGHT MEETING WHICH APPEARED TO BE CRUCIAL ONE. NAEVDAL INDICATED LIKELIHOOD ADVISORY COMMITTEE WOULD MEET TOMORROW AFTER RECEIPT SYG REPORT ON MONDAY EVENING MEETING.

NAEVDAL SAID IT WAS CONSENSUS NORWEGIAN DEL GA WOULD HAVE TO RECONVENE WITHIN TWO TO THREE WEEKS TO FACE UP TO SITUATION REGARDING PLACING TROOPS ON BOTH SIDES ARMISTICE LINE.

CORDIER CONFIRMED IN MORE GENERAL TERMS INFORMATION CONTAINED PARAGRAPHS (1) THROUGH (5) ABOVE.

LODGE

SGC

MAY 10 1957

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: March 25, 1957

SUBJECT: Developments in Egypt, and Announcement of U.S. Intention to Join Baghdad Pact Military Committee

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. H. Dayal, Charge d'Affaires, Embassy of India  
Mr. J. Lampton Berry, NEA  
Mr. Robert W. Adams, SOA

COPIES TO: NEA (2cc)  
SOA (4cc)  
OLI (2)  
NE (1)  
American Embassy, New Delhi (1)

Mr. Dayal said that he had found recent press reports on developments in Egypt and Israel quite confusing, particularly a report published on March 25 indicating that Secretary General Hammarskjold's talks with Nasser were not proceeding satisfactorily. He asked if Mr. Berry would care to comment on such reports and on the situation in Gaza. Mr. Berry replied that, although Egypt had resumed administrative control over Gaza, at least "symbolically", with the installation of its Governor in that area, the UNEF was still in actual tactical control. Mr. Berry further stated that there was no confirmation of reports that Nasser had told the Secretary General that UNEF units must occupy positions on both sides of the Gaza border, but that such a proposal would certainly appear to be consistent with Nasser's views. The Israelis, on the other hand, had repeatedly declared that they would not permit the stationing of UNEF personnel on their side of the frontier. Although the Israelis have said they are "adamant" on this point, Mr. Berry expressed the personal opinion that the posting of UNEF units on both sides of the Gaza frontier might be a practical and realistic course for the UN to consider.

On the subject of conversations between the Secretary General and Nasser, Mr. Berry said that there were no official reports to confirm that the talks were "breaking down" as indicated by the press. He added that the Secretary General realized he faced a most difficult task but appeared to be moderately optimistic regarding the outcome of his talks with Nasser. Mr. Berry said that official reports on the first conversation between the Secretary General and Nasser certainly did not support recent press stories. Since the second, and presumably final, talk was taking place only today, March 25, it did not appear that there was any basis at this time for pessimistic newspaper reports on the outcome of the conversations. Mr. Berry added that one of the most difficult issues, that concerning Suez Canal fees, had not, to his knowledge, as yet been discussed by the Secretary General with Nasser.

Mr. Berry said

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Mr. Perry said that he realized some diplomatic representatives in Washington held views unlike that of the United States with respect to the Straits of Eiran. It is the position of the United States that the Straits of Eiran, while clearly within the territorial jurisdiction of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, nevertheless are the channel of communication between the Gulf of Acaba and the Red Sea, and therefore were "international waters" in the sense that they should be open to peaceful navigation. He added that, because of the conflicting views held on the right of passage through the Straits of Eiran, this might be a question on which an advisory opinion could appropriately be asked of the International Court of Justice.

Mr. Dyal then asked for Mr. Perry's comments on the announcement that the United States would join the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact. Mr. Perry said that the United States would, if invited by the member countries at the next Ministerial Meeting to take place in May, become a member of the Military Committee of the Pact. This announcement, he said, had been played up in the press beyond all reasonable proportion. The fact is, Mr. Perry added, that the military obligations of the United States under President Eisenhower's "American Doctrine" for the Middle East are already much more substantial than they would be in connection with membership in the Baghdad Pact's Military Committee.

Mr. Perry said that it had been intended that this statement of intention on the part of the United States would be kept secret until the Ministerial Meeting in May. According to plan, therefore, and as soon as Ambassador Richards informed Mr. Fendores in Turkey of the intention of the United States, a message was sent to Ambassador Bunker in New Delhi instructing him to notify Prime Minister Nehru confidentially of this development. Unfortunately, it was discovered that this subject had been "leaked" to the press and that exaggerated newspaper stories would soon be made public. In order to forestall erroneous or misleading press reports, it was decided by the President, then meeting with Mr. MacMillan in Bermuda, to release a factual statement which would place the United States decision in its proper context. Mr. Perry expressed his regret that the original plan was not followed because of this "leak" to the press. He said he was particularly sorry that Ambassador Bunker may not have been able, therefore, to inform Prime Minister Nehru in advance, as had been the intention of the Department of State.

D.R.

9

REV

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In reply refer to  
SEV 674.84A/3-2557

April 16 1957

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674.84A/3-2557

Dear Senator Dirksen:

I refer to your letter of March 25, 1957, acknowledged by telephone March 27, enclosing a letter from Mr. Charles FitzHenry of Washington, Illinois, concerning the facts surrounding the creation of the State of Israel and the international character of the Gulf of Aqaba.

The questions Mr. FitzHenry raises are dealt with at some length in publications and statements prepared by this Department. I am therefore enclosing copies of the "Background" publication on Israel, the United States Aide Memoire to Israel of February 11, 1957 and a recent speech by Deputy Under Secretary Robert Murphy about our relations with and the history of the various nations of the Middle East.

I feel confident that these publications will provide the information that Mr. FitzHenry is seeking.

Your constituent's letter is returned as you requested.

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Hill  
Assistant Secretary

Enclosures:

- ✓ 1. Material as stated.
- ✓ 2. From Mr. FitzHenry (returned).

The Honorable  
Everett McKinley Dirksen,  
United States Senate.

P:SEV:CEP:ushing:OBL:rp

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APR 16 1957 P.M.  
to 3/ for signature  
4/12/57

CS/T

674.84A/3-2557

Everett McKinley Dirksen  
Illinois

United States Senate  
Washington, D.C.

ACTION  
is assigned to

SE

March 25, 1957

Honorable Robert C. Hill  
Assistant Secretary of State  
Department of State  
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. Hill:

I wonder if you might have a member of your staff prepare a reply that I might send to Mr. Charles FitzHenry, 618 Peoria Street, Washington, Illinois, regarding the problem he discusses in his letter which is attached hereto. Please return his letter with your reply.

With every good wish,

Everett McKinley Dirksen

*Everett M. Dirksen*

PUBLIC SERVICES DIV.

POB

Enclosure

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APR 26 1957

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

United States Senate

*Public Services*  
DIVISION OF PUBLICATIONS  
(SSB)

March 25, 1957

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*sent letter to Sen. Kuchel enclosing material on international relations, middle East problems,*  
Respectfully referred to 3/28/57  
cmh  
File

Department of State

with thanks for such favorable consideration as  
the communication herewith submitted warrants,  
and for a report thereon, in duplicate to  
accompany return of inclosure.

By direction of  
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inclosures, if any) micro-  
records

THOMAS H. KUOHEI

U. S. - 1957

326743

FROM: Susan Loew, Chadwick School, Rolling Hills  
California

RE: Information on Middle East problems.

Would appreciate your replying direct to  
Miss Loew.

K:Wj

April 1 1957

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674.84A/3-2557

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674.84A/3-2557  
APR 1 1957



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March 25, 1957

**United States Senate**

Letter and newspaper clipping from Mr. Harry Wunsch  
Compo Parkway, Westport, Connecticut, regarding  
the Middle East situation.

Respectfully referred to  
Honorable John Foster Dulles  
Secretary  
Department of State

with thanks for such favorable consideration as  
the communication herewith submitted warrants,  
and for a report thereon, in duplicate to  
accompany return of inclosure.

By direction of

*William A. Purtell*  
William A. Purtell, U. S. S.

674. A/3-2557

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APR 26 1957

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Rev <i>39</i>
Ext <i>39</i>

FROM AND TYPE OF DOCUMENT		DATE DUE	
Partell, William A.		DATE REC'D	
DATE 3/25/57		NO.	
SUBJECT			
Ltr. fr. Harry Wunsch regarding the Middle East.			
TO:	TO:	TO:	TO:
HEB/P	45 - CR		
DATE	DATE	DATE	DATE
4/15/57			
ANSWERED		NO REPLY NECESSARY	

April 17 1957

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Central  
Files

In reply refer to  
SEV 674.84A/3-2557

Dear Senator Purtell:

I refer to your communication of March 25, 1957 to Secretary Dulles, acknowledged by telephone March 29, enclosing a letter and a newspaper clipping from Mr. Harry Wunsch of Westport, Connecticut, concerning the situation in the Middle East.

By virtue of the 1949 Armistice Agreement entered into by the Governments of Egypt and Israel, the jurisdiction of the Gaza Strip remains in Egyptian hands. Neither the United States nor the United Nations is in a position to alter this agreement without the consent of both parties to any modification.

The Egyptian Government did agree to the stationing of troops of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Gaza Strip on the Egyptian side of the Armistice Line. These troops have thus far served effectively to prevent raids from either side into the other's territory. The return of the Egyptian Governor to undertake the administration of the Gaza Strip has in no way hindered the operational effectiveness of the UNEF. In fact, Major General Abdel Latif, the Governor, has urged the people of the Strip to cooperate with the UNEF in every way in the fulfillment of its mission.

Concerning the status of the UNEF, the following exchange took place at the Secretary's news conference of March 26, 1957:

"Q. Mr. Secretary, it seems to be the position of some powers that UNEF is there at the sufferance of Egypt, and must leave when Egypt decides that it must go. Can you tell us what the United States position on that is?

"A. The generally

The Honorable  
William A. Purtell,  
United States Senate.

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"A. The generally accepted view in the United Nations is that the General Assembly has no right to impose upon any nation the presence of any observers or representatives or forces of the United Nations, and that in order for them to enter upon the territory of another State they have to have the consent of that State. Now once the consent has been given, then I think a good argument can be made that the consent cannot be arbitrarily withdrawn..until the purpose of that consent has been accomplished...

"Q. Mr. Secretary, is it your view then that the mission of UNEF has not been completed as yet?

"A. ...I felt that under a liberal construction of the original mandate to the UNEF, in the light of the present situation and the fact that there is no clear assurance that hostilities, that belligerency, may not reoccur, it is not correct to conclude that the original mandate has been exhausted."

With the presence of the UNEF along the 1949 Armistice line, it is felt that Israel would enjoy security from the concern that she has voiced concerning Egyptian administration of the Gaza Strip: that is, renewed fedayeen raids from the Strip into Israel territory.

Mr. Wunsch's letter and clipping are returned as you requested.

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Hill  
Assistant Secretary

**APR 17 1957 AM**

*to H for signature*  
**APR 17 1957**

Enclosure:

✓ From Mr. Wunsch (returned).

*L.*  
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4/12/57

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NEA/P - Mr. Frye



M-189  
3-14-50

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OFFICE OF COMMUNICATION  
AND RECORDS

June 27, 1957

TO: NEA

FROM: OC/R-F

Please mark this paper "File" (and initial) if action has been completed, and return to ~~OC/R-F~~. This is required under Departments Regulations, 421.2 (Nov. 15, 1946).

Thank you,

RNR-SA-18

~~OC/R-F~~

SA-7

HUBERT B. SCUDDER  
1ST DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

HOME ADDRESS:  
SEBASTOPOL, CALIFORNIA

Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D. C.

March 25, 1957

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RIVERS AND HARBORS  
PUBLIC BUILDINGS AND  
GROUNDS

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See letter  
Apr 2, 1957

Honorable Robert C. Hill  
Assistant Secretary of State  
State Department  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hill:

I am enclosing herewith copy of a letter I have recently received from one of my constituents, Mr. Frederick C. Fisher. You will note his inquiry.

I would appreciate your furnishing me with information that will enable me to reply to Mr. Fisher.

Very sincerely yours,

Hubert B. Scudder

HBS/gch  
enclosure

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Rev 7
Cat 100

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March 21, 1957

The Honorable Hubert B. Scudder  
Member of Congress  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Scudder:

The papers report that the Department of State has taken the position that the waters of the Gulf of Aqaba are open to navigation by the vessels of all nations. Has the text of the opinion of the law Officer of the Department upon the matter been made available to the public? If so, how can I obtain a copy of it?

Yours truly,

F. C. FISHER  
19 Wellington Avenue  
san Anselmo, California

LD

Sent him

a copy

the Feb 11

Arch. Memoir

see DCB

See



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TO: Secretary of State

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SENT DEPARTMENT 3027, REPEATED PRIORITY INFORMATION USUN 150.

CIA

ACCORDING STRAVROPOULOS LAST NIGHT'S SESSION OF HAMMARSKJOLD WITH NASSER LASTED FOR SEVEN HOURS TILL ONE O'CLOCK THIS MORNING, FOLLOWING WHICH SUMMARIZING MESSAGE SENT NEW YORK WHICH PRESUMABLY WILL BE AVAILABLE TO USUN. SYG TIED UP WITH CONTINUOUS MEETINGS WITH HIS STAFF SO FAR TODAY AND SEEING FAWZI AT FOUR THIS AFTERNOON. I HAVE ASKED SEE AS SOON AS HE IS FREE. ON WHOLE STAVROPOULOS HAD IMPRESSION SYG REASONABLY SATISFIED WITH LAST NIGHT'S TALKS.

HARE

JS



MAY 23 1959

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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1127, March 26, 4 p.m.

Control: 16747

Rec'd: March 26, 1951  
3:20 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 1127, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 210, USUN 85.

GOI made two-pronged attack on UN and SYG over weekend and press generally has swung enthusiastically into support.

(1) In airport press conference on her return from US Foreign Minister Meir said "we consider UN secretariat main culprit in what has happened".

(2) Foreign Ministry called press conference for Foreign correspondents who were told Israel had been victim of "international hoax" in withdrawing from Gaza on assumptions based on SYG's February 22 report of "Egypt's readiness and willingness to make arrangements for maintenance of order in Gaza strip". According to spokesman "UNEF was not in control single hour after Israelis withdrew." Hammarskjold's undertakings "were not carried out resulting in serious crisis of confidence in UN".

Spokesman went on to enumerate alleged inadequacies present regime in Gaza: Foreign mail in Israel destined for Gaza will not be accepted by UNEF which also refuses to accept IL one million in foodstuffs belonging to UNRWA now at Haifa; UNEF has been impotent to stop nightly incursions into Israel Kibbutzim by thieves; and Fedayeen who mined Nahal Oz road recently had to pass within 30 yards of UNEF outpost and were not stopped.

Meir and press predicted that while Hammarskjold might put to Nasser Israel's question whether "Egypt considers itself at war with Israel" he would receive negative or ambiguous reply.

Meir stated she doubted Hammarskjold would visit Jerusalem. She expressed satisfaction that her talks with "State Department" had established clearly we were right in our interpretation of American policy. Many things have gone wrong in Gaza and we have proposed practical steps to be taken in order to restore balance as far as possible. We are now awaiting State Department answer. I can not guarantee future is assured. Promises, I believe in are

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-2- 1127, March 26, 4 p.m., from Tel Aviv

are those which are fulfilled."

Representative press comment in support of attack on UN follows:  
LAMERCHAV (Achdut Avodah) "Hammaraskjold is 'expert' in giving in to Nasser's demands. Those parties which insisted on Israel's withdrawal on assumption Nasser would then be willing talk sense have found out already that their assumptions were wrong."

Situation calls for alertness. Whatever outcome of Nasser-Hammaraskjold talks, Israel must put to test all 'assumptions' supported by various states by: (A) Sending ships through Canal without delay; (B) having Israel ships go to Eilat and from it unimpeded; (C) not allowing UN forces to be stationed on its side of demarcation lines; (D) getting all countries which believe Aqaba Gulf to be international waterway, to send ships through it, thereby confirming their assumption."

AL HAMISHMAR (Mapam) "Hammaraskjold will presumably not emerge from talks disappointed and will not present Nasser's refusal to make concessions as failure of the talks. Indeed there are no basic differences of outlook between Hammaraskjold and Nasser. They both desire return of 'status quo antebellum'. As result of Hammaraskjold Mission grave political and military tests are awaiting Israel".

HAMODJA (Agudat Israel) "Experience has shown Israel's objections to Hammaraskjold's plans and aims carry little weight. Neither is US interested in undermining prestige of UN and its SYG. Ultimately pressure will be directed against Israel and her case will be presented in a distorted light as an obstruction to Middle Eastern peace".

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FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 683, MARCH 26, 8 PM

PRIORITY

RE PALESTINE

CORDIER SHOWED US CABLE FROM BUNCHE REPORTING ON SEVEN HOUR MEETING BETWEEN SYG AND NASSER LAST NIGHT. THIS MEETING CONCLUDED PRESENT PHASE TALKS WITH NASSER. SYG PROCEEDING BEIRUT TOMORROW MORNING FOR SHORT MEETING WITH MCCLOY AND HAS RESERVATIONS FLY BEIRUT TO NEW YORK ARRIVING THURSDAY AM. SYG ASKED CORDIER SCHEDULE MEETING ADVISORY COMMITTEE 3 P.M. THURSDAY.

THERE WAS VERY LITTLE OF SUBSTANCE IN BUNCHE'S CABLE. SYG'S OVER-ALL ASSESSMENT OF MEETING WAS ATMOSPHERE "CORDIAL BUT BLUNTLY FRANK".

RE GAZA, CABLE SAID EGYPT NOT INSISTING ON HAVING UNEF STATIONED ON ISRAELI SIDE OF LINE AS PRE-CONDITION CONTINUANCE UNEF IN GAZA.

RE SUEZ CANAL, SYG OBTAINED EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT DISCUSS WITH US AND NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVES CAIRO FURTHER DECLARATION OR POSITION OF EGYPT REGARDING OPERATION CANAL. UNDERSTAND NASSE WILL MEET WITH AMB HARE WEDNESDAY AM. BELIEVE IT DESIRABLE HAVE REPEATED NEW YORK AUTOMATICALLY ANY REPORT HARE MAKES ON THIS CONVERSATION SINCE INTEND SEE HAMMARSKJOLD THURSDAY AM, AT CORDIER'S SUGGESTION.

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**DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

**Memorandum of Conversation**

**DATE:** March 26, 1957

**SUBJECT:** Israel and the Near East

**PARTICIPANTS:** Rabbi Philip S. Bernstein, Chairman, American Zionist Committee  
for Public Affairs  
Mr. I. L. Kenen, Executive Director, American Zionist Committee  
for Public Affairs  
G - Mr. Robert Murphy *RM*  
NE- Donald C. Bergus

**COPIES TO:**

S/S, G, NEA, NE, Tel Aviv

Rabbi Bernstein asked if he was right in his feeling that there was a serious deterioration in the Near East since Israel's withdrawal. Mr. Murphy did not think so. The Saudi statement on the Gulf of Aqaba had come no surprise because the Saudi position on this matter had been clear prior to withdrawal. Egyptian troops had not moved back to Gaza or Sharm el-Sheikh. We had expected a certain Arab effervescence in the wake of withdrawal but there appeared to be moderating factors in the situation as well. They appeared to recognize the value of restraint. Nasser probably did not want to precipitate anything but there had been no basic change in the Arab attitude towards Israel.

Israel had apparently taken a strong position against the stationing of the UNEF on its side of the Armistice line. The Secretary was not clear in his own mind as to the reasons for this Israel opposition to a move which we felt would bring increased protection for Israel. Rabbi Bernstein felt that no Israel Government could survive a decision to place the UNEF in Israel. This would be considered as a concession to Nasser at a time when there was no observable attitude of conciliation on his part. Mr. Murphy commented that Nasser had permitted UNEF on his territory. Israel seemed to take this for granted. Mrs. Meir's great point had been Israel's exposure to fedayeen. Was there no value in UN protection? Rabbi Bernstein said that as long as Egypt maintained an attitude of belligerency, a handful of UN troops would afford protection. He also raised the point that Israel had developed the land right up to the Armistice line; acceptance of UNEF would result in a diminution of Israel's territory. Mr. Murphy said that we were talking in terms of perhaps

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half a kilometer. He felt it was better to have the tranquilizing influence of the UNEF in this situation.

Mr. Murphy reviewed our positions on the Suez Canal and Aqaba and discussed the consultations now going on between the United States and Israel Governments on the subject of economic aid.

Rabbi Bernstein stated that he planned to go to Israel about April 20 to remain there for five or six weeks. His Rochester congregation had given him a Sabbatical and he planned from Israel to visit Eastern Europe, Germany, and Austria to look into the situation of Jews in those countries. He wondered if he could be helpful to the Department. Mr. Murphy said he would like to think about this and talk to Rabbi Bernstein further. Rabbi Bernstein wondered if it would be possible or useful for him to go to Egypt in late April or during May for talks with Egyptian leaders in an effort to achieve better understanding. Mr. Murphy indicated some doubt as to whether the Egyptians would be receptive to such an idea but said he would inquire of the Embassy in Cairo.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

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DATE: March 26, 1957

SUBJECT: Review of Middle East Events

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Manlio Brosio, Italian Ambassador

NEA - William M. Rountree  
NE - Lewis Hoffacker

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NE/E (1cc)  
NE (1cc)  
WE (1cc)  
OLI (2cc)  
AmEmbassy ROME (1cc)

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The Italian Ambassador requested Mr. Rountree's comment on "an impression" received from Rome to the effect that certain Italian officials thought well of the suggestion that an agency or committee of the United Nations supervise transit and the receipt of tolls in the Suez Canal. Mr. Rountree noted that elements of the suggestion had been discussed from time to time and most recently in connection with the proposed interim settlement, which called for the use of the United Nations as an agent to accept and disburse tolls. While the United States would look favorably on United Nations supervision in a final settlement as well, it is most questionable whether Egypt would tolerate such a procedure. It was suggested that it might be appropriate to discuss the Italian ideas in this connection with the Secretary General, who is immersed in delicate negotiations on the issue, prior to pursuing them with the Egyptian Government.

The Ambassador asked if there had been United States-United Kingdom agreement at Bermuda on the Canal and Nasser issues. Pointing out that the Bermuda conferees were handicapped by being unaware of the outcome of the Nasser-Hammarskjold conversations, Mr. Rountree said there had been agreement to continue to support the Secretary General in his efforts to bring about a provisional Suez settlement. The six-point Egyptian memorandum circulated last week was disappointing although it did not eliminate all possibilities for continued negotiation. Should Hammarskjold not succeed in bringing about a satisfactory interim arrangement, the parties concerned would have to determine an alternative approach in the light of

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circumstances prevailing at that time.

With regard to talk of a Turkish-Iraqi-Iranian pipeline, Mr. Rountree spoke of general United States-United Kingdom endorsement of the concept of exploring means of protecting such a substantial financial undertaking through a possible multilateral treaty. The Ambassador was curious as to possible signatories of such a treaty and was informed that the idea was discussed at Bermuda only in very general terms. The Ambassador persisted in suggesting the appropriateness of Italy joining in any such treaty.

In answer to the Ambassador's question, Mr. Rountree said that the possibility of United States membership in the military committee of the Baghdad Pact had existed for some time but that it was not sufficiently firm to raise with King Saud during his visit to Washington.

The Ambassador said, in confidence, that a Soviet Embassy "information man" had passed to the Italian Press Counselor what was obviously "a malicious story." King Saud's party gave Americans the impression that Saud was eager to argue in favor of the United States when he returned to Cairo whereas he and his followers actually described the United States as pro-Israeli in subsequent conversations with Nasser. Although Mr. Rountree had not heard this report, he agreed that it was in line with misleading and mischievous Soviet tactics in the Middle East.

Within the next few days, Italian Minister Ortona would probably raise with Mr. Berry reports on Yemen affairs as received from the Italian representative in Sana'a.

The Ambassador asked whether "permanent machinery" for United States-United Kingdom consultation was to be established as a result of the Bermuda talks. Mr. Rountree said that the United States and the United Kingdom would continue to consult on problems of mutual interest.

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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1134, March 27, 11 a.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

SENT DEPARTMENT 1134, USUN 87.

Re DEPTTEL 900.

On day of receipt REFTEL I found suitable occasion stress  
Walter Eytan Director General Foreign Office points raised.

While waiting arrival Foreign Minister Meir at Lydda Airport  
March 22 I made point of expressing to Eytan our concern over  
sharp GOI and press criticism Hammarskjold. I said I had  
noted in conversations with wide range of persons this criticism  
was having unfortunate effect of creating public attitude  
bitterness and distrust which not (repeat not) contributing to  
period of calm so essential to settlement outstanding critical  
problems of area; although trend of events not (repeat not)  
to our liking and we disappointed perhaps situation not (repeat  
not) as bad as pictured and part of Israel's concern may be  
based on inaccurate press accounts; that we continued rely on  
SYG and considered it important GOI extend cooperation to him  
in his effort to achieve maximum possible implementation arrange-  
ments set forth his February 22 statement. I directed attention  
to inherent danger that inflammatory public expressions and clear  
lack of confidence in SYG might make his efforts in Cairo very  
difficult and everyone would be the loser.

Eytan said there was no (repeat no) question about the existence  
in Israel of strong feeling against SYG in circumstances. He  
did not (repeat not) attribute it in any appreciable degree to  
erroneous press stories but to past experiences. With regard to  
Israel cooperation with Hammarskjold, all depended on "what he  
would try to do and the way he went about it." He thought US  
could offer effective support to SYG's Cairo efforts and assumed  
we were using our influence. I remarked that I hoped there  
would be quiet atmosphere in which to work and there was no (repeat  
no) question but that the SYG understood USG position and desires  
with respect to the major issues. "Yes" he said, "but no repeat n

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-2- 1134, March 27, 11 a.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

one can say just what Hammarskjold will do or how he will express himself."

Later at airport I took opportunity (following her comment to press EMBTEL 1103) to attempt dissipate some of Foreign Minister's feeling of distrust of SYG (EMBTEL 1115) but with conspicuous lack of success. However, I shall continue whenever possible efforts to reduce disposition Foreign Minister and other GOI officials to indulge in public expressions of lack of confidence in him pointing out counter productiveness from their viewpoint of such policy.

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FROM: Tel Aviv

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1134, March 27, 11 a.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1134, USUN 87

Comment: Press and official criticism may well be part of domestic political tactics and an attempt to support thesis GOI, USG and others "duped" by him, and disillusionment with SYG may now be regarded as essentially a national attitude. But the feeling I believe runs deep and has been generated over long period of time. Only yesterday, in private conversations with prominent American visitor, Ben Gurion displayed his usual feelings mistrust in SYG returning to his long festering resentment at Hammarskjold's letter of April 13, 1956 (EMBTel 1095) sent to Ben Gurion through Embassy and considered by Ben Gurion as clear evidence of bias on SYG's part. He becomes almost livid with emotion whenever he recalls that event. His distrust of SYG became firmly fixed that day and I feel sure has been compounded progressively.

Today his intensity of feeling is reflected widely in GOI. Ben Gurion's strong disapproval of Hammarskjold is everpresent. On occasion official call at his residence in Jerusalem sometime ago, he with a smile and knowing look, called my attention to a silver dish sent to him by Hammarskjold soon after the conclusion of their private conversations in mid-April 1956 on the occasion of Hammarskjold's visit to Israel. The rim of the dish bore an inscription referring to "memorable conversations" - "from Dag Hammarskjold". Ben Gurion had earlier expressed doubt that SYG's actions could always be interpreted as strictly neutral or consistent with his official position. On several occasions Ben Gurion has asked the question, "Is he representing the UN or Nasser?" Today his intensity of feeling is reflected widely within and without government. And Ben Gurion's disciple Golda Meir, who is feeling the intense heat of criticism for her part in counselling withdrawal by Israel on the basis of unrealized confidence is even more emphatic in denouncing the UN and SYG. I doubt we can greatly reduce intensity of feeling at this time

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at this time but our constant counselling of quieter public comment on basis of self-interest may act as restraining influence if current conditions prevail.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**Memorandum of Conversation**

DATE: March 27, 1957

SUBJECT: Israel

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Zev Argaman, Minister-Counselor, Embassy of Israel  
NE - Fraser Wilkins  
NE - Donald C. Bergus

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Mr. Argaman noted that the Bermuda communique contained only three sentences with respect to the Middle East. He did not like the reference to "primary reliance" on the UN. A copy of the communique was examined by Mr. Argaman and Mr. Wilkins and it was shown that there was no such reference in the communique.

Mr. Argaman asked concerning the UN Secretary General's trip to Cairo. Mr. Wilkins said there were no reports as yet. Mr. Argaman said there were indications that Israel could obtain transit through the Suez Canal if it permitted UNEF on its territory. Mr. Wilkins said he had seen nothing on this, he did not see this developing into a big issue, and that he felt there had been a lot of misinformation and exaggerated reporting. Mr. Argaman said he had information from Israel that the entire civil administration was in Egyptian hands. The UNEF had no standing other than military. Israel was not positive of this information, however. The Israelis were convinced that unless UNEF had responsibilities for administration, it would be of no great value and could not last very long. Israel did not think Egypt wished to remove UNEF now. If UNEF were on both sides of the armistice line, Israel would be hampered in dealing with infiltrators.

Mr. Wilkins felt that the more UN presence there was along the armistice lines, the better. We had always felt that Israel could get good protection from the UNTSO and the UNEF. Mr. Argaman felt that

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acceptance of UNEF on Israel's side of the line would only raise Nasser's prestige. Mr. Wilkins did not agree. The presence of UNEF in the area arose from the United Nations and the Secretary General's report. Mr. Argaman said Israel wanted implementation of the entire General Armistice Agreement. He imagined that if the Secretary General could get a renunciation of belligerency from Egypt, Israel would reconsider. Mr. Wilkins pointed out that the Egyptians might raise a number of points such as the fact that there had been new hostilities provoked by Israel since the signing of the original Armistice Agreement, that there was a new ceasefire in effect; that the ICJ must decide matters such as Israel's right of transit through the Canal; that the Security Council was not a court.

to the ICJ

Mr. Argaman said the UN might decide to take Israel's right of transit through Suez. He was not sure Israel would be willing to take it to the ICJ. This would take a long time. Israel's rights to use the Canal were clear. Let those who challenged Israel's rights take the matter to the ICJ. Meanwhile let Israel use the Canal pending a decision.

Mr. Argaman did not believe that what the Secretary had said with respect to seeking an advisory opinion from the ICJ on Aqaba was in accordance with Israel's understanding of the U.S. position.

Mr. Argaman asked what the U.S. was going to do about the Suez Canal. Mr. Wilkins replied that we were awaiting the results of the Secretary General's mission. Mr. Argaman said he understood the U.S. had come to an agreement on this matter with the British. Mr. Wilkins said we had exchanged information with them but there had been no agreement on future contingencies.

Mr. Wilkins expressed the opinion that Egypt would not interfere militarily in the Sinai Peninsula.

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FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 691, MARCH 28, 5PM

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RE HAMMARSKJOLD-NASSER DISCUSSIONS



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THIS MORNING I HAD AN HOUR AND A HALF MEETING WITH HAMMARSKJOLD IMMEDIATELY UPON HIS RETURN FROM EGYPT. A SUMMARY OF HIS COMMENT FOLLOWS: (DOCUMENTS WHICH HE GAVE ME IN THE COURSE OF HIS ACCOUNT ARE INCLUDED IN SUBSEQUENT SEPARATE TELEGRAMS):

TO SOME EXTENT HE HAD TAKEN A NEW ROAD IN HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH NASSER AND FAWZI IN THAT HE HAD ACCEPTED NOTHING, BUT HAD NEGOTIATED AS AN AMBASSADOR WOULD UP TO WHAT HE CONSIDERED THE MAXIMUM RESULT OBTAINABLE BY HIS EFFORTS AT THIS TIME, RESERVING APPROVAL OF THESE RESULTS TO GOVERNMENTS. "NOTHING IS AGREED WITH ME ON GAZA OR THE SUEZ", HE SAID.

## 1. GAZA

WITH RESPECT TO GAZA, HE SAID THAT HE HAD PROCEEDED ON THE BASIS OF HIS CONVICTION THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO GET AWAY FROM TALKING ABOUT GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND GET DOWN TO HARD FACTS. HE HAD TOLD GENERAL BURNS THAT HE SHOULD WRITE OUT EVERYTHING THAT BURNS AS THE COMMANDER, FELT HE NEEDED TO PUT A STOP TO INFILTRATION AND TO MAINTAIN ORDER. HE HAD TOLD BURNS NOT TO TALK ABOUT PRINCIPLES AT ALL BUT ABOUT PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THAT HE WOULD TRANSMIT HIS REQUESTS TO THE EGYPTIANS AND TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE. THIS BURNS HAD DONE AND THE EGYPTIANS HAD ACCEPTED BURNS' PAPER AND AGREED TO HIS REQUESTS, ALTHOUGH WITHOUT SIGNING IT. THE PAPER DID IN FACT REPRESENT AN AGREEMENT WITH EGYPT (BURNS MEMORANDUM AS ACCEPTED BY EGYPT CONTAINED IN IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM, MYTEL 692). HAMMARSKJOLD EMPHASIZED AGAIN HOWEVER, THAT THIS DID NOT REPRESENT AN AGREEMENT WITH HIM AND THAT IT WAS HIS INTENTION TO PUT IT BEFORE THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE.

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THE EGYPTIANS HAD MADE DEFINITE UNDERTAKING IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM THAT NO EGYPTIAN TROOPS WOULD MOVE INTO GAZA. HE SAID THAT THE EGYPTIANS REGARDED THIS AS A MORAL COMMITMENT TO THE SYG, AND IT WAS AGREEABLE TO THE EGYPTIANS THAT HE SHOULD USE IT AS SUCH WITH ISRAEL AND IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE U.S.

EGYPT HAD NOT (REPEAT NOT) MADE DEPLOYMENT OF UNEF ON ISRAEL'S SIDE OF THE ARMISTICE LINES A CONDITION TO THEIR AGREEMENTS ON UNEF'S FUNCTIONS OR TO THE CONTINUANCE OF UNEF IN GAZA, WITH ONE EXCEPTION. THAT EXCEPTION WAS THAT UNEF'S RIGHT TO SHOOT EGYPTIANS CROSSING THE ARMISTICE LINES MUST BE MADE CONDITIONAL ON A SIMILAR RIGHT TO SHOOT ISRAELIS. THIS POINT RELATED TO PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE BURNS-EGYPTIAN MEMORANDUM. EGYPT WAS AGREEABLE TO UNEF'S HAVING THE AUTHORITY TO FIRE AT INFILTRATORS REFUSING TO HALT WHEN CHALLENGED IN THE ZONE IN WHICH MOVEMENT IS PROHIBITED. PROVIDED ISRAEL ON ITS SIDE ALSO ACCEPTS SUCH AUTHORITY OF UNEF TO FIRE. ALTERNATIVELY, EGYPT WOULD CONSIDER GIVING THIS AUTHORITY TO UNEF ON ITS SIDE IF UNEF WERE JOINED IN ITS PATROLS BY PALESTINIAN POLICE.

GENERAL BURNS CONSIDERED THE POINTS OF AGREEMENT ON UNEF'S FUNCTIONS CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH ARE TO HIM SATISFACTORY ALTHOUGH THEY DID NOT CONSTITUTE A UNEF ADMINISTRATION OF GAZA. IN FACT, HOWEVER, UNEF WAS ALL OVER THE PLACE, BUT NOT RUNNING THINGS EXCEPT THROUGH WHAT UNRWA WAS DOING.

HAMMARSKJOLD SAID, GOING BACK TO HIS STATEMENT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON FEBRUARY 22 ON WHAT IT WAS UNDERSTOOD WOULD BE DONE IN GAZA, THAT (1) THE INITIAL "TAKE-OVER" HAD GONE BY, (2) THE HELPFUL ARRANGEMENTS CONTEMPLATED WITH UNEF NOW EXIST. UNEF HEADQUARTERS ARE WITHIN GAZA AND NOT JUST ON THE DEMARCATION LINE AND UNEF HAS FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT. WHILE THERE WERE SITUATIONS WHICH, IF THEY AROSE, WOULD MAKE THE EGYPTIANS WANT TO GET RID OF UNEF IN GAZA, THE EGYPTIANS IN FACT VERY MUCH WANTED TO AVOID THIS. THEY KNEW THAT IF FEDAYEEN RAIDS STARTED AGAIN IT WOULD BE THE END OF UNEF. THE SYG HAD TOLD THEM THAT IF THE RAIDS STARTED HE WOULD WITHDRAW THE FORCE BUT, ASIDE FROM HIS OWN POSITION, THE HARD FACTS WERE THAT THE GOVERNMENTS MAKING UP UNEF WOULD ALSO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES IF THE RAIDS STARTED.

HE SAID THAT WE WOULD BE AMUSED AND SURPRISED AT HOW HARD HE

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-3- 691, MARCH 28, 5 PM, FROM NEW YORK

HAD BEEN ON NASSER ON THIS AS WELL AS ON OTHER POINTS. THE MAIN POLITICAL FACT WITH RESPECT TO SAID, HE SAID, WAS THAT "THE EGYPTIANS ARE WORKING WITH US TO PREVENT RAIDS." HE HAD NOT REALIZED BEFORE HIS TALKS THAT HE COULD PLAY THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF SO HARD AND GET AWAY WITH IT.

HE WAS HAPPY TO SEE THAT SECRETARY DULLES HAD REAFFIRMED THE U.S. POSITION ON THE DESIRABILITY OF UNEF ON BOTH SIDES OF THE LINES. HE INTENDED TO TAKE UP THIS QUESTION WITH THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE. HE HAD NOT DWELT ON IT BEFORE UNTIL HE WAS SURE THAT UNEF WAS SECURE ON THE EGYPTIAN SIDE REGARDLESS OF WHETHER IT WAS ON THE ISRAELI SIDE OR NOT. NOW, WITH THAT ASSURANCE, THE QUESTION OF HAVING IT ON THE ISRAELI SIDE WOULD BE DEALT WITH ON ITS OWN MERITS. HE WANTED, HE SAID, TO HAVE THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TAKE THE DECISION ITSELF TO PUT THE QUESTION UP TO ISRAEL, ALTHOUGH HE HAD AUTHORITY OF COURSE TO DO SO. BY HAVING THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE DO IT, IT WOULD HELP TO AVOID THE ISRAELI CHARGE THAT IT WAS SIMPLY NASSER'S IDEA.

IN ADDITION TO MOVEMENT OF UNEF'S FUNCTIONS WHICH EGYPT HAD ACCEPTED, HAMMARSKJOLD GAVE ME A SECOND NOTE FROM BURNS TO THE SYG ON THE SUBJECT OF UNEF ACTION IN THE EVENT ARMED FORCES, AS OPPOSED TO INFILTRATORS, CROSSED THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE. (NOTE CONTAINED IN IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM, MYTEL 692). THE PROBLEM HERE INVOLVED WHAT ACTION UNEF COULD TAKE IF ISRAEL RESORTED AGAIN TO RAIDS INTO EGYPTIAN TERRITORY THROUGH ARMED ATTACK. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID THAT WHEN THIS QUESTION HAD ARISEN IN THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE PREVIOUSLY, BOTH CANADA AND NORWAY HAD SAID THAT THE UNEF COULD NOT SHOOT. THIS THEY CONSIDERED BEYOND THE ORIGINAL CONCEPT OF UNEF. BURNS HAD BEEN CONSIDERABLY UPSET BY THIS REACTION AND BELIEVED THAT IF THE ORDINARY ISRAELI TYPE RAID, FOR EXAMPLE A RAID BY A BATTALION, TOOK PLACE, THAT UNEF SHOULD BE EMPOWERED TO SHOOT. ON THE OTHER HAND, BURNS REALIZED THAT IF A REAL ISRAELI INVASION TOOK PLACE, UNEF WAS IN NO POSITION TO RESIST. HAMMARSKJOLD INTENDED TO DEAL WITH THIS QUESTION IN THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE AND POINTED OUT IT INVOLVED NO AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT WITH EGYPT.

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2. SHARM EL-SHEIKH. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID THAT IN THE CASE OF SHARM

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✓ SHE KH THE COAST GUARD OF M... NO INTENTION TO MOVE IN... FACT CLOSING THEIR EYES TO... HAD BEEN PUT TO FAWZI IN HAMMARSKJOLD... WOULD DO... ISRAEL... FAWZI HAD SAID... HAMMARSKJOLD SAID... EGYPTIANS THERE WAS A PROBLEM WITH... CAUSE DIFFICULTIES.

3. SUBT. WHEN HAMMARSKJOLD... WAS ALREADY THERE AND... WITH RESPECT TO THE SUBT. MEMORANDUM (CAIRO TEL. MAR 20),... MEMORANDUM WAS A PARTIAL... ALL OF THE POINTS CONTAINED... AND THAT HE COULD NOT...

HE THEREFORE CONCENTRATED HIS... MUST CONSULT THE... BEFORE GOING FURTHER. IN... HAD AGREED TO CONSULT... AS A DRAFT.

HAMMARSKJOLD HAD INSISTED IN CONNECTION WITH... GOVERNMENTS THAT THERE SHOULD BE... COOPERATION WITH THE USERS. HAMMARSKJOLD HAD POINTED OUT THAT THE EGYPTIAN MEMORANDUM DID NOT... EITHER OF THESE RESPECTS AND THAT...

AS A RESULT OF HIS INSISTENCE, ... FROM GOVERNMENTS AND HAD ALSO AGREED... THE INFORMATION HE HAD OBTAINED... ANY WAY HE SAW FIT. THIS HAD BEEN... FROM FAWZI TO THE SYG WHICH... OF WHICH HAMMARSKJOLD GAVE... IN THIS LETTER, HAMMARSKJOLD AGAIN... OF CONSULTING WITH INTERESTED COUNTRIES, POINTING OUT HIS REGRET THAT EXCHANGES OF VIEWS BETWEEN... WHICH HAD BEEN EXPECTED, HAD NOT TAKEN...

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ALSO IN HIS LETTER THE IMPORTANCE OF ORGANIZED COOPERATION WITH THE USERS. HAMMARSKJOLD FELT IT MOST IMPORTANT THAT THE USERS, PARTICULARLY THE U.S., SHOULD FOLLOW UP NOW BY CONVEYING TO EGYPT THEIR COMMENTS ON EGYPTIAN MEMORANDUM.

HAMMARSKJOLD SAID THAT AS HE ANALYZED THE EGYPTIAN MEMORANDUM HE CONSIDERED THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD DEALT WITH ALL OF THE ARBITRATION POINTS CONTAINED IN THE SIX PRINCIPLES OF THE SC.

SECONDLY, THE EGYPTIANS HAD, AT HAMMARSKJOLDS INSISTENCE, DESIGNATED THE BANK OF INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT FOR THE RECEIPT OF TOLLS, WHICH HE CONSIDERED AS GOOD AS THE IBRD.

THIRDLY, ON THE FUNDING PROVISIONS, HE HAD PRESSED THE EGYPTIANS FOR A LARGER PERCENTAGE TO BE SET ASIDE BUT HAD BEEN UNABLE TO BUDGE THEM. THEY HAD CONTENDED THAT IN THE OLD COMPANY, MORE THAN 50 PERCENT OF THE INCOME FROM TOLLS WAS SET ASIDE FOR SALARIES, PENSIONS, ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES, ETC., AND ADDITIONAL AMOUNTS WERE PAID TO SHAREHOLDERS AND IN ROYALTIES. IT WOULD NOT BE PRACTICALLY POSSIBLE TO TAKE OUT OF THE OPERATING INCOME FOR DEVELOPMENT FUNDS AS MUCH AS 50 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL, AND A 25 PERCENT FUND WOULD IN FACT PUT ASIDE FOR DEVELOPMENT CONSIDERABLY MORE THAN THE OLD COMPANY HAD DONE OR COULD HAVE DONE UNDER THE PREVAILING FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS.

FOURTH, IN ARTICLES 8 AND 11(D), THE EGYPTIANS HAD LEFT THE DOOR OPEN TO ARRANGEMENTS FOR COOPERATION WITH THE USERS. HE HAD SUCCEEDED IN GETTING THE EGYPTIANS TO INCLUDE THE SECOND SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 8 AND THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 11(D). BEYOND THESE MATTERS, HE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO MOVE THE EGYPTIANS ON THE PROVISIONS OF THEIR MEMORANDUM.

HE SAID THAT THE EGYPTIANS WOULD NOT CONSULT WITH ENGLAND AND FRANCE ALTHOUGH THEY TOOK FOR GRANTED THAT THE U.S. WOULD DO SO AND THEY LEFT IT OPEN TO HIM TO DO SO. LIKEWISE HE HAD RECEIVED NO OBJECTIONS FROM THEM TO HIS DISCUSSING THE EGYPTIAN POSITION WITH ITALY AND NORWAY.

THE FACT, HOWEVER, THAT HE HAD AGREED TO NOTHING HIMSELF PROVIDED ADDED PRESSURE ON EGYPT. IN HIS OPINION THEY WERE VERY ANXIOUS

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TO COOPERATE WITH THE UN AND THE SCUA. ON 3/28/49, BEFORE HE HAD ASKED FOR McCLOY TO GO AND TALK BLUNTLY TO THE EGYPTIANS TO EGYPT. WHEN NASSER, HE SAID, HAD ASKED HIM WHAT REALLY WAS THE MATTER WITH THE EGYPTIAN MEMORANDUM, HE HAD TOLD NASSER: THE TROUBLE IS THAT PEOPLE DON'T TRUST YOU. HE SAID THAT TO THE EXTENT THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO DO, HE BELIEVED HE HAD BROUGHT NASSER DOWN TO EARTH AND IN THIS RESPECT, WHICH IT WOULD HAVE BEEN, IN HIS OPINION, A MISTAKE TO HAVE PRESENTED THE SECRETARY'S LETTER TO NASSER. THE EGYPTIANS KNEW THAT IF HE SPOKE WITH AS GREAT ASSURANCE AS HE DID, IT WAS COVERED BY U.S. BACKING. HE HAD NOT ADVOCATED USE OF FORCE OR LETTER TO NASSER BECAUSE DOLLE'S LANGUAGE WAS A LITTLE BIT MORE HAMMARSKJOLD HAD USED.

AFTER HEARING FORGOTTEN, HE READ TO HAMMARSKJOLD THE DEPARTMENT'S REACTIONS. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID THAT THE U.S. POSITION ON AND HIS OWN WERE IDENTICAL. HE HAD READ THE EGYPTIAN QUESTION.

ON QUESTION 1 - HAMMARSKJOLD SAID THAT HE HAD RAISED THIS VERY QUESTION WITH THE EGYPTIANS WHO HAD ARGUED THAT THE DIFFICULTY THEY SAW WAS FINDING THE PROPER FORM FOR A BINDING INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION. THEY SAID THAT THEY COULD NOT NEGOTIATE WITH SCUA BECAUSE THEY REGARDED IT AS NOT TRULY REPRESENTATIVE OF ALL THE USERS. THEY COULD NOT SEE HOW THEY COULD FORM AN AGREEMENT WITH THE UN ITSELF WHICH WAS NOT A TIGHT CONTRACTING PARTY AND THEY COULD NOT UNDERTAKE TO HAVE A WORLD CONFERENCE. THEREFORE, THEY ARGUED THAT IT WAS BETTER, AFTER GETTING REACTIONS TO THEIR POSITION AND TAKING THEM INTO ACCOUNT, TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO THE UN BY DEPOSITING THE INSTRUMENT CONTAINING THE WORDING OF THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF THEIR MEMORANDUM WHEREIN EMPHASIS IS PLACED ON THE OBLIGATIONS THAT THEY HAVE UNDERTAKEN.

QUESTION 2 - HAMMARSKJOLD SAID THAT HE HAD NO DOUBT THAT THE EGYPTIAN DECLARATION WAS INTENDED TO COVER ALL USER NATIONS AND THAT THIS INCLUDED ISRAEL EXCEPT THAT ARTICLE 10 OF THE 1888 CONVENTION ALSO APPLIED TO ISRAEL.

HAMMARSKJOLD SAID EGYPTIANS ARGUED THAT WAS NOT CLAIMING A RIGHT TO SHOOT WHEN THEY RELIED ON BELLICORIENT RIGHTS AS ISRAELIS INSISTED THEY WERE CLAIMING, BUT THAT THEY WERE CLAIMING RIGHT OF SELF-

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-7- 691, MARCH 28, 5 PM, FROM NEW YORK

PROTECTION UNDER THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND CONVENTION. THEY WERE THUS ~~ADAMANT AGAINST PERMITTING ISRAELI SHIPS TO PASS THROUGH CANAL~~. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID IN THIS CONNECTION AGAIN WE WOULD BE SURPRISED HOW HARD HE HAD BEEN ON NASSER ON THIS POINT, BUT IT WAS FACT THAT ISRAELI ATTACK IN OCTOBER HAD NOT IMPROVED PROSPECTS FOR ISRAELI TRANSIT. EGYPTIANS REGARDED THEIR SECURITY IMMEDIATELY INVOLVED IF ANY SHIP FLYING ISRAELI FLAG WENT THROUGH CANAL.

HAMMARSKJOLD HAD TOLD NASSER THAT IF EGYPTIAN POSITION WAS LEGAL IT WAS "DAMNED FOOLISH" AND UNDERCUT EGYPT'S MORAL POSITION THROUGHOUT WORLD. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID NASSER HAD REPLIED FRANKLY THAT HE AGREED WITH HIM BUT NONETHELESS NO EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT COULD LET ISRAELI SHIPS INTO PORT SAID AND ISMAILIA AND THAT IF IT DID THERE WOULD BE IMMEDIATE TROUBLE WITH DANGER OF SABOTAGE TO CANAL ITSELF. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID, HOWEVER, THAT EGYPTIANS WOULD AGREE THAT UNDER ARTICLE 6(B) OF MEMORANDUM ANY PARTY ~~TO CONVENTION OF 1888~~ COULD TAKE UP ISRAELI CASE IF THEY SO DESIRED AND REFER IT TO ICJ. HE SAID IT WAS OBVIOUS EGYPTIANS EXPECTED REFERENCE OF QUESTION OF ISRAELI TRANSIT TO COURT. IN THIS CONNECTION, IN DISCUSSING WITH FAWZI WAYS OF TAKING QUESTION TO COURT. FAWZI HAD SAID IT WAS DESIRABLE TO HAVE QUESTION OVER AND DONE WITH AND HE THEREFORE HAD SOME MISGIVINGS ABOUT AN ADVISORY OPINION BEING SOUGHT BY GA SINCE IT WOULD ONLY BE ADVISORY. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION ON THIS POINT, HAMMARSKJOLD SAID HE THOUGHT IT WAS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE FROM FAWZI'S ATTITUDE THAT EGYPT WAS ANXIOUS TO FIND WAY OFF THE HOOK ON QUESTION OF ISRAELI TRANSIT RIGHTS, WITHOUT THEMSELVES TAKING ANY INITIATIVE, OR, OF COURSE, WITHOUT BEING FORCED INTO ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAELI TRANSIT OTHER THAN BY ADJUDICATION.

QUESTION 3 - THIS HAMMARSKJOLD HAD PREVIOUSLY ANSWERED POINTING OUT THAT EGYPTIAN MEMORANDUM'S ONLY PROVISION IN RESPECT TO ORGANIZED COOPERATION WITH USERS WERE REFERENCES CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPHS 8 AND 11 (D).

QUESTION 4 - HAMMARSKJOLD REGARDED EGYPT AS HAVING AGREED TO COMPULSORY JURISDICTION OF ICJ UNDER CONVENTION. IT WAS NOT CLEAR TO HIM, HOWEVER, WHETHER THEY HAD ACCEPTED COMPULSORY JURISDICTION WITH RESPECT TO DISPUTES ARISING ALSO OUT OF THE NEW EGYPTIAN MEMORANDUM ITSELF.

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QUESTION 5 -- HAMMARSKJOLD CONSIDERED QUESTION OF WHOM EGYPT WOULD NEGOTIATE WITH WAS NOT ANSWERED BY MEMORANDUM BUT WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT IN SAME WAY AS QUESTION OF COOPERATION WITH USERS.

QUESTION 6 -- HAMMARSKJOLD SAID EGYPT HAD ACCEPTED RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL USERS TO ARBITRATION UNDER CANAL CODE.

SYG SAID EGYPTIANS HAD TAKEN POSITION THEY WOULD WAIT UNTIL TUESDAY, APRIL 2, BEFORE FINALIZING TEXT THEIR MEMORANDUM. THEY INTENDED HAVE TEXT MADE PUBLIC 48 HOURS BEFORE OPENING OF CANAL WHICH MEANT THEREFORE THEY EXPECTED CANAL TO OPEN AT EARLIEST ON WEDNESDAY, 3RD, OR THURSDAY, 4TH.

4. MEETING OF GA. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID HE HAD TOLD NASSER MOMENT EGYPTIANS STOPPED AN ISRAELI SHIP GOING THROUGH CANAL, GA WOULD HAVE TO MEET. IN HIS OPINION GA WOULD IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE TO ASK FOR ADVISORY OPINION OF ICJ.

5. ISRAELI REQUEST FOR EGYPTIAN POSITION ON BELLIGERENCY. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID HE HAD SUBMITTED IN FORMAL LETTER TO NASSER ISRAELI QUESTION, BUT AS YET HAD RECEIVED NO REPLY. HE HAD, HOWEVER, GONE FURTHER AND HAD PUT HIS OWN QUESTIONS TO EGYPTIANS IN LETTER, COPY OF WHICH HE GAVE ME (CONTAINED MYTEL 694). HAMMARSKJOLD SAID DESPITE MRS. MEIR'S CONTENTION THAT NASSER COULD ANSWER ISRAELI QUESTION BY YES OR NO, IT WAS IN FACT NOT THAT KIND OF QUESTION AND HE HAD ATTEMPTED FORMULATE HIS OWN QUESTIONS IN SUCH WAY AS TO REQUIRE YES OR NO ANSWERS. HE SAID HE CONSIDERED HE SHOULD SEND SIMILAR LETTER TO ISRAEL AND INTENDED SHORTLY DO SO.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

THAT YOU TELL ISRAELIS FOLLOWING:

1. THAT SITUATION THEY DESIRED TO SEE BROUGHT ABOUT IN GAZA HAS BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT. THERE IS SOLID ASSURANCE AGAINST RAIDS FROM EGYPT; THERE IS AN UNDERTAKING AGAINST RETURN OF EGYPTIAN TROOPS; BURNS HAD BEEN GIVEN ALL UNDERTAKINGS HE SAID WERE NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN INTERNATIONAL ORDER, INCLUDING PLACING OF PART OF PALESTINIAN POLICE UNDER HIS ORDERS; AND EGYPTIANS HAVE NOT PRESSED THEIR

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DEMAND TO HAVE UNEF DEPLOYED IN ISRAEL. SITUATION WHICH ISRAEL DESIRED SEE IN STRAITS OF TIRAN IS ALSO NOW IN EXISTENCE.

EXISTENCE OF BOTH THESE SITUATIONS CONFIRMS ISRAELI AND AMERICAN EXPECTATIONS.

2. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID TO ME FOLLOWING THIS MORNING'S CONVERSATION IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION THAT EGYPTIANS MAY ALLOW SHIPS WITH OTHER THAN ISRAELI REGISTRY, BUT CARRYING ISRAELI GOODS TO AND FROM ISRAELI PORTS, TO TRANSIT CANAL, ALTHOUGH THIS IS NOT YET DEFINITE. IF TRUE, IT IS ANOTHER GAIN OVER PREVIOUS SITUATION AND, MOREOVER, IS AN ADDITION TO EXPECTATIONS VOICED BY ISRAEL PRIOR TO HER WITHDRAWAL.

3. ISRAEL THEREFORE SHOULD NOT INTRODUCE ISRAELI FLAG VESSELS MOMENT CANAL OPENS, BUT SHOULD WAIT AND SEE WHETHER NON-ISRAELI FLAG VESSELS CARRYING ISRAELI CARGO ARE ALLOWED TO PASS AND ALSO GIVE A CHANCE FOR TEST OF USE OF GULF OF AQABA BY ISRAELI SHIPS NOW UNDERSTOOD TO BE EN ROUTE AROUND CAPE OF GOOD HOPE.

4. ANOTHER REASON FOR WAITING IS THAT EGYPTIAN MOTIVES FOR STOPPING ISRAELI VESSELS IS NOT PRIMARILY A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE: OR JURIDICAL, OR A MATTER OF BARGAINING, BUT IS DUE SOLELY TO HEATED STATE OF PUBLIC OPINION WHICH SHOULD COOL AND SUBSIDE WITH PASSAGE OF TIME, THEREBY MAKING POSSIBLE TRANSIT OF ISRAELI VESSELS.

WITH REGARD TO EGYPT I RECOMMEND:

1. THAT ALL MODIFICATIONS WHICH WE FAVOR SHOULD BE TRANSMITTED TO AMBASSADOR HARE FOR TRANSMISSION BY HIM TO EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT

2. IF, IN SPITE OF OUR REPRESENTATIONS, EGYPTIAN POSITION STILL FALLS SHORT OF WHAT WE CONSIDER SATISFACTORY, RECOMMEND THAT OUR ATTITUDE SHOULD BE THAT EGYPTIAN DECLARATION COULD BE ALL RIGHT IF EGYPT LIVES UP TO IT IN SPIRIT OF FAIR PLAY. BUT THERE IS A VERY GRAVE DOUBT IN MANY PEOPLE'S MINDS THAT EGYPTIANS WILL LIVE UP TO IT. IF THEY DO NOT LIVE UP TO IT, THEY WILL EXPOSE THEMSELVES TO VERY SEVERE CENSURE, NOTABLY BY U.S. AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS AND THIS LAST SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR IN PUBLIC.

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-10- 691, MARCH 28, 5 PM, FROM NEW YORK

COMMENT: IF WE STATE THAT WE EXPECT THAT THEY WILL NOT LIVE UP TO IT, THEN IT IS ALMOST FOREGONE CONCLUSION THAT THEY WILL NOT. IF WE IMPLY THAT WE EXPECT THEM TO AND THAT WE WILL BE VERY CENSORIOUS IF THEY DO NOT, THEN THERE IS CHANCE THAT THEY WILL. I THEREFORE DO NOT THINK WE SHOULD SAY WE ARE ACCEPTING THEIR POSITION UNDER DURESS. THE WORD "DURESS" IMPLIES THAT WE DO NOT THINK THEY WILL LIVE UP TO IT. IT ALSO IS SOMEWHAT UNDIGNIFIED FOR COUNTRY AS POWERFUL AS U.S. TO ADMIT THAT IT HAS BEEN FORCED INTO ACCEPTING SOMETHING AGAINST ITS WILL BY BEING BLACK-MAILED BY SUCH WEAK COUNTRY AS EGYPT.

3. WE SHOULD IMPLY THAT WHILE WE COULD, OF COURSE, USE ALL KINDS OF FORCEFUL PRESSURE AGAINST EGYPT, WE ARE CONTINUING TO ABIDE BY THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE CHARTER AND NOT TAKING ADVANTAGE OF OUR STRENGTH TO IMPOSE OUR WILL ON IT AND THAT WE LOOK TO EGYPT TO CARRY OUT ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS IN A SPIRIT OF COMPLETE JUSTICE.

LONDON

CC

MAY 17 1957

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# INCOMING TELEGRAM, Department of State

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58-52

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Action

Control 19154

Rec'd: March 29, 1957

1:31 p.m.

IO - UNP - *From: Tel Aviv*

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 1147, March 29, 6 p.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1147, USUN 89.

Embassy officer discussed with Herzog, chief, American section Foreign Ministry, continuing press attacks on Hammarskjold pointing out that UN and SYG essential instruments in attempting to achieve objectives equally important to Israel as to rest of free world. Expressed opinion deliberate policy of undermining confidence in SYG, if this were in fact intention of GOI, would prove counter-productive.

Herzog reviewed long history deteriorating relations between SYG and Ben Gurion (EMBTel 1134) and said frankly GOI could not (repeat not) help but believe SYG biased against Israel. In its opinion, he never misses an opportunity to point finger at Israel and on other hand either avoids criticism of Egypt or becomes timid apologist for Nasser. Herzog denied press attacks were government-inspired, but admitted feelings of Cabinet members had filtered to press and public. However, he insisted GOI was maintaining "correct" attitude toward SYG and was not criticizing him in official statements. As example this restraint, he referred to recent question re SYG asked in Knesset by Herut which was phrased in "violent language" Ben Gurion was prepared to reply in equally violent tone, but calmer counsel prevailed and he decided not (repeat not) to answer Herut interpolation.

In this connection Herzog reported "surprise" of GOI when Cordier recently telephoned member Israeli delegation UN in New York re Israeli invitation for SYG to visit Israel. After initial bewilderment, GOI identified "invitation" as Israeli suggestion put forth during negotiations last December that SYG come out to view situation first-hand and perhaps establish UN commission to determine future status Gaza Strip. Herzog pointed out that SYG had planned go to Cairo without an invitation presumably because he had proposals to present to Nasser and that he could equally as well have come to Israel without formal invitation if he had had anything to discuss

with GOI.

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-2- 1147, March 29, 6 p.m., from Tel Aviv

with GOI. In line with this reasoning, Foreign Office had announced it would "welcome" Mr. Hammarskjold if he wished to come to Israel but had not (repeat not) issued formal invitation.

Herzog volunteered to bring substance this conversation to attention Ben Gurion.

LAWSON

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Department of State

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57  
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RMR TO: Secretary of State

SS NO: 2229, March 29, 7 p.m.

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CSENT DEPARTMENT 2229; REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 442, PARIS 418,  
CAIRO 80, TEL AVIV 34.L  
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Central Press today carries text Tass announcement referring:  
 (1) Alleged statements "certain Israeli State leaders" and French  
 press that Israel was preparing "new aggression against Egypt",  
 (2) indications from Israeli State leaders in UN "gentlemen's  
 agreement" reached between Secretary and Israeli Foreign Minister  
 giving Israel "guarantee" against Arab countries, (3) foreign  
 press references French assurance support Israel with military  
 forces and guarantee air coverage. Statement concludes "Soviet  
 Government was and remains resolutely in opposition application  
 force against countries Near and Middle East ... unleashing new  
 aggression against Egypt would create dangerous situation and  
 direct threat of broad military conflict with heavy consequences  
 for cause peace". Comment follows.

BOHLEN

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779 Department of State

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57-51

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Control: 19279

Rec'd: MARCH 29, 1957  
4:42 PM

FROM: MOSCOW

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2231, MARCH 29, 8 PM

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 2231, REPEATED INFORMATION PRIORITY PARIS 419,  
LONDON PRIORITY 443.

TASS STATEMENT ON ISRAEL (EMBTel 2229) IS CHARACTERISTIC SOVIET STATEMENT IN THAT IT COMMITS GOVERNMENT TO NOTHING AND PERMITS VARIOUS INTERPRETATION DEPENDING UPON CIRCUMSTANCES. AS WRITTEN IT APPEALS DESIGNED 1) TO STIFFEN EGYPTIAN POSITION BY INDICATION SOVIET SUPPORT AGAINST ISRAEL, 2) TO COMPROMISE U.S. IN EYES OF ARABS BY INSINUATION OF US/ISRAEL DEAL AGAINST ARAB STATES, 3) IF ISRAEL REMAINS QUIET SOVIET PROPAGANDA CAN CLAIM THAT THIS STATEMENT FORESTALLED OR PREVENTED ISRAELI ACTION AGAINST EGYPT, 4) ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO COMMITMENT OR EVEN INDICATION SOVIET ACTIONS IN SUCH EVENT, STATEMENT COULD SERVE AS BASIS FOR WHATEVER ACTION SOVIETS BELIEVE BEST SERVE THEIR INTERESTS IN ACTUAL EVENT RENEWAL HOSTILITIES BY ISRAEL.

STATEMENT THUS PROVIDES NO CLUE AS TO WHAT ACTION IF ANY SOVIETS WOULD TAKE IN EVENT ISRAEL AGAIN MOVES MILITARILY AGAINST EGYPT. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO JUDGE FROM HERE PROBABILITIES ANY SUCH ACTION, BUT I WOULD STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT IF DESPITE ALL EFFORTS TO CONTRARY IT BECAME EVIDENT ISRAEL WAS PLANNING MILITARY ACTION IT WOULD BE WELL AS SOON AS FEASIBLE AFTER ACTION STARTED TO MAKE PLAIN TO SOVIETS OUR ATTITUDE IN REGARD TO ANY SOVIET INVOLVEMENT. I SAY THIS BECAUSE I BELIEVE TEMPTATION ON PART OF SOVIETS, WHO ARE WHOLLY COMMITTED TO EGYPTIAN SIDE, TO MAKE SOME MOVE AGAINST ISRAEL WOULD BE VERY STRONG AND IF ISRAEL WAS TO TAKE ACTION SINGLE-HANDED (WITH OR WITHOUT FRENCH AIR COVER) SOVIETS MIGHT BE MISLEAD INTO BELIEVING THEY COULD DO SOMETHING WITH IMPUNITY WITHOUT

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-2- 2231, MARCH 29, 8 PM FROM MOSCOW

WITHOUT INVOLVING ANY REAL RISK OF MAJOR WAR. I AM REASONABLY CERTAIN THAT APART FROM PROPAGANDA AND POSSIBLY BELLIGERENT NOTES SOVIETS WOULD DO NOTHING IF THEY WERE CONVINCED THAT ANY SOVIET INVOLVEMENT HOWEVER INDIRECT IN RENEWED ISRAEL/EGYPT CONFLICT WOULD RUN INTO UN'S OPPOSITION. IN ACTUAL EVENT, THEREFORE, ISRAEL ARMED ACTION AGAINST EGYPT HIGHLY IMPORTANT OUR POSITION SHOULD BE MADE IMMEDIATELY AND UNMISTAKABLY CLEAR.

I HAVE JUST SEEN RECOMMENDATION IN PARIS 4999 TO DEPARTMENT, RPTD MOSCOW 150, CONCERNING DESIRABILITY STATEMENT IN RELATION TO TASS DECLARATION. WHILE I SHARE PARIS' VIEW, IMPORTANCE WESTERN SOLIDARITY IN FACE SOVIET THREATS, I DO NOT FEEL THIS STATEMENT FALLS IN SAME CATEGORY AS, FOR EXAMPLE, THREAT AND WARNING TO NORWAY, AND IN EFFECT OPERATIONAL PARAGRAPH CONCERNING SOVIET ATTITUDE CONTAINS NO THREATS AT ALL. FURTHERMORE, SINCE ONE OF PURPOSES DECLARATION IS TO INVOLVE U.S. WITH ALLEGEDLY AGGRESSIVE DESIGNS ISRAEL, UNLESS STATEMENT WERE VERY CAREFULLY DRAFTED IT MIGHT SERVE TO FURTHER SOVIET PROPAGANDA PURPOSES IN NEAR EAST.

BOHLEN

GEV

APR 8 1957

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674.842/3.2957  
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Code Room: Please repeat Moscow's 2231, 3/29/57, to above.

*Quilley*  
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(RP)

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Subject: Soviet Warning to Israel

SS 2  
NEA/P 5

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Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA/P:RFProhme

Drafted by:

NEA/P:ERBamer:efc

4/1/57

Clearances:

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APR 1 - 1957 P.M.

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Control: 19362

Rec'd: MARCH 29, 1957

5:43 PM

MESSAGE CENTER

Info  
RMR

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 5019, MARCH 29, 7 PM

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SENT DEPARTMENT 5019, REPEATED INFORMATION MOSCOW, TEL AVIV UNNUMBERED.

PRESS TODAY PUBLISHES TASS REPORT OF RADIO MOSCOW BROADCAST STATING FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAS PROMISED AID TO ISRAEL IF LATTER FIGHTS EGYPT AGAIN; FRENCH AVIATION IS READY PARTICIPATE IN ATTACK AGAINST EGYPT AND ASSURE AERIAL COVER FOR EGYPTIAN TROOPS.

OCB

USIA

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

AFP HAS PUT OUT REPLY, OBVIOUSLY BASED ON GOVERNMENT SOURCES, WHICH STATES GOVERNMENT REACTS COOLLY TO TASS STATEMENTS AND THAT THESE BASED ON FALSE STORIES PUBLISHED BY CERTAIN FRENCH PAPERS. AFP STORY NOTES PINEAU STATEMENT OF MARCH 27 TO ASSEMBLY IN WHICH HE DENIED RUMORS. IN COMMENTING ON ABOVE LE MONDE 'DAILY NOTES MATTER WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN RAISED IF BOURGES-MAUNOURY HAD NOT TALKED OUT OF TURN WITH UNITED STATES CHARGE TWO WEEKS AGO.

AT SAME TIME THIS GOING ON PARIS-PRESSE IS SERIALIZING JUST PUBLISHED MERRY BROMBERGER BOOK, ALLEGEDLY BASED ON NATIONAL DEFENSE SOURCES, WHICH GIVES GREATEST CREDIT TO FRENCH FORCES FOR ISRAELI VICTORY IN SINAI.

THIS SERIES BEING SUMMARIZED SEPARATELY BY USIS.

YOST

SGC

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53-51  
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FROM: New York

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 704, March 29, 8 p.m.

NIACT

FOR SECRETARY FROM LODGE

Re report by UNSYG

Pursuant our conversation, have discussed with Hammarskjold question of his making report on his talks in Cairo. He agreed begin work on report tomorrow and will try get it out immediately.

LODGE

HSO/16

Control: 19415  
Rec'd: March 29, 1957  
8:25 p.m.

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*Secretary informed*  
*W/S*

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM

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## Department of State

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Department invited Israel Minister call March 29 to convey to him lights UNSYG mission to Egypt and US views thereon. Shiloah stated Eban would probably be seeing UNSYG in New York next week.

Rountree said UNSYG's report not entirely discouraging. Re Gaza we think UNSYG's conversations with Nasser have achieved constructive results. Egyptians have undertaken no Egyptian troops would move into Gaza. Burns considers points of agreement on UNEF's functions and concrete arrangements are to him satisfactory. Egyptians have indicated strong desire prevent raids from Gaza into Israel territory. There are number details concerning courses action which UNEF might take in various circumstances which UNSYG discussing with Advisory Committee.

Re Aqaba UNSYG feels Egyptians have made clear to him they had no intention move into Sharm el Sheikh area or ask UNEF to leave. At this point Rountree informed Shiloah of Bermuda discussions re Aqaba. Agreed there that legal positions US/UK on Aqaba broadly identical in substance. Would be further consultation on how establish legal position permanently. Possibility of obtaining either an advisory opinion or a decision by ICJ would be subject such consultation. No decision taken re approach to ICJ.

Re Suez

Drafted by:  
NEA:NE:DCBergus:rej - 3/29/57

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

NEA - William M. Rountree

Clearances:

S/S-CR  
MAR 29 1957 P.M.

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Re Suez Egyptian position remained as publicly stated their draft memorandum which has now appeared in press. We do not consider Egyptian position satisfactory. Not based on Six Principles. No means of achieving organized international participation. US studying Egyptian memorandum, has not responded to it, but plans to soon. Main emphasis should be arrangements for Canal based on Six Principles. We foresee difficult time ahead in negotiations with Egyptians. We feel there extreme desirability for approach by negotiations at this stage. Rountree ~~has~~ reminded Shiloah of ~~Secretary's~~ Israel undertaking not to attempt put ship through Canal ~~without~~ consulting ~~US~~ ~~Secretary's~~ ~~urgent~~ urged that for present Israel not try test Egyptian intentions by attempting put ships through Canal.

Shiloah's responses, which he qualified as preliminary, were in general gloomy. He endeavored point out there really no basis for optimism in results UNSYG's efforts. He asked if UNSYG had put to Nasser question ~~as to~~ whether he still asserted belligerency. Rountree replied we understood UNSYG had addressed letter to GOE on subject which had not yet replied. In course discussion, Shiloah said Israel did not want to do anything precipitate re transit through Suez Canal and did not intend do so. This would apply only as long as there was feeling USG had not abandoned effort bring about suitable arrangement. Moment USG de facto accepted Nasser's dictate Israel would not say it was still incumbent on it not to try to find ways to exercise its rights. Even then he was not saying Israel would not try to consult with US and get its support.

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AIR POUCH  
PRIORITY

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

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FROM : AMCONGENERAL JERUSALEM

149  
DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

March 29, 1957  
DATE

REF : ConGen Despatch 145, March 25, 1957

13 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION HEA-4	DEPT. I N F O	RM/R-2 OL-8 IO-4 USUN-1 EUR-5 P-1
	REC'D 4-8	OTHER	CIA-12 ARMY-4 NAVY-3 AIL-3 OSD-4 USA-1

SUBJECT: Activities of the MAC's during the  
Period 9 March through 15 March 1957

BEIRUT-1 DAMASCUS-1  
CAIRO-1

Copies of the substantive parts of the weekly reports prepared by the Mixed Armistice Commissions of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization which summarize their activities for the period 9 March through 15 March 1957 are enclosed.

  
William E. Cole  
American Consul General

Enclosure

Copy of Parts of MAC Weekly Reports  
for 9 March through 15 March 1957

Copy sent Amman, Tel Aviv

Department pass to Beirut, Cairo, Damascus

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Page 1 of  
Encl. No. 1  
Desp. No. 149  
From Jerusalem

COPY

The following is a summary of the activities of the Mixed Armistice Commissions for the period 9 March to 15 March 1957.

EGYPTIAN - ISRAEL MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

Demonstrations occurred on the 8th. Crowds shouted pro Egyptian and pro President Nasser slogans. The name of President Tito was linked with that of President Nasser. Anti-UNEF sentiments began to appear.

On the 9th there was a large influx of people into Gaza from the villages and towns throughout the Strip. Demonstrations were broken up with difficulty. Several people who were preparing to surround and attack a house in the residential quarter of Gaza were captured, disarmed and arrested by UNEF personnel.

On the 10th even greater demonstrations occurred and crowds called for the return of Egypt and the departure of the UNEF. The demonstrations assumed large and difficult proportions outside the UNEF headquarters and the mob was only dispersed by the use of tear gas and smoke. At one stage the UNEF fired over the heads of the crowd. From this shooting one local was alleged to have been killed by a (ricochet?) bullet. An immediate curfew was clamped on the town and maintained effectively throughout the day. During the height of the demonstration some UN amplifier vehicles were stoned and suffered minor damage.

The town notables, led by one recently released from political detention, held quieter and more orderly demonstrations on the 11th. Throughout the Strip things were much quieter. The country people were friendly and it was apparent that the town demonstrations had been whipped up by organizers. The Israelis commenced opening a ploughed trench along the old shallow trench demarcation line.

Further demonstrations took place on the 12th and particularly during the funeral procession of the victim alleged to have been killed during the warning firing of the 10th.

There was a massed demonstration on the 13th during which time the mob was addressed by town notables and others. Slogans were shouted regularly calling for the return of Egypt. On orders from the Revolutionary Committee or the National Front Committee the UNRWA local staff took the day off to attend the demonstrations and participate in the processions. The demonstrations passed off without any serious incidents. A small section of the railway line, a little to the north of the Gaza Railway station, was blown up during the night.

On the 14th the Revolutionary Committee called for a strike by UNRWA employees on all aspects other than food distribution and medical attention. This action was abandoned as a result of the arrival of the Egyptian Civil Governor and Staff in Gaza that evening. Large crowds waited along the route from Rafah to Gaza throughout the afternoon and early evening. The Governor's convey included some 25 vehicles by the time it reached Gaza and was escorted by Egyptian Military Police.

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On the 15th a former Egyptian Delegate to the EIMAC visited MAC house and intimated verbally that on instructions from higher authority he was back in his former post as Delegate to the MAC. The Egyptian authorities set about organizing the police and the local governmental departments.

Mine accidents continue to occur, particularly in the southern extremity of the Strip.

More people were released from prison until at the end of the period 50-60 only remained in detention.

At the conclusion of the period under review the general situation appeared to be somewhat confused.

Increased observer activity occurred as UNTSO observers worked with UNEF. Visits were made to most parts of the Strip and as far south as Rafah. Visits were also made to old OPs on the Egyptian side.

#### HASHEMITE JORDAN KINGDOM - ISRAEL MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

The situation remained quiet along the demarcation line. On 12 March, an item appeared in the Jerusalem Post (repeated from 11 March issue of El Jihad, Old City Daily) to the effect that the Jordan Army commanders in Bethlehem and Hebron had warned border villagers that collective punishment might be imposed if infiltration into Israel was not stopped. An UNMO stationed in Hebron on 12 and 13 March reported that a number of shepherds were brought into the police station from areas along the demarcation line and warned by the local police commander not to graze across the line. (This followed the killing on 9 March by an Israeli patrol of a Jordanian shepherd who had crossed into Israel - see para. below).

The outstations of Nablus, Hebron and Latrun on the Jordan side of the demarcation line continued to be manned by UNMOs.

A Sub-Committee meeting, held on 11 March, discussed missing persons, property and other problems incidental to the maintenance of the General Armistice Agreement.

It has not yet been possible to arrange a mutually agreeable time for a Jerusalem Area Commander's meeting.

The Jordanian Delegation submitted 9 complaints: 1 complaint alleging firing across the demarcation line - a Jordanian shepherd killed (the Israelis agreed to a joint investigation which would not constitute a precedent and oblige them to attend an emergency meeting if held. This was the first time the Israelis have participated in such joint action since October 1956); 2 complaints alleging firing across the demarcation line (no investigations); 6 complaints alleging overflights (no investigations).

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The Israeli Delegation, in conformity with Israel policy, submitted no complaint.

Outstanding complaints: HJK-1,305; Israel-350; Total-1,655

ISRAEL-LEBANESE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

The Lebanese Delegation submitted 3 complaints: 1 complaint alleging that on 11 March at 0730Z one jet plane coming from Israel overflow Naqoura and Tyre areas; at 0800Z two jet planes overflow Nabouna; at 0835Z four jet planes overflow Alma Chaab and Naqoura - all planes returning to Israel; 1 complaint alleging that on 14 March one jet plane coming from Israel overflow the Lebanese territory from Labouna to Chaama and then returned to Israel; 1 complaint alleging that a total of ten persons aged between 19 and 20 were arrested inside Lebanon as infiltrators on 12 January, 25 January, 1st February and 18 February (this last complaint was submitted on 15 March 1957).

The Israeli Delegation submitted no complaint.

ISRAEL - SYRIAN MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

During the period under review, seven shooting incidents were reported by the parties. Five of them were alleged to be the result of penetration into the demilitarized zone of Israeli police and Syrian shepherds. (Most of these incidents were alleged to have taken place in the southern sector of the demilitarized zone, near the Syrian village of Kafer Hareb. The Senior Syrian Delegate promised that he would look into the matter, but asked the Chairman why he was permitting the Israeli police to circulate at will in the demilitarized zone. The Chairman stated that he had never given any permission to the Israeli police to operate in the demilitarized zone. In fact, the actions of the Israeli police in the demilitarized zone had been protested to the Israeli authorities on several occasions by the Chief of Staff, UNTSO, and by the Chairman and had been the subject of several reports to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

The work on the site of the Jordan River Project in the demilitarized zone remains halted. The progress outside the demilitarized zone is still slow.

The Israel Delegation submitted 9 written complaints (referring to the period 28 February to 3 March): 1 alleging an overflight over Lake Tiberias; 2 alleging penetration of Syrian herds into the demilitarized zone; 1 alleging a shooting incident; 1 alleging that a Syrian fishing boat from Zaki river entered the waters of Lake Tiberias; 4 alleging that Syrian searchlights were directed towards Sussita in the southern sector of the demilitarized zone. (No investigations. No casualties.)

The Syrian Delegation submitted 4 written complaints alleging shooting incidents. (No investigations. No casualties.)

Outstanding complaints: Israel-684; Syria-765; Total-1,449

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: March 29, 1957

SUBJECT: Gaza, Gulf of Aqaba and Suez Canal

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Embassy of Israel  
Mr. Yohanan Meroz, Counselor, Embassy of Israel  
NEA - Mr. William M. Rountree  
NE - Mr. Fraser Wilkins  
NE - Mr. Donald C. Bergus

APR 5 1957

COPIES TO: S/S(2cc), G, G, NEA(2cc), NE(2cc), IO, OLI(2), Cairo, Tel Aviv, Jidda, USUN

Mr. Rountree said that he had felt it would be a good idea for him to call Mr. Shiloah in to convey to him the highlights of the Secretary General's mission to Egypt and our views on it. He asked if the Israelis planned to see the Secretary General. Mr. Shiloah replied that he imagined Ambassador Eban would be seeing the Secretary General in New York next week.

Mr. Rountree said that the Secretary General's report had not been entirely discouraging. On Gaza, we thought that the Secretary General's conversations with Nasser had achieved constructive results. The Egyptians had undertaken that no Egyptian troops would move into Gaza. General Burns considered that the points of agreement on UNEF's functions and concrete arrangements were to him satisfactory. The Egyptians had indicated a strong desire to prevent raids from Gaza into Israel territory. There were a number of details concerning courses of action which the UNEF might take in various circumstances which the Secretary General was discussing with the Advisory Committee.

On Aqaba, the Secretary General felt that the Egyptians had made clear to him that they had no intention to move into the Sharm el Sheikh area or to ask UNEF to leave. It was our impression that UNEF would stay indefinitely. Nothing of importance had been said on either side regarding passage through the Straits of Tiran.

Mr. Rountree

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Mr. Rountree felt it would be useful if at this point he informed Mr. Shiloah of the US/UK discussions on Aqaba at Bermuda. We had compared notes with the British and had agreed that our legal positions were broadly identical in substance. There would be further consultations between the British and ourselves as to how the legal position could be given permanency. We had discussed the possibility of obtaining either an advisory opinion or a decision of the International Court of Justice. We would consult further on this. No decision had been taken regarding an approach to the ICJ.

On the Suez Canal, the Egyptian position remained as publicly stated in their draft memorandum. We did not consider the Egyptian position satisfactory. It was not based on the Six Principles. There were no means of achieving organized international participation. We were studying the Egyptian memorandum. We had not yet responded to it but planned to do so soon. The main emphasis should be on arrangements for the Canal based on the Six Principles. We foresaw a difficult time ahead in negotiations with the Egyptians. One thing which had occurred to us was the extreme desirability of approaching this problem by negotiations at this stage. Mr. Rountree reminded Mr. Shiloah of Israel's undertaking not to attempt to put a ship through the Canal without consulting the United States. Mr. Rountree urged that for the present Israel not try to test Egyptian intentions by attempting to put ships through the Canal.

Mr. Rountree summed up by saying that some progress had been made by the Secretary General. We were disappointed on Suez and were working on a response to the position taken by the Egyptians. This was urgent because the Egyptians had said they had intended to publish their memorandum soon. It was regrettable that the memorandum had leaked to the press. The United States had not released it. The Egyptians had, however, handed it to many governments besides the United States, including the USSR, India, Yugoslavia, and other Arab states. The fact that the terms of the memorandum were now publicly known would make it more difficult to persuade Egypt to accept amendments.

Mr. Shiloah said that he would convey the foregoing to his Government which would doubtless be conveying its response to the United States. His preliminary reaction was that Israel was not as optimistic as Mr. Rountree had sounded in evaluating both the achievement of the Secretary General and future prospects in Gaza. The Secretary General's failure to insist on a reply to Israel's question to Egypt on belligerency obviated whatever achievement Mr. Hammarskjold may have had. Mr. Shiloah inquired if we had any information as to how Hammarskjold had handled the Israel request. Mr. Rountree replied that we understood the Secretary General had written a letter on the subject to the Government of Egypt which had not yet replied.

Mr. Shiloah

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Mr. Shiloah thought that Nasser wanted to consolidate his gains in Suez before making trouble in Gaza. He did not foresee organized Egyptian raids in the immediate future. Nasser was not yet ready to become involved in a military clash. The United States, Israel and the United Nations should not be satisfied with achievements of a temporary nature. There must be an arrangement to give the UNEF authority in Gaza. So long as it was there on sufferance, we could not derive satisfaction from its presence.

On Aqaba, Mr. Shiloah reiterated the Israel position that any Western initiative for an advisory opinion from the ICJ would be likely to be misinterpreted. Mere mention of the possibility by the U.S. threw doubt on the firmness of the American position on the Straits.

On Suez, Israel believed that acceptance of the Egyptian plan with its clear implication that there would be continued discrimination in the matter of transit would have serious effects on Israel and the Free World generally. Israel did not want to do anything precipitate in the Canal and did not intend to. This applied only as long as we all had the feeling that the United States had not abandoned its effort to bring about a suitable arrangement. The moment the United States de facto accepted Nasser's dictate Israel would not say it was still incumbent on it not to try to find ways to exercise its rights. Even then he was not saying that Israel would not try to consult with the United States and get its support. Israel was for the time being at the stage where it still hoped that the United States would be firm on the position it had announced publicly. Israel assumed there would be no decision to give in. Israel had always urged that a stand be taken before the Canal was cleared. Israel had felt that this was a card. The U.S. position, as stated by the Secretary, had been that it was improper and inexpedient for the U.S. to use this as a card so long as we were operating through the United Nations.

Mr. Shiloah felt it was becoming more and more evident that the United Nations did not feel that Nasser should be pressured, that he was an aggrieved party and that it was first necessary to return to the status quo ante and then try to proceed from there. The Secretary had taken a different position at the very outset in his November 1 speech in the United Nations General Assembly. Mr. Shiloah made a strong plea that the U.S. call to the attention of world public opinion the fact that it disapproved of Nasser. U.S. failure to do so worried Israel.

Mr. Rountree said that on Gaza and what might transpire there in the future he did not believe Israel was under any illusions as to the U.S. attitude. We did not feel that we could relax in the expectation that

the situation


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the situation would relax. The main point was that we should not rest on our laurels. What Hammarskjold had done merely provided us with an opportunity to improve the situation, not to maintain it as is.

On Suez, we would never think that the Egyptian memorandum was a good proposal. We were studying it and would react but the form our negotiations would take was not known. Mr. Shiloah asked if he could say that the U.S. had not changed its policy of insisting on non-discrimination in the use of the Canal. Mr. Rountree replied that Mr. Shiloah could report that the U.S. attitude on all Six Principles was unchanged.

Mr. Shiloah reiterated Israel's interest in a U.S. reaction to the points made by Mr. Eban in his talk with the Under Secretary on March 19. Mr. Rountree replied that we would press forward on this.

re in AS   
NEA:NE:DCBergus:rej - 3/30/57

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## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : NEA - William M. Rountree

DATE: March 29, 1957

FROM : NE - Fraser Wilkins

consists of 1 pages  
4 copies, series R

SUBJECT: Your Discussion with Israel Minister, Friday, March 29, 1957, 4:30 PM

Discussion

The Secretary has suggested that selected information from Hammarskjold's report on his trip to Egypt be conveyed to the Israelis. We have gone through the telegrams (attached) from USUN to extract points for communication to the Israelis. We have tried to make these points as general as possible since the Israelis will doubtless be approaching the Secretary General in New York and we do not want to appear as attempting to undercut him. We have not, for example, mentioned Hammarskjold's handling of the question of Egyptian belligerency which was raised in the Israel Foreign Minister's letter to him of March 19.

Recommendation

That you make the following points in your discussion with Mr. Shiloah:

1. Gaza: We think that the Secretary General's conversations with Nasser on Gaza have achieved constructive results. The Egyptians have undertaken that no Egyptian troops would move into Gaza. General Burns considers that the points of agreement on UNEF's functions and concrete arrangements are to him satisfactory. The Egyptians have indicated a strong desire to prevent raids from Gaza into Egyptian territory. There are a number of details concerning courses of action which the UNEF might take in various circumstances which the Secretary General is discussing with the Advisory Committee.

2. Aqaba: The Secretary General feels that the Egyptians have made clear to him that they had no intention to move into the Sharm el Shaikh area or to ask UNEF to leave.

3. Suez Canal: The Egyptian position remains as publicly stated in their recent draft memorandum. We are continuing our efforts to obtain an interim arrangement. We do not consider the Egyptian memorandum satisfactory. We urge Israel not to press this matter at the moment by attempting to force the issue by presenting an Israel ship or cargo for passage through the Canal.

4 Attachments:

USUN's Telegrams 691, 692, 693 and 694.

NEA:NE:DCBergus:rej

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## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : NEA - William M. Rountree

DATE: March 29, 1957

FROM : NE - Fraser Wilkins *FW*

SUBJECT: Israel Suggestions on Middle East Arms

Discussion

In a call on the Under Secretary on March 19, 1957, the Israel Ambassador made a number of comments and suggestions on current problems in the area (Tab A). Since that time, the Israelis have informed us that the Israel Foreign Minister is pressing the Embassy here to obtain our comments on these points. Mr. Shiloah raised the question with Mr. Murphy on March 26 (Tab B) and with you on March 28. You undertook to look into this matter.

There are listed below the points made by Mr. Eban during the March 19 conversation with recommended U.S. comments on the points. We recommend that our comment be communicated to the Israel Ambassador by you at an early opportunity, or to Mr. Shiloah when he comes in this afternoon.

1. Egyptian Belligerency: Mr. Eban reported that the Secretary General had undertaken to ascertain from Egypt whether it was prepared to declare that it renounced all claim to the existence of a state of war between Egypt and Israel.

Recommended Comment: We assume that Israel will be learning from the Secretary General the result of his efforts in Cairo in this connection. The U.S. position is that, now that Israel has withdrawn its forces, the General Armistice Agreement precludes either party from asserting the rights of belligerency.

2. Gaza: Mr. Eban stressed the "indivisibility of United Nations responsibility" in Gaza. The United Nations could not be held responsible for security only along the armistice line, with the Egyptians responsible for it elsewhere in Gaza. Israel would prefer that the United Nations have no responsibility rather than diluted responsibility. Israel thinks it would be useful if there were forthwith appointed a United Nations Commissioner in Gaza. It might be useful if the U.S. called to Egypt's attention the Israel Foreign Minister's March 1 UNGA statement that a deterioration of the situation in Gaza would cause Israel to assert its rights.

Recommended Comment: While Egypt has rights to exercise responsibility in Gaza under the Armistice Agreement, the U.S. continues to believe that

Egypt

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-2-

Egypt should not to any substantial degree exercise those rights and that United Nations organs should be the major de facto administrative element in Gaza. We are in close touch with the Secretary General on the subject. Our present information indicates that the United Nations is playing a considerable role in the administration of the Strip. There is no indication that Egypt plans to send military forces into Gaza. We have noted Israel's suggestion that a United Nations Civil Affairs Commissioner be appointed and will bear it in mind in our consideration of the Gaza situation. This suggestion might also be made to the Secretary General and the Advisory Committee. On the whole, however, we are inclined to believe that substance rather than form is the important thing as regards the United Nations role in Gaza. We have pointed out to the Egyptian authorities the dangerous consequences which rash Egyptian acts with respect to Gaza could produce.

3. Aqaba: Mr. Eban said that Israel could not "stand the shock" of the return of Egyptian military to Sharm el Shaikh, and that if developments of this kind took place the matter should be immediately referred to the Advisory Committee and the General Assembly. He added that Israel wished an exchange of Aide-Memoires between Israel and the United States on the subject of free passage through the Straits of Tiran and would be approaching the Department with a draft Aide-Memoire for our consideration. Mr. Eban referred to a previous Israel request that the U.S. encourage the Danes to authorize the Brigitte Toft to sail through the Straits of Tiran. The Ambassador hoped that the U.S. would give effective encouragement to U.S. shippers who were being approached by the Israelis with cargoes for Eilat. He also hoped that the U.S. would take an encouraging attitude if approached by U.S. or French interests seeking our views on the proposed 32" pipeline from Eilat to the Mediterranean.

Recommended Comment: We have no information of Egyptian intentions to send military forces to Sharm el Shaikh where elements of UNEF are presently stationed. Our position is that a proposal that UNEF forces be withdrawn would be a subject for consideration by the UNSYG, the Advisory Committee, and the General Assembly. We are prepared to consider a draft Israel Aide-Memoire and to reply to it along the lines of our publicly stated position on the Straits of Tiran. We understand that the Brigitte Toft has arrived at Eilat. We are prepared to make clear to U.S. shipping interests our position with respect to passage through the Straits of Tiran. We have no objection to the proposal for a 32" pipeline across Israel from Eilat to the Mediterranean. Our responsibilities to American investors, however, might require us, if asked, to point out that in the present situation, the prospects for finding adequate oil supplies to transport through such a pipeline are not encouraging. *The risks involved in such a project*

4. Suez Canal.

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-3-

4. Suez Canal: Mr. Eban said Israel welcomes the U.S. assurance that it continues to adhere to the Six Principles. There is a danger that the Canal will be opened as a result of United Nations efforts at clearing it with no assurance that United Nations law on these matters will apply. The short time remaining until the Canal is opened should be a period of intense activity aimed at settling these matters. While the Israelis would take no action without consulting the U.S., it was likely that on a certain date, after ships of other nations had transited the Canal, either an Israel ship or an Israel-bound ship under another flag, carrying cargo which the Egyptians had in the past considered contraband, would seek passage through the Canal. The Governments which advanced funds for the clearance of the Canal favored Israel's use of the Canal and should protract the period of clearance, if necessary to resolve this issue.

Recommended Comment: The U.S. continues to support the Six Principles and to seek a permanent arrangement for the Canal based on them. We are following closely the Secretary General's efforts to achieve an interim arrangement for the operation of the Canal. The most recent Egyptian memorandum on a Canal regime is unsatisfactory in a number of respects. We note Israel's intention to consult the United States before attempting to send an Israel ship or an Israel-bound ship through the Suez Canal. We believe that Israel should take no precipitate action, and that the matter of timing is very important.

5. U.S. Public Attitude Toward Nasser: Mr. Eban said that in each of the foregoing matters, Nasser was pursuing policies which were opposed by Israel, and, he thought, the United States. It must be made plain to world opinion that the U.S. opposes these policies. Perhaps the Bermuda Conference would provide such an opportunity.

Recommended Comment: The U.S. agrees that there are elements in the policies of the present regime in Egypt which are diametrically opposed to the interests of the free world and what we consider to be the best interests of Egypt and the Near East. The United States has not hesitated to make its position clear in specific instances as occasion required, and will continue to do so in the future.

2 Attachments:

1. Memo of Conversation, March 19 (Tab A).
2. Memo of Conversation, March 26 (Tab B). (SECRET)

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NEA:NE:DCBergus:rej

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: March 19, 1957



PARTICIPANTS:

Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel  
Mr. Gideon Raphael, Counselor, Israel Foreign Ministry  
Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Embassy of Israel  
The Under Secretary  
NEA - William M. Rountree (for part of meeting)  
NE - Donald G. Bergus

*OK for dist  
C.A.H.*

COPIES TO: S/S(2), G, U, C, NEA(2), NE(2), IO, OLI(2), USUN, Cairo, Tel Aviv

14

Mr. Eban said he wished to discuss the implications of yesterday's joint statement. He regretted that press comments had been attributed to U. S. officials which seemed to place an unfortunate emphasis on warnings and pressures against Israel. The Under Secretary stated that some of these news stories disturbed us, that we had no idea of who was being quoted, and that we were trying to find out where these stories originated. Mr. Rountree pointed out the great press activity which always followed an important event such as Mrs. Meir's call at the Department yesterday. Newsmen did not appear to be above the use of such techniques as approaching Embassy officials, attributing remarks to the Department, and inviting comment. The reverse was also true. We had briefed Department spokesmen yesterday to state that the purpose of the joint communique had been to set forth what had been said in the discussions between the Israel Foreign Minister and the Secretary. It was difficult to control press speculation.

Mr. Eban then passed to the following matters:

1. Clarification of Egypt's Position on Belligerency. When the Foreign Minister had seen the Secretary General yesterday, she had formally requested him to ascertain if Egypt wished to continue to exercise belligerent rights. Mr. Eban handed the Under Secretary a copy (attached) of Israel's formal communication to the Secretary General on this subject. Mr. Eban understood that the Secretary General had undertaken to elicit that clarification. An Egyptian

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response that it no longer claimed the right of belligerency would be a dramatic turning point. If, on the other hand, the Egyptians said that they intended to maintain belligerency, there was merit in having elicited this expression from them. There would then be a clear position to be brought to the attention of the Security Council, General Assembly, and others. Israel was not publicizing the fact that the Secretary General had been asked to seek the Egyptian view, so as to avoid placing impediments in the way of the Secretary General's inquiry and Egypt's reply.

2. Gaza. Mr. Eban said that the present course of events seemed to point to a steady erosion of United Nations responsibility in Gaza. It was necessary to halt and reverse this trend. The first principle of an approach should be the indivisibility of United Nations responsibility. The United Nations could not be held to a position of responsibility for security only on the armistice line with the Egyptians responsible for it elsewhere in Gaza. Israel believed that it should be established as a policy of United Nations member states that if the United Nations were responsible for security on the armistice line it must be responsible for internal security as well. Israel had spoken to some of the countries on the UNEF Advisory Committee. Some, perhaps a majority, agreed with Israel. Israel would welcome U. S. views and seeks U. S. support. Israel would prefer that the United Nations would have no responsibility rather than diluted responsibility. If Egypt wished responsibility in the Gaza Strip, let it face Israel directly. This did not necessarily mean that Israel would fight Egypt but that Egypt would bear the responsibility for its acts. Israel thought it would be useful if there were forthwith appointed a United Nations Commissioner for civil affairs in Gaza. It might be useful if the U.S. called to Egypt's attention the Israel Foreign Minister's March 1 United Nations General Assembly statement that a deterioration of the situation in Gaza could cause Israel to assert its rights.

3. Agaba. Mr. Eban said it had been reported that the Israel vessel the Queen of Sheba had passed safely through the Straits of Tiran. The Israelis had called to the attention of the Secretary General reports that Egypt sought to replace the Finnish soldiers of UNEF stationed at Sharm el Sheikh. The Secretary General had dismissed these reports as rumors. Israel had told the Secretary General that the arrival of Egyptian soldiers there would be the kind of shock that Israel could not stand, particularly now. If developments of this kind took place, the matter should be immediately referred to the Advisory Committee and the General Assembly. Mr. Eban referred to

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previous conversations with the Secretary where there had been discussion of the idea that a further U.S.-Israel exchange of Aide-Memoires on the Gulf of Aqaba take place. Israel would shortly be presenting a draft Aide-Memoire, along the lines of the Foreign Minister's March 1 statement, for the consideration, in the first instance, of Mr. Phleger. Israel hoped to exchange such documents with a large number of the maritime powers of the world. Mr. Eban renewed his request that the U.S. encourage the Danes to authorize the Brigitte Toft to sail through the Straits of Tiran. The vessel was now in Djibouti awaiting instructions. Mr. Eban said that favorable U.S. action on this request would not be used as a precedent for further Israel requests for U.S. intervention with other maritime powers. Mr. Eban hoped that the U.S. would give effective encouragement to U.S. shippers who were being approached by the Israelis with cargoes for Eilat. The Under Secretary said we would look into this and imagined that the shippers would be approaching us. Mr. Eban hoped that the U.S. would take an encouraging attitude if approached by U.S. or French interests seeking our views on the proposed 32" pipeline from Eilat to the Mediterranean.

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974.7301  
4. Suez Canal. Israel welcomed the U.S. assurance that it continued to adhere to the Six Principles. The process of clearing the Canal was approaching its end and there had been no political agreement with respect to the Canal's operation or the ending of discrimination in its use. There was a danger that the United Nations would open the Canal with no assurance that United Nations law on these matters would apply. Israel thought that the short time remaining until the Canal was opened, presumably April 10, should be a period of intense activity aimed at settling these matters. While the Israelis would take no action without consulting the U.S., it was likely that on a certain date, after ships of other nations had transited the Canal, either an Israel ship or an Israel-bound ship under another flag, carrying cargo which the Egyptians had in the past considered contraband, would seek passage through the Canal. Israel believed that every Government which had advanced funds for the clearance of the Canal favored Israel's use of the Canal. Mr. Eban thought these Governments had every right not to see the Canal open for a single day under a regime of discrimination. They should, if necessary, protract the period of Canal clearance. There was more moral leverage now.

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611.74  
5. U.S. Public Attitude Toward Nasser. Mr. Eban said that in each of the three foregoing matters Nasser was pursuing policies

which

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which were opposed by Israel and, he thought, the United States. It must be made plain to world opinion that the U.S. opposed these policies. The Secretary had spoken of the need of exerting maximum pressure on Nasser. One means would be the public voice of the U.S. This would be helpful to the Israel Government in its current domestic difficulties. Perhaps the Bermuda Conference would be an appropriate place for the U.S. and the U.K. to join in expressing policies of opposition to these elements of Nasser's policy.

Attachment: *att EP*

Israeli Foreign Minister's  
letter of March 19, 1957 to  
the Secretary General.

*SB*  
NEA:NE:DCBergus:rej - 3/20/57

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19th March  
1957

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

I refer to our conversation of yesterday and have the honour, on behalf of the Government of Israel, to reiterate the request that you put the following question to the Government of Egypt during your forthcoming visit to Cairo:

Is the Government of Egypt prepared to declare that it renounces all claim to the existence of a state of war between Egypt and Israel, and that it will refrain scrupulously from any acts of belligerency and from any hostile action by land, sea or air, including restrictions against Israel-bound shipping in the Suez Canal and in the Gulf of Aqaba and the organisation of raids into Israel from Egypt and other neighbouring territories?

You are authorized to inform the Government of Egypt that Israel has already expressed in due form its readiness to make a pledge of non-belligerency with Egypt.

Please accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Golda Meir  
Minister for Foreign Affairs

H. E. Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld,  
Secretary-General,  
United Nations,  
New York.

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Number 1 of 2 copies, Series a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: March 26, 1957

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister Plenipotentiary, Israeli Embassy  
Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy

COPIES TO: NEA  
IO  
S/S

1-1482

At lunch today the Israeli Charge Shiloah referred to the recent visit to the Department of Foreign Minister Golda Meir, Ambassador Eban and himself, mentioning that after conversation with the Secretary they were referred to the Under Secretary; that incident to that conversation a memorandum of the subjects discussed was left with the Department. Shiloah, in mentioning again as he did last week Israeli's eagerness to resume more "normal" relations with the United States Government agencies, said he had received several inquiries from his Foreign Minister relating to the above-mentioned conversations. She wondered whether there had been any reaction to the points mentioned. Shiloah said it would be so helpful if instead of being left for a long period in uncertainty regarding such inquiries they could be given some indication of our thinking. I said I was sure these matters were under active consideration and that I had not understood that they called for specific comments as they form part of our consideration of the general problem in the Middle East. I said, however, I would bring the matter to the attention of the competent officials. Mr. Shiloah seemed to indicate a better understanding of our attitude concerning economic relations with Israel.

In describing the Israeli attitude regarding the stationing of UNEF forces on the Israeli side of the demarcation line, he said that Israeli opposition is largely based on psychological factors. The Israeli population generally is opposed, he said, and he doubted that the present Government would dare to support such proposition. He referred also to the other practical considerations which had been mentioned before by the Israelis to the effect that such a force would not be effective and that it would amount merely to increasing the observers corps. He left the impression that the Israeli mind

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closed on this score.

Mr. Shiloah continues critical of Hammarskjold and is disparaging of his activity in Cairo.

Held  
4/8/67  
NEA/P. Mr. Faye

RECEIVED  
OFFICE OF THE  
DIRECTOR  
APR 10 1967





# Campaigners for Christ the King

1314½ West Eleventh Place

Los Angeles 15, California

Richmond 7-8738

March 29, 1957

"Behold your King!"

John 19:14

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

I have, this date, sent a message to the Premier of Israel, David Ben-Gurion, suggesting that a possible solution for peace between that country and Egypt, might be for the State of Israel to purchase the Gaza strip from Egypt.

I am wondering, if in the interest of peace, the United States might be willing to loan Israel the money for this purchase if Egypt could be persuaded to sell?

I am hoping that this letter may of some value to you in your determined effort to seek a solution to the Middle East problem.

Sincerely yours in Christ the King,

Bruce E. Brant, C.C.K. Director

Catholic Action calls upon us to participate with the Apostolic Hierarchy to bring souls to Christ.

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TO THE RM/R CENTRAL FILES

674.84A/3-20-57

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67484A/3-20-57

1957 APR 3 PM

FILED  
APR 26 1957

SEP

Dear Mr. Brant:


Thank you etc.

~~The position of the Government of Egypt is known to be opposed to~~

~~the transfer of additional land to Israel, whether by sale or other means.~~

The position of the Government of Egypt is known to be opposed to  
the transfer of additional land to Israel, whether by sale or other means.

Sincerely yours,

A large, stylized handwritten signature, possibly 'H', with a long horizontal stroke extending to the left.

May 13 1957

DOCUMENT MUST BE REFILED  
IN THE PH/A CENTRAL

Dear Mr. Brant:

After consideration at the White House, your letter of March 29, 1957 to the President concerning the purchase by Israel of the Gaza Strip has been sent to the Department of State for reply. We appreciate the interest in our relations with the nations of the Middle East that prompted you to write, and I am sorry for the delay in this response.

The question of United States financial assistance to Israel to enable that state to purchase the Gaza Strip does not seem to apply in this case. The Government of Egypt is known to be opposed to the transfer of additional land to Israel either by sale or by any other means.

Because of your expression of interest in the problems of the Middle East, I believe that you will be interested in the enclosed copy of a recent speech by Deputy Under Secretary Robert Murphy in which he describes the history of and United States relations with the various countries of that area.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

John P. Neagher  
Chief  
Public Services Division

Enclosure:

✓ As stated.

Mr. Bruce R. Brant, Director,  
Campaigns for Christ the King,  
1314 1/2 West Eleventh Place,  
Los Angeles 15, California.

S/S-CP  
MAY 13 1957 P.M.

NEA/P: TRPrye  
P: SEV: CERushing:rp

5/7/57

W. C. 774.840 / 3-2957

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Depart. of State

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Control:  
Rec'd:

19833  
March 30, 1957  
5:08 p.m.

NEA  
Info

FROM: Tel Aviv

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 1149, March 30, 11 a.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1149; REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 233, PARIS 196,  
CAIRO 215, AMMAN 203, BEIRUT 199, USUN 90

At suitable opportunity will inform Foreign Minister for record  
(DEPTTEL 911) US did not have advance knowledge GOE plan to send  
Governor to Gaza. In meantime, on my instruction, Embassy  
officer so informed Herzog, Foreign Ministry, in conversation  
certain to be repeated Meir and Ben Gurion.

Although I am confident her remarks to me (EMBTTEL 1115) did not  
refer to US knowledge of a GOE plan in advance of Nasser's public  
announcement of his intention to despatch Governor to Gaza, but  
referred to SYG and US knowledge that Nasser was in fact to  
despatch him without delay (i.e. announcement not propaganda), I  
believe it worthwhile that we make the referenced statement for  
the record. It was my belief that Mrs. Meir spoke only of US  
intelligence or situation in sense of Governor being en route to  
Gaza and was expressing keen dissatisfaction that neither SYG nor  
US took any steps to stop him before crossing border of Gaza  
although aware he en route. This limitation her remarks  
this consistent, I believe with impression her first knowledge  
Nasser plan came from his announcement and with her feeling  
Secretary "dumbfounded" at Nasser announcement.

LAWSON

MOG:JJ

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38  
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Rec'd: March 30, 1957  
9:55 a.m.

NEA

FROM: Paris

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RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 5021, March 30, 11 a.m.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 5021; REPEATED INFORMATION MOSCOW, TEL AVIV  
UNNUMBERED

Re EMBTEL 5019

Penultimate word first paragraph REFTEL should read Israeli.

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USIA

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

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Control:

640

Rec'd:

April 1, 1957

5:34 p.m.

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1150, April 1, 4 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 1150, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 234, PARIS 197, CAIRO 216, BEIRUT 201, DAMASCUS 149, AMMAN 204.

At Jerusalem convention of International Council of Jewish Women last night, Foreign Minister who principal speaker made emotional speech on Israel's continued "battle for existence." She followed her well-known line, to effect that Sinai action matter life or death for Israel which wanted only peace and right (not merely be allowed) to live; that Israel's success at arms not due better or more equipment or larger forces but to troops knowledge of what they fought for; that although UN voting clearly against Israel it did not reflect existing wide sympathy many delegates with moral position of Israel within issues concerned. She did not attack Hammarskjold, introduce highly explosive subject of Gaza, Suez and Aqaba (probably reserving them for her all-important Knesset speech Tuesday), or imply criticism of US. But she revealed that the Cabinet decision for Sinai action was taken on October 27, 1956, when she reiterated her belief in wisdom that decision and said she would, on looking back on situation, again "show her right hand in support of that policy" as she had on that date.]

In a short pre-speech conversation with me she spoke depressingly of having spent the day reading "disappointing telegrams" mentioning especially one describing the Shiloah-Rountree conversation (DEPTEL 924) and reports of SYG's Cairo visit which some, she thought, might play up as successful but which she obviously considered unsuccessful from viewpoint improving materially Israel-Egypt position. She spoke of SYG's letter to Nasser on question belligerency and expressed some doubt that clear reply would be received or firmly demanded. I expressed opinion it mistake to try to evaluate situation on basis of initial approach to problems, incomplete information or erroneous reports but she seemed feel outlook not encouraging.

She mentioned

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674.84A, 4-157

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APR 3 0 0959

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-2- 1150, April 1, 4 p.m., from Tel Aviv

She mentioned her disappointment over continuation of US travel ban (EMBTEL 1148) preventing Passover travel to Israel by US Jews. (Later, pointed references this matter directed at me by other speakers during ceremony).

Other recent reports which, although not specified by her but looked upon with some apprehension by others in the government, must have contributed to her dispirited attitude probably included: Saudi troops in Aqaba; Egyptian troops in El Arish; Nasser's intransigence on Suez; Nasser's domination over UNEF in Gaza involving, among other things, enforced Egyptian police participation with UNEF in patrolling. She seemed, for her, unusually pre-occupied and depressed, a condition she indicated derived largely from the importance and concern with which she approached her appearance before the Knesset tomorrow and the minimum amount of ammunition she possessed to meet the inevitable heavy attacks. She remarked, "I wish it were Mr. Dulles up there instead of me," implying that she expected a broad frontal attack on GOI withdrawal policy in light of subsequent Gaza developments and Nasser's bellicose statements and avowed determination to prevent Israeli ships from transitting Suez or Tiran. Her concern over up-coming speech and debate comes, very likely, from knowledge she regarded widely as very important factor in GOI withdrawal decision and her expressed confidence in US ability to prevent early de facto Egypt position in Gaza was a material influence.

There seems little doubt that opposition's heavy guns will be brought up in Knesset debate. Although I did not see Ben Gurion last night, a visitor to his home reported him improved in health, in relaxed mood and very good spirits.

LAWSON

AB:DEM/8

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1957 APR 2 PM 5 47

DC/T

For DC/T use

SENT TO: Amembassy, TEL AVIV

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674.842

4-157

Origin

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Re first part last sentence paragraph one Embtel 1150. Is Formin  
statement matter of public record? Embassy's observations desired re  
accuracy of statement.

Central  
files

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674.34A/4-157

674.842/4-15

Drafted by:  
NEA:NE:DCBergus:rej - 4/2/57

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

NEA:NE - Donald C. Bergus

Clearances:

R - WPArmstrong, Jr. (In Substance) *or*

*SAH* S/S-CR

APR 2 1957 P.M.

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Control: 636  
Rec'd: April 1, 1957  
5:31 p.m.NEA  
Info

FROM: Jerusalem

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 278. April 1, 3 p.m. (SECTION 1 OF 2)

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PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 278, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 158, BEIRUT 158, CAIRO 74, DAMASCUS 60, LONDON 34, PARIS 23, TEL AVIV 132, BAGHDAD, JIDDA UNNUMBERED.

General Burns made social call at CONGEN March while on week-end visit Jerusalem. Following summarizes his comments during ensuing discussion current matters.

(1) Burns voiced strong disapproval of Israeli attitudes opposing stationing part of UNEF force on Israeli side D/L including El Aja demilitarized zone. He failed see any validity their arguments against this, and could not admit agreement stationing UNEF troops their territory would represent any further "concession" on Israel's part. Their withdrawal from Sinai and Gaza strip was not at all in nature of a concession regardless Israeli contentions that effect. He opined that most of the trouble GOI would have with public opinion if UNEF troops stationed Israeli side, D/L were of their own making through propaganda or bombastic utterances Israeli officials. Question stationing UNEF on Israeli side D/L assumed importance owing connection other matters. For instance it appears unlikely Nasser could possibly agree make declaration of Egyptian "non-belligerence" as long as UNEF force confined to Egyptian area only.

(2) Burns had no especial comment regarding Gulf of Aqaba. He did not wish to speculate on Egyptian actions should UNEF force withdraw from Sharm-el-Sheik. He foresaw no likelihood such move in near future. He observed that Nasser may well be more reasonable in his own views than extremist supporters who put him into power and upon whom he depends to remain there. Egyptian attitudes toward navigation in Gulf would of course depend on outcome play of such varying factors.

(3) Burns said UNEF had transferred both administrative and security functions Gaza strip to Egyptians as soon as they ready assume such duties. Burns had queried UNHQ for specific instructions as to his right retain any such authority upon arrival Egyptian

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-2- 278, April 1, 3 p.m., from Jerusalem (SECTION 1 OF 2)

Egyptian administrators and had been told he had none. He explained that while there was no question of Egypt's right administer Gaza, Hammarskjold had obtained informal understanding from Fawzi that Egypt would allow such right remain in abeyance for a certain time. However, questions of face or other factors must have assumed such weight with Nasser that any such understanding was ignored. UNEF is in any case dependent on Egyptian cooperation owing situation its sources supply and lines communication. In addition, UNEF is not adapted assume civil administration functions owing lack qualified personnel plus language problem. UNEF now retaining merely certain responsibilities for its own security and to some extent security matters affecting UNRWA.

(4) Continuing foregoing theme, Burns stated that usual nationalist plus Communist type agitators, perhaps on instructions GOE, very active in Gaza strip upon arrival UNEF in efforts.

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AB:SC/7

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

## Department of State

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Action

Control:

856

NEA

Rec'd:

April 2, 1957

3:44 a.m.

Info

FROM: Jerusalem

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 278, April 1, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

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SENT DEPARTMENT 278, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 158, BEIRUT 82, CAIRO 74, DAMASCUS 60, LONDON 34, PARIS 23, TEL AVIV 132, BAGHDAD, JIDDA UNNUMBERED.

Persuade people against UNEF administration of area. Local officials and other influential residents obviously opposed UNEF administration, remained polite but not helpful upon arrival UNEF in area.

(5) Burns stated that no Egyptian military personnel had entered Gaza strip except the Governor plus his staff and necessary technical personnel for communications services, etcetera. Palestine police are now in charge of security matters. This is same force which existed before the Israeli occupation, part of which was retained on duty by the Israelis.

(6) Regarding functions of UNEF Burns said force has no authority to shoot anyone, but it can endeavor capture infiltrators and turn them over to police for appropriate action. He is now endeavoring clarify with UNHQ and Egyptians question UNEF use of force (i.e. firearms) in connection border control. However, UNEF will continue depend on cooperation Egyptian Administration and police in prevention infiltration. Lacking cooperative attitude UNEF itself, of course, vulnerable to revenge attacks, mining, etcetera. UNRWA can assist together with police in tracing infiltrators some of whom living in camps are known through their proclivities for boasting of exploits.

(7) In Burns' opinion Nasser does not want make use Fedayeen at present time, but might do so in retaliation some new aggressive activity by Israel. Burns said conditions in Gaza area quiet and orderly. He did not believe Egyptians had made any extensive attempts undertake reprisals against locals for collaboration with Israelis. UNEF troops are behaving well, although they find situation somewhat confining. Arrangements are being made for them take leave in Beirut and possibly in Jordan-Jerusalem.

CONGEN comment: While this office is not able

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comment

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-2- 278, April 1, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO) from Jerusalem

comment in any detail on foregoing, certain local sources such as French Consul General for example state many Egyptian military personnel have entered strip in civilian garb and consider situation there less favorable than would appear from description given by Burns. Assume it is quite conceivable such clandestine activities may exist to certain extent without Burns knowledge.

COLE

EOC:AH

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Air Touch

APR 8 - 1957  
Unclassified

674.84A/4-157  
No. 1824

To: Department of State, Washington

April 1, 1957

From: American Embassy, Paris

Subject: French Lawyer's Views on Akaba Navigation

5.0 / ACTION / N / RM/R-2 OLI-8 EUR-5 ICA-10 P-1  
Rec'd / NEA-4 / F / CIA-12 USIA-10  
4-4

Attached in single copy is a news story from Combat of April 1, 1957, setting forth the views of Charles Rousseau of the Paris law faculty on navigation in Akaba.

Rousseau states that recourse to the Hague Court would be wise as it would undoubtedly result in a decision favorable to the liberty of transit of Akaba and Tiran.

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the RECORD COPY. It must be  
returned to RM/R for filing.

Robert H. McBride  
First Secretary of Embassy

Attachment:  
COMBAT article

POL:LLBrowne/rmc

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674.84A/4-157

HBS

674.84A/4-15

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

4238

**Memorandum of Conversation**

DATE: April 2, 1957

SUBJECT: Gaza, Sharm el-Sheikh and Suez Canal

PARTICIPANTS: Senator John Kennedy, Massachusetts  
Senator Hubert Humphrey, Minnesota  
Senator Alexander Wiley, Wisconsin  
Senator George Aiken, Vermont

COPIES TO: Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary, IO  
Joseph J. Sisco, UNP

PM/R,  
H - Miss Kerlin  
W - Mr. Dillon  
NEA-Mr. Rountree

UNP  
IO  
USUN  
OLI (2)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-51120-1

Mr. Wilcox briefed the UN Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the current situation in Gaza and Sharm el-Sheikh and on the latest developments regarding the Egyptian proposal for operating the Suez Canal.

Mr. Wilcox said that the situation in Gaza appeared better than pictured in the newspaper reports. He stressed that the arrangements made by the Secretary General with Egypt regarding UNEF responsibility in Gaza met the requirements which General Burns felt were essential if UNEF was to discharge its functions effectively. Mr. Wilcox said we believed good progress had been made, that UNEF was playing a substantial role in Gaza, and that there had been a restoration of tranquility in Gaza and an improvement in the security situation. By the use of a map, Mr. Wilcox showed the members of the Subcommittee where elements of UNEF are presently located in the Gaza and Sharm el-Sheikh areas.

With respect to Sharm el-Sheikh, Mr. Wilcox said we had reason to believe that the Egyptians did not intend to move in for the time being or to ask UNEF to leave. Mr. Wilcox said that we are exploring on a preliminary basis the practicability of requesting an advisory opinion of the ICJ regarding freedom of passage through the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.

Mr. Wilcox also reviewed briefly the status of discussions in Cairo between the United States and Egypt regarding the Egyptian draft memorandum on the future operation of the Suez Canal. Mr. Wilcox said our primary objective was to reestablish confidence that the Suez Canal, as contemplated by the 1888 Convention, will provide a permanently dependable waterway.

The Members

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The Members of the Senate Subcommittee raised a number of questions of detail and each expressed his appreciation for the interesting and informative briefing given to them by Mr. Wilcox. Mr. Wilcox said that he was at the disposal of the Subcommittee and he would be glad in the future to provide them with additional information regarding US policy in the United Nations.

*705*

IO - Francis O. Wilcox

IO:UNP:JJSisco:rs







ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

APR 2 1957

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

In reply refer to: I-2361/7

Dear Mr. Rountree:

The Secretary of the Navy has requested that the attached letter inclosing a plan for Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement be forwarded to the Secretary of State.

From a military standpoint the Department of Defense believes that the plan has merit. The plan would involve an improvement in the land communications network of the Middle East. Such a development has military connotations, since it would alleviate logistical and operational difficulties associated with any plan for the defense of the area from outside aggression.

However, the extent to which the proposed plan would be useful in obtaining even a limited amount of cooperation between the states of the area involves a determination of factors not within the purview of the Department of Defense. Accordingly, I recommend that it be submitted to the Secretary of State for his consideration.

Sincerely yours,

*Mansfield D. Sprague*  
Mansfield D. Sprague  
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

Attachment

Honorable William Rountree  
Assistant Secretary of State for  
Near Eastern Affairs  
Department of State

68
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Cal

SecDef Cont. No. C-438

JUN 1 0 1957

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674.844/4-257

674.844/4-247

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Answered  
by  
Asst Secy

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C-438

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SECRET  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

*Charles S. Thomas*

*092 Middle East*

*(14 March 57)*

SecDef Cent. No. C-438

**CONFIDENTIAL**

- 23666 - **CONFIDENTIAL**

Op-611 1a1  
Ser 3164P61  
14 MAR 1957

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Enclosure (1) sets forth a proposed plan developed by the Chief of Naval Operations for the establishment of Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement in furtherance of the Eisenhower Doctrine for the Middle East.

I believe that the proposal has sufficient merit to warrant the attention of governmental agencies which will be engaged in implementing the Eisenhower Doctrine and in seeking solutions to current Middle East problems which will further the interests of the U. S. Therefore, I forward it to you for consideration.

I am forwarding this letter via the Secretary of Defense in order that he may be apprised of its contents and be afforded the opportunity to comment as he may deem appropriate.

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES S. THOMAS

Honorable John Foster Dulles  
Secretary of State  
Washington 25, D. C.

Encl: (1) A proposed plan for Egyptian  
Israeli rapprochement in  
furtherance of the Eisenhower  
Doctrine in the Middle East

SecDef Cont. No. C-438  
I 236117

ORIG. COL S G TAXIS, USMC, Op-611, Rm 4E569

Retyped: 3/14/57 - EN1(2)/elb

SecNav Cont. No. C-505

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CONFIDENTIAL 347

CONFIDENTIAL

**A PROPOSED PLAN FOR EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI RAPPROCH-**  
**MENT IN FURTHERANCE OF THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE**  
**FOR THE MIDDLE EAST**

**1. ASSUMPTIONS:**

a. That the Suez issue will be resolved, at least on an interim basis.

b. That Egyptian-Israeli agreement can be the key to a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute.

2. In implementation of the Eisenhower Doctrine for the Middle East, advantage must be taken of the fact that a fluid rather than a frozen situation presently exists in the area. Once the Suez issue is resolved, the momentum thus gained in the resolution of Egyptian-Israeli differences must not be lost. This paper is directed at the problem of improving Egyptian-Israeli relations as a basis for eventual rapprochement between Israel and all the Arab States.

3. At the core of the present difficulties in the Middle East is the Arab-Israeli dispute. To date all efforts to resolve this dispute have been fruitless. It would appear that an acceptable solution would, at a minimum, have the following attributes:

a. It should be based upon initial improvement in Egyptian-Israeli relations.

b. It should provide promise of mutual benefit for both Israel and Egypt.

c. It should benefit the other Middle Eastern States.

d. It should so benefit a large portion of the world as to encourage general world support.

e. It should preserve the territorial sovereignty of the disputing parties.

f. It should provide for a physical separation between Israel and Egypt.



g. It should be of such nature that hesitancy or failure of either party to negotiate willingly would incur the active displeasure of a considerable portion of the free world.

h. It should be such nature that failure of either party to live up to an agreement once reached would result in bringing to bear the pressure of the free world.

i. It should be of such nature that failure of either party to live up to an agreement once reached would be inimical to the economic interests of that country.

4. Egypt, once having reached an agreement (*modus vivendi*) with Israel, could lead the other Arab States to do the same. The thought of negotiations with Nasser is unpalatable and could prove highly unsatisfactory. Negotiations with a successor Egyptian Government would offer more hope of success. However, there may be no alternative to Nasser.

5. A solution to the specific dispute between Israel and Egypt might be encouraged through the approach outlined below:

At the present time, Europe requires in excess of 2 million barrels/day of Middle East oil. By 1967 Europe will require on the order of 7 million barrels/day from the Middle East. Suez Canal traffic has increased at such a rate since 1945 that the existing Canal, if fully operative, probably will be saturated traffic-wise by 1961. Thus, a means of Canal augmentation is essential to the expeditious movement of POL and other cargoes between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. A program to provide this augmentation is a world-wide economic necessity, and would constitute a viable economic enterprise.

The proposal could be advanced that if both Israel and Egypt would lease to an international organization a strip of territory on either side of their mutual frontier, this strip of territory would be developed as an international traffic route from the Gulf of Aqaba to the Mediterranean. A strip of perhaps a mile in width is envisaged, with each party retaining nominal sovereignty over its particular portion. The entire strip, including terminal facilities, would be subject to the complete administration and operation of the international contracting organization or designated agency thereof. Across this strip would be constructed a high-capacity rail and road net, and pipelines sufficient to meet the growing POL requirements of Western Europe for an indefinite period. The rail and road facilities would, if practicable, terminate in a port on the Mediterranean at the juncture of the Egyptian and Israeli frontiers. The difficulty of constructing a satisfactory port at this point is appreciated; if it proves unsound after adequate examination, the alternate solution would be to extend the road/rail routes north and south along the coast to

State in Israel and to Port Said in Egypt. The POL terminal could, of course, remain at the Mediterranean juncture of the two frontiers.

The financing of this transit strip could be done in many ways: at the moment the World Bank is satisfactory for illustrative purposes. The funds derived from the project initially should be expended in such a manner as to amortize the basic investment, meet operating expenses, assist in the rehabilitation of the Palestinian refugees and provide a degree of income to both nations. Upon conclusion of the amortization of the basic investment and the provision of sufficient funds for the rehabilitation of the refugees, the income from the strip should (a) provide for the maintenance, operation and development of the international highway, and (b) provide equal portions of the balance to both Egypt and Israel for the internal development of those nations.

The Israeli would not be long in seeing the long-range financial benefits which would derive. The Egyptians initially would be suspicious that the project was intended to supplant the Suez Canal. Logic, based on the continuing expansion of East-West traffic through the Middle East indicates that the international highway is a necessary augmentation to the Suez Canal, not a substitute for it. Once the Egyptian understands this, it is reasonable to assume that the long-range economic advantages which would accrue to Egypt will be appreciated.

The fact that the strip of territory, though nominally sovereign to the nations concerned, would be under the administration and operation of an international body would provide a physical separation between the two parties. At the same time, the very pattern of traffic which would develop would be such as to encourage commercial relationships between the parties, with a resultant reduction in the frictions which exist today.

The benefit to the world economy should be evident. Both the Arab States and Israel, as well as the UN, would be relieved of the pressing problem of the Arab Refugees. Problems of unemployment would be alleviated throughout the entire area. The oil-producing nations of the Middle East would benefit. It would provide a basis for the eventual development of direct and rapid means of land communication between Eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea ports, and major distribution centers in Israel, Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq - obviating the time-consuming sea voyage between Suez and Eastern Mediterranean ports. The lessening of tensions in the Middle East which would result from the accomplishment of such a project would provide a major step toward Arab-Israeli peace. A peace, or even a modus vivendi, once obtained, would do much to restore this part of the world as a viable economic entity. The overall stabilizing effect of the removal of trade patterns between and across Israel and the Arab States would benefit them both.

5. The difficulty of developing a solution to the Arab-Israeli problem is thoroughly understood. Nevertheless, only by thorough examination of

every possible approach which may have merit can a solution be reached. This paper purposely sets forth no more than broad outline plan. If merit appears to inhere, any ensuing detailed study which might be made will require the efforts of specialists in many fields of endeavor. Such a study is beyond the single capability of the originating office.

In reply refer to  
HEA:NE

April 2 1957

674.84A/3-2  
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Dear Mr. Scudder:

In response to your letter of March 25, 1957, I am enclosing a copy of an Aide Memoire handed to the Israeli Ambassador on February 11, 1957, which answers the inquiry you have received from Mr. Frederick C. Fisher regarding the Gulf of Aqaba.

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Hill  
Assistant Secretary

Enclosures:

Two copies of the above-mentioned Aide Memoire.

The Honorable  
Robert F. Scudder,  
House of Representatives.

Dr/R
68
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Oct. KHH

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

37-39

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CORRECTION ISSUED  
4/4/57, 11 p.m.

Action

Control: 2571  
Rec'd: April 4, 1957  
3:24 a.m.NEA  
Info  
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FROM: Tel Aviv - CORRECTED COPY

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1161, April 4, 9 a.m.

Reference: Department Telegram 937

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In Embassy's view, affirmative vote Meir says she registered on October 27 (which she made matter public record in speech reported JERUSALEM POST April 1 and quoted Embassy telegram 1150) was responsible to Ben Gurion's official canvass of Cabinet after acquainting them for first time with Sinai-Gaza campaign blueprint.

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Purpose of canvass was to spread responsibility as widely as possible over government. Informed opinion here generally holds, and Embassy agrees, that decision to strike was taken Gurion, probably Golda Meir, Chief of Staff Dayan, and possibly but not necessarily, two or three others.

IDF had been mobilized and deployed on Israel borders for sometime before -- to such extent, as matter of fact, that government was obliged to explain build up which was plainly visible to everyone in nation-wide broadcast October 26 (Embassy telegram 423).

LAWSON

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Correction made  
by RM/R

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Department of State

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AIR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1161, April 4, 9 a.m.

Control:

2571

Rec'd:

April 4, 1957

3:24 a.m.

Reference: Department Telegram 937

In Embassy's view, affirmative vote Meir says she registered on October 27 (which she made matter public record in speech reported (#)) (Embassy telegram 1160) was responsible to Ben Gurion's official canvass of Cabinet after acquainting them for first time with Sinai-Gaza campaign blueprint.

Purpose of canvass was to spread responsibility as widely as possible over government. Informal opinion here generally holds, and Embassy agrees, that decision to strike was taken sometime earlier by very small inner group, including Ben Gurion, probably Golda Meir, Chief of Staff Dayan, and possibly but not necessarily, two or three others.

IDF had been mobilized and deployed on Israel borders for sometime before -- to such extent, as matter of fact, that government was obliged to explain build up which was plainly visible to everyone in nation-wide broadcast October 26 (Embassy telegram 423).

LAWSON

VH:MJH/6

(#)Omission. Correction to follow.

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# Department of State

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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1163, April 4, 11 a.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 1163, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 238, PARIS 199, ROME 97, BEIRUT 207, AMMAN 206, DAMASCUS 151, CAIRO 218, JERUSALEM UNNUMBERED.

No (repeat no) official texts have been issued but according to government-dominated press Golda Meir vigorously supported by Ben Gurion in presentation Foreign Ministry's budget to Knesset, put best possible face on Israel's withdrawal from Gaza and Sharm E-Sheikh which opposition charges was serious mistake. Debate will continue tonight with Meir scheduled to answer critics.

Ben Gurion intervened to say that if withdrawal had been error, was his full responsibility. He described following achievements as flowing from campaign, prospects of free navigation destruction of enemy's ability to attack Israel and diminution of Nasser's prestige both in Egypt and other Arab States and rest of world, including USSR. Object had not (repeat not) been territorial conquest or to enter into full-fledged war with Egypt.

Burden of Golda Meir's speech was about the same insofar as it dealt with purposes and accomplishments of campaign but she indicated disappointment with post bellum developments in Gaza. According to press she reiterated, as she has many times, that US was acquainted with every step in development of Israel's decision to withdraw and with conditions which Golda Meir envisaged would subsequently prevail (France also knew development of Israel's policy, press stated adding that she said no (repeat no) French pressure had been put on Israel to accept).

She was quoted as saying that "By very fact GOI informed American Government in advance about contents of Israel's declaration, US Government has assumed moral responsibility for its implementation. I cannot (repeat not) but express my deep disappointment with impression created that US apparently did not (repeat not) exercise its full influence in order prevent deterioration of situation in Gaza, a development which is contrary to what should have happened there in accordance with understanding reached between us".

To what

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-2- 1163, April 4, 11 a.m. from Tel Aviv

To what Ben Gurion also said, she added that revolutionary change had taken place in attitude of UN members who had assumed moral responsibilities to prevent situation from reverting to status quo ante.

Coalition speakers qualified their support along party lines. Achdut Avoda's Yigal Alon made clear his party supported decisions which sent IDF into Sinai and Gaza but could not (repeat not) share responsibility for decision to withdraw. Hazan speaking for Mapam condoned military action but argued along well-known line that "quality for Israel's Arab minorities and abolition of military rule were first steps for achieving peace with Arab states. Gaza had been lost when Israel had failed to reclaim Gaza residents would be accepted as full-fledged Israeli citizens." Herut's Begin charged Meir had withdrawn without any assurances from US, implying that she was trying to shift responsibility for her own serious error. General Zionists took similar tact.

Early editorial comment was also along party lines. Prime Minister drew support from HAARETZ (independent) which praised him for basing his arguments on fact that withdrawal "decision was necessary and there is no (repeat no) sense in delaying fruits of victory had been wasted".

Similarly JERUSALEM POST said "Gains of Sinai campaign should not (repeat not) be diminished in public estimation. It is doubtful if at any time there was any expectation of or desire for territorial acquisitions by Israel. That all territory conquered had to be returned is principal apparent loss since campaign ended. But Gaza strip apart, campaign was primarily fought to prevent attack from Egypt of which there was abundant proof that it was being planned. That war aim was achieved and it is very unlikely Egypt will wish to indulge in aggression for some long time to come".

LAWSON

SW:AH

APR 12 1967



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Control: 4362

Rec'd: April 6, 1967

8:57 a.m.

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1166, April 4, 5 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

SENT DEPARTMENT 1166, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 200, LONDON  
239, BEIRUT 15, DAMASCUS 15, AMMAN 207, JERUSALEM 22, CAIRO 215

REMARKS

USARMA had long conversation yesterday with Harkabi, director  
IDF Intelligence, whom he found in more relaxed and hopeful  
mood than at any time previously. Accuracy of information he  
revealed confirmed by US reconnaissance and exchange information  
with other friendly MAS.

(1) Aqaba: Harkabi did not express great concern about this  
area. According Israeli information only one Jordanian com-  
pany in Aqaba at present time. As British withdrew during  
next two months, it is expected that more Jordanian military  
will come into Aqaba. Although no Syrian nor Saudi troops in  
Aqaba at present, Saudis are known to be stationed not far  
away and it is planned they will be brought into Aqaba later.  
He had heard vague rumors some time ago that Saudis were train-  
ing frogmen, but did not believe they were present in area or  
represented a threat. Egyptian frogmen have been assisting in  
clearing Suez Canal and Harkabi believed Nasser "has his hands  
full" and would not for some time be in position to return to  
Sharm E-Sheikh with aggressive aims. He expressed opinion that  
there will be considerable unemployment in Aqaba following  
British departure and Israelis expect minor border incursions  
of an unorganized nature with thievery as object.

(2) Hula: Harkabi confirmed erection bridge at Daganja which  
he characterized as civilian necessity to keep access open to  
village which would otherwise be cut off because dike formerly  
used as road now under water. Bailey bridge capacity unknown  
this time. Furthermore Hula area too swampy to be practicable  
for any offensive against Syria. He confirmed some shooting  
border and expected this would continue in small way in connec-  
tion with construction activities on Hula water plan. He con-  
siders Syrian blustering about Israeli threat this area to be  
mainly due to Sarraj, who is "fighting for his life."

(3) Gaza:

Correction made  
by RM/R

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-2- 1166, April 4, 5 p.m., from Tel Aviv (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

(3) Gaza: Harkabi seemed fairly untroubled about conditions in Gaza and did not seem disturbed at number or type of Egyptians now in strip. He did not think organized Fedayeen had been introduced and used same argument as in connection with Sharm E-Sheikh against their early return i.e., Nasser in no position to start anything at this time. Furthermore he said UNEF is now in strip as deterrent. This is first time Harkabi has indicated any confidence in possibility UNEF a constructive element. Presence of Egyptian military in El Arish does give Israel some concern but even on this point Harkabi was unusually relaxed.

LAWSON

BB:DEM/8 /

Note: Message delayed in transmission.

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CORRECTION ISSUED  
4/7/57, 1 p.m.Control: 3095  
Rec'd: April 4, 1957  
3:04 p.m.

FROM: Tel Aviv - CORRECTED COPY

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1166, April 4, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

SENT DEPARTMENT 1166, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 200, LONDON 239,  
BEIRUT 208, DAMASCUS 152, AMMAN 207, JIDDA 22, CAIRO 219.

Comment: This new confidence or decrease in concern is obvious not only in relaxed IDF posture but in civil life which continues at normal pace. Despite the existence of "sore spots" and continued GOI unhappiness over present Gaza and Suez situations, there seems to be a noticeable reduction in public tension during past few days.

Contributions to this somewhat encouraging situation, which can be reversed overnight by a single adverse development in any of the sensitive areas, are probably of many origins. They include:

Ben Gurion's forthright remarks in the Knesset Tuesday, reflecting his supreme confidence in the wisdom of GOI policy and in his leadership, while at same time effectively bringing to public something of realism of situation which demanded withdrawal policy and pointing up real gains made by Israel as result Sinai campaign and withdrawal policy; the raising of US ban on travel, with expected early return of US personnel thus underlining USG estimate of no immediate security threats in Israel, prospects of immediate reactivation of aid, technical assistance, Export-Import Bank loan negotiations and return of tourists; relative quiet on borders and minimum number incursions; receding concern, which was very apparent only week or so ago both among military and general public, that IDF might be remobilized for reoccupation of Gaza;--all combine to reduce apprehensiveness to lowest point in several months.

Appearance these limited signs relaxation in attitude does not mean that major issues and problems have disappeared or sharp comment on them will not continue to receive full play in press Knesset and elsewhere. For example it may be expected that Suez transit rights for Israeli ships will be played up heavily. Threats of dispatching test ships will be made frequently with actual activation that policy possible when GOI convinced serious efforts by

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1166, April 4, 5 p.m., from Tel Aviv - CORRECTED COPY  
(SECTION TWO OF TWO)

efforts by US and UN to obtain passage not being made or when reasonable hope success such efforts not visible. And a line of pessimism on Gaza regarding UNEF administration and Egypt's increased administrative take-over must be anticipated for some time. However public concern over these issues will not, it is believed, increase rapidly in the absence of incidents or a stepped-up GOI inspired propaganda program. Thus Israel may have a short period of somewhat less tense local atmosphere for consideration its serious economic and social problems.

LAWSON

BB:DEM/8

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## INCOMING TELEGRAM

## Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

53-51

Action

Control: 3095

Rec'd: April 4, 1957  
3:04 p.m.

NLA

FROM: Tel Aviv

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 1166, April 4, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1166, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 200, LONDON 239, BELRUT 208, DAMASCUS 152, AMMAN 207, JIDDA 22, CAIRO 219.

Comment: This new confidence or decrease in concern is obvious not only in relaxed IDF posture but in civil life which continues at normal pace. Despite the existence of "sore spots" and continued GOI unhappiness over present Gaza and Suez situations, there seems to be a noticeable reduction in public tension during past few days.

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Appearance these limited signs relaxation in attitude does not mean that major issues and problems have disappeared or sharp comment on them will not continue to receive full play in press, Knesset and elsewhere. For example it may be expected that Suez transit rights for Israeli ships will be played up heavily. Threats of dispatching test ships will be made frequently with actual activation that policy possible when GOI convinced serious efforts by US and UN to obtain passage not being made or when reasonable hope

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-2- 1166, April 4, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO) from Tel Aviv

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LAWSON

AB:GEV/1

\*As received, correction to follow.

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NND 897403  
Box 2679

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1/5

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation

684A.86/4-457

Tel 410

Date

4 Apr 57

From

State

To

Shahray

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:



Security-Classified Information



Otherwise Restricted Information

NPC  
Authority

1/5/89  
Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

①

FRANK M. COFFIN  
SECOND DISTRICT, MAINE

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, D. C.**

April 4, 1957

ROOM 145  
HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
DONALD E. NICOLL  
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

DISTRICT SERVICE OFFICE:  
460 MAIN STREET  
LEWISTON, MAINE

MRS. CATHERINE TIMPANY  
DISTRICT ASSISTANT

**ACTION**  
is assigned to



Honorable Robert C. Hill  
Assistant Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hill:

Thank you for your letter of March 29th, together with the enclosed material. I shall be most interested in reading with care Mr. Murphy's speech.

Sincerely,

*Frank M. Coffin*

Frank M. Coffin, M. C.

PUBLIC SERVICES DIV.

*File 4/9/57*  
*per. tel. McWinnitt (11)*

1957 APR 8

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

674.84A/4-457

APR 10 1957

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This letter (and its enclosures, if any) micro-filmed for RM/R records



In reply refer to  
SEV 674.84A/2-1957

April 4 1957

Dear Mr. Allen:

I refer to your letter of February 19, 1957 enclosing a letter from Mrs. Arthur Johnson of Oakland, California, concerning the situation in the Middle East. Thank you for bringing Mrs. Johnson's views to our attention.

Secretary Dulles has recognized that the member nations of the United Nations did not do all they might have in the past to achieve a just settlement in the Arab-Israel conflict. However, now that the withdrawal of Israel forces behind the Armistice line has been accomplished, the President has called for "... a greater effort by the United Nations and its members to secure justice and conformity with international law." The President stated that, "The United States, for its part, will vigorously seek solutions of the problems of the area in accordance with justice and international law."

Ambassador Lodge, in the United Nations General Assembly, noted the Secretary General's statement of February 22, 1957 that the Government of Egypt, which has jurisdiction over the Gaza Strip by the 1949 Armistice Agreement, has agreed to make special arrangements for some of the bodies of the United Nations. The Secretary General had stated: "For example, the arrangement for the use of the United Nations Emergency Force in the area should ensure its deployment on the Armistice line at the Gaza Strip and the effective interposition of the Force between the armed forces of Egypt and Israel. Similarly, the assistance of the United Nations and its appropriate auxiliary bodies would be enrolled toward putting a definite end to all incursions and raids across the border from either side."

Ambassador Lodge


The Honorable  
John J. Allen, Jr.,  
House of Representatives.

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Ambassador Lodge, after noting the above words of the Secretary General, stated that "It is the view of the United States that from a juridical standpoint the future of the Gaza Strip must...be worked out within the framework of the Armistice Agreement."

I believe that your constituent will be interested in the enclosed selection of material which explains in greater detail United States policy in the Middle East.

Mrs. Johnson's letter is returned as you requested.

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Hill  
Assistant Secretary

Enclosure:

1. Selected material.
2. From Mrs. Johnson (returned).

S/S-CR

APR 3 1957 A.M.

APR 4 1957

1.  
P:SEV:CE Rushing:OBL:bm:cf

P H

NEA/P-Mr. Frye 4/1/57

*See also below  
for initials*

In reply refer to  
SEV 674.84A/2-1957

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The Honorable  
John J. Allen, Jr.,  
House of Representatives.

674.84A/2-1957

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Robert C. Hill  
Assistant Secretary

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- ✓ 1. Selected material.
- ✓ 2. From Mrs. Johnson (returned).

*L.*  
P:SEV:CE Rushing:OBL:bt

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*Cleaned in draft*  
NEA/P-Mr. Frye

3/27/57

S/S-CR

MAR 28 1957 P.M.

to 3/28/57 signature  
APR 2 1957 P.M.



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*insert* → Mrs. Johnson's letter is returned as you requested.

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Robert C. Hill  
Assistant Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Selected material.
2. From Mrs. Johnson (returned).

P:SEV:CE Rushing:OBL:bt

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NEA/P-Mr. Frye

3/19/57

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1169, April 5, 10 a.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1169, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 240, PARIS 201, ROME 99, CAIRO 220, BEIRUT 209, DAMASCUS 153, AMMAN 208, USUN 91.

Foreign Ministry made informal representations to Embassy today deploring distinction drawn by President in his press conference between "assurances" given to GOI on Aqaba and Gaza in February 20 address and references to Israel's rights re Suez Canal.

"We have no (repeat no) doubt" Foreign Ministry officials said "that in strictly legal sense US is on firm ground in arguing as President did in his press conference Wednesday that US Government struck one attitude on Aqaba and quite another in no (repeat no) sense binding re Suez. However, we think it can be argued successfully that we were morally and logically right in assuming that by his February 20 remarks he recognized Suez ban as Israel disability as great as Aqaba requiring same energetic corrective efforts in one as in the other".

In support of this thesis he specifically quoted paragraph from President's February 20 speech which says in part: "...Egypt, by accepting six principles adopted by SC last October in relation to Suez Canal, bound itself to free and open transit through the canal without discrimination and to principle that operation of canal should be insulated from politics of any country. We should not (repeat not) assume that if Israel withdraws, Egypt will prevent Israeli shipping from using Suez Canal or Gulf of Aqaba. If unhappily Egypt does (#) armistice agreement or other international obligations then this should be dealt with firmly by society of nations".

Papers reported President's disavowal US commitment Suez in reproachful tones. Editors see Israel's rights in matter being completely ignored. According to LAMERHAV (Achdut Avoda) Washington policy is "complete surrender to Egyptian dictator. All promises given to Israel on free passage through Suez and Tiran have been completely obliterated even from memory of those who gave promises and wrote letters".

PERMANENT (Histadrut)

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-2- 1169, April 5, 10 a.m. from Tel Aviv

DAVAR (Histadrut) describes issue as "three-cornered war of nerves among Washington Cairo and UN with all parties completely ignoring Israel's rights in canal".

HABOKER (General Zionist) states that "Egyptian dictator does not (repeat not) deny he intends to use Suez as political pressure against Israel ... it is clear if he is allowed to get away with it that day is not (repeat not) far off when he will make new conditions every second morning for passage of other nations ships".

LAWSON

(#) Omission. Correction to follow

SW:AH

APR 12 1957

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

## Department of State

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CORRECTION ISSUED:

4/6/57, 10 a.m. TT

Control: 3579

Rec'd: April 5, 1957  
8:35 a.m.MESSAGE CENTER  
APR 5 1957  
8 AM 7 22

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AIR

FROM: Tel Aviv - CORRECTED PAGE 1.

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1169, April 5, 10 a.m.

PRIORITY

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Correction made

by RM/R

DAVAR (Histradut)

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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Action

Control: 3861

Rec'd: April 5, 1957  
1:50 p.m.

NEA

FROM: Tel Aviv

Info

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 1171, April 5, 11 am.

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SENT DEPARTMENT 1171 REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 242, PARIS 203, ROME 100, AMMAN 209, BEIRUT 210, CAIRO 222, DAMASCUS 154, JERUSALEM UNNUMBERED.

Foreign Ministry continues making careful public record in support its contention UNEF is slipping into status of Egyptian tool. Latest effort was press conference April 3 in which Foreign Ministry's Armistice Affairs Advisor Tekoah declared that "Hammaraskjold's recent statement prevention of Fedayeen activities is responsibility of Egyptian authorities with UNEF only assisting indicates Nasser has succeeded in depriving UNEF of all competence."

Tekoah declared new devices were necessary to prevent Fedayeen activity originating in Gaza. He said "Israel Government feels most effective method would be erection of physical barrier (Cf. DEPTTELS 1076) along demarcation line consisting of two rows of barbed wire ten meters apart illuminated and mined. (Foreign Ministry later told Embassy GOI had favored such barrier since first proposed by General Burns in 1955.) If agreement could not (repeat not) be reached with UNEF and Egypt for erection such barrier Israel would consider installing one of its own." (See my comment along these lines to Ben-Gurion (EMBTTEL 1056) and my recommendation to Department (EMBTTEL 1075).

Tekoah said that posting UNEF units in Israel was "irrelevant to security of area and was merely meant as device to save Nasser's face".

Press conference was prominently played in all Monday press but unsensationally and there was no (repeat no) supporting editorial comment.

LAWSON

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M-605

CONFIDENTIAL  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: April 5, 1957

SUBJECT: (1) Israel Shipping to Eilat, (2) U.S. Policy on Suez, (3) U.S. Economic and Technical Assistance, (4) Export-Import Bank.

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel  
Mr. Yohanan Meroz, Counselor, Israel Embassy  
NEA - William M. Rountree  
NE - Richard B. Parker

APR 12 1957

COPIES TO: S/S(2cc), G, C, NEA(2cc), NE(2cc), NE/E, W, IO, OLI(2), Tel Aviv, Cairo

12

Ambassador Eban said that he had two points to raise. The first of these was navigation through the Straits of Tiran. In accordance with previous agreement with the Under Secretary, he wished to inform us that an American flag tanker the SS Kermhillk (presumably the SS Kern Hills) was en route to the Gulf of Aqaba with a cargo of oil and should arrive in Eilat on April 6. No trouble was anticipated. Ambassador Eban hoped that such traffic would soon become a matter of course and that the Israelis would no longer feel the need to inform other governments of such trips. Mr. Rountree thanked Ambassador Eban for this information.

Ambassador Eban then said that although he was clear in his own mind his Government had requested him to seek clarification of the President's remarks regarding the Suez problem made in his press conference on April 4. Specifically, Israel wishes to know if the U.S. considers a just settlement of the Suez question any less important than settlement of the Gaza and Aqaba problems. Mr. Rountree said that the various principles which we think

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must be part of any reasonable and fair arrangement regarding Suez were still very much in our minds. We think the Six Principles should be embodied in any settlement.

Ambassador Eban noted that the President in his press conference had drawn a distinction between the Aqaba and Gaza problems and the Suez question as related to Israel. He assumed that our position with regard to belligerency was the same as that stated by Ambassador Lodge on March 1. Mr. Rountree noted that the Lodge remarks on belligerency concerned primarily Gaza and navigation through the Straits of Tiran. Ambassador Eban noted that Mrs. Meir, in her speech to the United Nations General Assembly on March 1, had quoted the President's February 20 remarks regarding Suez, which historically at least, indicated that we were just as concerned about Israel's rights in Suez as we were about her rights in Aqaba and Gaza. Israel hopes that in discussing the Suez problem with Egypt, the United States will point out the need to cease discrimination against ships bound to or from Israel. The United States should be explicit in this regard so that Egypt may not misinterpret the Six Principles, which do not specifically mention Israel. Ambassador Eban would like to be able to assure his Government that the United States supports the right of passage through Suez for all ships, irrespective of cargo or destination.

Mr. Rountree said he did not think there was any doubt that our position regarding the Six Principles had conveyed to the Egyptians our true attitude on Israel shipping. He could assure Ambassador Eban that the U.S. understands the Israel view regarding Suez, and that we have put forward our belief in the right of free navigation on numerous occasions. Ambassador Eban said that Israel wanted to be sure the Egyptians had no doubts as to what sort of solution would be satisfactory to the United States, and did not wish the Egyptians to think that the U.S. would be satisfied with a settlement which allowed restrictive practices against Israeli shipping to continue.

Ambassador Eban said that some powers had consulted Israel regarding its attitude toward a Security Council hearing of the Suez problem. Israel did not plan to take any initiative in this regard. It was his frank opinion that there was much to be gained and nothing to be lost by taking the matter up in the Security Council. He was unable to say whether the present time was suitable for such a move. He pointed out that the Security Council had discussed Suez in October and had approved the Six Principles and

that the

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that the United Nations had since taken further responsibility for Suez under the November 2nd resolution. He asked for our views. Mr. Rountree replied that we were unable to give him a definitive answer, since the whole question of Suez was the subject of active negotiations. Various possibilities exist. If we get no results from our present talks with the Egyptians, we may well decide that a Security Council hearing would be beneficial. Ambassador Eban noted that the Secretary General said that he was in favor of exhausting the present efforts with the Egyptians first. Mr. Rountree said that he strongly agreed with this, and that all possible efforts at direct negotiation should be exhausted before going to the Security Council.

Mr. Rountree said that in a telephone conversation on April 2, he had promised to inform Ambassador Eban when it would be fruitful to discuss technical and development assistance to Israel. He was now able to say that if Israel representatives would renew their discussions with ICA officials they would be able to reach some definite conclusions. Ambassador Eban said that he had recently talked to Mr. Waugh of the Export-Import Bank who said that the Bank intended to reconstitute its mission to go to Israel. Since the members of the Mission are now dispersed, it would probably not be possible to reassemble them until the latter half of May, at which time they would depart for Israel.

NEA:NE:RBParker:rej:mlb - 4/8/57

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CONFIDENTIAL Attachment  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE


EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

April 8, 1957

THE UNDER SECRETARY

Secretary's Call to Hammarskjold

There is attached for your information a record of the Secretary's April 6 telephone conversation with Hammarskjold.

  
Fisher Howe

CONFIDENTIAL Attachment

SATURDAY  
April 6, 1957  
c.11:00 a.m.

TELEPHONE CALL TO SECRETARY GENERAL HAMMARSKJOLD

After amenities, he indicated that he thought some inter-  
nationally binding character could be given to an Egyptian declaration  
filed with the UN, possibly for acceptance by nations with which  
Egypt has treaty relations. (This, the Secretary General thought  
might eliminate the Israeli problem which looms so large in Egyptian  
eyes.) I said it was a novel idea which I thought required a good  
deal of thought and that international obligations could be created  
merely by a unilateral act under Article 102. I thought this had to  
be carefully studied. Hammarskjold agreed.

We spoke of possible Security Council action about Suez. The  
Secretary General said he would deplore this at the present time.  
He thought that at last there had begun genuine negotiations between  
Egypt and the United States. That was a great step forward and we  
should surely exhaust those possibilities before going to the Security  
Council. I said that a situation might arise where either France  
and/or the UK would themselves go to the Security Council on lines  
that might not be constructive and where the United States itself  
might have to preempt the field perhaps itself going along what might  
be more constructive lines. The Secretary General recognized that this  
was a problem.

JFD:pdh

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#### Source Citation

Central File: Decimal File 674.84A, International Political Relations. Other International Relations., Political Relations Between Egypt And Palestine., March 8, 1957 - April 8, 1957. March 8, 1957 - April 8, 1957. MS Egypt: Records of the U.S. Department of State, 1853-1962: Records of the Department of State Relating to the Foreign Affairs of Egypt (Decimal Files 674 and 611), 1955-1959. National Archives (United States). Archives Unbound, [link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5111694270/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=640c5288&pg=1](https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5111694270/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=640c5288&pg=1). Accessed 20 Apr. 2022.

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